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Resisting Ethnic Cleansing: Crimean Tatars, Crimea, and the Soviet Union, 1941-1991

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by

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by

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"Resisting Ethnic Cleansing: Crimean Tatars Against and Within the Soviet Union, 1944-1991," examines Stalin's multifaceted ethnic cleansing of the Crimean Peninsula and how the region's largest ethnic group, Crimean Tatars, created a decades-long protest movement to resist each aspect of Stalin's policy. First, I argue that Stalin's deportation and exile of Crimean Tatars amounted to a bureaucratic genocide: a Soviet iteration on state violence that used inefficiency, irresponsibility, confusion, and loyalty to the system to destroy the national and class "enemies" of the Soviet Union. Second, this study emphasizes how ethnic cleansing in Crimea was extraordinary in the way Soviet power transformed Crimea after the deportations. From 1944 to 1954, this transformation created a "new Russian Crimea" through policies of mass settlement, land redistribution, and renaming geographic locations and rewriting history. Third, having revealed the full extent Stalin's project, I explore how Crimean Tatars created the largest protest movement in the postwar Soviet Union. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Crimean Tatar activists and everyday citizens established contacts with Soviet dissidents and Western human rights activists to create a transnational protest movement. Through this network, a small, repressed nation demanded specific changes from what was one of the world's most complex state bureaucracies and framed their arguments within the international language of protest and human rights. They accomplished their main goal, and returned to Crimea as the Soviet Union collapsed. Overall, this project highlights how activists can incorporate the ideas and language of post-Nuremburg human rights into practical actions and how ordinary citizens can work simultaneously within and outside of a system to resist a repressive police state.

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Introduction

Resisting ethnic cleansing in the Soviet Union was a difficult task. In April of 1974, Crimean police denied Halich Diliara residency registration in Crimea. Diliara was a Soviet citizen, a "mother-hero," and a Crimean Tatar. Crimean authorities violated her rights for the lone reason that she was Crimean Tatar. Without registering her internal passport, she could not legally own her house or work, and Crimean officials "banned" her children from school. Crimean police deported her and thousands of other Crimean Tatars from Crimea in the 1960s and 1970s.[1] Per Leninist internationalism and the Soviet brotherhood of nations, Crimean Tatars or any Soviet minority should never have had to fight ethnic discrimination. However, Joseph Stalin gave Crimean Tatars no choice. From 1944 to 1953, the Soviet Union committed one of the most extreme examples of ethnic cleansing of the twentieth century.[2] This study reveals the full extent of Stalin's ethnic cleansing in Crimea, and how Crimean Tatars resisted this ethnic cleansing from 1944 to 1991. By doing so, this is the first work to detail how Soviet ethnic cleansing under Stalin's regime translated into systemic ethnic discrimination in the post-Stalin Soviet Union. This study also argues that during World War II Stalin divided Soviet nationalities into two groups, those that retained their place in Soviet

[1] Halich Enanovna Dilyara, letter to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, ca. 1976, Radio Free Europe-Russian Language Broadcast Archive: Azeri Language Service (hereafter RFE-RLBA: ALS), box 270, folder 2, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, CA (hereafter HIA).

[2] While small in scale, the scope of the ethnic cleansing was astonishing. As chapter 2 discuses, within a week, the Soviet Union removed all Crimean Tatars remaining in Crimea (around 180,000 people). However, what really distinguishes the Crimean example from other Soviet example are the long-term policies to maintain the demographic annihilation of non-Slavs on the peninsula and create an ethnic homeland for Russians as discussed in chapters 3 and 4.

republics and autonomous regions, and those that Stalin intentionally sought to destroy. In fact, by 1944 the only radical or revolutionary aspect of Soviet nationalities policy concerning Crimean Tatars and Crimea was the Soviet capacity and willingness to commit ethnic cleansing and its own version of genocide.

Stalin justified Crimean ethnic cleansing in the short-term by forcing some Crimean partisans to lie about World War II. Together, they fabricated a charge of mass treason against Crimean Tatars. Activists easily disproved and the Soviet government later denounced these allegations, but the myth has endured among some Russian nationalists.[3] Instead of "mass-treason," many Crimean Tatars undertook "mass" service in the Soviet armed forces during World War II.[4] In reality, Stalin acted on the geopolitical impulses of creating ethnic homogeny in strategic regions. His lieutenants understood the lie and geopolitical rationale, and supported policies that were anathema to official Marxism-Leninism and the policies of "affirmative action" for Soviet minorities.[5] As the next sections explains, the totality of Stalin's plan to expel minorities and transform Crimea was an intense variant of Soviet ethnic cleansing, and the intentional mass-death of Crimean Tatars is best described as a "bureaucratic genocide" that was part of the larger ethnic cleansing process.

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[3] Lying about wartime treason to justify genocide and ethnic cleansing is not unique to Stalin. For example, Ronald Suny argues that the Young Turks and Turkish state implemented the Armenian genocide and controlled information about the atrocities with "deliberate, sustained falsification" of facts and general narrative surrounding the event. This included lying about "Armenian treachery" during the First World War: see Ronald Grigor Suny, *They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else: A History of the Armenian Genocide* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), xvii, xix.

[4] Chapter 1 argues that around 40,000 Crimean Tatars served in combat and around 20,000 more worked in Soviet industry during the war. In comparison, evidence suggests that no more than around 6,000 Crimean Tatars fought for Nazi units or volunteered with the occupation authorities. This was in spite of Nazi plans for a much more robust collaboration numbers.

[5] As discussed below, this study concurs with Terry Martin's argument about Soviet nationalities policy. Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), 2.

Meanwhile in Crimea, Soviet authorities created a "new Russian Crimea" through policies of mass settlement and land redistribution.[6] Crimean administrators redistributed land and homes and renamed Tatar villages after Lenin, Marx and ordinary Russian words such as "Sunny." To repopulate the peninsula, Stalin forced over a hundred thousand Slavic farmers to move to Crimea. While this repopulation included both ethnic Ukrainians and Russians, around three-fourths of the new settlers were Russian and the Crimean government and party expected and encouraged the Russification of all new Crimeans. Moreover, Stalin ordered Soviet historians to engineer a new historical narrative for Crimea that justified policies antithetical to Leninist internationalism. This "new Crimean narrative" argued that all non-Slavs were occupiers of Crimea and that their deportation was liberating Slavic populations. In short, the Soviet state created an "alternate Russia" that championed a chauvinist and imperialistic strain of Russian nationalism in an official capacity that was not possible in central Russian regions from 1917 to 1991.[7]

As the transformation of Crimea neared completion, Stalin died. Khrushchev then "gifted" Crimea to the Ukraine SSR. However, this transfer did not originate with Khrushchev. Stalin realized that Crimean economic growth and stability required water and electricity. As early as 1947, he began placing Ukrainian enterprises in charge of Crimean infrastructure because it was the most expedient and geographically logical way

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[6] Chapters 3 and 4 reveal that a "New Russian Crimea" was the actual title of the Crimean transformation project that Stalin ordered and forced the Crimean communist party and government to adopt in November 1944. Moreover, as the rest of this study underlines, no order from Moscow, even after Crimea became an oblast of the Ukraine SSR, ever rescinded this stated goal of creating and maintaining a unique Russian identity in Crimea.

[7] Nicholas B. Breyfogle coined the term "alternate Russias" to refer to the recreation of Russian social, cultural and economic systems on the new territory of the Russian Empire in the Caucasus and elsewhere. While Stalin's Crimean resettlement did not include overt religion, the social and cultural transformation of Crimea was quite similar: see Nicholas B. Breyfogle, *Heretics and Colonizers: Forging Russia's Empire in the South Caucasus* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 311-313.

to ensure these resources. Khrushchev merely finished the transfer that Stalin began. The fact that the "new Russian Crimea" and the Russification of the peninsula seemed to contradict the 1954 transfer mattered little to Soviet leaders until the 1980s. In fact, they argued that a "Russian Crimea" within the Ukraine SSR was a positive example of Soviet nationalities policy extinguishing the reactionary strains of Russian and Ukrainian nationalism. In practice, this study underlines what many Ukrainian officials admitted in the 1980s: that the Russification of the peninsula was so complete during the postwar period that, Ukrainian-speaking settlers who relocated to the peninsula after 1954 continued to undergo Russification.[8]

Despite the extensive program of ethnic cleansing and the resulting bureaucratic genocide, Crimean Tatar resistance and resilience ensured that Stalin's policies were not a complete success. One irony of Stalin's policy was that, because Crimean Tatars were not actually guilty of mass treason, the Soviet state allowed many Crimean Tatars to remain party members and even began assigning them to party and managerial posts in exile as early as 1944. Beginning in late-1944, some Crimean Tatar elite protested Moscow's policy as mass death consumed the small nation. What began as individual acts of defiance and survival morphed into the most coordinated, and longest lasting, protest movement in the postwar Soviet Union. For four decades, a small and devastated minority challenged Soviet policy on both the domestic and international stage. Crimean Tatars overcame small numbers and exile with a stubborn sense of purpose that baffled

[8] As Yaroslav Hrytsak argues, Khrushchev and Brezhnev believed that Ukraine was the "younger brother" to Russians in administering the Soviet Union. As such, overseeing Crimean resources and economics was a reasonable role for the Ukraine SSR and should not undermine the autonomy of Russian speakers on the peninsula. Besides, the Ukraine SSR already included large Russian-speaking populations such as the Donbas. Yaroslav Hrytsak, "The Postcolonial Is Not Enough," *Slavic Review* (Vol. 74: 4, Winter 2015), 732-737.

and impressed Soviet authorities. They embraced non-violent methods. They argued with, not against, Leninist internationalism and demanded political representation in Crimea.[9] They did not condemn the postwar Soviet state, but demanded access to the welfare state in their homeland.[10] When reforms stalled, activists criticized the post-Stalin leadership, from Nikita Khrushchev to Mikhail Gorbachev. When Crimean police violated their rights or Soviet historians called them "traitors," activists sent detailed reports to both the Soviet government and international observers. On two separate occasions during Leonid Brezhev's rule, Crimean Tatars forced the "stagnant" state to respond to popular activism with unprecedented reforms and repressions. While during the 1960s and 1970s the Crimean Tatar nation did not succeed in returning to Crimea en masse, tens of thousands of Crimean Tatars attempted to return and thousands succeeded, creating a series of crises in one of the Soviet Union most strategic and cherished regions. In other words, Crimean Tatars never accepted the end of "de-Stalinization" and they perfected, as best they could in the circumstances, resistance and protest in the Soviet Union.

Crimean Tatars compared their situation to other instances of ethnic cleansing, genocide, and ethnic and racial discrimination across the globe. This rhetoric was a deliberate attempt to embarrass the Soviet Union into reversing one of the crimes that de-Stalinization had failed to undo. Crimean Tatars were not just conversing with

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[9] The Crimean Tatar method of engaging Leninist self-determination to argue for national rights is strikingly similar to Armenian nationalists arguing for the return of Armenian lands in Turkey and the recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Maike Lehmann, "Apricot Socialism: The National Past, the Soviet Project, and the Imagining of Community in Late Soviet Armenia." *Slavic Review* (Vol. 74:1, Spring 2015), 9-31.

[10] As Sheila Fitzpatrick argues, "welfare-state paternalism" became an expectation of Soviet citizens in the postwar period, and they already "perceived" the state obligation before the war, despite near-constant economic turmoil and human misery: see Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism- Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 226.

themselves and the Soviet state, but their situation and energy attracted support from Moscow-based Soviet dissidents. At times in the 1960s and 1970s, the work of Slavic dissidents and Crimean Tatar activists was intimately interconnected and the Soviet police state attacked their efforts. Through this cooperation, international human rights activists from Moscow's Cold War adversaries also interacted with this durable protest movement. While involved to varying degrees, each of the above groups did not just support Crimean Tatars, but also learned from them. Crimean Tatars pioneered the language of international human rights by recalibrating Leninist self-determination for use by ethnic minorities in the empire Lenin founded. After the Holocaust, they were one of the first ethnic groups to hold a state besides Nazi Germany accountable for having violated Article II of the United Nations Convention on Genocide.[11]

When Mikhail Gorbachev began his economic and political reforms in 1986, Crimean Tatars activated the full force of their national network. From Tashkent to Moscow to Simferopol, lifelong activists and everyday Crimean Tatars pressured the Soviet state to acquiesce to their mass return to Crimea. When Gorbachev waffled or the bureaucracy stalled, Crimean Tatars persisted. With thousands of Crimean Tatars returning to Crimea on their own and thousands more protesting, beginning in July 1990 the Soviet Union attempted to reverse-engineer ethnic cleansing in Crimea. One of the most radical political projects during an era of unprecedented Soviet reform, Soviet of Ministries Order 666 was a repudiation of Stalin's 1944 deportation of Crimean

[11] In particular, this study highlights that Crimean Tatars, Soviet dissidents and international human rights activists argued that the Soviet Union violated Article II, Section C, which forbids a state from "Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part": see "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide," Treaty by the United Nations General Assembly (New York: December 9, 1948), 278-280. Available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%2078/volume-78-i-1021-english.pdf. Accessed on August 6, 2017.

minorities and an acknowledgment that Crimea's largest indigenous population, Crimean Tatars, had the right to return to Crimea en masse. However, Order 666 created a political crisis in Crimea because the Soviet Union did not have the power or assets to implement many of the practical structural and political parts of the return plan. There was immense opposition to Crimean Tatar return by Crimean authorities and many Slavic Crimeans, and the plan caused deep resentment towards Gorbachev and reform in Crimea. Although the plan had insurmountable problems and collapsed with the Soviet state in 1991, the policy shift meant Crimean authorities had lost the support of Moscow in discriminating against Crimean Tatars.

Desperate to undermine Crimean Tatar political, housing, and economic demands, Crimean leaders reinvigorated the anti-Tatar Russian nationalism of the new Crimean narrative. They reacted to liberalizing state control by indulging in anti-Tatar discrimination, and encouraging Crimean residents to follow their lead.[12] In 1991, Crimean authorities held a referendum that ensured Crimean Tatars could not recreate the Crimean ASSR's power-sharing dynamic. They recreated the Crimean ASSR without meaningful Crimean Tatar participation. As a result, after the Soviet collapse Crimea became a strategic region where one state (Ukraine) controlled land with a majority population that believed themselves to be connected to another state (Russia). At the same time, a long-exiled indigenous population continued to return, but remained disenfranchised. This outcome created political conflicts between Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars after the 1991 Soviet collapse and shaped the events of 2014.

[12] This trajectory towards "overt" discrimination is in contrast to the racial dialogue in the United States with the advent of "dog whistle" attacks on the welfare state and federal law that developed during late Cold War period: see Sean P. Cunningham, *Cowboy Conservatism: Texas and the Rise of the Modern Right* (Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 2010), 124-126.

Defining Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide in the Crimean Context

On March 17, 2014, the overwhelming majority of Crimeans voted to leave Ukraine and join the Russian Federation. Most international observers noted that the 2014 referendum, no matter how coerced, was fair in the sense that the majority of Crimean residents considered themselves Russian.[13] This study does not dispute that sentiment. However, the referendum results were the product of ethnic cleansing. The political, economic, and demographic results of Stalin's ethnic cleansing policies destroyed the role that Crimean Tatars had had in the governance of Crimea during both Tsarist colonization and the Crimean ASSR until World War II. As such, this study explores how a landmass that Crimean Tatars, Lenin and many Bolsheviks considered to be the Crimean Tatar homeland in 1922 is today a primarily Russian-speaking region with a majority population that considers Crimean Tatar autonomy to be a threat to their Russian identity.

Most historians employ the definition of "ethnic cleansing" that emerged after the Yugoslavian civil wars during the 1990s. Terry Martin describes the crime as "the forcible removal of an ethnically defined population from a given territory."[14] As Martin argues, the same nation and state building policies that created Soviet ethnic "affirmative action" (as explained in the next section) eventually, in "certain conditions," led to ethnic cleansing. The certain condition in the case of Crimea was Stalin's fear of ethnic

[13] The official result was 96.77 percent of residents voted to join the Russian Federation with 83.1 percent of eligible voters casting ballots. The majority of Crimean Tatars refused to participate in protest: see Will Englund, Carol Morello, and Griff Witte, "Crimea's parliament votes to join Russia," *The Washington Post*, March 17, 2014. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/crimeas-parliament-votes-to-join-russia/2014/03/17/5c3b96ca-adba-11e3-9627-c65021d6d572_story.html?utm_term=.3cefd181b698. Accessed on July 20, 2017.

[14] Terry Martin, "The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing," *The Journal of Modern History* (Vol. 70:4 December 1998), 813-861 (here 822).

diversity in a strategic region. This fear led him to abandon Soviet nationalities policies in certain regions and engage in ethnic cleansing. This "xenophobic wave" of repressing ethnic "fifth columns," as Jeffry Burds argues, began in 1938 and peaked with the wartime deportations along the Soviet periphery.[15]

Overall, this study agrees that the defining characteristic of ethnic cleansing is mass expulsion. However, even inside the Soviet Union no two instances of ethnic cleansing were the same. The importance of Crimea to Soviet security and culture made the scope and permanence of this ethnic cleansing greater than in the other regions that Stalin ethnically cleansed. So extreme in fact, that the common definition of "ethnic cleansing" does not encompass much of Stalin's Crimea policy. The events concerning Crimean Tatars and Crimea from 1944 to 1991 underline that a state that desires to maintain the results of ethnic cleansing has to rely on more than just state repression. Soviet authorities also had to enact long-term land, economic, language, resettlement, and ideological policies to complete and sustain the ethnic transformation of Crimea. For Crimean authorities in the postwar period, these polices were essential in sustaining the changes of ethnic cleansing and undermining the ability of Crimean Tatars to reverse ethnic cleansing during the postwar period and beyond. For Crimean Tatars, these policies became specific targets of their protest.

Determining the intentionality of the mass death that resulted from Soviet ethnic cleansing is frustrating for historians because, although the Soviet call to murder was

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[15] Martin, Naimark and numerous other scholars agree that the war led to a dramatic "escalation" in ethnic cleansing. Outside of Crimea, deportations included Kurds, Volga Germans, Meshketian Turks, Chechens, Ingushetians, Kalmyks, Balkars, Iranians, and smaller groups: see Jeffry Burds, "The War against 'Fifth Columnists': The Case of Chechnya, 1942-1944," *Journal of Contemporary History* (Vol 42:2, 2007),16; Martin, "The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing," 820; Norman M. Naimark, *Stalin's Genocides*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 1-14.

never "overt," the Soviet system ensured that much of the mass death was "intentional." Martin considers Soviet ethnic cleansing to be "genocidal," while Norman Naimark has recently argued that Stalin did commit "genocide," especially against class enemies. However, as Naimark concedes and scholars of the Holocaust argue, taking the term beyond Hitler's ideologically driven extermination of the Jewish people is fraught with downplaying the unique terribleness of Hitler's "Final Solution."[16]

Keeping this issue in mind, this study proposes the term "bureaucratic genocide" to describe the intentional killing of a large portion of Crimean Tatars from May 1944 until late 1946. Bureaucratic genocide was a Soviet iteration on state violence that used inefficiency, irresponsibility, confusion, and loyalty to the system to destroy the national and class "enemies" of the Soviet Union. The logistics and mechanics of bureaucratic genocide created mass death by refusing citizens food, water, housing, and medical treatment, killing over 40,000 Crimean Tatars. This term separates the intentional mass death of Crimean Tatars from the most extreme example of genocide, the Holocaust, while also distinguishing the severity of the crime from the other instances of forced migration that the Russian imperial government and Soviet Union instigated on several occasions.[17] This variation on "genocide" also supports Bartov's assertion that Soviet "bureaucratic callousness (and inefficiency)" was a key trait that distinguished Stalin's

[16] Holocaust scholar Omar Bartov argues convincingly that, despite commonalities in mass atrocities that Hitler and Stalin committed, the ideological goals of the Holocaust made Hitler's crimes different. At the same time, Bartov admits that the practice of genocide neither began nor ended with the Holocaust, even if it was the single event that created the term and global discussion of such crimes: see Omer Bartov, *Murder in our Midst: The Holocaust, Industrial Killing, and Representation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 53; Naimark, *Stalin's Genocides*, 1-3; Martin, "The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing," 819-822.

[17] As chapter 2 outlines, the hope is that "bureaucratic genocide" most accurately places the mass death of Crimean Tatars in Central Asia on the "continuum between genocide on the one end and nonviolent pressured ethnic emigration on the other end." Martin, "The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing," 819-822.

crimes from Hitler's more extreme assault on the Jewish people.[18] Moreover, by defining the bureaucratic genocide of Crimean Tatars as just one part of Stalin's larger ethnic cleansing program, this study identifies the specific actors and circumstances that led a forced deportation to end in mass death.[19] Finally, distinguishing between the crimes of ethnic cleansing and genocide underlines which crime Crimean Tatars could attempt to reverse (ethnic cleansing) and which they could not (genocide).

A Break from Leninist Nationalities Policies

In *Empire of Nations*, Francine Hirsch rejects the Cold War-era "Totalitarian" school in Western Academia that, in the words of Richard Pipes, portrayed the Soviet Union as "a prison of peoples" that, from the top down, repressed Soviet nationalities. Hirsch argues that state-sponsored "evolution," based on Marxist ideas of modernity, actually consolidated and created nationalities with the participation of Soviet ethnic groups and Soviet ethnographers.[20] Hirsch also asserts that Lenin created this policy based on his belief in national self-determination and the Bolshevik need to create a powerful state to propel a transition to communism and world revolution. Martin characterizes the same system as ethnic "affirmative action" that guaranteed non-Russians political and party positions in their respective republics, with the intention of

[18] Bartov does not believe that Soviet mass death was "industrial" in the sense that, in Hitler's death and concentration camps, extermination was the one singular goal. As chapter 3 and 5 of this study argue, while the bureaucratic genocide of Crimean Tatars was intentional, Stalin never intended or expected that every single individual from any deported group would die. Bartov, *Murder in our Midst*, 193.
[19] Ibid., 4.
[20] Historians such as Richard Pipes and Robert Conquest became part of the "Totalitarian School" during the Cold War that viewed the Soviet Union as a state with nearly total "top-down" control of policy and implementation. Hirsch, *Empire of Nations*, 5-12. For an example of the "Totalitarian School" see Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).

controlling the massive state while avoiding the "danger" of being "labeled" an empire.[21] While this study agrees that Lenin intended to create a path to communism, the Crimean case reveals that, by the late-1930's Stalin no longer depended on revolutionary ideas to create nationalities policy. Instead, he believed that ethnic quotas in Crimea and elsewhere were a threat to Soviet stability. Moreover, this study argues that historians cannot completely disregard Stalin's desire and will to "break nations." In fact, Stalin's ethnic cleansing of Crimean Tatars and other Soviet nationalities during World War II represents Stalin's partial rejection of Leninist "self-determination" in favor of empire building and a permanent fracture in Soviet nationalities policy and governance in peripheral regions.

Bolshevik ideas on the role of nationality in communist revolution emerged from a combination of imperialist and revolutionary ideas. As a result, Lenin and the Bolsheviks never resolved an inherent contradiction between promoting self-determination while managing an empire. As Hirsch argues, on the one hand Lenin and the Bolsheviks hired imperialist ethnographers to clarify national and ethnic identities.[22] They sought to restructure the postcolonial world through the doctrine of "nationalist in form, socialist in content."[23] Moreover, Lenin believed that the Soviet state should counter "Great Russian Chauvinism" with a socialist state that privileged the autonomy of non-Russian nationalities. On the other hand, the Bolsheviks also believed that national groups had to evolve through a "Marxist concept of development through

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[21] Overall, Martin portrays these policies as pragmatic imperial governance, even quipping that, had he lived longer, Lenin would have referred to the Soviet Union as "the highest stage of imperialism." Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire,* 19-20.

[22] Francine Hirsch, *Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), 1-2., 53.

[23] Paul Stronski, *Tashkent: Forging a Soviet City 1930-1960* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 2010), 242-243.

historical stages." Lenin believed that this Soviet "civilizing mission" would help create communism.[24] Thus, despite national self-determination, all Soviet individuals had to "speak Bolshevik" and organize their lives based the Marxist norms that private property was always exploitative and authoritarianism was justified for a workers' state.[25] These ideas of "self-determination" and forced "development" were contradictory, but Bolsheviks reconciled themselves to the belief that their empire was ultimately anti-imperial and a vanguard of world revolution.[26] The resulting policy that Lenin and the Bolsheviks created in the early 1920s was "*korenizatsiia,"* a Soviet-wide policy that promoted ethno-national "affirmative action" for over 170 different nationalities.[27] As Slezkine argues, this policy created a Soviet "communal apartment" where every nationality was afforded its own space.[28] As the next section discusses, ethnic groups such as Crimean Tatars received different degrees of cultural and political autonomy within Soviet republics or autonomous republics within the larger Soviet republics.

Tensions resulting from the contradiction between ethnic "self-determination" and state control/forced modernization were evident even before Lenin's death. For example, as early as 1919 Nikolai Bukharin and Grigorii Piatikov had argued that granting national self-determination to "buffer republics" could undermine Soviet geopolitical stability and anger ethnic Russians.[29] At the time, Stalin was in charge of implementing the nationalities policy and was Lenin's staunchest defender on the subject. However, the arguments of Bukharin and Piatikov mirrored the geopolitical calculations that drove

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24 Hirsch, *Empire of Nations,* 1-2, 5-7, 53.
25 Stephen Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 220-221.
26 Hirsch, *Empire of Nations*, 5-7.
27 Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire*, 2; Hirsch, *Empire of Nations,* 1-2.
28 Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment," 420.
29 Ibid.

Stalin to ethnically cleanse "buffer regions" two decades later. Moreover, Martin has revealed that Stalin agreed with Bukharin on the substance of his claim that ethnic Russians could perceive *korenizatsiia* as discrimination.[30] Furthermore, while the Bolsheviks jettisoned many of the imperial tools of Tsarist Russia, such as religious bureaucracy and most market trade relations, Lenin embraced and strengthened other controls. For example, the forced requisition of grain, livestock, and property during collectivization replaced the Russian imperial tribute (*iasak*) and often undermined the political, economic, geographic, and cultural "autonomy" of Soviet nationalities. As the Bolsheviks enforced these policies, the Cheka-GPU-NKVD-KGB police state eclipsed the authoritarian, but limited, policing of the Tsarist Okhrana and orchestrated mass terror and systematic repressions. This Soviet police state created an internal passport and registration (*propiska*) system that eventually restricted all Soviet citizens.[31] As this study underlines, "passportization" would become a key method in implementing and preserving Crimean ethnic cleansing.

After Lenin's death in 1924 and Stalin's consolidation of power, there was not an immediate change in Soviet nationalities policy. However, the increase in state repressions during collectivization and industrialization foreshadowed Stalin's willingness (as well as the Soviet state's ability) to violently restructure the Soviet population to meet economic and ideological goals, all with the hope of overtaking the

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[30] Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*, 17.

[31] Although Soviet internal registration was similar to "passportization" in other states, experts on Stalinist policing such as Paul Hagenloh, Sven Simonsen, and David Shearer argue that the Soviet use of residency restrictions as an instrument for expanding the "Terror," isolating the victims, and the level of everyday control the state had over citizens was unprecedented: see Paul Hagenloh. *Stalin's Police: Public Order and Mass Repression in the USSR*, 1926 -1941 (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009), 14; David R. Shearer, *Policing Stalin's Socialism: Repression and Social Order in the Soviet Union, 1924-1953* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 11; Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "Between Minority Rights and Civil Liberties: Russia's Discourse Over "Nationality" *Registration and the Internal Passport, Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 33, No. 2, June 2005; Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*, 5.

capitalist West with a "revolution from above."[32] These Stalinist policies of forcibly reshaping society, economy and demographics were extreme examples of the "trans-European" story of population manipulation that nationalist, revolutionary, and liberal-democratic regimes pursued during the twentieth century.[33]

As collectivization stalled and the fascist threat increased, Stalin began attacking peripheral nationalities. Most importantly, as chapter 1 argues, Stalin grew increasingly uncomfortable with this ethnic "affirmative action," especially in strategic and peripheral regions such as Crimea and the Caucuses. At the same time, denouncing Lenin's nationalities policy was never an option during peacetime, even during the height of the "great terror." After all, at the time Stalin based his legitimacy on the legacy and policies of Lenin, all of which he had an essential role in creating and implementing. However, World War II gave Stalin an opportunity to "break" certain Soviet nations that he believed were a threat to Soviet geopolitics. The following chapters describe how Stalin abandoned the Soviet nationalities policy based on Marxism-Leninism and created a project to ethnically cleanse Crimea. Stalin based the project on an ideology steeped in nostalgia for Russian imperialism, a nostalgia that Stalin promoted throughout the war to rally support from the Soviet Union's majority Russian population. As chapter 4 will display, this imperial turn in Crimea was so extensive that even Marxist academics from Moscow failed to restore the position of Leninism-Marxism in Crimean historical literature and politics in the decades after the war.

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[32] Naimark, *Stalin's Genocides*, 1-14.

[33] Peter Holoquist, "To Count, to Extract, and to Exterminate: Population Statistics and Population Politics in Late Imperial and Soviet Russia," in Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 111-144.

Hirsch characterizes the post-Stalin Soviet nationalities policy as undergoing a "contraction and assimilation" as some smaller nationalities were removed from official nationalities lists and underwent various degrees of Russification, along with the development of a Soviet identity based largely on the triumph of the Second World War.[34] This study, while focusing on Crimean Tatars, suggests a new concept for postwar Soviet nationalities policy. There were two separate, but simultaneous trajectories for Soviet nationalities after the Second World War. The first trajectory is the one Hirsch describes. Despite some conflicts with Moscow over nationalist ideology and local control, the large nations such as Uzbeks, Volga Tatars and Ukrainians kept their Soviet republics or autonomous regions for the rest of Soviet history. When Mikhail Gorbachev began Glasnost and Perestroika in the late 1980s, these nations asserted political and social authority to create either independent nations or sign treaties with the new Russian Federation to retain some local economic and political control.

Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Meshketian Turks, Kalmyks, Volga Germans, and other small nationalities represent the second trajectory. These were the nations that Stalin "broke," and housed in the "prisons" of the Far East Soviet Union and Central Asia. The postwar experience of these nations, to say the least, was much different. Instead of continuing the Soviet experiment in their republics, they found themselves victims of ethnic cleansing, bureaucratic genocide and extreme assimilation policies that Stalin hoped would extinguish the national identity of the survivors. Moreover, the post-

[34] Hirsch acknowledges that Stalin eliminated nationalities such as Crimean Tatars and Chechens. However, she does not appear to believe that this ethnic cleansing seriously challenged the underlying ideological logic to Soviet nationalities policy (Hirsch also does not identify these policies as ethnic cleansing, while Martin does). I argue that this ethnic cleansing and the willingness of the Soviet state to endorse these methods undermines the idea that during and after World War II Lenin's ideas on Soviet nationalities mattered more than pragmatic concerns of sustaining the Soviet empire. The desire for stability, not building a road to Communism, drove Soviet nationalities policy concerning Crimea. Hirsch, *Empire of Nations*, 319-315; Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire,* 342.

Stalin story for each these nationalities is diverse because Khrushchev's thaw allowed some groups such as Chechens and Kalmyks to return to their regions while forbidding the return of other groups. Of the groups that Moscow denied the right to return, Crimean Tatars were the largest and most important. Regardless of returning or remaining in exile, the groups from this second trajectory spent the rest of Soviet history attempting to rebuild cultural and social institutions that the Soviet state had helped create, then destroyed. While just a small fraction of the total Soviet population and ethnic groups, these nations' experience was an indicator that the belief of Soviet leaders in Leninism as a guide to nationalities policy never fully recovered after the death of Stalin.

For Crimean Tatars, Russians, Ukrainians and others in Crimea, the implosion of Soviet nationalities politics had many deep contradictions. Stalin ordered Crimean officials, academics and others to create a "new Russian Crimea," but at the same time began the process to transfer Crimea from the Russian republic to the Ukraine SSR. Especially after Stalin's death, the Soviet Union showcased the Crimean tourist and health industry as the fruits of inter-ethic harmony and socialist progress. Despite such obvious contradictions, the depth of transformation in terms of demographics, language, land distribution, and historical memory created a population, government and communist party that believed in the past, present and future "Russianess" of the Crimean peninsula.[35] Ironically, this policy was one of the very "great power chauvinism," that

[35] Martin argues there was a turn in the mid-1930s in Soviet nationalities policy that focused more on the "primordial" origins of nations, while Hirsch argues that Soviet nationalities policy continued to build on modern concepts around Soviet industry, brotherhood and progress towards communism. This study argues that, in the case of Crimea, Stalin and Crimean officials did undertake an experiment in using "Russian" and "Slavic" primordial claims to create a uniquely Russian space in Crimea. Moreover, the claims that non-Slavic Crimean minorities were occupying the peninsula also consisted of historical claims going back two millennia. See Hirsch, *Empire of Nations*, 8; Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*, 442.

Lenin and the Bolshevik party had denounced in the early years of the Soviet Union. Stalin intentionally created an awkward "room" for Russians in the Soviet "communal apartment." However, Stalin created this "room" of the communal apartment out of an imperialistic desire to stabilize the Soviet empire, and not, as Lenin had believed, to create a communist future. The pronouncements, literature and rhetoric of the new Crimean leadership more resembled the "imperial patriots and philosophical conservatives" of late-nineteenth century Russian Slavophiles than Soviet communists.[36] Crimean Tatars, Armenians, Greeks, Bulgars, and other smaller minorities no longer existed in Crimea. Ukrainians could remain, and the Soviet Union even forced tens of thousands to relocated to the peninsula from 1944 to 1991. However, even while part of the Ukraine SSR Crimean authorities made no room for a separate Ukrainian identity, and expected everyone to speak Russian despite the pronouncement of Slavic brotherhood.[37]

In the meantime, Crimean Tatars appropriated the ideals of Leninist nationalities policies for their own national identity and protest movement. After all, as the following section explains, the Soviet state had actually promoted the modern Crimean Tatar national identity that Stalin demolished in 1944. Crimean Tatars made the simple argument that their return to Crimea would be a return to Lenin's principles and end the

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[36] Laura Engelstein. *Slavophile Empire: Imperial Russia's Illiberal Path* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 10.

[37] Orest Subtel'ny asserts that Ukrainian officials after the transfer felt that Crimea, with postwar Russian-centric resettlement, actually deluded the Ukrainian ethnic dominance in the republic. Moreover, even when Kyiv suggested Ukrainization policies to Crimean authorities, the Crimean government and party rejected the idea outright. As Stephen Velychenko argues, in many ways Ukrainian nationalism in the post-Soviet period was a direct reaction to the scope and success of Russification in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea: see Stephen Velychenko, "The Issue of Russian Colonialism in Ukrainian Thought: Dependency Identity Development," *Ab Imperio* (no. 1, 2002), 323-367; Orest Subtel'ny, *Ukraine: A History* (4th edition) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 499-501.

hypocrisy of the anti-imperial Soviet project having committed ethnic cleansing and promoted nostalgia for Russian imperialism.

Crimean Historical Background, Crimean Tatar Nationalism, and Islam

Crimean Tatar activists deliberately excluded Islam and religious symbolism from their resistance movement after the end of special settlement in 1956. Instead, Crimean Tatars politicized Leninist self-determination and human rights because they believed a secular political platform was the most practical public position for a repressed Muslim people seeking political rehabilitation in the post-Stalin Soviet Union. In fact, their ability to divide political action from religious faith was a vital tenet to Crimean Tatar resistance.[38] In the words of anthropologist Greta Uehling, this was how Crimean Tatar activists and everyday Crimean Tatars "spoke to the state."[39] Overall, during the Soviet period Islam became part of Crimean Tatar "ethno-national" identity. Many Crimean Tatars did not abandon private religious belief, but the radical transformation of the Crimean Tatar nation during the first-half of the twentieth century moved religion from the public to private sphere. This transformation aligns the arguments of Adeeb Khalid, Ali Igmen, Douglas Northrop, Elizabeth Constantine and other scholars that Islam in the Soviet context can be understood only by exploring how Soviet rule interacted with

[38] Scholar and supporter of the Crimean Tatar return movement, Peter Reddaway, argued that Crimean Tatar activists had a strict understanding that they were arguing for the "correct nationality policy of Lenin" and that their political statements would "eschew references to our (Crimean Tatar) Islamic faith, even though it is an important part of our (Crimean Tatar) national identity": see Peter Reddaway, "The Crimean Tatar Drive for Repatriation: Some Comparisons with other Movements of Dissent in the Soviet Union," in Allworth, *The Tatars of Crimea*, 230.

[39] Uehling describes "speaking to the state" as a political performance that critiques the Soviet government on its own terms, for example with the ideal of Leninist self-determination: see Greta Lynn Uehling, *Beyond Memory: The Crimean Tatars' Deportation and Return* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 150-153.

different Muslim peoples and regions.[40] The Crimean Tatar perspective originated from a unique combination of Crimean Tatar nationalism, Soviet atheism, the Soviet nationalities policies discussed above and the ethnic cleansing of Crimean Tatars.

Populations and territorial claims in Crimea and the Black Sea region have fluctuated for millennia. Before the Crimean Khanate, the Crimea and Black Sea had shifted between being the core and periphery of different empires.[41] After the Mongol Empire began to dissolve, Tatars ruled Crimea as part of the Golden Horde. As Bryan Williams notes, the blanket term Crimean Tatar inaccurately portrays the Tatars of Crimea who were a diverse collection of steppe and mountain Turkic peoples with a mixture of more ancient Crimean inhabitants.[42] Regardless, from the fourteenth-century on, the people who today indentify as Crimean Tatars united under the Crimean Khanate

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[40] Numerous studies of Soviet Muslims have confirmed the diversity of the Muslim experience in the USSR. For example, Ali Igmen's work on the Soviet transformation of the Kyrgyz SSR argues that, as a nomadic people with a "particularly unorthodox approach to Islam," the Soviet state and Kyrgyz party officials successfully merged "Soviet modernity and Kyrgyz tradition" into a new, Soviet Kyrgyz identity. As a result, while Igmen address the role of Islam in his study, he focuses on nomadic traditions and the creation of new heroes during the early Soviet era: see Ali Igmen, *Speaking Soviet with an Accent: Culture and Power in Kyrgyzstan* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012), 140-141. In contrast, Douglas Northrop underlines that in the Uzbek SSR the Soviet Union launched an extensive "unveiling" campaign that did not occur among nomadic Muslims or in Crimea. This campaign had the unintended consequence of making the veil a prominent symbol of Uzbek resistance to Soviet power. While Islam maintained a greater role in Uzbek society, Northrop also argues that a hybrid of Soviet modernity and Uzbek traditions left a permanent mark on Uzbek society and religious practice. Elizabeth Constantine supports Northrop's premise, and further argues that, while scholars should not promote nostalgia about the Soviet transformation for Uzbek women, they cannot "ignore how Soviet rule changed the lives of Uzbek women." Moreover, Constantine asserts that appreciation for the change of Soviet period is more widespread in rural Uzbek regions. This is in contrast to urban Uzbekistan where state support for the post-Soviet religious rebirth has been more vigorous as Uzbek elites promote conservative Islamic practices: see Douglas Northrop, *Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2004), 356-357 and Elizabeth A. Constantine "Consequences of Soviet Policy and Ideology for Gender in Central Asia and Contemporary Reversal" in Jeff Sahadeo and Russell Zanca eds., *Everyday Life in Central Asia: Past and Present* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2007), 122-123. Khalid is explicit in arguing that scholars cannot ignore that Soviet "history matters" in regards to how Soviet Muslims view Islam and practice their religion. Nevertheless, as Khalid argues, Islam became primarily a "key marker of ethnic identity and an aspect of national culture." Adeeb Khalid, *Islam After Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007), 2, 4-11, 84-85.

[41] Charles King, *The Black Sea: A History* (Oxford University Press, 2005), 9.

[42] For a detailed description of Crimean Tatar ethnogenesis, see Brian Glyn Williams, *The Crimean Tatars: From Soviet Genocide to Putin's Conquest* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 1-13.

with a capital at Bakchisarai, with the peninsula maintaining a diverse merchant population on the coast that had originated during Greek times. Similar to Kazan, the Crimean Khanate had a longstanding relationship with Moscovy that included trade, but was more antagonistic because of Tatar raids on Russian villages as part of the Black Sea slave trade, and the Khanate's periodic submission to Ottoman sovereignty. After numerous military clashes, in 1774 Catherine the Great invaded to deter Ottoman ambitions, and in 1783 she annexed Crimea.[43]

Russian imperial expansion in Crimea was an example of the empire governing "overlapping nomenclatures of social statuses and hierarchies of authority" on "an irregular map of human diversity and hegemony" as Kappeler argues.[44] The place of Crimea in the Russian Empire, and later the Soviet Union, is best thought of as an "assemblage point" of empire. As *Ab Imperio's* editors suggest, the Russian "imperial situation" in peripheral regions was highly flexible and changed at certain moments and "under certain circumstances, from certain building blocks."[45]

In Crimea, the strategic position of the peninsula, the fraught relationship between the Russian center and Crimean Tatars, and the orientalist obsession of Russian aristocrats and artists with the former Khanate defined the Crimean "assemblage point" within the Russian empire. The primary empire-building tools in the Crimean were military power (specifically the creation of the Black Sea Fleet headquarters at Sevastopol), state-initiated deportations, unforced migration, the steady flow of Russian and Ukrainian settlers to the Crimean coast, and limited Crimean Tatar assimilation into

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[43] Alan Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), xi-10.
[44] Kappeler, *The Russian Empire*, 6-8.
[45] *Ab Imperio*, "Ab Imperio 2014 Annual Theme," accessed online on January 2, 2014 at http://abimperio.blogspot.ru/2013/09/ab-imperio-2014-annual-theme.html.

the Russian imperial bureaucracy. Key to this control was Catherine's decision to place the Muslim population under the oversight of the Orenburg Mufti. This religious bureaucracy, along with the "*zemstvo*" reforms and "Tatar normal schools" created a new sense of social cohesion among Crimean Muslims and the new schools educated the first generation of Crimean Tatar intellectuals. At the same time, while many Crimean Tatars joined the Mufti's bureaucracy, the increase in Russian and Ukrainian peasants and land redistribution alarmed many Tatar leaders.[46]

As the Ottoman Empire waned, the competition for control over the Black Sea culminated in the Crimean War (1853-56), the long siege of Sevastopol, and the eventual defeat that embarrassed Nicholas I and encouraged his successor's modernization reforms.[47] The Crimean War also brought extensive forced and voluntary immigration of Crimean Tatars to Tatar communities in Istanbul and other Ottoman-controlled regions of present day Bulgaria and Romania.[48] In the wake of violence direct against Tatars during the Crimean War, young Tatar intellectuals began to question their place within the empire. In this environment, the Crimean Tatar Islamic intellectual Ismail Gasprinskii began the Jadid movement, a Muslim reformist and modernization movement. Jadids did not reject Russian rule, but resisted Russification and concluded that only a modernized and educated Tatar population could protect itself from coercion. This discussion also outlined the idea of a distinct Crimean Tatar nation. Similar to Kazan and Central Asian

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[46] The *zemstvo* were local government bodies that were part of Tsar Alexander II's liberalizing reforms in 1864. For more on this period see Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 98-100. On the Orenburg Mufti's role in Crimea, see Robert D. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 13, 15-16; Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 96-98.

[47] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), 170-177.

[48] At least 400,000 Crimean Tatars left Crimea during the Russian imperial period, although to what extent the immigration was forced or voluntary is still a matter of intense debate among scholar and Crimean Tatars. During the 1960s, many Crimean Tatar activists claimed that much of the immigration was forced and was part of a larger process of Russifying the peninsula. Uehling, *Beyond Memory*, 35.

Jadids, they decided that the Mufti and official Islam were roadblocks to reforms within the Muslim community.[49] Many Crimean Tatar Jadids led protests and formed their own branches of Muslim revolutionary committees during the Revolution of 1905. However, because of the strategic importance of the Crimea, the Tsar's Okhrana was much more active in repressing Crimean Jadids than the repressions in other regions.[50]

However, World War I and the Russian revolution provided an opening for Jadids and Crimean Tatar nationalists. During the revolutions of 1917, imperial "assemblage points" flexed their political muscles and had unique revolutionary narratives. In the case of Crimean Tatars, Jadid and early nationalists transformed Islamic practice during the revolutionary period and used the cover of war and chaos to destroy the Islamic establishment that had been part of the Russian imperial government. As Bryan Glynn-Williams describes, this process was almost an inter-Crimean Tatar civil war of sorts, and many Crimean Tatar nationalists viewed the old conservative religious order as tools of Russian repression. When Crimean Tatars formed their own autonomous governing body, the *Kulturai* (Congress) in mid-1917, reformers and nationalists under the leadership of Celebi Cihan defeated the "reactionary" Mullahs. Cihan formed the Crimean Tatar National Party (Milli Firka) and "declared that the new foundations for Crimean Tatar society would not be decided by the Islamic clergy."[51] In December 1918, Crimean Tatars even formed a short-lived republic before pressure from Bolsheviks and the White Army ended the experiment after a month. Afterwards, most surviving

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[49] Edward J. Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii (Gaspirali): The Discourse of Modernism and the Russians" in Edward A. Allworth, (ed.). *The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 60-66. See also, Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998).
[50] Fisher, *Crimean Tatars*, 100-115.
[51] Williams, *The Crimean Tatars*, 60-70.

Crimean Tatar nationalists and Jadids had to choose a side in the developing civil war, and allied with the Bolsheviks.[52]

As Lenin contemplated the Bolshevik stance on nationalities politics, he identified the secularist-nationalist surge among Crimean Tatars. In his "Proclamation to all the Muslims of Russia and the Orient" in 1917, he insisted that he would reward Crimean Tatar support of the Bolshevik revolution with the freedom to continue their "national and cultural institutions." Of course, Bolsheviks were referring to the *Kulturai*, and the organization's deliberate rejection of the old religious order. When Lenin created the Crimean ASSR in October 1921, Jadids and other Crimean Tatar revolutionaries became the direct beneficiaries of Soviet "*korenizatsia"* policy, and they formed the political core of the Crimean ASSR during its "golden years" from 1923 to 1928. This was a version of the "communal apartment" that Crimean Tatars, Russians, and smaller minorities shared, but the Crimean ASSR guaranteed Crimean Tatars political and party positions, a 36% share of Crimean ASSR Supreme Soviet seats, and cultural and linguistic autonomy. Moreover, the Soviet state recognized Crimean Tatars as a nation separate from Volga and other Tatars.[53] As Williams notes, Crimean Tatar nationalism had become quite popular among much of the Crimean Tatar population. This was especially true in rural areas where nationalists had gained popularity by demanding Crimean Tatar control of farmland. When the Bolsheviks began recruiting primarily rural Crimean Tatars into the Bolshevik party, the new Crimean Tatar party members brought this nationalist sentiment with them into the Crimean ASSR government and party. For many Bolsheviks in the early 1920s, this secular nationalism was the version

[52] Fisher, *Crimean Tatars*, 116-129; Williams, *The Crimean Tatars*, 85.
[53] Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 133-136; see also Williams, *The Crimean Tatars*, 92-97.

of Crimean Tatar identity that was most conducive to world revolution and socialist politics. In addition, the Soviet anti-religion campaigns eliminated the reformist Crimean Tatar Mullahs in the 1920s and 1930s, further secularizing Crimean Tatar society. Bolsheviks were purging Crimea of Islamic institutions and a faith that Crimean Tatars nationalists had already radically transformed. This created the uncomfortable paradox for Crimean Tatars that the "autonomy" and "national identity" that they sought to recreate in Crimea was partially the product of Soviet policy.[54]

Moreover, despite "autonomy," Crimean Tatars suffered substantially in the Crimean ASSR, beginning with the trial and execution of the Crimean Central Committee Chairman, Veli Ibrahimov, for "bourgeois nationalism" in May 1927. Similar to purges in other republics, "Veli Ibrahimovism" became the Crimean Tatar version of an "enemy of the state." Soviet authorities charged thousands of Crimean Tatar officials throughout the late 1920s and 1930s. Most Crimean peasants, regardless of ethnicity, experienced the loss of property and some faced arbitrary "dekulakization." Famine ravaged the area from 1932-33.[55] Despite the purges and frequent chaos, Crimean Tatars retained their political, economic and cultural position on the peninsula throughout collectivization and the "Terror." At the same time, as chapter 1 underlines, Stalin was already signaling a shift in nationalities policies for Crimean Tatars.

After the begging of World War II, the religious aspect of the mass treason charges during World War II, ethnic cleansing, and the Soviet refusal to allow Crimean Tatars to return to their homeland made their experience more complicated than that of

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[54] Williams, *The Crimean Tatars,* 60.

[55] To a degree, the charges of nationalism were not imaginary, as Ibrahimov and others had complained about the Soviet government relocating increasing numbers of non-Tatars to the peninsula as part of industrialization. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 138-141.

Central Asian Muslims and even other deported groups such as the Chechens who returned home in the late-1950s. As chapter 1 discusses, German occupation authorities promoted a renewal of Islam in Crimea in order to popularize collaboration with the Nazi regime. Since both Crimean Tatar nationalists and Soviet purges had decimated the Crimean Tatar Islamic leadership in the preceding decades, Nazi administrators relied on Muslim leaders from Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey to lead the "Muslim Committees." However, the Nazi collaboration plan failed in part because many Crimean Tatars viewed the conservative mullahs as an unwanted return to prerevolutionary governance through religious elites. Then, when the NKVD swept Crimea for Crimean Tatars that had collaborated with Nazis in April 1944, members of and participants in the Muslim Committees were a top arrest priority. As a result, both Crimean Tatar activists and everyday Crimean Tatars understood, regardless of their personal religious beliefs, that Soviet authorities equated public displays of Crimean Tatar Islamic belief with treason and Nazi collaboration.[56]

As the Crimean Tatar return movement began in the late 1950s, it was centered in the Uzbek SSR, where ethnic Uzbeks were still experiencing their own "secularized" and "nationalized" evolution of Islamic traditions.[57] Social mobility in exile depended on the ability of Crimean Tatars to "speak Bolshevik." Even when Islam did attain a more official role during the Cold War, Crimean Tatars were uninterested in participating in Soviet outreach efforts to the greater Muslim world.[58] The same is true of overtly Islamic

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[56] Gulnara Bekirova, *Krymskotatarskaia Problema v SSSR, 1944-1991* (Simferopol: Odzhak", 2004), 24.
[57] Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 141-149; Stronski, *Tashkent,* 191, 267.
[58] For example, there is no evidence of Crimean Tatars participating in the Islamic Muftiate that operated in Central Asia from the late-1950s until the Soviet collapse. On the Soviet acceptance of limited Islamic institutions in postwar Central Asia, see Eren Murat Tasar, *Soviet and Muslim: The Institutionalization of Islam in Central Asia, 1943-1991* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

dissent effort in the Soviet period. For example, when Volga Tatar and Bashkir nationalists began promoting a "pan-Turkic" movement in the 1970s that condemned the "suppression of religious practices," Crimean Tatars activists declined to participate.[59] As such, the main basis for Crimean Tatar national identity from 1944 until 1991 was the memory of autonomy and secular nationalism of the Crimean ASSR combined with the shared experience of war, ethnic cleansing and exile.

However, despite espousing secular nationalism and the taboo towards public displays of faith, many Crimean Tatar individuals and the national collective never abandoned their particular idea of Islamic identity. When Crimean Tatars fought for a return to their homeland and cultural and political autonomy, the desire to preserve Islamic traditions and identity was implied as one of the reasons that national self-determination was necessary. They cloaked Islamic practices in terms of Crimean Tatar cultural traditions, songs, the Crimean Tatar language and the teaching of Arabic script. This was true for the four decades of protest from the 1950s to the 1980s, and the accounts of Crimean Tatar activists in the post-Soviet period support this interpretation.[60]

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[59] Azade-Ayse Rorlich, *The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilience* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 172.

[60] For example, in her recollections of the protest movement, leading Crimean Tatar activist and historian Aishe Seitmuratova does not address explicitly address Islam even when writing in the post Soviet period: see Ayshe Seytmuratova (Aishe Seitmuratova), "The Elders of the New National Movement: Recollections," in Edward A. Allworth (ed.) *The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland* (Duke University Press: Durham, 1998), 155-179. Observers of the Crimean Tatar movement in the 1960s and 1970s also framed the movement in secular terms. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 199-201. Uehling's interviews also suggest that, while never discussed in public, some Crimean Tatars consulted Islamic law on how to conduct their protests. For example, in some interviews Crimean Tatars cited Islamic law for their beliefs about non-violence and discomfort towards self-immolations incidents in the late-1970s and their ultimate decision to consider self-immolation martyrdom for a "compelling cause." However, as Uehling reveals, some post-Soviet Crimean Tatar mullahs disagree with the Crimean Tatar movement's belief that self-immolation was defensible as martyrdom. Moreover, some Crimean Tatars have compared immolation participants to "Christ-like" actions rather than to Islamic ideas of martyrdom. This is the result of more spirited and open religious debate of such issues after 1991. Uehling, *Beyond Memory*, 175, 183, 192-193.

Finally, the 2014 Russian annexation of the peninsula has further complicated the role of Islam for Crimean Tatars and their historical memory. As this study underlines, anti-Tatar beliefs in Crimea transitioned from rhetoric of Crimean Tatars as "traitors" to the fear of the Tatar "other" in the 1970s, but still avoided direct insults towards Islam. However, the 2014 Russian annexation has introduced an anti-Islam dynamic to the current Russian repression of Crimean Tatar political enfranchisement and cultural expression. Pro-annexation authorities in Crimea began portraying the limited, but visible, renewal of Crimean Tatar Islamic faith after 1991 as evidence of "extremist" Islamic radicalization directly connected to global Jihadists such as the Islamic State (ISIS). Crimean police and "self-defense" units have raided mosques, confiscated religious materials, and recently incarcerated several Crimean Tatar religious leaders.[61] In the light of such charges, this study underlines the fact that, for forty years and under a much more repressive regime, Crimean Tatars maintained their political resistance as separate from their personal beliefs on religion. Islamic practice did, as with all religious practice across the former Soviet Union, reemerge from the underground after 1991. However, there is no evidence of religious extremism among Crimean Tatars. Any such action would be a radical departure from the post-deportation Crimean Tatar national identity and legacy of non-violent protest.

Sources and Structure

[61] The government of Vladimir Putin has pioneered the use of "laws against extremism" to undermine political opposition groups in the Russian Federation from a wide-range of political and religious backgrounds: see Madeline Roache, "Russian authorities imprisoning Crimean Tatars in psychiatric hospitals," *The Guardian*, March 28, 2017. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2017 /mar/28/russian-authorities-imprisoning-crimean-tatars-in-psychiatric-hospitals. Accessed on July 15, 2017.

In December 2013, I expected to begin archival research in Moscow before extended research trips to work in Crimean archives and conduct oral interviews in Crimea. This mix of archival documents with oral interviews was deliberate. The documents of the "Soviet elite" are important because, as J. Arch Getty and Oleg Naumov argue, despite the lies, Soviet government sources "tell us at a minimum" what Soviet officials "wanted others to think."[62] At the same time, research on global imperialism and colonialism has caused historians to read archival documents more critically, and supplement the documents with oral interviews and other sources. This methodology exposes how imperial centers have varying amounts of peripheral control, while the agency of subalterns and peripheral government officials also varies over time and geography.[63] In short, the original idea of this study was a critical conversation between the Soviet elite and Crimean Tatars.

However, by March 2014, I had cancelled my Crimean research as Russia occupied the peninsula and war erupted in Eastern Ukraine. When Russian security forces shuttered the Gasprinsky Library in Simferopol and several prominent Crimean Tatar scholars fled their homes, it was clear that the decision was the right course.[64] At the same time, in Moscow, I had the encouraging surprises of both excellent access to Soviet archives and the outstanding quality of documents. The recent digitization of the search aides for the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF) and the Russian State Archives of the Economy (RGAE) allowed a deep dive into dozens of archival

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[62] J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, *The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932-1939* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 27.
[63] Eric Tagliacozzo and Andrew Wilford, eds., *Clio/Anthropos: Exploring the Boundaries Between History and Anthropology* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 2-4.
[64] Thankfully, Crimean authorities have since allowed the library to reopen: see "V Krymu likvidirovana krupneishaia krymskotatarskaia biblioteka," *KorrespondenT.net*, September 19, 2014. Available online at http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3421011-v-krymu-lykvydyrovana-krupneishaia-krymskotatarskaia-byblyoteka. Accessed on June 14, 2017.

collections concerning Crimea and Crimean Tatars from 1941 to 1991. In addition, I conducted extensive research in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), and in the samizdat and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty collections at the Open Society Archives in Budapest, Hungary and the Hoover Institution Archives in Stanford, California.

As a result, several of this study's chapters, along with one key argument, are not what I originally intended. Fortunately, the derailment of the original research plan helps further separate this work from other projects on Soviet nationalities policies and Crimean Tatars. Similar to previous projects, this study recognizes that Soviet organs, and hence archival documents, often concealed the scope and scale of repressions. However, the more important revelation is that some Soviet archival collections corroborate the arguments that Crimean Tatar activists have been making since the 1950s. From the NKVD in 1944 to Ukrainian Gosplan economists in 1990, the Soviet government understood how it ethnically cleansed Crimea, that Crimean Tatars never accepted the outcome, and that repressing Crimean Tatar rights and protest was a costly and often unsuccessful undertaking. Crimean Tatars and the Soviet Union had a common understanding of the crimes and their consequences, and for four decades argued about righting these wrongs.

This revelation is important for the limited and atomized study of Crimean Tatars and for the pursuit of Soviet historiography in general. First, several recent works on Crimean Tatars rely on studies from the 1970s and the late-Soviet period, mixed with recent oral interviews.[65] Each chapter in this study addresses this oral interview

[65]Alan Fisher's 1978 book, *The Crimea Tatars,* remains the most comprehensive history of the Crimean Tatars and Aleksander Nekrich's *The Punished Peoples*, also published in 1978, is still the best chronicling

evidence and often, again, supports earlier assertions. For example, the archives support the assertions of Williams and Uehling that Crimean Tatars used memory to survive as a coherent "nation" in exile.[66] However, among non-Soviet experts studying Crimean Tatars there is often a deliberate attempt to not "speak with the (Soviet) state" because the state was responsible for the ethnic cleansing, mass death and national degradation. Some historians of the Turkic World chide even examining Turkic people's experience during the Soviet period, while others seem uninterested in the Russian-language scholarship of post-Soviet Crimean Tatar scholars.[67] While never disputing the repressive nature of the Soviet state, this study argues that Crimean Tatar protest and return are products of interacting with the Soviet system. Crimean Tatar activists and everyday citizens had specific arguments for the specific Soviet policies of deportation, ethnic cleansing, bureaucratic genocide, and ideology that went well beyond their basic, and universally understandable, desire to return home and maintain national identity. Moreover, these arguments with the Soviet state are crucial in understanding exactly how and why Crimean officials were so successful in using racial discrimination to undermine Crimean Tatar rights in Crimea and why that dynamic continues today.

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of the Crimean Tatar deportation. While both works offer some insight on the 1950s and 1960s, they do not cover the crucial late-Brezhnev and Gorbachev periods. The first edition of Edward Allworth's *The Tatars of the Crimea*, an edited volume published in 1988, contains the most impressive documentation of the Crimean Tatar human rights movement, but mainly focuses on the leadership and cultural. *The Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Tragic Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1978); Edward Allworth eds., *The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland*, 2nd Edition (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998).

66 Uehling documents stories of deportations, exile and attempts to return to the Crimea. The focus on the memory of a homeland and how over generations Tatars never agreed upon these memories, explains why building national collectivity was complicated. See Uehling, *Beyond Memory*, 11-16. The first iteration of William's work, *The Crimean Tatars* is an excellent history of Crimean Tatar ethnogenesis, but considers the post-Stalin period as rather unimportant. The 2015 reiteration of this work provides new and fascinating oral interviews, but does not draw on Soviet archival documents or address Russian language publications such as Gulnara Bekirova's latest monograph. See Bryan Glyn Williams, *The Crimean Tatars: The Diaspora Experience and Forging of a Nation* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 334-464; Gulnara T. Bekirova, *Krymskie Tatary, 1941-1991: Opyt politisheskoi istorii* (Simferopol', 2008).

67 Carter Vaughn Findley, *The Turks in World History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 184.

Returning to Soviet historiography, Getty and Naumov are correct that understanding the Soviet elite is essential because high politics created most Soviet policies. At the same time, they assert that it is "not vitally important" to use documents to establish "whether Bolsheviks regularly lied to themselves and to one another, or whether they believed anything of what they said."[68] This study asserts that it actually is useful and, to a certain degree, possible to establish whether or not a Soviet official believed what they said or wrote, especially once one leaves Stalin's inner circle. An exploration of numerous collections can actually entrap many Soviet leaders in their falsehoods, and some bureaucrats produced enough documents to gauge their understanding of, moods toward, and reactions to, certain crises, policies, and the most egregious lies they or their state told. This exercise is essential to understanding how and why the Soviet state and its citizens acted the way they did, especially after Stalin's death. The presentation of "smoking gun" documents the following chapters present are explanatory, not moralistic. At the same time, some of these documents reveal that Soviet bureaucrats sometimes did their own moralizing, even about their own decisions or missions. Crimean Tatars understood this tension. They constantly battled with the Soviet state over Stalinist lies and catching Soviet officials in lies and hypocrisy helped fuel their prolonged resistance. If Stalin's "Terror" was "the negation of politics," the Crimean Tatar story is a case study of the post-Stalin return to limited political debate, even at the height of the "stagnation."[69]

This study had two halves. The first four chapters explain how and why Stalin ethnically cleansed Crimea and how the Soviet state implemented the policies. Crimean

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[68] Getty and Naumov, *The Road to Terror*, 27.
[69] Ibid., 583.

ethnic cleansing had five phases that included creating the mass treason lie, deportation and bureaucratic genocide, land redistribution and renaming, repopulating Crimea, and rewriting Crimean history. The first chapter on Crimean Tatars in combat and collaboration provides a wartime narrative of Crimean Tatar service and identifies the mechanics and participants in fabricating false treason charges. This chapter utilizes NKVD documents as well as materials from Crimean partisans, labor organizations, the Crimean tourism industry, and other collections. The second chapter on the deportation and bureaucratic genocide of Crimean Tatars includes a close reading of NKVD documents contrasted with Crimean Tatar accounts from both archival and secondary sources. The third chapter combines party and government documents with Gosplan archives and a host of other ministerial collections to explore how the Soviet state rebuilt Crimea with the intention to solidify ethnic cleansing. Rewriting Crimean history is the focus of the fourth chapter. This foray into how the Soviet union falsified the Crimean historical record examines numerous collections from trade unions, cultural and academic entities, Soviet censors, museums, and the work of Crimean historians, archeologists, museum curators, excursion guides, and others actors.

The last four chapters reveal the reaction of Crimean Tatars. In chapter five, Soviet police records and economic archives disclose how Crimean Tatar individuals began to resist ethnic cleansing. Moreover, the chapter explains how, once mass death ended in exile, the reality of postwar Soviet life in the Uzbek SSR and other regions transformed the economic and educational composition of Crimean Tatar survivors. The sixth chapter explores Crimean Tatar protest and the Soviet reaction of policy changes and repressions. A combination of Crimean Tatar letters and Soviet government

documents reveal that individuals and groups could influence policy debates in Moscow, and Soviet policy failures often led to more protest and new repressions.

The seventh chapter interrogates the archives of Soviet samizdat, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty and numerous Soviet collections to examine the cooperation of Crimean Tatars with Soviet dissidents and the international human rights movement. This joint effort climaxed in the late-1970s with another round of protest, policy, returns and harsh repressions, and underlines one area of drama during "stagnation." In the final chapter, the examination of over a dozen archival collections and other primary and secondary sources complete this study by discussing how the invigorated Crimean Tatar movement and a radical Soviet return plan contended with Crimean officials for control of the peninsula.

Chapter 1

Exposing Stalin's Lie: "Mass Treason" and Fighting for the Red Army during World War II

Stalin told bold lies to justify mass terror and ethnic cleansing and give his enforcers ideological cover. He was the project manager of a police system that, even after years of war, did not flinch from arresting decorated soldiers, partisans and war widows all because of their ethnicity. When Stalin accused entire ethnic groups of "mass treason" during World War II, he was signaling to NKVD and MVD leaders who understood that the lies were cover for expelling entire ethnic groups from a given region.

The impending victory against Hitler and the manipulation of treason and collaboration charges gave Stalin the cover to eliminate ethnic minorities. In May 1944, Stalin accused Crimean Tatars and other Crimean minorities of "mass treason" during World War II and began a project of ethnic cleansing in Crimea.[1] The victims included over 180,000 Crimean Tatars and over 40,000 Greeks, Armenians, Bulgars, and other nationalities that the Stalin deported to Central Asia and other Soviet regions.[2]

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[1] See State Archive of the Russian Federation (hereafter GARF), f. 10026, op. 4, d. 1025, l.l. 88-93. Gosudarstvennyi komitet oborony postanovlenia GOKO No. 5859ss ot 11 maia 1944 "O Krymskikh Tatarakh."

[2] The second chapter will explain these figures in detail. In general, by June 11, 1945 the official number of deported Crimean Tatars to the Uzbek SSR was 151,604 people. By the end of June 1944 the NKVD had also deported 15,040 Greeks, 12,422 Bulgars, and 9,621 Armenians from Crimea. Over 40,000 Crimean Tatars would die within the first year, and around 10,000 more in the subsequent years. GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l.l. 5-9. Tashkent NKVD, Polkovnik Gosbezopasnosti Mal'ytsev i Podpolkovnik Gosbezopasnosti Maslennikov - V. V. Chernyshov. (sekretno), June 25, 1944. See GARF, f. 9479s, op. 1s, d.179, l. 227. Serov-Beria, June 28, 1944; GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l.l. 44-45. "Dokladnaia Zapiska o khoziastvenno-trudovom ustroistve spetspereselentsev iz Kryma, rasselennykh v Uzbekskoi SSR, za vremia 1.7-44 g. po 1.7-1945 g." NKVD General-Maior Babadzhanov and Nachal'nik NKVD UzSSR Polkovnik Kirillov in Tashkent to Chernyshev (No. 5/6451). September 15, 1945.

Many Western scholars studying Crimean Tatars have avoided a deep examination of World War II for two reasons. First, all of the relevant Soviet documents remained sealed for decades, and many critical documents remain classified today. Second, by arguing in detail over the exact number of collaborators, one engages in a discussion in which there seems to be some magic number or percentage of an ethnic group whose disloyalty to a state justifies ethnic cleansing. This is why scholars such as Greta Uehling and J. Otto Pohl argue that Crimean Tatar collaboration with the Nazi occupation was no more extraordinary than that of other Soviet nationalities.[3] Moreover, Soviet leadership itself on multiple occasions acknowledged that that mass collaboration was a "groundless charge."[4] While this is true, the lie and the Soviet creation of alternate versions of Crimean history mattered to Crimean Tatars and the protest movement that they began in 1958.

In Crimea, Stalin's falsehoods became essential to the memory of the Second World War because they justified Soviet terror on the peninsula just months after liberation and several weeks after the NKVD had arrested actual collaborators. Post-deportation Crimean officials and participants in the transformation of Crimea from a multiethnic Soviet republic into an ethnic Russian homeland embraced the lie to preserve their economic and political monopoly in Crimea. In some Russian nationalist circles, Stalin's lie outlived the NKVD and the Soviet Union. The lie also mattered because

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[3] Pohl argues that the two "Deputy Peoples Commissars" of the NKVD, Ivan Serov and Bogdan Kobulov, claimed that the Nazis succeeded in their goal of recruiting 20,000 Crimean Tatar collaborators, but cited no actual evidence: see J. Otto Pohl, "The Charges of Treason Against Crimean Tatars," an online publication by the International Committee for Crimea (Washington DC, 2010). Available at http://www.iccrimea.org/scholarly/pohl20100518. Accessed on June 6, 2017. See also, Greta Lynn Uehling, *Beyond Memory*, 1-3.

[4] Document 2, "Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union," September 5, 1967 in Allworth, *The Tatars of Crimea*, 245-247.

Crimean Tatars and the Soviet state knew that it was a lie. Because most Crimean Tatars had not collaborated with the Nazis, in exile the Soviet state allowed individual Crimean Tatars to remain in the communist party and continue serving in the armed forces, government, and economic managerial positions. By default, this gave Crimean Tatars the social and economic mobility in exile that they would later translate into organized dissent.

This chapter combines individual biographies and other archival evidence with secondary sources to explore wartime sacrifices and present a counter-narrative to Stalin's mass collaboration charges of Crimean Tatar "mass service" in the Soviet war effort. As such, this paper first reviews Crimean Tatars in regular service in the Soviet armed forces, and then turns to occupied Crimea. This effort is critical because some current historians such as O. V. Roman'ko still commit to the idea that collaboration both caused and justified the deportations. To make this argument, scholars such as Roman'ko underestimate the number of Crimean Tatars that served in the Soviet Armed Forces and partisans and exaggerate collaboration numbers. By doing so, they argue that more male Crimean Tatars collaborated than fought against the Nazis. Furthermore, Roman'ko dubiously asserts that the willingness to honestly discuss collaboration by Crimean Tatar activists and historians such as Gulnara Bekirova somehow absolves Soviet authorities of the crime.[5]

Soviet archival material discredits Roman'ko's point and supports Crimean Tatar accounts. The most important revelation of this study is that Soviet archival documents

[5] Since the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, Roman'ko, who identifies as Russian, has become a professor at the V. I. Vernadskii Crimean Federal University (Krymskogo federal'nogo universiteta im. Versnadskago). Bekirova has since left Crimea: see O. V. Roman'ko, *Krym pod piatkoi Gitlera. Nemetskaia okkupatsionnaia politika v Krymu 1941-1944*, (Moscow: Veche, 2011), 50, 392-330; Gulnara T. Bekirova, *Krymskie Tatary*, 73-74.

from the NKVD (secret police), MVD (Interior Ministry), KPSS (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), and Supreme Soviet actually corroborate Crimean Tatar claims that the majority of work-age Crimean Tatar males fought for the Soviet Union, and did not collaborate. For example, documents such as censuses, NKVD investigations, background checks, and surveillance on Crimea and the Uzbek SSR reveal that the police and military, from NKVD head Lavtreni Beria downwards, knew the charge was a lie. The NKVD was not alone. Knowledge of Stalin's falsehood helped determine how the Communist Party and other Soviet organs interacted with Crimean Tatar veterans after the deportation.[6] Soviet government and party documents also display how, despite Stalin's atrocity against Crimean Tatars, the war experience served as a shared experience for Crimean Tatars and other Soviet citizens.

The final goal of this chapter is tracing the lineage of the falsehoods that the Soviet state used to justify ethnic cleansing against Crimean Tatars. In the years after the deportation, Soviet officials began a concerted effort to conceal Crimean Tatar participation in the partisan effort and the Soviet armed forces, while at the same time exaggerating Crimean Tatar collaboration with the Nazis. Through the examination of books, tour guides, and other Soviet publications, this chapter exposes Stalin's key accomplices who provided false evidence and details what methods they used to create a false historical record.

Stalin's Reason for Deporting Crimean Minorities

[6] Chapter 5 uncovers how Beria and top NKVD officials began releasing some Crimean Tatars from special settlement as early as 1944. Also, the chapter provides evidence of the surprising, and widespread, incorporation of Crimean Tatar party members, veterans, and skilled workers into economic and political fabric in their regions of exile, all in spite of them being labeled as "traitors."

The reason Stalin gave for deporting Crimean Tatars and all Crimean minorities in 1944, mass treason, was a lie designed to conceal Stalin's actual motivations. In the case of Crimea, as early as 1927 Stalin was concerned about Crimean Tatar efforts to repatriate Crimean Tatar diaspora from Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania into the Soviet Union to take part in building Crimean ASSR institutions. While Lenin had believed in outreach to Muslims outside the Soviet Union, Stalin disliked this approach, especially after Kemal Ataturk outlawed the Turkish Communist Party in 1925. As such, he continually undermined Crimean Tatar efforts at repatriation. Stalin believed that any former Turkish passport holder was a potential security threat because they could harbor pro-Turkish or pro-capitalist sentiment. He also had similar concerns about Greek, Bulgarian, Iranian, and Armenian populations in Crimea.[7] Even before the "Great Terror" began, Stalin accused the head of the Crimean ASSR government, the Crimean Tatar Bolshevik Veli Ibrahimov, and Crimean Tatar intelligentsia of creating a Crimean Tatar nationalist plan to gain greater demographic control of Crimea and betray the Soviet state to Turkish interests. From the late 1920s to the height of the great terror in 1936-38, the NKVD arrested and executed thousands of Crimean Tatars.[8]

However, purging thousands of Crimean Tatars and other Crimean minorities from the government, party and cultural positions from Crimea did not alleviate Stalin's distrust of Crimean ethnic minorities. In fact, in preparation for the 1939 census, the Soviet Census Bureau downgraded Greeks and Bulgarians in Crimea from official "Soviet nationalities" to the lower status of "national minority." At the same time, the

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[7] GARF, f. 1235, op. 141, d. 1102, l.l. 2-3. Pis'mo TsIK Krymskoi ASSR- Sekretariat VTsIK. February 13, 1931.

[8] Williams underlines the extraordinary fact that, because Crimea was such a strategic region, the arrest and trial of Ibrahimov in May 1928 was one of the first and most important purges against "nationalists" that soon became a Soviet-wide campaign. Williams, *The Crimean Tatars*, 81-84.

Census Bureau decided that Crimean Tatars no longer deserved an ethnic designation separate from Volga Tatars. On the eve of the Nazi invasion, Crimean Tatars became, per the Soviet state, "Tatars who reside in Crimea." While in 1939 these designations were just on paper, they established the groundwork for the postwar narrative that Crimean Tatars and other Crimean minorities were not indigenous to Crimea.[9]

Crimean Tatars in the Soviet Armed Forces

Before the deportation of May 17-18, 1944, Crimean Tatars were one of the dozens of Soviet ethnic groups under occupation. Similar to all Soviet citizens, for Crimean Tatars the war meant service in the Red Army, partisan resistance and, for a smaller number, collaboration. Above all, the war brought suffering and death. Germany and Axis allies invaded and occupied most of Crimea between September and November 30, 1941, with the exception of Sevastopol that held out until July 1942.[10]

Thousands of Crimean Tatars began fighting as soon as the war began. Drafted into the army in 1939, Izet Memetov served in Ukraine, where he was shot in the left leg. He continued fighting until receiving another injury in battle on the Dnepr River. When the Soviet front collapsed, he returned to active duty and was wounded a third time near Kirovgrad and spent several months in the hospital. Finally, in 1945 he was wounded a fourth time during the battle for Konigsburg (Kalinigrad) and remained hospitalized until early 1946.[11] Party member M. Osmanov left his hometown of Simferopol on June 23,

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[9] Hirsch, *Empire of Nations*, 302.

[10] Mungo Melvin provides a new examination of the regular military campaign for Crimea and Sevastopol in *Sevastopol's Wars: Crimea from Potemkin to Putin* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2017), 422-650.

[11] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l.l. 113-114. Perechen- "Voprosov, postavlennykh hekotorymi grazhdanami Tatarskoi natsional'nosti v pis'makh I zaiavleniiakh, postupivshikh v 1966 godu v adres Ver. Sov. SSSR." 1966. (hereafter "Perechen").

1941 (the day after the war began), and joined the Soviet army, becoming an officer. He received commendations for defending Stalingrad, and fought in the campaigns to liberate Kiev, Lublino, and Warsaw, and in the storming of Berlin. Other Crimean Tatars such as I. U. Ablaev served at sea. After working at the Sevastopol Shipbuilding Factory for 15 years, he began repairing damaged ships in the Black Sea Fleet during the battle for Sevastopol. On March 15, 1942, his repair unit evacuated to the city of Tuaps. Shortly afterwards, the Luftwaffe bombed Ablaev's unit while they were repairing the "Ostrovskii" transport ship. Hospitalized with head trauma, Soviet medics evacuated him to the Kazak ASSR.[12]

Experiences such as these became a point of pride and thousands of these Crimean Tatar veterans would become a leading voice of the protest movement demanding the nation's return to Crimea. A 1967 protest letter from 20 Crimean Tatars underlines this fact. Six of the signees, Enver Abliaev, Asan Kadyev, Minure Kadyeva, Femi Ametov, Osman Kasabov, and Abduraman Molla, identified themselves as "decorated World War Two veterans." Five others including Seitumer Chalbash, Ismail Kenzhe, Settar Ipek-Ogly, Osman Ametov and Khodzhai Kendzhedmetov identified themselves as "World War Two veterans."[13] Often, veterans participating in letter-writing campaigns also indicated where they fought. In an April 27, 1990 letter to Moscow, Crimean Tatar veteran Z. A. Chekhalaeva specified that he was a veteran of the Black Sea Fleet and had fought during the liberation of Odessa and Sevastopol. In the same letter, N. A. Salidzhanov stressed his service in the liberation of Briansk and

[12] Ibid., l. 109.
[13] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447, l.l. 21-26. Krymski Tatary iz goroda Sukhumi. January 17, 1968.

Voronezh, while A. U. Bekirov highlighted that he had defended Stalingrad and later fought in Kursk and Briansk.[14]

Most Soviet families lost members to World War II combat and Crimean Tatars underlined that they were no different in later letter-writing campaigns. For example, while the Nazis forced A. A. Umerov into labor, his brother, Seit Bekir Umerov, served in the Red Army as a political commissar and died in the defense of Moscow.[15] In a 1966 letter to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, G. S. Suleimanova demanded to know how she was from a family of traitors when her sister died fighting in the siege of Sevastopol and her husband had received Soviet commendations in the same battle.[16] Thousands of more such accounts reside in collections of *samizdat* and human rights organizations, and the recent work of Crimean Tatar scholars such as Bekirova.[17]

NKVD and MVD reports confirm the preponderance of such stories among the Crimean Tatars they deported, providing both individual accounts and general trends. For example, the NKVD found that Zeidula Stil'skii defended Sevastopol until he was wounded on February 21, 1942.[18] Other reports show that Meva Believa, Khaztizhat Khalilova and Malira Urachnieva were all widowed with children after their husbands died in combat, a fate shared by thousands of Crimean Tatar mothers and millions of other Soviet mothers.[19] Many reports are incredibly detailed. The NKDV report on Khatiszhe Alieva-Shibanova found that her two sons, Shanasi and Shevkem, served in the

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[14] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 209, l.l. 28-29. Letter to Sov. Nats. Ver. Sov. SSSR Nishanov from Crimean Tatar Veterans. April 27, 1990.
[15] Perechen, l. 110.
[16] Ibid., l. 109.
[17] For an online database see Gulnara Bekirova's website, Krym i Krymskie Tatary, http://kirimtatar.com. Accessed on December 4, 2015.
[18] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l. 89. Zakliuchenie 28 avgusta, 1945.
[19] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 138-139. "Spisok Krymskikh Tatar, prozhivaiushchikh na territorii Dagestanskoi ASSR." NKVD DASSR Kom. Gosbez R. Markaian. November 3, 1944.

Red Army and Shevkem was wounded in combat. Her daughter, who was in Moscow when the war began, joined a defense unit, and received an "In Defense of Moscow" medal.[20] Another report describes how Iach'ia Abdurefa Ibraimov had served in the Red Army since 1937, was awarded a "Red Star" for his actions early in the war, and received medals for the battles of Warsaw and Berlin.[21]

As the accounts above display, from 1941 to 1944, the Soviet Union awarded Crimean Tatars with medals and other commendations. Some such as Uzeir Abduramanov became "Heroes of the Soviet Union."[22] Emir Chalbash had one of the most impressive Crimean Tatar wartime careers. The NKVD reported that as a fighter pilot in the Soviet air force, he flew 345 sorties, fought in more than 50 dogfights, shot down 11 enemy planes, and assisted in shooting down six more aircraft. He received numerous medals and became a flight instructor. His brother, Kurt-Molla Chalbash also served with distinction in a Red Army tank unit. Amet-Khan Sultan was another Soviet fighter pilot with over 30 kills.[23]

The actual numbers of Crimean Tatars who served and died is a victim of chaos, but both Soviet and Crimean Tatar figures are much higher than proponents of the mass collaboration charge. On the high-end, Crimean Tatar scholar and activist Aishe Seitmuratova claims that approximately 64,640 Crimean Tatars served in the war in some capacity. Of these, the conflict killed nearly 30,000 Crimean Tatars, including Seitmuratova's father.[24] In letter writing campaigns after de-Stalinization, activists often

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[20] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l.l. 20-20ob. Zakliuchenie 28 Iulia, 1945 goda.
[21] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l. 42. Zakliuchenie 31 Avgusta, 1945.
[22] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l. 7. Zakliuchenie 12 Sentiabr', 1945
[23] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l.l. 105-105ob. Zakliuchenie 29 noiabria, 1945.
[24] HIA, A. M. Nekrich Collection (hereafter AMNC), Box 47, Folder 2, pg . 2, Aishe Seitmuratova. July 3, 1979.

stated that approximately 28,000 Crimean Tatars served in the Soviet armed forces while more than 4,000 fought as partisans. Furthermore, more than 3,000 received condemnations and 17 became "Heroes of the Soviet Union."[25]

NKVD documents agree that the number of Crimean Tatar soldiers was large. During May 1944, the NKVD deported thousands of active duty Crimean Tatars from the front and Soviet regions. This included Crimean Tatar soldiers who had taken leave immediately after the liberation of Crimea to help their families. The NKVD in Tashkent oblast became frustrated by the situation because they received large groups of "Crimean Tatar officers and regular soldiers" and simply did not know how to handle the influx of soldiers "with military identification papers still in their hands… and still in full military uniform, just without weapons."[26] Sometimes Crimean Tatars deported straight from combat such as Red Army Captain Ussin Suleimanov and infantryman Abdulla-Gani Sattarova arrived "with their service pistols."[27] The NKVD separated many of the higher-level Crimean Tatar party officials, military officers, and partisan leaders from the bulk of Crimean Tatars and deported them to Molotov oblast. Rather than receiving "traitors," the head of the local NKVD, Major Natarov, reported that many of deportees were "party members with party tickets in their hands, partisans, and military medal winners."[28]

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[25] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447, l.l. 21-26. Krymski Tatary iz goroda Sukhumi. January 17, 1968.

[26] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 43. "Dokladnaia Zapiska- O prieme i rasselenii spetspereselentsev po Tashkentskoi Oblasti." Nachal'nik UKNVD Podpolkovnik Matveev i Upol. NKVD SSSR Polkovnik Tarkhonov- Kobulov. June 1944.

[27] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l 19. Kapitan Gosbezopastnosti Romashov- Upolnomochennomy NKVD SSSR po Uzbekskoi SSR Mal'tsevu. "Dokladnaia Zapiska o rezul'tatakh priema i rasseleniia spetspereselentsev (K.T.) po Andizhanskoi Obl." June 1944.

[28] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 137. Kuznetsovu iz Zam. Nachal'nika UKNVD Molotovskoi Oblasti Po Kadram Maior Gosbez Natarov. September 5, 1944.

For the Soviet Armed forces, deporting thousands of active-duty Crimean Tatars was awkward and caused discontent. Many military officers refused to disarm and deport their Crimean Tatar comrades. Such refusals became so endemic that the NKVD General overseeing Crimean Tatars deportees, Chernyshov, bluntly told Beria in an October 31, 1944, letter that many Crimean Tatar officers and soldiers were still fighting and also were requesting that the NKVD release their families from special settlement. When the NKVD criticized commanders for disregarding deportation orders, officers retorted that there were "never clear instructions" on how to deport their fighters from combat zones.[29]

This situation meant that thousands of Crimean Tatars served the remainder of the war, if not longer, and continued to arrive in special settlement throughout 1944, 1945, and in some cases until 1948. One typical sample form NKVD records is from the fourth quarter of 1945, when most of the 2,200 new Crimean Tatar arrivals in the Uzbek SSR were Red Army soldiers.[30] Officially, more than 7,000 demobilized Crimean Tatar soldiers arrived after the initial deportation, but the actual number was much higher. Most of the 16,000 new Crimean Tatars that the MVD added to the special settlement registry between July 1944 and July 1945 were veterans. Moreover, in some cases special settlement authorities did not add demobilized Crimean Tatars demobilized to special settler lists as Crimean Tatars because the ethnic group no longer existed.[31]

The MVD census of Crimean Tatar special settlers in March 1949 counted 477 Red Army officers, 1,154 sergeants, 1,200 veteran invalids, and 5,287 regular soldiers in

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[29] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 160, l. 185. Kuznetsov i Chernyshov - Beria. October 31, 1944.

[30] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l. 195. January 2, 1946. Zam. NKVD UzSSR General-Maior Zavgorodnii to Kuznetsovu. No. 5/655.

[31] GARF, f. 10026, op. 4, d. 1025, l. 76. "Spetsposelentsy iz Kryma/ 1944-1956 gg." V. N. Zemskov. December 9, 1991.

the Uzbek SSR. In addition, 7,065 were still "serving" in some capacity. These numbers do not consider the around 10,000 of veterans and officers deported to other regions, the thousands who died in combat, thousands who died in special settlement, and hundreds of officers and soldiers who had already been released from special settlement.[32] Rough estimates of Crimean Tatars killed in combat and by German atrocities often cite the figure of 12,000, but go as high as 30,000.[33] Considering those numbers, the NKVD figures and other Soviet documents together, the suggestion that 28,000 or more Crimean Tatars served in the regular Soviet Armed Forces during the war is reasonable, but the actual number is likely higher.

Finally, the above figure does not include around 4,000 partisans and underground communists or the party workers and agricultural specialists that did evacuate. For example, the NKVD never deported dozens of Crimean Tatar administrators, specialists, and workers who evacuated to the Dagestan ASSR in 1941.[34] Nor does it count Crimean Tatars that Gosplan evacuated from Crimea to industrial areas of the Soviet Union. This includes 4,000 Crimean Tatar males that Gosplan moved to the Moscow Region Coal administration in late 1941 (they continued mining until 1948).[35] Considering the service of regular soldiers, party workers, partisans, regular workers, and Crimean Tatars in other capacities, the "mass" service of Crimean Tatars in the war effort is at least around 40,000 people, perhaps more. This was out of a prewar population of around 218,000 Crimean Tatars.

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[32] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 483, l.l. Statisticheskie Svedeniia o rezul'tatakh perepisi vyselentsev-spets. na territorii Uzbekskoi SSSR. March 28, 1949.
[33] Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 161.
[34] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l.l. 138-140. "Spisok Krymskikh Tatar, prozhivaiushchikh na territorii Dagestanskoi ASSR." NKVD DASSR Kom. Gosbez R. Markaian. November 3, 1944.
[35] GARF, f. 5446, op. 49a, d. 3343, l. 2. Pis'mo Min. Ugol'noi Promyshlenosti Zapadnykh Raionov SSSR A. Zasiad'ko- Beria. March 8, 1947.

The Failed Nazi Occupation of Crimea

Crimean Tatar activists never denied the fact that several thousand Crimean Tatars collaborated with Germans between 1941 and 1944, with the majority in "self-defense units."[36] However, as Crimean Tatars and recent work by Uehling and Bekirova argue, Crimean Tatar treason was not any more extraordinary than that of other Soviet Nationalities. Russians should not share guilt for Vlasov's Russian Army and the same goes for Ukrainians and Stepan Bandera's followers. Similarly, Volga Tatars, Georgians and Kazakhs had large German units, and none of these groups saw their autonomous Soviet republics dissolved or experienced ethnic cleansing.[37]

Similar to Slavic peasants in the western Soviet Union who initially greeted German invaders as liberators from Soviet repression, the devastation of collectivization and Stalin's terror caused some Crimeans to see Nazis in a similar light.[38] Furthermore, as the NKVD left Crimea in late 1941, they executed all prisoners in Simfiropol, Yalta, and other cities. Moscow's scorched-earth policy did little to harm the German occupation and left both Crimean Tatars and Russians on the peninsula desperate. Kolkhoz farmers watched as Soviet officials took their farm's livestock to Krasnodarskii krai, Stalingrad oblast and other regions, but left most of the farmers behind.[39] The retreating Red Army then destroyed farm equipment, stored grain, and livestock. This was also detrimental to the Soviet partisan movement, and one of the reasons Soviet partisan units immediately took to robbing villages where some livestock had escaped the

[36] Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 155, Roman'ko, *Krym pod piatkoi Gitlera*, 50.
[37] Uehling, *Beyond Memory*, 3-4.
[38] Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 153.
[39] Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (hereafter RGASPI), f. 17, op. 44, 763, l. 140.

agricultural purge. However, of note in both Fisher and Roman'ko, there are few concrete examples of a sudden surge of Crimean Tatar affection for the invaders. It is important to remember that by September 1941, most Crimean families already had one or more family members in the Red Army, differentiating the region from some of the more naïve welcomes Nazis received in the month after June 22, 1941, on the Eastern front.[40]

While the detailed plans for the Crimean occupation are far beyond the scope of this study, some general facts need to be established. First, Hitler (like Stalin) believed that Crimean Tatars could be a "fifth column" and he tried to organize armed Crimean Tatar collaboration around the formation of Crimean Tatar SS units, regular army units, and volunteer "self-defense" units. In Crimea, Field Marshall von Manstein ran these military affairs. The General Commissar for the Crimean Peninsula, Alfred Frauenfeld, handled administrative operations. He attempted to govern Crimean Tatars through "Muslim Committees" that encouraged collaboration by bringing in exiled Crimean Tatar political and religious leaders from Turkey and Romania to renew "Islamic belief." Similar committees governed Russians and Ukrainians and allowed them to elect their own Orthodox bishop. While the push to elicit Tatar collaboration was intense in early 1942, Germany still relied on mostly Russians and Ukrainians for the local collaborationist government, and even in helping to organize the Muslim Committees.[41] For instance, after the war the NKVD arrested Elena Fedorets for her organizational work with Muslim Committee members.[42]

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[40] Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 154-155.
[41] Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples*, 16; Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 155-157.
[42] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 44,d. 763, l.l. 283-295ob. Protokol No. 61 Zasedaniia Krymskogo Obkoma ot 24 oktiabria 1944g.

However, terror was key to Nazi rule in Crimea. While occupation authorities demanded collaboration, they simultaneously launched a wave of Gestapo terror to hunt down communists. NKVD investigations reveal that the fate of thousands of Crimean party members in 1942 was similar to that of Ediia Memetova. The Gestapo arrested her, interrogated her, and executed her.[43] Some Crimean Tatars survived in the communist underground longer, coordinating propaganda and partisan activities. Sever Useinov was a member of the party underground in Simferopol from December 1942 until March 1943, when most members were arrested and executed. Useinov avoided arrest until January 1944, when the Gestapo captured, tortured and executed him.[44]

Most Party and Komsomol members remaining in Crimea formed dozens of partisan units that included Russians, Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars. Similar to underground party members, Crimean partisans often met a quick and brutal end at the hands of the Gestapo in 1942. For example, Crimean Tatar Komsomol members Lutfie Ibraimova, Suleiman Tairov, and Abla Ibraimov were among dozens of Soviet partisans that the Gestapo hung in public to set an example for the residents of Bakhchisarai.[45] Some partisans did survive 1942. Crimean Tatar and Komsomol member Alim Abdennanova led the "Dzhermai-Kaminskaia" partisans and provided the Red Army intelligence. Still, the Gestapo eventually captured the group in March 1944, torturing and executing the members, including Abdennanova.[46]

The hunt for communists quickly turned into the hunt for Jewish Crimeans in 1942, thus beginning the Crimean Holocaust operation. All told, German documents

[43] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l.l 57-57ob. Zakliuchenie 31 ianvaria, 1945.
[44] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l. 101. Zakliuchenie 12 Sentiabr, 1945.
[45] Perechen, l. 112.
[46] Ibid, l. 57.

record 91,678 murdered Jews, communists, Gypsies, and other "racially impure elements" between October 1944 and April 1942.[47] In addition, Nazi authorities kidnapped thousands of Crimeans of all ethnicities, including Crimean Tatars, for slave labor in the Third Reich. For example, A. A. Umerov was just 15 years old in 1942 when occupation authorities took him to Mathauzen in Austria.[48]

However, in 1942 some Crimean Tatars and other Crimean residents collaborated with the Axis. Nazi occupation plans stated an ideal number of between 15,000-20,000 Crimean Tatar collaborators, and scholars from Fisher to Roman'ko cite these numbers. Roman'ko details the careers of Crimean Tatar collaboration leaders such as Abdulla Karabash, a communist party turncoat who headed the most successful Crimean Tatar collaborationist battalion (nicknamed "Schuma"), edited the Crimean Tatar occupation newspaper *Kirim,* and was complicit in the Holocaust and the murder of former comrades. In addition, he found the names of 13 Crimean Tatar officers that led battalions.[49]

However, the collaborationist quota and reality were very different. The Nazis strove to elicit mass collaboration numbers during the first months of occupation, even allowing the "Muslim Committees" to use the Bakchisarai Palace as a functional and symbolic headquarters of collaboration. However, by February 15, 1942, the 13 collaborationist "battalion leaders" working with the Muslim committees had only recruited 1,632 Crimean Tatar volunteers. The Mullahs from Turkey found few Crimean Tatars willing to collaborate in exchange for the freedom of religious practice, and the Germans abandoned the effort in early 1943. In order to find more men, German

[47] Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples*, 15.
[48] Perechen, l.l. 110-111.
[49] Roman'ko, *Krym pod piatkoi Gitlera*, 413, 235-236.

authorities sent Crimean Tatar collaborators to search Soviet POW camps for "Crimean Tatar volunteers." This effort was essential because most working age Crimean Tatar males were in the Soviet armed forces. The effort produced between 8,000 and 9,000 "recruits," and in no way met the goal of over 15,000.[50] What is more, thousands of the recruits were old men or children that the occupation army later dismissed as unfit for service. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that some of those assigned to the "Tatar brigades" were other Muslims and even non-Muslim Soviet POWs. In some cases, occupation authorities filled whole "Tatar" brigades with Soviet prisoners from Central Asia, the Lower Volga, and Caucasus.[51]

Despite Roman'ko's exploration of Crimean, German, and documents of allied powers, he never presents proof of much more than 5,000 collaborators who actually fought for the Nazi army. When the Nazis evacuated Crimea in early 1944, they took around 2,500 collaborators with them, and this number included *all* nationalities.[52] So, where are all of the proposed traitors that defenders of the collaboration charge allege? They do not exist in any documents, and the only way to claim that the number was higher is by citing the around 5,000 firearms that the NKVD confiscated from Crimean Tatars during the deportation.[53] The use of this figure as proof of collaboration is absurd because most of these weapons came from the thousands of Crimean Tatar soldiers deported from the peninsula.

Beria and the NKVD recognized the failure of occupation authorities to reach their goal of 15,000-20,000 Crimean Tatar collaborators, and this failure determined how

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[50] Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples*, 12-22.
[51] Ibid., 20, 27.
[52] As Pohl underlines, the mass treason charges were based on, at the most, 6,000 possible collaborators. Pohl, "The False Charges of Treason," 4.
[53] Roman'ko, *Krym pod piatkoi Gitlera*, 230-233.

they handled Crimean Tatars in 1944 and throughout special settlement. To understand the phenomenon, scholars must make a clear distinction between the three different NKVD operations concerning Crimea and Crimean Tatars. The first NKVD operation from April 11 to May 14 swept Crimea and arrested individuals actually suspected of treason. The NKVD arrested 1,137 Crimean Tatars as "anti-Soviet elements." Moreover, these figures are likely exaggerated.[54] As Marina Sorokina argues, the NKVD had multiple reasons to fabricate charges against innocent Soviet citizens.[55] While some of these arrests were for specific cases of active treason in collaborationist units, many were farm managers and village elders.[56] The second operation, the deportation, lasted from May 17 until delivering deportees into special settlement by the end of June 1944. The NKVD soldiers cited the mass-treason charge as the reason for the operation, but their commanders understood that the first operation had already arrested collaborators. The third operation, led by the Special Settlement Division of the NKVD, was a final sweep of Crimean Tatars in special settlement to double-check if the initial sweep had missed any collaborators. This last sweep netted only a few dozen treason charges and did not support the claim of "mass treason."[57]

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[54] In her study of Belorussia, Franziska Exeler determined that "Some, maybe even many of the convicted" had committed a litany of crimes, but certainly not every arrested individual was guilty: see Franziska Exeler, "The Ambivalent State: Determining Guilt in the Post-World War II Soviet Union," *Slavic Review* (Vol 75:3, Fall 2016), 606-629 (here 610-111). On the figuers, see GARF f. 5124, op. 7, d. 207, l. 10. Spravka o dokumentakh, otrazhaiushchikh istoriiu Krymskoi ASSR i ee Tatarskogo naseleniia. B. I. Kaptelov - Glavnogo arkhivnogo upravleniia pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR E. M. Kozhevnikov. August 25, 1987.

[55] Marina Sorokina, "People and Procedures: Toward a History of the Investigation of Nazi Crimes in the USSR," *Kritika* (Vol. 6:4, 2005), 797-831 (here 804).

[56] GARF f. 5124, op. 7, d. 207, l. 10. Spravka o dokumentakh, otrazhaiushchikh istoriiu Krymskoi ASSR i ee Tatarskogo naseleniia. B. I. Kaptelov - Glavnogo arkhivnogo upravleniia pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR E. M. Kozhevnikov. August 25, 1987.

[57] To double check the first operation, the NKVD made a special list of special settlers whose relatives had collaborated, and then confirmed that the collaborators had been killed, arrested, or had fled to Germany or Turkey. Again, the short lists do not support mass collaboration and indicate that most family members of

Interestingly, Supreme Soviet documents show that Roman'ko was not the first historian to defend the mass collaboration charge with the same sources and unimpressive figures. The first serious attempt came from a historian whose name appears in Supreme Soviet records as Vasilov. Throughout the first half of 1967, Vasilov compiled material to support the mass treason charge on behalf of those who did not want Crimean Tatars returning to Crimea. Vasilov based much of his argument on the fact that, at his Nuremburg Trial, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein testified that at the height of the battle with Crimean partisans in 1942, he had six active Tatar battalions and four more comprised of the police volunteers that could be sent to fight if needed. Moreover, he claimed to have 300 to 800 men per battalion. With an average of 500 men per battalion, the figures indicate around 5,000 people in total. It is no surprise then that when Roman'ko scoured Manstein's paper trail for collaborators he uncovered roughly the same number Vasilov cited and Manstein indicated at Nuremburg.[58]

Regardless of what one believes about the exact numbers, everyone at the time, including Manstein himself, admitted that the collaboration effort failed to enlist the target numbers of 15,000 to 20,000 Crimean Tatars.[59] Manstein and his regime succeeded at quickly alienating every ethnic group on the peninsula through their actions. As 1942 turned into 1943, the recruitment failure caused Germans to implement mass violence as the primary means of governing Crimea. Many of the "volunteers" joining brigades were coerced from the beginning, and such coercion blossomed in 1943. With

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collaborators had fled as the Nazis withdrew. GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 66. NKVD Chernyshov and M. Kuznetsov to Beria. October 16, 1944.

[58] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l. 24. Spravka "k trebovaniam nekotorykh tatar o ikh reabilitatsii i priniatii po etomu voprosu sootvetstvuiushchego akta." Vasilova. September 1967.

[59] Manstein acknowledged his failure in August 1942. Cited in Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples*, 24. From Dokumenty ministerstva inostrannykh del Germanii. Vypusk II: Germanskaia politika v Turtsii (1941-1943 gg.) (Moscow, 1946) no. 25, p. 87 (Dittmann to Tippelskrich, August 5, 1942).

numbers not increasing, the SS executed Crimean Tatars such as Kandar Abbliakim to "encourage" what men remained in his village to "volunteer." In March 1943 alone, the SS executed 60 people to set an example.[60]

Coercion quickly morphed into mass atrocity.[61] Manstein was one of Hitler's monstrous ideological commanders, and fought a war against the Soviets that did not follow "the European rules of war." He believed that the "Judeo-Bolshevik system" was the true enemy of the "Lebensraum" project, and that he should exterminate all hostile or uncooperative elements during the occupation.[62] Soviet liberators found Crimean Tatar collective farms such as Al'minskii, Zales'e and Bodany to have been "destroyed by the German occupiers."[63] In the case of the Crimean Tatar sovkhozes of Tomak and Chotty, the occupation authorities pillaged the farms' hardware and leveled homes.[64] In retaliation for partisan actions and other infractions, the Gestapo carried out mass executions of Crimean kolkhoz workers. One such massacre occurred in the village of Mangush on November 13, 1943, when Nazis shot over 150 people and buried them in a mass grave. Of the 96 bodies identified after the war, 29 were Crimean Tatars.[65] In January 1944, the Germans burnt down the Tatar villages of Argin, Baksan, and Kazal, along with the Russian villages of Efendikoi, Kutur, and Neiman, and most of the survivors joined with partisans in the mountains for the remainder of the war. Between

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60 Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples,* 27.

61 Ben Shepherd describes how Nazis turned to atrocity and village destruction across the entire Eastern zone of occupation. Again, Crimea and Crimean Tatars received the common and brutal treatment: see Ben H. Shepherd, *War in the Wild East: The German Army and Soviet Partisans* (1st Edition) (Harvard University Press, 2004), 2-4, 120-216, 224-234.

62 On Manstein and general Nazi policy towards Soviet partisans and civilians see Mark Mazower, *Hitler's Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2008),167-172.

63 GARF, f. A-259, op. 6, d. 764, l. 4.A. Gritsenko to Kosygin. October 24, 1944.

64 GARF, f. A-259, op. 6, d. 1520, l.l. 5-5ob.Gosudarstvennyi Arbitrazh pri Sovnarkome RSFSR. M. Shaliupa- Sovnarkom RSFSR. March 5, 1945.

65 Perechen, l. 84.

December 1943 and January 1944 alone, the occupation authorities burned down 128 Crimean Tatar villages.[66]

Soviet economic data confirms the destruction of Crimean agriculture, and thus the lively hood of 70% of the Crimean Tatar population, during the war. With supplies destroyed or confiscated by the evacuating Soviets and occupation authorities, more than half of the previously cultivated land became fallow.[67] As the Nazi destruction of Crimean Tatar and Russian villages and deportations of working-age individuals to the Reich accelerated in 1943, Crimean agriculture languished and harvests in Crimea declined by more than 80%.[68] Nazis and partisans alike poached livestock and decimated herds.[69] For the Nazis, failure of the collaboration regime meant brutal retribution and the requisition of what human and material resources remained in Crimea.

Crimean Tatar Partisans

The NKVD recognized the failure of Nazi collaboration efforts in 1942. In response, the Soviet armed forces promoted Crimean Tatars to top partisan positions in 1943 in a calculated effort to take advantage of Nazi dysfunction. Ramozan Kurt-Ucherov had served as the head of resort construction for the Presidium of the Crimean ASSR until the war. Active in the underground, he became the commissar of the 17th partisan unit of the 6th Crimean Brigade on June 16, 1943, and led the unit until being wounded on February 13, 1944.[70] In similar fashion, Mustafa Selimov, the First

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66 Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples*, 24.
67 Russian State Archive of the Economy (hereafter RGAE), f. 4372, op. 46, d. 79, l.l. 39-41. Otchet "o rabote otdela opredeleniia urozhainosti s 1 iiulia 1945 goda.
68 RGAE, f. 4372, op. 46, d. 79, l. 63. Dinamika polivnykh posevov po Krymu.
69 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 44, d. 759, l. 47. Stenogramma.
70 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l. 49. Zakliuchenie 6 aprelia, 1945.

Secretary of the Yalta Party until the invasion, became a commissar of a unit in the United Southern Front of Crimean Partisans in June 1943, and served until liberation.[71] In the meantime, Seit-Ali Ametov became commissar for the 9th partisan division until liberation.[72] With his family safely evacuated to the Dagestan ASSR, Refat Mustafaev led another partisan group outside the city of Alushta.[73]

Crimean Tatar partisan leaders such as Abdulla Dagzhy (who acquired the nickname "Uncle Vova") raided occupation supply and communications infrastructure. The female Crimean Tatar partisan Alima Abduennanova led the sabotage group "Sofia." Other Crimean Tatar men and women such as Aishe Karaeva, Khatidzhe Chapchakchi, Server Syrly and Tairov Iusyf joined the uptick in partisan and underground efforts.[74] Sixteen-year-old Akhmet Osmanovich Koliak ran away from home to join a unit in 1943.[75]

The Soviet armed forces also arranged for the infiltration of Crimean Tatars from the Red Army into occupied Crimea to assist their comrades. When the war began, Romazan Gafarovich joined the regular Red Army and survived his first two years on the front. In 1943, partisan coordinators recalled him from the regular army and dropped him into Crimea. He served as a regular partisan before commanding his own unit as the Soviet liberation began, receiving commendations for his service.[76] Dzheppar Kolesnikov also had served in the Red Army for the first two years, in his case as a

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[71] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l. 80. Zakliuchenie 19 sentiabria, 1945.
[72] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l. 194. Zakliuchenie 14 Ianvaria, 1947.
[73] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 140. "Spisok Krymskikh Tatar, prozhivaiushchikh na territorii Dagestanskoi ASSR." NKVD DASSR Kom. Gosbez R. Markaian. November 3, 1944.
[74] Open Society Archives, Budapest (hereafter HU OSA). Sobranie Dokumentov Samizdata: Tom 12 Dokumenty o Krymskikh Tatarakh (AC No. 379-1946) Sazmizdat Archive Association Munich, Germany, 1975. AC No. 1882, pg. 10. "Neopreverzhimye fakty iz zhizni krymskikh tatar za period s 1967 po 1973 goda." January 1973.
[75] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l. 317 . Zakliuchenie 12 noiabria, 1947.
[76] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l. 60. Zakliuchenie 6 oktiabria, 1945.

political commissar. He infiltrated Crimea in the summer of 1943, becoming the commissar of the Third Partisan Brigade of the United Eastern Front of Crimean Partisans, fighting until liberation.[77]

The party awarded Crimean Tatar partisans for their service, and continued to do so just before and even after the deportation. For example, a list of 180 Crimean partisans that the Crimean communist party produced *after* the deportation includes 14 Crimean Tatars and several other Crimean minorities. Party lists show Ali Ibraimov received a medal on September 1, 1944, and Khamedul Akhmetov received a medal on May 8, 1944.[78] Abdul Khairulla received a medal during the April 29-30, 1944, awards ceremonies, while the May 10, 1944, ceremony awarded Tul Urmatov and Memet Molochnikhov the Red Star Commendation for partisan service.[79] Confirming this uptick in Crimean Tatar partisans after Mokrousov's removal, historian N. F. Bugai found that Soviet partisan coordinators reported that 630 out of 3,783 (or 17%) of Crimean partisans were Crimean Tatars.[80]

In the decades after the war, surviving Crimean Tatar partisan fighters identified themselves with pride in protest letters to Moscow. In a 1967 letter, Izzet Khairullaev signed as a "former partisan commissar," while Ava Musliu Mova signed as a "decorated female partisan" and Mussemma Garfurova as a "female partisan."[81] In fact, after the

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[77] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l. 137. Zakliuchenie 17 janvaria, 1946.
[78] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 15, d. 476, l.l. 69-77. Otchet s proizvedenom vruchennykh medalei patizanu Otechestvennoi-voiny po Krymskomu Shtabu patizanskogo dvizheniia. 14 iiulia, 1944 g.
[79] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 15, d. 476, l.l. 134-135. Protokol vrucheniia ordenov i medali SSSR 29-30 aprilia 1944 goda- Pred. Prezidiuma. Ver. Sov. K. ASSR A. Kh. Menebarievym; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 15, d. 476, l.l. 136-137. Protokol vrucheniia ordenov i medali SSSR 10 maia 1944 goda- Pred. Prezidiuma.
[80] N. F. Bugai, ed. *Deportatsiia narodov kryma: Dokumenty, fakty, komentarii* (Moscow: Insan, 2002), 150.
[81] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447, l.l. 21-26. Pis'mo Krymski Tatary iz goroda Sukhumi. January 17, 1968.

Soviet Union officially denounced Stalin's lie in 1967, the Crimean Tatar paper in Uzbekistan, *Lenin Bayragi*, published a confirmation of Crimean Tatar partisan service.[82]

Providing Evidence to Support Stalin's False Allegations

As Soviet writers began producing wartime narratives for public consumption after 1945, Soviet leaders made sure that accounts of the war in Crimea confirmed Stalin's false allegations of Crimean Tatar treason. To lead this effort, Crimean party leaders turned to individuals who had incentive to champion such allegations. In particular, The Crimean 1st party Secretary, V. Bulatov, sought assistance from partisans who could identify and falsify the wartime accounts of specific Crimean Tatars, villages, and partisan engagements. Their goal was to take isolated instances of Crimean Tatar treason and construct a compelling narrative of Crimean Tatar mass treason.[83]

First, Bulatov sought out A. N. Mokrousov, a disgraced Russian partisan leader that Moscow had removed in 1942 after the partisan collapse. When the Crimean Partisan movement began, Moscow had appointed Mokrousov and A. V. Martynov to organize partisan actions (Mokrousov had been a successful partisan fighter during the revolution). By the end of 1942, the Gestapo had decimated both the general partisan movement and the underground. In the summer of 1942, as the occupation forces were pressing their assault on partisans, Mokrousov and Martynov alleged to Marshal Budenny that the "overwhelming majority" of Crimean Tatars in mountainous regions were "following the

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[82] Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*,160-161.

[83] Bulatov had the assistance of the NKVD in removing Crimean Tatar leaders A. Menbariev and I. Seitulaev from their positions in the Crimean ASSR government during the deportation. Bekirova suggests that his anti-Tatar bias was due to his disagreements with Menbariev and Seitulaev during their work running the Crimean ASSR government and party in exile from 1942 to April 1944. Bekirova, *Krymskotatarskaia Problema v SSSR*, 23.

fascists." These accusations came after Mokrousov had lost control of several Crimean Tatar partisan units who continued to attack Axis forces outside of Alushsta. Under Mokrousov's command, partisan activities were often little more than the mass robbery of village livestock and foodstuffs, causing serious public relations problems.[84] Many Crimean Tatar partisans did not condone Mokrousov's tactics to solve supply issues and claim that he often ordered Crimean Tatar partisans to rob their own villages.[85]

As the quarrel escalated, Mokrusov accused Crimean Tatar partisans of deserting to the Nazis and the bad blood devolved into an ugly situation by the late spring of 1942. When occupation forces destroyed several Crimean Tatar villages for providing men and supplies to partisans, several hundred Crimean Tatars civilians and a number of Crimean Tatar partisans took to the forest and sought to join Mokrousov's partisans. According to both Crimean Tatar accounts and the account of a Russian partisan, A. Ia. Olekha, Mokrousov refused to join with the groups and left the Crimean Tatars to be hunted and executed by the Gestapo. These victims included prominent Crimean Tatar leaders such as Abdurefi Seyt-Iagi (the former president of the Crimean ASSR Supreme Soviet), Asan Seferov, and Nuri Asmanov. Other allegations against Mokrusov and Martinov include reprisals against Russian and Tatar villagers who aided Crimean Tatar partisans not under his control.[86] Crimean Tatars and the Crimean Obkom countered Mokrusov by providing evidence that Crimean Tatar villagers had aided partisan infiltration efforts throughout 1942. Even Manstein himself recalled fighting sixteen Crimean Tatar partisan brigades

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[84] Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples,* 26; Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*,160.
[85] Lack of control, coordination, supplies, and the general isolation of Soviet partisans was a constant problem across all occupied Soviet territory. For the larger picture, see Kenneth Slepyan, *Stalin's Guerillas: Soviet Partisans in World War II* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2006), 1-2.
[86] Nekrich, *Punished Peoples*, 26-29.

of around one hundred men each at the height of the anti-partisan campaign in 1942.[87] Mokrusov's failure to sustain partisan efforts angered Crimean Tatar partisans and even other Russian partisans, and displeased Moscow.[88]

The partisan failure was the result of a sustained anti-partisan campaign by the Nazis and supply issues. Collaborators did aid the Nazis, but this collaboration included all Crimean ethnicities and mirrored the situation in all regions the Nazis occupied. Furthermore, partisan failures were sometimes the sole fault of partisans themselves. In one unfortunate incident, Timofei Kaplun, the Commissar of the Karasubazar partisan division, got so drunk with the Sudak partisan commander one evening that their merrymaking revealed their position to a nearby Romanian patrol.[89] Moscow never bought his excuse, removing both Mokrousov and Martynov from their positions.[90] As already discussed, part of the correction to the failure was placing more Crimean Tatars, both partisans already on the peninsula and those infiltrated in, into leadership positions.

Crafting a wartime narrative in Crimea to fit Stalin's allegation became Mokrousov's ticket back into Moscow's good graces. After the deportation, both the KPSS and Crimean party renounced the earlier dismissal of Mokrousov and declared that, in fact, his allegations of Crimean Tatar mass treason were right after all. The party then appointed him the director of the excursion and tourism division for the Crimean branch of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (hereafter VTsSPS). Mokrousov's primary job was to promote historical texts and accounts of the war that

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[87] Bekirova, *Krymskotatarskaia Problema*, 23.
[88] In Pohl's assessment, Mokrousov could hide neither his personal animosity towards Crimean Tatars nor a "debilitating" drinking habit. Pohl, "The Falsification of Treason Charges," 5
[89] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 44, d. 763, l. 72. Protokol No. 57.
[90] Bekirova, *Krymskotatarskaia Problema*, 23.

defamed Crimean Tatars.[91] In excursion texts approved by Mokrousov, excursion writers declared that Crimean Tatars had always been "enemies of the Russian people and the proletarian revolution," repeated verbatim Stalin's accusation of treason, and proclaimed that the war in Crimea had been against both "fascists and Tatar traitors."[92] Crimean publishing houses in Simferopol soon repeated these lines, as with the 1949 "Crimean Almanac" that described all Crimean Tatars as "lazy," "parasitic," and "traitorous."[93]

Being a tour operator tasked with the assignment of creating the evidence of Crimean Tatar mass treason meant changing thousands of wartime facts. Moreover, even in the Stalinist Soviet Union, falsifying history caused problems. As is evident in a correspondence between Mokrousov and his bosses, Moscow was nervous because Crimean materials were claiming "all Crimean Tatars were traitors since the very beginning of the war."[94] The reason for Moscow's apprehension was simple. As discussed earlier, in 1943 and 1944 the Soviet armed forced had infiltrated Crimean Tatars into Crimea as partisans. Why would Soviet generals have done this if Crimean Tatars were all collaborating? Moreover, as displayed in the Soviet documents discussed earlier in this paper, evidence that Crimean Tatars were not mass collaborators is overwhelming.

Subsequently, the most important part of Mokrousov's job became getting Russian and Ukrainian Crimean partisans to write personal narratives of the war that

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[91] While both Uehling and Bekirova underline that Mokrousov's account of treason was crucial evidence for the mass treason charges, his postwar career in the VTsSPS has remained unexplored. Uehling, *Beyond Memory*, 65-66.

[92] GARF, f. 9250, op.1, d. 153, l.l. 12, 19. VTsSPS, Metodicheskaya razrabotka ekskursia sevodya i budushi. I. Kirrilov, March 19, 1949; GARF, f. 9520, op. 1, d. 153, l.l. 39-40. Turpokhoda na goru "Chatir-Dag." Kirrilov. November 19, 1948.

[93] *Al'manakh Krym*, No. 3 (Simferopol: 1949), 218-220.

[94] GARF, f. 9520, op. 1, d. 153, l. 119. Pis'mo Nachal'nik Tur-Eks. Upravlenie VTsSPS G. Kosilov i Zav. Metodicheskom Sektorom E. Supina- A. V. Mokrousov. March 3, 1950.

supported Stalin's allegation Crimean Tatars. In 1949, Mokrousov tapped Russian partisan commander Il'ia Vergasov to pen his experiences for use in the Crimean tourism industry and historical publications. Thus began the career of the Soviet Union's most virulently anti-Crimean Tatar writer who presented the false allegations of mass treason to the Soviet public for decades to come. In a 1971 publication, he would go so far as to brag about personally leveling Crimean Tatar villages in revenge for their alleged collaboration. However, Vergasov manufactured his anti-Tatar zeal after a lengthy editing process with Mokrousov that changed his memories to fit Stalin's charges. The VTsSPS archives saved the paper trail of this process and underline that Vergasov's first attempt to record the history of Crimean resistance was very different from his later publications.

Vergasov's first 55-page account of Crimean partisan warfare, written in 1949, is the most extraordinary document on partisan warfare in Crimea. The document does not provide any evidence of overwhelming Crimean Tatar collaboration. It does the opposite, echoing the complicated reasons for partisan failure, the participation of Crimean Tatars in the Crimean underground and partisans, the collaboration of small numbers of both Slavic and Muslim Crimeans, and even confirms Manstein's failure at filling Tatar brigades.[95] He lists partisan units he commanded from Crimean Tatar mountain villages such as Kacha-Biiuk and Uzen. He said that even during the worst of the German onslaught in 1942 Crimean Tatar and Russian villagers still helped them. In fact, he kept his headquarters in the Tatar village of Laki. There were villagers that the Germans had collected into "volunteer" units, but that many of the villagers were on their

[95] GARF, f. 9520, op. 1, d. 136, l.l. 1-55. Stenogramma lektsii podpolkovnika I. Z. Vergasova: "Krymskie Partizany." 1949.

side. He even claimed that some members of the local "Muslim Committee" were assisting their operation. Other Tatar villages such as Chair, Makur and Stil provided food and treated wounded partisans. Moreover, Vergasov described how his partisan units had nominal control over the Crimean Tatar villages of Beshui, Sabil, and Uzenbash and credited the villagers with "not allowing the Germans to operate" on their territory.[96]

While Vergasov discussed collaboration, he gave no blanket condemnation of Crimean Tatars. Out of the four individual traitors that he executed, three were Russians (one his own partisan), and one Crimean Tatar. On collaborationist adversaries, he remembered fighting recruits from the Russian Liberation Army (ROA). He described the cooperation of some Tatars not as mass, but rather coming from some "elements," mainly "reactionaries and nationalists" from the "old order of mountain villages" that had housed resistance to Soviet power in 1918. While attributing some issues to treason, he indicated that the general partisan failure was organizational, especially with their supply dumps. The Axis troops used this oversight to their advantage, leaving the partisans undersupplied and isolated in mountainous regions. This assessment corresponds with the evidence that Mokrousov simply lost control of many partisan brigades as the enemy pressed their assault from December 1941 through much of 1942.[97]

The most stunning revelation, especially given Vergasov's later accounts, is that he confirmed the failure of the occupation forces to illicit mass collaboration of Crimean Tatars through the Muslim Committees and brigades of Tatar "self-defense units." He admitted that when some villages were surrounded by German forces they might "help" Germans. However, he scoffed at the German effort of organizing Tatar brigades:

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[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid.

"Volunteer units were formed, under the holy Muslim Committee that was based in the Bakchisarai palace. All of this, of course, was a myth and later the Germans dissolved the committee." Taken as a whole, Vergasov's summary of Crimean partisan warfare aligns with NKVD documents and Crimean Tatar accounts. But why did his account fundamentally change in the coming decades?

The answer is simple. Mokrousov took the transcript of Vergasov's account and, with a pen, removed the positive information on Crimean Tatar service and the parts addressing the failed Nazi efforts to create robust Crimean Tatar collaboration, and added fabricated accounts of collaboration.[98] This is just one document, but the man who would become the most prominent partisan writer providing evidence of Crimean Tatar treason, wrote it. Moreover, the Crimean partisan commander who not only created the myth of Crimean Tatar mass collaboration, but also had the job of popularizing the myth, censored it. As Mokrousov and his staff edited partisan accounts to exaggerate Crimean Tatar collaboration, they established a body of work that by the early 1950s, in the words of Crimean Tatar activists, "systematically poisoned the consciences of Soviet citizens that travel to Crimea for treatment and relaxation with the shameful accounts in excursion guides, tourist materials, and racist and nationalistic books."[99]

The falsified accounts of Vergasov and Mokrousov's other writers became very specific. For example, in lectures and his 1959 book, *In the Mountains of Tavridia: Notes of a Partisan* (*V Gorakh Tavrii: Zapiski Partizana*), Vergasov singled out the decorated partisan Bekir Osmanov and claimed that instead of being a loyal Soviet,

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[98] Ibid.

[99] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447, l. 47. Pis'mo Sovetskikh grazhdan Krymskikh Tatar, vernuvshikhsia na svoiu rodinyiu zemliu- v Krym posle 23 letnogo izganiia i "reabilitatsii" po ukazu ot 5 sentiabrai 1967 goda. January 23, 1968.

Vergasov executed Osmanov as a traitor.[100] False allegations as specific as the one against Bekir Osmanov are easy to expose with archival evidence and border on comical. Osmanov was a partisan leader and the KPSS recognized his service in 1943 and in 1944 during a formal ceremony along with other Crimean partisan leaders. Osmanov received these commendations *after* Vergasov had "executed" him "for treason."[101] Osmanov was still alive and a party member in the 1960s and became so incensed that he traveled to Crimea to confront Vergasov in-person and wrote letters to the Supreme Soviet.[102] These efforts failed, and Vergasov's 1971 book, *Krymskie tetradi* (*Crimean Notebooks*), continued the charade.[103]

Together, Mokrousov and Vergasov established the tone and method for exculpating Crimean Tatars from the Crimean partisan effort, and they attacked both Crimean Tatar individuals and the ethnic group as a whole. Denying that Crimean Tatars participated in the Red Army, partisans and received medals was essential. When the Crimean publisher "Krymizdat" published a collection of stories of "Hero of the Soviet Union" winners who were born in Crimea, only one Crimean Tatar (two-time Hero of the Soviet Union Akhmet Sultan) was among the 46 included. Crimean Tatar activists savaged this publication, correctly noting that Abduraim Reshitov, Abdul Treifuk, Bekir Mustafaevich, Seitnafe Seitveliev, Uzeir Abduramanov and 11 other Crimean Tatars

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[100] Perechen, l.l. 75-76.
[101] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 15, d. 476, l.l. 69-77. Otchet s proizvedenom vruchennykh medalei patizanu Otechestvennoi-voiny po Krymskomu Shtabu patizanskogo dvizheniia- pri Nachalnik' Krymskogo Shtab patizanskogo dvizheniia po kadram-Maior Skrebets. 14 iiulia, 1944 g.
[102] Perechen, l. 75.
[103] Ilia Vergasov, *Krymskie tetradi* (Moscow, 1971), 260-64; Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples*, 29.

received the medal.[104] Their exclusion from such publications was intentional and persistent until the late 1980s.

As Uehling notes in her interviews with Crimean Tatars, Russians, and Ukrainians, after 1944 the Soviet press excelled at fusing the charges of mass treason with the "negative stereotypes" of Crimean Tatars as Muslims from the "East" who the Soviet government could not be trusted.[105] Mokrousov's early work with VTsSPS was just the beginning of the process, and chapter 4 will underline how the VTsSPS and academics created a much larger anti-Tatar narrative for public consumption once they had established the basic treason charges.

A Legacy of Falsehoods

Stalin ordered Crimean officials and Slavic partisans to create a narrative of Crimean Tatar mass treason in order to justify his geopolitical project in Crimea. Since the early days of the Crimean ASSR, Stalin had disliked Crimean Tatar autonomy and the war gave him an opportunity to change the political and demographic landscape of one of the Soviet Union's most strategic regions. However, the fact that Soviet officials had to create false evidence reveals that they were nervous about such blatant lies. As this chapter has demonstrated, Soviet documents from the NKVD, MVD, military, and other Soviet organs counter Stalin's allegations and support the Crimean Tatar argument by providing individual examples of Crimean Tatar wartime experiences and rough estimates of service totals. Moreover, the Soviet archives reveal that Moscow understood

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[104] See *Zvezdy nemerknushcei slavy* (Simferopol: Krymizdat, 1967). For the Crimean Tatar response to this publication see HU OSA, Sobranie Dokumentov Samizdata: Tom 12 Dokumenty o Krymskikh Tatarakh (AC No. 379-1946) Sazmizdat Archive Association Munich, Germany, 1975. AC No. 1882, pg. 10. "Neopreverzhimye fakty iz zhizni krymskikh tatar za period s 1967 po 1973 goda." January 1973.
[105] Uehling, *Beyond Memory*, 65.

the failures of the Nazi occupation regime in Crimea to create a robust collaborationist army. The Soviet armed forces reacted by bolstering Crimean Tatar partisans in Crimea in 1943. To reiterate, this evidence comes from the state that charged and punished the entire nation with mass treason. However, with direct order from Moscow, Mokrousov, Vergasov and Crimean officials supported Stalin's ethnic cleansing by framing the myth of Crimean Tatar mass collaboration in the narrative of Crimean liberation and fascist defeat. As this study will discuss in chapter 4, by the early 1950s the Crimean historians adopted these treason stories as part of their larger anti-Tatar historical narrative.

However, because the myth of Crimean Tatar mass treason was absurd, the charge became difficult to sustain after his death. As the rest of this study also highlights, after the initial atrocity Crimean Tatars in special settlement could still navigate the Soviet state to achieve a form of social mobility. They remained or became Komsomol members and KPSS members, as well as demanded pensions and even voted in the 1946 Soviet elections. At the forefront of this group were Crimean Tatar veterans such as Bekir Osmanov who would begin petitioning for rehabilitation only a month after deportation.

These veterans became the vanguard of the Crimean Tatar resistance and protest movement for full rehabilitation and return to Crimea. They cited their indisputable service during the war to demand the attention of the Soviet state, and many dedicated their lives to attacking Stalin's false allegation of mass treason. As the following chapters argue, it was largely through their efforts that the Crimean Tatar return movement became the longest, largest, and most organized protest movement in the Soviet Union. This development separates Crimean Tatar veterans from many of their

Soviet comrades. As Amir Weiner argues, the war produced "an assertive Soviet individual who held tight to his (and it was mostly his and not hers) newly earned-in-blood right to define his identity." As the next chapters elucidate, Crimean Tatars took this assertiveness further than most and expanded their assertive wartime identity to the nation as a whole.[106]

Simultaneous to this resistance, belief in the treason charges became the defining dogma of the postwar Crimean communist party and government. As the following chapters highlight, new Crimean officials and residents argued that the expulsion of "treasonous" Crimean Tatars from the peninsula was essential to the larger project of creating a "new Russian Crimea" and sustaining the postwar status-quo after the 1956 "thaw" led to Crimean Tatar demands to return home.

[106] Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton University Press, 2001), 367-368.

Chapter 2

The Bureaucratic Genocide of Crimean Tatars

From May 1944 to the summer of 1946, the Soviet state committed bureaucratic genocide against Crimean Tatars, killing between 40,000 to 60,000 people, or around one fourth of the prewar Crimean Tatar population. Haphazard special settlement plans, intra-ministry fights, late trains, stolen food, conflicting orders, cruel individuals and a plethora of other bureaucratic issues caused mass death through exposure, disease and starvation. The Soviet bureaucracy, from mundane agricultural ministries to factory directors, killed Crimean Tatars and share guilt with Stalin and his captains. This fact is significant for explaining how the mass death occurred and why some Crimean Tatars died, while others survived.

Out of all the aspects of Crimean ethnic cleansing that Crimean Tatars resisted from 1944 to 1991, nothing was harder to overcome than the demographic and geographic implications of this displacement and mass death. At the same time, this sea change in Crimean Tatar history was a collective trauma, and survivors created a decades-long protest movement that both condemned and sought to reverse all the aspects of Crimean ethnic cleansing.

The goal of this chapter is to explain how mass death unfolded once Stalin put his deportation plan into motion. This chapter's first section explains the terminology surrounding Crimean ethnic cleansing, and places the Crimean Tatar story into the larger history of crimes against humanity. The second section examines Stalin's plan on paper,

while the third section explores how Soviet bureaucracy implemented the plan, creating inhumane conditions. Finally, the fourth section documents the peak of mass death in special settlement.

Crimean Tatars, Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide

For most of the Cold War, the Western discussion of genocide was self-centered, including only those crimes, as Samantha Power states, in which the U.S. could "influence the killers."[1] However, since the end of the Cold War historians have reconsidered the motivation, planning, and outcomes of numerous twentieth-century atrocities, and placed them into the academic debates surrounding genocide. These debates often focus on the "intent" of the guilty party. Some of the debated Soviet crimes that closely resemble the mass death of Crimean Tatars include the deaths of Kulaks and special settlers during Stalin's collectivization, other ethnic deportations during World War II, the Ukrainian "Kholodomor," and the Kazakh and other Soviet famines.[2] A non-Soviet example would be the 1945 Czechoslovakian-led "population transfers."[3] Although debates over the above events continue, the language of crimes against

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[1] In *A Problem From Hell,* Powers does not include the Soviet ethnic cleansing of ethnic minorities in her discussion that includes crimes affecting Armenians, European Jews, Cambodians, Rawandans, Kurds, Bosnians, and others. This is unfortunate because Soviet Crimes, as she points out, strongly influenced the father of the term, Ralph Lemkin: see Samantha Power, *A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Pereninial/Harper Collins, 2002), xv-xvii, 21. Sure enough, Norman Naimark points out that had Lemkin's insistence on including crimes committed by states against their own citizens, this would have implicated both the Soviet Union and United States. Norman Naimark, *Stalin's Genocides*, 17.

[2] For example, while there are strong opposing opinions that the Ukrainian famine was either intentional or accidental/unavoidable, the truth probably lies closer to Michael Ellman's assertion that some deaths were intentional, while others were accidental. In contrast, Nicolo Pianciola convincingly argues that the Kazakh famine was largely unintentional: see Michael Ellman, "The Role of Leadership Perceptions and Intent in the Soviet Famine of 1931-1934," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 57, No. 6, September 2005, 823-841 and Pianciola, Nicolo, "Famine in the Steppe," *Cahiers du monde russe*, 45, 1-2, 2004. On the experience of Kulak special settlers, see Lynn Viola, *The Unknown Gulag: The Lost World of Stalin's Special Settlements* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

[3] On Czechoslovakian "population transfers," see *Chad Bryant, Prague in Black: Nazi Rule and Czech Nationalism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 208-252.

humanity, which developed in response to twentieth century atrocities, frames these discussions.

When this study began, I first described Stalin's solution for Crimean Tatars as "ethnic cleansing." I hesitated at using "genocide" as an unqualified noun because Soviet historian Norman Naimark qualifies Stalin's Crimean Tatar policy as "ethnic cleansing" and "cultural genocide." Naimark asserts that Stalin's plan did not require the extermination of Crimean Tatars as individuals, just as a nation and social/political entity. Stalin sent such "enemy nations" into exile "with the idea that they would disappear through a combination of attrition, permanent removal from their homelands, and assimilation into their new surroundings."[4]

However, as my research continued, the decision not to use the term "genocide" became uncomfortable for several reasons. First off, Naimark's work focuses on motive and commonalities between crimes, only glancing over the means, methods, and outcomes of specific crimes.[5] Also, just because Stalin's plan did not require total extermination, the process and result of killing a large percentage of one ethnic group and removing them from their homeland is a similar outcome to many other atrocities that historians now consider genocide. Most importantly, Crimean Tatars began using the term "genocide" and the Tatar term "Sergun" as early as the late 1950s to characterize the crime.[6] Certainly "ethnic cleansing" describes the physical removal of Tatars from

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4 Naimark was the first Western historian to examine many of the relevant NKVD documents surrounding the deportations of Soviet minorities. Naimark, *Stalin's Genocides*, 98.

5 This is because such historians are tackling the important macro-scale task of defining terms such as genocide and ethnic cleansing. Naimark first discusses Crimean Tatars and the ethnic cleansing of Soviet Minorities in *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 94-104.

6 Naimark recommends the assertion of Chechen and Ingush historians that Stalin's deportation and special settlement of those nations were "cases of genocide." However, in the next paragraph on Crimean Tatars

Crimea and the other elements of Stalin's project that this study details, but it does not indicate how or why Crimean Tatars died en masse.

Eventually, a paper trail of Soviet documents made it apparent that Stalin, Molotov, and Beria realized their plan was sentencing tens of thousands of people to death because they knew how the Soviet state would implement the plan.[7] They knew that trains would run early or late, food and supplies would not be delivered, housing would not be ready, and that individuals along the way would exacerbate the problems because Stalin had declared the deportees to be a nation of traitors. They knew medical assistance in the Uzbek SSR would be sparse. In particular, food and supplies organs such as the Central Commission for Worker's Supply (hereafter "Narkomtorg"), the Central Commission for Meat and Milk (hereafter "Narkom MMP") and the Central Commission for Provisions (hereafter "Narkomzag") ensured mass death by refusing the NKVD's requests to feed special settlers and ensuring that the rations special settlers received were as pitiful as possible. Even when food did arrive or housing was available, abusive factory and farm directors condemned people to death. In short, every influential Soviet official involved with Crimean Tatars expected that the "resettlement" plan would not work until a substantial number of deportees were dead. By 1944, Stalin and the Soviet state understood that deporting "enemy nations" created mass death and knew how

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Naimark does not mention that Crimean Tatar historians, and even some Soviet dissidents such as Grigorii Aleksandrov, began referring to Stalin's crime against them as genocide as early as the late 1950s. See, Naimark, *Stalin's Genocides*, 96-97. On the use of Nuremburg trial transcripts and how these documents came to Tashkent in the 1950s and were used by Crimean Tatars and Soviet dissidents, see GARF, f. 10148, op. 1, d. 26, l.l. 1-7. "Stat'ia Ali Khamzina, interv'iu posvishennye pamiata G. M. Aleksandrov. June 5, 2003. By the mid-1960s, Crimean Tatar activists used GENOCIDE, in all-caps and bolded, in both petitions to the Soviet government and in samizdat. For example, see GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447. l. 69. *Info* # 71, June 17 to July 1, 1968.

[7] Molotov in particular had "increased responsibilities" from 1941-1945: see Oleg Khlevniuk (trans. Nora Seligman Favorov), *Master of the House: Stalin and His Inner Circle* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 258.

to ignore and conceal the mass death, while at the same time finding scapegoats to blame. The crime was inefficient and sloppy, but such was Soviet bureaucracy.

At the same time, Stalin planned on some Crimean Tatars surviving. One paradox of the crime is that, while the NKVD was the main offending state organ, Stalin's decrees, no matter how unrealistic, ordered the NKVD to keep special settlers alive in exile. No matter how cynical one is about the NKVD, the leadership of the Special Settlers Division did try to secure food needed for Crimean Tatar survival. This was their job. While many of the following NKVD and MVD documents are biased towards Stalin's police and blame the mass death on other ministries, all accounts of the mass death confirm that some special settler authorities prevented death from becoming worse. Therein lay the uniqueness of Stalinist bureaucratic genocide. There was always a "plan" for some survivors so it is impossible to conclude that Stalin intended to kill all members of any given group. However, Stalin and his bureaucracy knew that his policies created mass death and only worked after a substantial percentage of any deported group was dead.

In sum, the mass death of Crimean Tatars from May 1944 to 1946 was bureaucratic genocide, a genocide that the entire Soviet bureaucracy, in a collective effort, created and implemented. This crime was the first and most important component of the larger ethnic cleansing campaign in Crimea that had the primary goal of removing Crimean Tatars as individuals and a nation from the peninsula. The rest of this chapter explores how the event unfolded, from Stalin down to individual Crimean Tatars and Uzbek factory and farm directors.

Stalin's Solution to Crimean Fifth Columns: The Deportation Plan

Stalin's intent to ethnically cleanse Crimea is indisputable. GOKO* order 5859ss on May 11, 1944, proclaimed that during World War II "many Crimean Tatars" had deserted, betrayed Soviet partisans, or volunteered for the Third Reich Tatar brigades. As a result, Stalin ordered the NKVD to deport all Crimean Tatars to the Uzbek SSR as "special settlers." The six-page order assigned the roles of various Soviet organs in the deportation process, leaving no doubt that Stalin sought the total ethnic cleansing of Crimean Tatars from their homeland.[8]

Order 5859ss did not specify the actual date of deportation as May 17-18, but required Beria to have completed the Crimean phase of the "project" by June 1, 1944. Beria and Ivan Serov approved many of the crucial decisions of the Crimean deportation and worked with Kaganovich on transportation logistics. Together, they decided the number of convoys, their sizes, timetables, the train stations of arrival and departure, and arranged the motor transport to and from the stations. Moreover, as this chapter highlights, Stalin gave much of the final say on questions about the project to Molotov, and he and Beria would disagree on critical points.[9]

Once on the train convoys, the immediate future of Crimean Tatars was in the hands of the MVD, NKVD, the local authorities in the regions of special settlements, and the various Soviet organs tasked with providing supplies. From Moscow, Molotov, Beria and Vasily Chernyshev (head of the NKVD's special settler commission) oversaw the plan. In the Uzbek SSR, Amaiak Kobulov (Uzbek NKVD Commissar), Abdudzhabar

* Gosudarstvennyi Komitet Oborony (State Committee on Defense, 1941-45).
8 GARF, f. 10026, op. 4, d. 1025, l.l. 88-93. Gosudarstvennyi komitet oborony postanovlenia GOKO No. 5859ss ot 11 maia 1944 "O Krymskikh Tatarakh."
9 Ibid.

Abdurakhmanov (the head of the Uzbek Sovnarkom), and Usman Iusupov (the Uzbek Central Committee Secretary) organized the intake of deportees.[10] While en route, Stalin ordered Narkomtorg to provide hot water and one hot meal a day, and Narkomzdrav (the health ministry) to provide a doctor, two nurses, and medical supplies for each convoy.[11] Food supplies organs were supposed to provide deportees with 500 grams of bread, 70 grams of meat or fish, 60 grams of grain, and 10 grams of fat a day.[12]

In Uzbek oblasts receiving Crimean Tatars, the head of the local NKVD and local party and Soviet bosses were supposed to form commissions of three (troikas) to oversee the process and create similar troikas on the district level. These bodies first had to arrange vehicle transport for Tatars to farms and factories. Once at the new "settlements," the troikas had to provide housing or land plots, building materials and construction workers. For security, Beria dispatched extra NKVD officers already experienced in deporting ethnic "fifth columns" to Central Asia in 1943.[13] The NKVD required every 350 families to be guarded by one NKVD commandant with an assistant and in locations with more than 350 families, an addition of 250 families required an extra commandant would be added. Each commandant commanded three to seven regular NKVD soldiers.[14]

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[10] Chernyshev was a policing expert and GULAG boss during the war: see Anne Applebaum, *GULAG: A History* (New York: Anchor Books, 2003), 260.

[11] GARF, f. 10026, op. 4, d. 1025, l.l. 88-93. Gosudarstvennyi komitet oborony postanovlenia GOKO No. 5859ss ot 11 maia 1944 "O Krymskikh Tatarakh."

[12] To pay for the project, Stalin provided the NKVD with 30 million rubles from the Sovnarkom reserve fund. GARF, f. 10026, op. 4, d. 1025, l. 94. Vedomost' vydeleniia produktov Narkomtorgu SSSR dlia pitaniia spetspereselentsev v puti sledovaniia- prilozhenye No. 1 k Postanovleniiu GOKO No. 5859ss ot 11 maia 1944.

[13] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1s, 179, l. 2. Zam. NKVD SSSR Komissar Gosbezopasn. 2 Ranga Chernyshov- NKVD Uzb. SSR Komissar Gosbezopasnosti 3 ranga Kobulov. May 12, 1944.

[14] GARF f. 9479s, op. 1s, 179, l.l. 33-34. NKVD UzSSR Komissar Gosbezopasnosti 3 Ranga A. Kobulov to Samarkand Nachal'niku YNKVD Ismailov. May 13, 1944.

Implementation

The actual removal of Crimean Tatars from Crimea was brutal and quick. On May 9, 1944, 19 year-old NKVD soldier A. Vesnin and his squadron arrived in Crimea at the Dzhanskoi train station and then drove to Kerch. Their commanding officers gave them no official reason for their deployment, but a rumor spread that Beria was sending them to fight "brigades of Nazi Tatar-volunteers." In Kerch, the NKVD regulars patrolled the surrounding hills, only to find no traitors. Then, on May 15, Vesnin's squadron drove to the Lenin regional center and awaited orders. Finally, in the early morning hours of May 18, commanders rushed the squadron out of bed, ordered the soldiers to grab their weapons, and loaded them onto lorries. The convoy flew across the steppe, arriving at the Crimean Tatar village of Oisul around 3:30am. As Vesnin recalls, only upon arrival did the officers announce that the operation was in fact the deportation of Crimean Tatars. They loaded their weapons and officers divided the men into groups of three with each group headed by a sergeant or a Kerch NKVD operative.[15] At 4:00 am the groups burst into Crimean Tatar homes and announced a scripted declaration: "In the name of Soviet authority! For treason against your motherland you are being relocated to a different region of the Soviet Union!" The NKVD gave families two hours to collect 200 kg of belongings, not the 500 kg that Stalin's order stipulated. The transportation of the entire village to the closest train station, Sem' Kolodezei, was made in one trip with new Ford and Studebaker trucks. According to Vesnin, most NKVD soldiers carried out the operation mechanically, but there were also "revolting" acts of cruelty. One old

[15] GARF, f. A-664, op. 1, d. 176, l.l. 35-37. "Trebovanie vosstanovit' spravedlivost' v otnoshenii zhertv bezzakoniia i represii." To Predsedateliu komissii po problemam zhertv bezzakonie I repressii v gody VOV tov. Deputatu L. A. Gorshkovu from sem'ia Memish-ogly Suleimana Saidovicha. August 12, 1989.

woman in Oisul was so overcome with "shock and grief" that she fled into a field and, instead of retrieving her, a soldier "cut her down with a burst of machinegun fire." Another soldier "dragged an invalid to the Ford by his hair."[16]

Crimean Tatars confirm the basics of Vesnin's account. Tenzila Ibraimova recalled that the NKVD woke them at 3:00 am in the village of Adzhiatman. With her husband in the Soviet army, she alone gathered her children in five minutes.[17] Sanzika Ibragimova recalled that the NKVD burst through their door at 3:00 am and gave them five minutes to get dressed, not allowing them to collect food. From their village of Adzhiatmak in the Fraidorfskogo district, the NKVD transported Sanzika and her three children to the train station in Evpatoria. Tenzila's and Sanzika's situation of being alone with their children was common because, as Chapter One underlined, most Tatar families had husbands who were fighting or had been killed in action.[18] Other accounts point to times as early as 2:00am.[19]

Nearly 160,000 Crimean Tatars were en route to seven different Uzbek SSR oblasts by May 20. Tashkent oblast was expecting 61,000 Crimean Tatars, followed by Samarkand oblast (37,500), Ferghana oblast (25,700), Namagan oblast (20,000), Andijan oblast (21,500), Kashka-Darin oblast (10,200), and Bukhara oblast (4,100).[20] In these seven oblasts, Uzbek authorities planned to resettle 94,500 deportees to kolkhozes,

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[16] Ibid.
[17] Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples*, 110-111.
[18] HU OSA, Sobranie Dokumentov Samizdata (hereafter SDS) AC No. 1877, pg. 18. "Obrashchenie krymskotatarskogo naroda k XXIII s"ezdu KPSS." 1968.
[19] Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples,* 110-111.
[20] GARF f. 9479s, op. 1s, 179, l.l. 24-27. May 20, 1944. Sekretar' TsK KP(b) Uzkekistana U. Iusupov and NKVD UzSSR Komissar Gosbezopasnosti 3 Ranga A. Kobulov to Beria.

36,300 to sovkhozes, and 23,200 to industrial sites.[21] They based this distribution on labor needs, the availability of housing, and the order to disperse the population thinly across the republic for the duel purposes of security and destroying the Crimean Tatar nation by isolating Tatars from each other.[22]

In addition, the NKVD deported around 32,000 Crimean Tatars to Russian oblasts. Documents reveal that this was an effort to both separate much of the Crimean Tatar political and party elite from the majority of Crimean Tatars and to place party members, skilled workers, and veterans into useful positions. These Crimean Tatars were concentrated in Molotov oblast (10,002), Mariin ASSR (8,597), Gorki oblast (5,514), Sverdlov oblast (3,591) and Ivanov oblast (2,800).[23] Smaller numbers also ended up in Iaroslavl' oblast and several other regions.[24]

The NKVD fully understood the conditions that awaited Crimean Tatars in their journey to exile. Before the trek began, commanders circulated a questionnaire for all NKVD soldiers to ask when they unloaded Crimean Tatars. While the first questions were basic information, question eight bluntly asked how many people died per family during the journey. Since the NKVD knew what age groups would die first, questions nine and ten asked for the totals of deceased children and elderly and requested the cause of death. The eleventh question then inquired about how many family members required hospitalization after the journey and what ailment each individual had. Finally,

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21 GARF f. 9479, op. 1s, 179, l. 29. May 1944. NKVD UzSSR Komissar Gosbezopasnosti 3 Ranga A. Kobulov- Beria.
22 GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l.l. 5-9. 25.IV.1944 Tashkent NKVD, Polkovnik Gosbezopasnosti Mal'ytsev and Podpolkovnik Gosbezopasnosti Maslennikov- V. V. Vhernyshov. (sekretno)
23 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 67. Spravka- O sostave I kolichestve vyselennykh iz Kryma spetspereselentsev." By Zam. Nach. Otdela Spets. NKVD SSSR Polkovnik Mal'tsev. July 1, 1944.
24 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 63. Zam. Nach. UNKVD Iaroblasti Podpolkovnik Nemirovskii i Nach. Oper. Otdela Iaroblasti Maior Muromtsev. June 13, 1944.

indicating the general chaos of moving a whole nation in a week's time, the fifteenth question asked how many people were "left along the way."[25]

As expected, conditions quickly deteriorated on the convoys and upon arrival. Several aspects of the unloading and resettlement plan accelerated the crisis. First off, it is important to realize just how haphazard the process was on the Uzbek side. Beria deported Crimean Tatars on May 17-18, and only two days later, on May 20, Uzbek officials were required to provide Beria with a list of oblasts, districts, and train stations "ready" to receive special settlers. Next, while the NKVD and supply organs were supposed to take steps to avoid starvation and illness on convoys, most convoys never received rations. In addition, Stalin had ordered the Uzbek NKVD to establish kitchens along the Tashkent railroad and stipulated that deportees receive 400 grams of bread a day. Again, most of these food and provisions never arrived, about which the NKVD on the ground in the Uzbek SSR complained repeatedly. Even in districts that did receive bread, supplies were sporadic and whole districts would go without rations for days at a time.[26] The NKVD and some Uzbek officials noted how the lack of food was "especially hard on children, who were getting nothing but a little bread."[27]

The deportation was also too quick. Crimean Tatars arrived in Central Asia as much as a week ahead of schedule. While Tashkent oblast was expecting arrivals the first week of June, Kobulov simply told oblast NKVD officials on May 19 that "due to the

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25 GARF f. 9479s, op. 1s, 179, l. 4. **"**Voprosy na kotorye sleduet dat' otvety i soobshchenii o pribytii i razgruzke eshelonov so spetspereselentsami." May 12, 1944.

26 GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 23ob. "Dokladnaia Zapiska- O rabote po rasseleniiu krymskikh tatar v Kashka-Dar'inskoi oblasti, UzSSR." Nach. NKVD K/Dar'inskoi Obl. Podpolkovnik Gosbez. Samarodov and Nach. Po NKVD UzbSSR Podpolkovnik Gosbez. Nikolaev- Kobulov. July 13, 1944.

27 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 27. "Dokladnaia Zapiska- otprieme I rasselenii krymskikh tatar po Namanganskoi obl." From Nach. UNKVD po Nam. Obl. Maior Gosbez. Gotsev, Upolnomochenniy NKVD SSSR Podpolkovnik Miliakov, Upol. UNKVD Podpolkovnik Trofimov, Upol. NKVD SSSR Podpolkovnik Vorob'ev. to Kobulov. June 1944.

expediting of the Crimean Tatar resettlement project," the first convoys would begin arriving at Tashkent railway stations as early as May 25. This was only ten days after Uzbek officials learned of the operation.[28]

Finally, the numerous instructions outlining the plan were confusing. On the one hand, Beria ordered the Uzbek NKVD to quickly transport Crimean Tatars to their final destinations, ordering 650 trucks to be ready.[29] On the other hand, in an attempt to avert outbreaks of typhoid fever and other illnesses, the Uzbek Sovnarkom ordered that every Crimean Tatar had to be "sanitized" before they could be transported to farms and factories.[30] Uzbek police fenced off isolation areas adjacent to train platforms to quarantine children and "cleanse" Crimean Tatars.[31] The Uzbek Sovnarkom also forbade Uzbek residents from assisting or having contact with the deportees.[32] As Paul Stonski argues, when deportees did have contact with Uzbeks, the interactions were often hostile. As national traitors, there was often hostility and sometimes violence towards Crimean Tatars that only made their predicament worse.[33] Rumors about special settlers spread through rural communities and helped fuel aggression. For instance, in Kashka-Dar'inskoi oblast a rumor spread that the NKVD was going to deport all Russians and

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28 GARF f. 9479s, op. 1s, 179, l. 36. NKVD UzSSR Komissar Gosbezopasnosti 3 Ranga A. Kobulov to Samarkand Pred. Oblispolkoma Artykov and Sekretar Obkoma Makhmulov. May 19, 1944.

29 GARF f. 9479s, op. 1s, 179, l. 26. Sekretar' TsK KP(b) Uzkekistana U. Iusupov and NKVD UzSSR Komissar Gosbezopasnosti 3 Ranga A. Kobulov to Beria. May 20, 1944.

30 GARF f. 9479s, op. 1s, 179, l. 54-56. Postanovlenie Sovnarkom Uzbekskoi SSR No. 596-80s. Signed by Zam. Pred. SNK UzSSR P. Kabanov and Sekretar' TsK KP/b/Uz U. Iusupov. May 24, 1944.

31 To assist this effort, Tashkent and Samarkand medical institutions sent nearly 500 students to quarantine areas for a month and a half. GARF f. 9479s, op. 1s, 179, l. 29. NKVD UzSSR Komissar Gosbezopasnosti 3 Ranga A. Kobulov to Beria. May 1944.

32 GARF f. 9479s, op. 1s, 179, l. 54-56. May 24, 1944. Postanovlenie Sovnarkom Uzbekskoi SSR No. 596-80s. Signed by Zam. Pred. SNK UzSSR P. Kabanov and Sekretar' TsK KP/b/Uz U. Iusupov.

33 Stronski, *Tashkent*, 132-133.

Uzbeks from the region once the Tatars arrived.[34] This disdain of Uzbeks towards special settlers was never universal and would wane in later years, but, in the wake of the war, a visceral hatred towards "traitors" was real.

As a result, even if all the required parties met Crimean Tatar convoys when they arrived, there was automatically a conflict between NKVD and Uzbek officials over the speed at which they should place Crimean Tatars on Uzbek farms and factories. Uzbek authorities sought to delay the process, while the NKVD demanded that Crimean Tatars reach their final destination as soon as possible.

These inconsistencies created a deadly situation. The "quarantine" areas were often no more than exposed encampments where Crimean Tatars starved and succumbed to illness because Uzbek authorities refused them shelter and food. In internal Uzbek NKVD correspondences, local NKVD commanders complained that much of the "industrial establishment" tasked with receiving special settlers had not "seriously prepared" for the project, and enterprise directors refused to let deportees enter their territory. Specific examples of these abuses abound in NKVD correspondences. The director of the PDI Enterprise, Nikolaev, refused to house 75 families (300 people) and said that he had no space for them. At Stalin factory 708, the director declined to house 2,000 deportees, only accepting around 270 people.[35] The directors of the Krasnoarmeiskogo strip mine in the Akhan-Goransk district of Tashkent oblast

[34] GARF, f. 10026, op. 4, d. 1025, l. 74. "Spetsposelentsy iz Kryma/1944-1956gg." Report by V. N. Zemskov on December 9, 1991.
[35] GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l.l. 39-40. "Dokladnaia Zapiska- O prieme i rasselenii spetspereselentsev po Tashkentskoi Oblasti. Nachal'nik UKNVD Podpolkovnik Matveev and Upol. NKVD SSSR Polkovnik Admin. Sluzhby Tarkhonov to Kobulov. June (on or after 14) 1944. (Hereafter cited as "Dokladnaia Zapiska po Tashkentskoi Oblasti.").

abandoned the 400 settlers assigned to them.[36] At least 1,200 Crimean Tatars arrived at the Kalinin Oil Enterprise in Andijan oblast on June 1, but the directors told the NKVD that special settlers would have to wait on trains and platforms for "10 to 15 days."[37] Even some organizations that requested special settler labor did not pick up deportees and had often lied about available shelter. For example, at the Voenstroi factory in Tashkent oblast, management placed 400 Crimean Tatars in an abandoned club and took no step to find them housing.[38] In other cases, local NKVD officers disobeyed Moscow and Tashkent. For instance, the commander of the Iani-Iul' city NKVD, Major Sleptsov, did not arrange care for deportees and lied about preparations.[39]

Compounding the crisis, many convoys arrived in regions that received more deportees than expected, or in regions not expecting settlers. One such group of deportees was convoy number 613/637, which was supposed to go to Piatok station in the Izbaskent district of Andijan oblast. At the last minute, the Andijan oblast party and NKVD changed the destination, directing the convoy of 2,578 people to the Assake station in the Lenin district. With no housing ready, authorities left the deportees to the elements. Some sought shelter in local teahouses. Weeks later 199 families were still homeless.[40] In similar fashion, the Bossuiskoi hydroelectric station in Tashkent oblast unexpectedly received over 3,000 people with only a few hours notice. Directors housed as many people as they could in earthen dugouts, cramming around 120 people into each

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[36] Ibid, l. 41.

[37] GARF, f. 9479s, op. 1s, 179, l. 78. TELEGRAM No. 1398. NKVD UzSSR Komissar Gosbezopasnosti 3 Ranga A. Kobulov- NKVD Chernyshev. June 1, 1944.

[38] Dokladnaia Zapiska po Tashkentskoi Oblasti. l. 41.

[39] Dokladnaia Zapiska po Tashkentskoi Oblasti, l. 39.

[40] GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l.l. 15-19. June 1944. Upolnomochennyi NKVD SSSR po AND OBL Kapitan Gosbezopastnosti Romashov to Upolnomochennomy NKVD SSSR po Uzbekskoi SSR Mal'tsevu. "Dokladnaia Zapiska o rezul'tatakh priema I rasseleniia spetspereselentsev (K.T.) po Andizhanskoi Obl."

dugout.[41] Many factories and farms that received unexpected settlers had no shelter whatsoever available. When the Kaitash strip mine in Samarkand oblast received 2,200 settlers, even many of the regular workers were living in temporary tents. Only around 1,000 settlers could fit into the tents and the rest had absolutely no shelter.[42]

To be clear, the abuse was not isolated, but endemic. According to the NKVD, "the majority" of party and government officials in Nagaman oblast refused to participate in the troika committees receiving special settlers.[43] The local organizations that were supposed to provide hot meals while the deportees were awaiting transport often never arrived. The chaos placed many NKVD officers in the conundrum described by NKVD Lieutenant Doroshenko in the Ak Kurgan district. Out of the three troika officials ordered to greet the convoy arriving at the 56 Raz"ezd station, he and his soldiers were the only ones to arrive, leaving them without proper transport and medical care. In addition, the directors of local cotton sovkhozes refused to provide hot meals.[44] With the local party and government not cooperating, Doroshenko appealed to Tashkent for help in saving the convoy. In another example, the Namagan oblast NKVD complained that the Iangi Kurgan district party secretary, Galagonov, completely ignored his duties to special settlers. Galagonov bluntly responded to the NKVD's complaint: "the party secretary has more important government matters to attend to, and that (special settlers)

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41 Dokladnaia Zapiska po Tashkentskoi Oblasti, l. 41.

42 GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 34. Doklandaya Zapiska o prieme is rasselenii spetspereselentsev – krymskikh tatar v Samarkandsoi Oblasti, UzbSSR. Zam. NKVD UzbSSR Polkovnik Meer, Nach. Samark. UNKVD Capitan Ismailov, and Pred. NKVD SSSR Polkovnik Grigor'ev to Kobulov and Mal'tsev. (no. 1/8025). June 9, 1944 (dated May 9, but must be a mistake).

43 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 27ob. **"**Dokladnaia Zapiska- otprieme i rasselenii krymskikh tatar po Namanganskoi obl." From Nach. UNKVD po Nam. Obl. Maior Gosbez. Gotsev, Upolnomochenniy NKVD SSSR Podpolkovnik Miliakov, Upol. UNKVD Podpolkovnik Trofimov, Upol. NKVD SSSR Podpolkovnik Vorob'ev. to Kobulov. June 1944.

44 Dokladnaia Zapiska po Tashkentskoi Oblasti, l. 40.

are the duty of the district NKVD… the party secretary has no obligation to work on this matter."[45]

In short, NKVD officers were often the sole coordinators of the resettlement. They were overwhelmed and undersupplied at best, but sometimes also abusive. Little bread arrived and there is no evidence that any Crimean Tatars ever received the promised meat, fish, or fat. A few days after the deportation began, Uzbek NKVD Commissar Kobulov claimed to Beria that 124,500 living quarters were ready. The reality as depicted above shows that the NKVD count was inaccurate because many of the dugouts and other shelters were not fit for human inhabitance, especially in the coming winter.[46] Some Tashkent NKVD reports to Moscow in 1944 attempted to hide the reality by proclaiming that many Crimean Tatars in the republic were "pleased" that the NKVD had not abandoned them "in open fields" to die.[47] This was true is some cases, but such claims suggest that everyone expected exposure, disease and starvation.

Given the chaos, the death toll on the convoys and during the "transit" from stations to the final destinations of farms and factories is difficult to surmise, especially for those groups left alone to the elements. In all, over 70 convoys of Crimean Tatars embarked between May 17 and 18. Each transported between 1,500 and 6,000 people.[48] By June 8, the last large deportation convoys bound for the Uzbek SSR had arrived in Central Asia. Tashkent reported that they had received 57 train convoys with 151,529

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[45] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 27. **"**Dokladnaia Zapiska- otprieme i rasselenii krymskikh tatar po Namanganskoi obl." From Nach. UNKVD po Nam. Obl. Maior Gosbez. Gotsev, Upolnomochenniy NKVD SSSR Podpolkovnik Miliakov, Upol. UNKVD Podpolkovnik. June 1944.

[46] GARF, f. 9479s, op. 1s, 179, l. 29. NKVD UzSSR Komissar Gosbezopasnosti 3 Ranga A. Kobulov to Beria. May 1944.

[47] In other words, Uzbek authorities that actually housed and fed Crimean Tatars were defying expectations. GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 7. Tashkent NKVD, Polkovnik Gosbezopasnosti Mal'ytsev and Podpolkovnik Gosbezopasnosti Maslennikov to V. V. Chernyshov. (sekretno) 25.IV.1944

[48] GARF f. 9479s, op. 1s, 179, l.l. 51-53. May 25, 1944. Plan: Priema I Razgruzki Eshelonov po Stantsiam. NKVD UzSSR Komissar Gosbezopasnosti 3 Ranga A. Kobulov.

people: 27,558 men, 55,684 women, and 68,287 children. Per NKVD records sent from Tashkent to Moscow, 191 Crimean Tatars had died en route. The deadliest convoy was convoy number 633 that arrived in Kugai, Namagan oblast, having lost 9 out of 3,094 passengers.[49]

In actuality, the number of deaths en route to the Uzbek SSR and immediately after disembarking was much greater. Reports by oblast authorities reveal that Uzbek NKVD officials in Tashkent blatantly concealed death and illness totals. While special settlers death was expected, it also meant NKVD officers were not doing their "job." As Naimark argues, this gave NKVD leaders the incentive to conceal "extraneous deaths" in special settlements and the GULAG.[50] For instance, Kobulov's assistant, A. Matveev, produced the final report for Beria that counted only 19 deceased and three hospitalized persons for the 6 convoys (13,804 people) that offloaded in Namgan oblast.[51] However, an earlier report to Tashkent from the Namagan NKVD stated that 31 people had died and 88 had become seriously ill on the convoys, and another 29 people had become ill after arriving. Reflecting on the general condition of deportees, the Namagan NKVD observed that most Crimean Tatars showed signs of "light illness" due to "changes in climate conditions," meaning heat exhaustion, dehydration and exposure.[52]

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49 GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l.l. 10-12. Nachal'nik 5 Otdeleniia Otdela Spetsposelenii NKVD SSSR Podpolkovnik V. Matveev in Tashkent. "Spravka o razgrushennykh eshelonakh po planu rasseleniia spetspereselentsev v 7-mi oblastiakh Uzbekskoi SSR (sekretno). June 8, 1944.

50 Naimark, *Stalin's Genocides*, 12.

51 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l.l. 10-12. Nachal'nik 5 Otdeleniia Otdela Spetsposelenii NKVD SSSR Podpolkovnik V. Matveev in Tashkent. "Spravka o razgrushennykh eshelonakh po planu rasseleniia spetspereselentsev v 7-mi oblastiakh Uzbekskoi SSR. (sekretno). June 8, 1944.

52 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l.l. Pg 26ob-27. "Dokladnaia Zapiska- otprieme i rasselenii krymskikh tatar po Namanganskoi obl." From Nach. UNKVD po Nam. Obl. Maior Gosbez. Gotsev, Upolnomochenniy NKVD SSSR Podpolkovnik Miliakov, Upol. UNKVD Podpolkovnik Trofimov, Upol. NKVD SSSR Podpolkovnik Vorob'ev. to Kobulov. June, 1944.

NKVD reports from Kashka-Darin oblast parallel these discrepancies. Tashkent reported just 13 hospitalizations to Moscow, when in fact the oblast NKVD reported that 71 deportees required immediate hospitalization and more than 350 "were suspected to be ill." Low-level NKVD officers were not medical experts, but they knew that the developing outbreaks of typhus, malaria and other diseases would only spread, as would starvation and exposure. They even informed Tashkent that victims "were just now beginning to display symptoms." Sure enough, in the weeks after arrival they hospitalized an additional 35 people in the Shakhriziabskii district and "many more" in other districts across the oblast.[53]

First-hand Crimean Tatar accounts confirm the atrocious conditions and rising death toll. In fact, evidence strongly suggests that oblast NKVD leaders had already greatly deflated the death tolls and that Tashkent only further shrunk the totals in reports to Beria. Rustem Mustafaevich recalled how he and his four siblings (already orphans) arrived in Uzbekistan and the NKVD simply left them with other Crimean Tatars on a barren train platform at Stantsii Novoaleksevka. With no food or shelter, his brother Bekir died and eventually the NKVD placed the surviving siblings in an orphanage. Rustem recalled the similar plight of his friends "Munire, Sabira, Taire, Alie and Emine" and other Crimean Tatar orphans as their number swelled.[54] Another survivor, Shamil Aliadin, confirmed the fact that even through convoys made it to Central Asia and Siberia in good time, it took many Crimean Tatars up to a month to get to their final destinations.

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[53] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 220b. "Dokladnaia Zapiska- O rabote po rasseleniiu krymskikh tatar v Kashka-Dar'inskoi oblasti, UzSSR." Nach. NKVD K/Dar'inskoi Obl. Podpolkovnik Gosbez. Samarodov and Nach. Po NKVD UzbSSR Podpolkovnik Gosbez. Nikolaev to Kobulov. Uprav. NKVD po K/Dar Obl. June 13, 1955.

[54] GARF, f. A-664, op. 1, d. 176, l. 18. Letter to S"ezdu Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR ot Uchitelia Voennogo Rustema Mustafaevicha. May 26, 1989

Many deportees spent weeks in "stifling" cattle cars on railway sidings in the Kazakh SSR or on train platforms. Death on the convoys was so pervasive, according to Aliadin, that the "NKVD would seize corpses and throw them out of the freight car windows" along the way.[55] According to Yusuf Suleymanov, he personally buried 18 dead compatriots, and estimated that nearly half of the 208 people form his village died on the convoy and on the Urta-Aul train platform in Tashkent oblast.[56] This is a sharp contrast to the 10 total deaths that the Uzbek NKVD reported at the Urta-Aul platform, especially when considering that Suleymanov's account references just a small segment of the 5,589 settlers stranded on the same platform during the deportation.[57] Other Crimean Tatars reported incidents such as that on a convoy somewhere between Zaparozhia and Kharkov. When a three year-old Tatar boy from the Crimean village of Aiseres fell off a train wagon, the guards did not retrieve him.[58] The above accounts perhaps reveal why the NKVD did not report totals for the question about how many people "vanished" while en route when they unloaded Crimean Tatars.

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55 As early as 1957, Crimea Tatar leaders such as Shamil Aliadin presented these accounts to the TsK SSSR. Aliadin's account appears in Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples,* 111.

56 Fisher includes similar accounts in his section on the deportation. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 170. Recent oral interviews and research by Bekirova further supports high death tolls on the convoys and immediately after arrival: see Bekirova, Gulnara. "Babushki, Brat'ia i Sestry Umerli v Pervye Mesiatsy," *Gazeta.ru*. May 17, 2104. Available at http://kirimtatar.com/ index.php? option=com _content& task= view&id=610&Itemid=382. Accessed on June 17, 2016.

57 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l.l. 10-12. Nachal'nik 5 Otdeleniia Otdela Spetsposelenii NKVD SSSR Podpolkovnik V. Matveev "Spravka o razgrushennykh eshelonakh po planu rasseleniia spetspereselentsev v 7-mi oblastiakh Uzbekskoi SSR. June 8, 1944.

58 Surviving the fall, local police picked him up and placed him in an orphanage where workers named him Arkadii Aleksandrov. His father had died during the war and his mother died in special settlement, but his older brother survived and spent two decades searching for his brother. In the meantime, Arkadii married a Russian woman and had children, and although he personally claimed to remember his other family, he never shared the fact that he was likely Crimean Tatar. However, in the 1960s his brother found him and when his wife found out that Arkadii was actually a Tatar, she divorced him. GARF f. A-664, op. 1, d. 176, l. 18. Letter to S"ezdu Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR ot Uchitelia Voennogo Rustema Mustafaevicha. May 26, 1989.

There is no doubt that the Uzbek NKVD lied to Moscow about the scope and scale of death and illness as the situation deteriorated. However, NKVD counts of special settlers do hint at the scale of death on convoys bound for the Uzbek SSR. The NKVD claimed it deported approximately 180,000 Crimean Tatars to the Uzbek SSR by May 20.[59] However, after unloading those convoys in late May and early June 1944, the Uzbek NKVD reported that they had only received 151,604 Crimean Tatars.[60] Most of this gap is likely from convoys diverted to Russian oblasts. Still, the fact that Uzbek NKVD officers unloading the convoys lowered the total of Crimean Tatars in the Uzbek SSR from 154,617 to 151,604 between May 25 and June 11 suggests a death toll of at least several thousand during over this period.[61] Again, this was the same period that Crimean Tatars reported dreadful conditions on train platforms.

Documentation of death and disease is even murkier for the over 30,000 special settlers sent to RSFSR oblasts. On the one hand, many of these deportees were party members, Soviet bureaucrats, veterans, and skilled workers, and the NKVD quickly placed them into factories to utilize their skills, especially in Gorki and Molotov oblasts. On the other hand, several NKVD documents do suggest disease outbreaks. For example, a report from Molotov oblast described unsanitary conditions as deportees unloaded from convoys onto boats. At least 54 Crimean Tatars became ill with typhus and the NKVD predicted the "outbreak would grow" without "immediate sanitary

[59] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1s, 179, l.l. 24-27. Sekretar' TsK KP(b) Uzkekistana U. Iusupov and NKVD UzSSR Komissar Gosbezopasnosti 3 Ranga A. Kobulov to Beria. May 20, 1944.
[60] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l.l. 5-9. Tashkent NKVD, Polkovnik Gosbezopasnosti Mal'ytsev and Podpolkovnik Gosbezopasnosti Maslennikov to V. V. Vhernyshov (sekretno). June 25, 1944.
[61] GARF, f. 9479s, op. 1s, 179, l.l. 51-53. Plan: Priema i Razgruzki Eshelonov po Stantsiam. NKVD UzSSR Komissar Gosbezopasnosti 3 Ranga A. Kobulov. May 25, 1944.

measures."[62] A report form Gorki oblast admitted that over a dozen Crimean Tatars had contacted typhus, but afterwards the NKVD took sanitary measures and vaccinated special settlers.[63] This access to vaccines and medical care appears to be the main difference between the RSFSR oblasts and the Uzbek SSR.

A final complicating factor to the deportation policy and the accuracy of Soviet numbers was the fate of Crimean Tatar soldiers. Secret orders dictated that commanding officers were supposed to immediately strip soldiers of their weapons and identification, give them a special settler card, and place Crimean Tatar soldiers in NKVD custody. Sure enough, the NKVD did deport several thousand active-duty Crimean Tatars on May 17-18. One typical individual deportation story is that of Alimzhan Satdarov. When the deportation began, he was located in Simferopol, serving in the 180th Reserve Rifle Division. On May 18, the NKVD removed him from his unit and deported him to Ferghana oblast.[64] Some of the individual deportation stories of Soviet soldiers are astounding. For instance, Abdal Gafarov had served in the Red Army since 1930, fought at Stalingrad, received commendations, and had become the Assistant to the Commander of the 197th OATB Technical Unit of the Eighth Airborne Army. On the morning of May 17, 1944, Gafarov and his comrades assisted the NKVD in preparing trucks for the deportation in Crimea's Sudak district. Then, despite protests from his commander, the NKVD removed Gafarov from his unit on May 18 and deported him to Molotov oblast on the deportation convoy he had helped prepare.[65]

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[62] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 94. Zam. Narkom Zdravookhraneniia SSSR Glavnyi Gossaninspektor SSSR Kuznetsov to V. V. Chernyshev. (Sov. Sek. No. 612/30). June 24, 1944.
[63] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 160, l.l. 39-39ob. Teniakshev v Gorki- Kuznetsovu. (Telegram No. 1146 NKVD 3946s). October 31, 1944.
[64] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l. 248. Zakliuchenie 19 Sentiabria, 1947.
[65] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l.l. 30-30ob. Zakliuchenie 17 Maia, 1945.

However, as Chapter One underlined, the initial deportation did not include at least 10,000 Crimean Tatar soldiers in the Soviet armed forces. [66] As the war raged, officers often ignored orders to deport Crimean Tatar soldiers because they did not want to loose experienced personnel. In addition, Moscow allowed senior Crimean Tatar officers not engaged in political agitation to keep fighting. Many of these soldiers arrived in Central Asia only after demobilization form 1945 to 1946, and some eluded special settlement for several years afterwards.[67]

The stories of how and when these Crimean Tatar soldiers arrived in Central Asia are quite diverse. Despite being wounded four times, Izet Memetov was only demobilized in 1946, and promptly traveled to his wife Bibik who had fled to Ukraine's Poltava oblast during the war. He lived with his family until 1947, when he decided to find his mother in the special settlements. The Uzbek MVD then detained Memetov when they found him traveling to the village of Pskent in Tashkent oblast to find his mother. In another example, tank soldier M. Osmanov attempted to return to his hometown of Sevastopol when the Red Army demobilized him in 1946, but the NKVD refused him entrance into Crimea and deported him to the Uzbek SSR.[68] In other cases, the NKVD did not immediately deport hospitalized Crimea Tatars soldiers. One such veteran was I. U. Ablaev, who was recovering from war wounds at a hospital in the Kazak ASSR during the deportation. Even after the hospital discharged him, a Kazakh

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[66] GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l.l. 44-45. "Dokladnaia Zapiska o khoziastvenno-trudovom ustroistve spetspereselentsev iz Kryma, rasselennykh v Uzbekskoi SSR, za vremia 1.7-44 g. po 1.7-1945 g." NKVD General-Maior Babadzhanov and Nachal'nik NKVD UzSSR Polkovnik Kirillov in Tashkent to Chernyshev (No. 5/6451). September 15, 1945. See also HIA, "An Open Letter from the Friends of the Crimean Tatars" in "The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians- Soviet Treatment of some National Minorities," Box 103, Folder 19, pg 8, Norman Allderdice Collection.

[67] GARF, f. 10026, op. 4, d. 1025, l.74."Spetsposelentsy iz Kryma/1944-1956gg." Report by V. N. Zemskov on December 9, 1991.

[68] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l. 109.

VTEK commission declared him an "invalid of the second category" and remobilized him to work in a Kazak mine. In the meantime, the NKVD had deported his family from Sevastopol to Bekabad in the Uzbek SSR. After the mine demobilized him in 1946, he left the Kazak SSR and joined his family in special settlement.[69] In sum, Stalin deported thousands of Crimean Tatar families even as their relatives served in the Soviet armed forces, and the deportation did not interrupt the service of several thousand of these Crimean Tatar soldiers. Unlike their families, there is little evidence of Crimean Tatar veterans dying during their personalized deportations.

Whatever the actual number of initial Crimean Tatar victims, the deportation was just the beginning of a months-long deterioration of conditions that led to hunger and disease, killing tens of thousands. This crime was a combination of cruelty, confusion, and Soviet inefficiency that began on the deportation convoys.

The Defects of Special Settlement Planning

Recent experience with Chechen, Ingush, other "special settlers" and the logistics of the resettlement plan left no doubt that the policy would lead to mass death.[70] True, the deportation orders gave food and supply organs the responsibility of providing special settlers with a daily quota of 8 kilograms of flower, 8 kilograms of vegetables, and 2 kilograms of grain and potatoes. On paper, these organs would deliver these food

[69] Ibid.

[70] For example, the NKVD recorded the death of at least 144,704 Chechens and Caucasus deportees (around 23.5% of each ethnic group), and other historians claim much higher death tolls: see Tony Wood, *Chechnya: The Case for Independence* (London: Verso, 2007), 37-38: see also Ediev D. Muradinovich, "Demograficheskie poteri deportirovannykh narodov SSSR," *Naselenie i obshchestvo*, No 79 (2004): 1-4.

supplies to Uzbek organs that would then distribute the rations.[71] However, similar to their grim understanding of the convoys, the NKVD knew that nightmarish conditions would follow the deportation.

The starvation and disease that began on the convoys only expanded its hold on the population once the trains reached the stations. As noted by Crimean Tatars and underlined in the previous section, the fact that convoys "arrived" quickly to train platforms in no way indicated that their journey was over. Even when deportees arrived at a final destination, food and other supplies were often absent and promised housing remained poor or non-existent. With the exception of some bread rations, Chernyshov admitted that in the Uzbek SSR the promised meat, vegetables, potatoes, and shoes never made it to the special settlers.[72] Even when a rare grain shipment did reach the Uzbek SSR, the NKVD faulted oblast and local authorities for distribution problems. In some cases, farm and factory administrators distributed less grain than stipulated in the orders, or gave it to regular kolkhoz workers.[73] As one NKVD officer explained, Uzbek officials often "stole" or used the food meant for special settlers "not following the order's intention." Some kolkhozes such as Narpai became notorious for stealing grain from the special settler fund.[74]

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[71] GARF, f. 10026, op. 4, d. 1025, l. 95. Raschet vydeleniia produktov dliia spetspereselentsev-Prilozheniia No. 2 k Postanovleniiu GOKO 5859ss ot 11 maia 1944. Signed by Khriapkina.

[72] GOKO orders 5859 from May 11, 1944 and 6600 from September 25, 1944. GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l. 58. Chernyshov to I. O. NKVD Uzbekskoi SSR General Maioru Babadzhanovu (No. 1/20494). October 6, 1945.

[73] GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 160, l.l. 150-161. Doklad "o rabote Otdela Spetsial'nykh Poselenii NKVD SSSR" (Sov. Sek.) by Kuznetsov. September 5, 1944.

[74] GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l.53. "Dokladnaia Zapiska o khoziastvenno-trudovom ustroistve spetspereselentsev iz Kryma, rasselennykh v Uzbekskoi SSR, za vremia 1.7-44 g. po 1.7-1945 g." NKVD General-Maior Babadzhanov and Nachal'nik NKVD UzSSR Polkovnik Kirillov in Tashkent to Chernyshev (No. 5/6451). September 15, 1945.

While abusive Uzbek officials were a real problem, the NKVD blaming regional authorities masked the main systemic failure of Stalin's plan: the food compensation system that depended on the cooperation of Crimean and Uzbek officials, the NKVD, Narkom MMP, Narkomtorg, Gosplan, and other Soviet organs. On paper, when the NKVD, Narkom MMP, and Narkomtorg confiscated livestock and food from Crimean Tatars they were supposed to provide deportees with a voucher. Special settlers could then exchange the voucher for food, work animals, clothes or raw materials.[75]

In practice, the use of the voucher system for feeding special settlers was an abject failure for several reasons. First off, the war had already strained Soviet food production and the rationing in rural areas was already in chaos. Many Uzbeks bartered for food, and Crimean Tatars had nothing to barter and were automatically on the bottom of food rationing priorities.[76] Second, the NKVD was a secret police organization, and often did not have direct access to food and other supplies. Narkom MMP, Narkomzem, Narkomzag, and farm directors controlled livestock and food rationing. Third, the above agricultural organs, the NKVD, the Crimean Sovnarkom, and the Crimean Obkom all had to provide Moscow with confiscation numbers. All the parties failed to do so and immediately delayed food distribution to special settlers. Accusations and counteraccusations between the food organs and the NKVD blamed each other for the

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[75] In principle, this was the same system with all wartime evacuees and deportees and the Uzbek SSR was in zone 5 where an individual should have received the largest trade in value for veggies. For example in zone 1 a kilo of confiscated meat would get you 4 kilos of veggies, while it would get you 10 kilos in zone 5. In reality, this system failed. GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 120-121. Tablitsa- ekvivalentov zameny produktov zhivotnovodstva i ovoshchami. October 1, 1940.

[76] On the food supply trouble and its relation to cash, prices and production see Kristy Ironside, "Stalin's Doctrine of Price Reductions during the Second World War and Postwar Reconstruction," *Slavic Review* (Vol. 75:3 Fall 2016), 655-677 (here 662-663): see also Wendy Z. Goldman, "Not by Bread Alone: Food, Workers, and the State," in Wendy Z. Goldman and Donald Filtzer, eds., *Hunger and War Food Provisioning in the Soviet Union during World War II* (Bloomington, 2015), 65-66 and William Moskoff, *The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the USSR during World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 161.

delays.[77] Eventually, as May turned to June, the NKVD in Crimea reported confiscating 15,740 cattle, 44,276 sheep and goats, and 4,450 horses in May 1944.[78] A separate tally by Crimean Obkom officials in September counted well-over 10,000 confiscated "horned animals," suggesting that the NKVD had an accurate figure.[79]

The plan then became so absurd that one must wonder if Moscow meant it to fail. At the end of the day, the most important count of confiscated livestock came from the Crimean Sovnarkom leader, Aleksandr Kabanov, who actually controlled livestock in Crimea at the time. Kabanov had just assumed near total control of the dual ethnic cleansing/rebuilding project in Crimea. He delayed passing along his own confiscation tallies and only did so after the NKVD complained.[80] When he did report, far from the tens of thousands of animals the NKVD counted, he claimed that during the deportation officials had confiscated only 2,589 large livestock and 2,283 goats and sheep from Crimean Tatars. Presiding over a devastated Crimea and tasked by Stalin with revitalizing Crimean agriculture, Kabanov had incentive to conceal much of the confiscated livestock.[81] Kabanov admitted that many of the confiscated animals were "subject to theft."[82] Documents from the Sovmin SSSR on postwar Crimea state that this

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77 GARF f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 4408, l.l. 2-3. NKVD (Chernyshev) – Sovnarkom SSSR Sov. Sektretno. August 1, 1944.

78 GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 126. June 17, 1944. Spravka- Vsego po Krymu priniato ot spetspereselentsev, kolkhoznikov, rabochikh, sluzhazhchikh I ot byvshikh tatarskikh kolkhozov. Numbers from SNK SSSR Gritsenko.

79 RGASPI f. 17, op. 44, d. 762, l. 24. Prilozhenie No 4 k postanovleniiu SNK I Obkoma VKP/b ot 20 VII, 1944. "Raspredelenie krupnogo-rogotogo skota po raiuonam priniatogo Narkommiasmolopromom of spetspereselentsev v krymu."

80 GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 109. July 27, 1944. Nach. Otdela Spets. NKVD SSSR M. Kuznetsov to Zam. Narodnogo Komissara Narkomsovkhozov SSSR Kabanov (V Srochno. Sekretno No. 52/671s).

81 GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 108. July 29, 1944. Spravka Sovkhozami Narkomsovkhozov priniato ot spetspereselentsev Krymskoi ASSR sleduiushchee kolichestvo skota by Zam. Narkom zernobykh I zhivotnovodcheski Sovkhozov SSSR Kabanov.

82 RGASPI f. 17, op. 44, d. 759, l. 47. Stenogramma Plenuma Krymskogo Obkoma VKP/b ot 28-29 Sentiabria 1944 goda.

theft was deliberate. In fact, divisions of agricultural organs in Crimea, at the time nominally under Kabanov's control, seized animals from all Crimean farms, including those with remaining Russians and Ukrainians, so that the new government had total control over food supplies.[83]

Afterwards, Crimean officials mostly refused to issue vouchers to special settlers or remaining Crimean residents. Neither the deportees nor remaining Slavic farmers were in a position to complain. The NKVD was aware that Kabanov's numbers did match their own count, but inquiries into the whereabouts of animals were fruitless.[84] Molotov attempted to "clarify" the situation in early July, ordering that all confiscated livestock should go to new Crimean settlers that had already begun arriving from different Russian oblasts. Molotov's order accepted that no one would get any compensation, and that Stalin endorsed Kabanov's methods. The project in Crimea, not the welfare of deportees, took precedence. During this bureaucratic debate, Crimean Tatars waiting for the food starved.[85]

Few Crimean Tatars ever received vouchers for confiscated food and livestock. The NKVD's admitted that the "return" of grain, livestock and other materials confiscated in Crimea occurred "irregularly and with large delays," if at all.[86] Even when Soviet organs did appraise confiscated items, the system failed. For example, Narkomzem appraised 5,943 beehives confiscated from Crimean Tatars and gave them to

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[83] RGAE, f. 5675, op. 1, d. 479, l.l. 18-19. Dokladnaia Zapiska St. Inspektor Shvedova, V.I., i Voronina, N.M. o rezul'tatakh komandirovki v Krymskuiu Oblast'. 1950

[84] GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 95. Nach. Otdela Spets. NKVD SSSR M. Kuznetsov to Zam. Narkommiasmoloprom SSSR Kuz'minykh (Sov. Sek. No. 52/668s). July 27, 1944.

[85] GARF, f. 5446, op. 46, d. 1695, l.l. 20-26. SNK SSSR Postanovlenie No. 842 ot 8 Iunia, 1944. "O neotlozhnykh merakh po vosstanovleniiu sel'skogo khoziastva Kryma."

[86] GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l.53. "Dokladnaia Zapiska o khoziastvenno-trudovom ustroistve spetspereselentsev iz Kryma, rasselennykh v Uzbekskoi SSR, za vremia 1.7-44 g. po 1.7-1945 g." NKVD General-Maior Babadzhanov and Nachal'nik NKVD UzSSR Polkovnik Kirillov in Tashkent to Chernyshev (No. 5/6451). September 15, 1945.

the Ukraine SSR. In return, Narkomzem ordered the Ukrainian state to pay the Uzbek government the appraised value so the Uzbek state could buy Crimean Tatars new beehives. What became of the money is unclear, but Crimean Tatars never received new honeybees.[87]

As conditions worsened, the Soviet ministries that controlled food had no interest in preventing the spread of starvation. Receiving little cooperation from anyone, the NKVD made a request to Narkomzag for 14,608 tons of grain to feed Crimean special settlers, with 9,977 tons designated for the Uzbek SSR. Narkomzag balked at this tonnage, and offered only 4,000 tons total, with 2,733 tons for the Uzbek SSR. Then, the supply organ proposed offering potatoes and vegetables in place of grain.[88] Narkomzag had already failed to provide any of the required vegetables and potatoes stipulated as rations during the deportation, mostly because the supplies did not exist. As such, this proposal was the equivalent of giving Crimean Tatars nothing.[89]

To reiterate, the most damning aspect of the genocidal policy was the plan itself. To base the sustenance of Crimean Tatars on the amounts of confiscated livestock and grain amounted to murder. There was never going to be enough livestock or grain confiscated from deportees in Crimea to feed the special settlers in the first place. Moscow knew that a pathetically small amount of livestock remained in Crimea by May

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87 GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 111. Spravka iz proekta postanovleniia SNK SSSR po voprosu vozmeshcheniia spetspereselentsam iz Kryma, skota, zerna, kozhsyria i shersti po Narkomzemu SSSR. August 18, 1944.

88 GARF f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 4408, l. 36. Sopostavitel'naia Vedomost' "na prodovol'stvennoe zerno. Kartofel' I ovoshchi podlezhashchie vydachi spetspereselentsam iz Kryma po predlozheniiam NKVD SSSR i Narkomzaga," P. Ivanov. 1944.

89 At the most, only 162.7 tons of vegetables out of the promised 4,080 tons promised by GOKO order no. 5859 arrived, and the NKVD claims that they never saw even that small amount. GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 245, l. 20. "Dokladnaia Zapiska o khoziaistvenno-trudovom ustroistve spetxpereselentsev is Kryma, rasselennykh v UzSSR za III kvartal 1945 god. (NKVD 5/7666) Nachal'nik NKVD UzSSR General-Maior Kirillov to Nachal'nik Otdela spetsposelenii NKVD SSSR Polkovnik Kunetsov. November 5, 1945.

1944.[90] This was true even if all parties involved had honestly calculated totals and reimbursed deportees, and Chenyshov explained this directly to Molotov in a secret letter on September 5, 1944.[91] When Molotov did issue a definitive order on what organization would provide what food, he went against the NKVD's request and used the lower Narkomzag numbers, promising non-existent potatoes and vegetables.[92] In this light, the plan was a deadly farce in which every organ involved knew that they could not supply the food needed for special settlers, so they constantly deflected blame and incriminated each other.

In addition to the inadequate food rationing and reimbursement plans, unrelated circumstances further reduced available food. Uzbek crop failures in 1944 greatly depleted Central Asian food supplies. Simultaneously, as the Soviet army liberated swaths of Ukraine, Stalin ordered the Uzbek SSR to ship livestock to Ukraine. Summing up the food situation for Uzbek special settlers in late 1944, Kirrilov admitted that fulfilling the rations for special settlers and returning grain and livestock was impossible.[93] It is also important to underline that this starvation was not part of the

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[90] No one knew exactly how many animals survived the war in the first place, and there were even discrepancies over livestock numbers on Crimea's 4,569 farms before the war. However, it is clear that the horned-livestock population went from several hundred thousand in 1941 to between 2,000 and 15,000 by May 1944. This devastation is also reflected in counts of pigs, poultry, and horses. See RGASPI f. 17, op. 44, d. 758, l. 7 ob. Stenogramma Plenuma Krymskogo Obkoma VKP/b ot 14 iiunia 1944 goda; RGASPI f. 17, op. 44, d. 759, l.l. 46-47. Stenogramma Plenuma Krymskogo Obkoma VKP/b ot 28-29 Sentiabria 1944 goda.

[91] GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 4408, l. 15. Chenyshev-Molotovu. September 5, 1944.

[92] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 245, l. 20. "Dokladnaia Zapiska o khoziaistvenno-trudovom ustroistve spetxpereselentsev is Kryma, rasselennykh v UzSSR za III kvartal 1945 god. (NKVD 5/7666) Nachal'nik NKVD UzSSR General-Maior Kirillov-Nachal'nik Otdela spetsposelenii NKVD SSSR Polkovnik Kunetsovu. November 5, 1945.

[93] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 111. Spravka iz proekta postanovleniia SNK SSSR po voprosu vozmeshcheniia spetspereselentsam iz Kryma, skota, zerna, kozhsyria i shersti po Narkomzemu SSSR. August 18, 1944.

Soviet-wide famine of 1946-1947. That crisis began only in the summer of 1946 after the majority of Crimean Tatar deaths had occurred.[94]

Hope for adequate shelter for the coming winter was also dismal. Similar to the food situation, there were detailed plans for home building. Stalin had ordered Glavsnables (the lumber supply organ) to provide lumber and other materials for homebuilding, while Glavneftsnab (the fuel supply organ) had to deliver 600 tons of petrol. Stalin also instructed the Sel'khoz bank SSSR to provide 5,000 rubles of credit per family for home construction, or a lump sum of 57 million rubles.[95]

In reality, many Uzbek farms and factories still refused to house special settlers or provide each family with a plot of land. The NKVD reported that 15,871 out of 36,568 Crimean Tatar families (or 43.5%) in the Uzbek SSR did not receive plots in 1944. Moreover, documents suggest that 15,871 families reviving plots was inaccurate. Soviet farms and industry were often not willing to cede land to "traitors." In one representative case, when the Zerovshan beet selkhoz in Samarkand oblast designated 30 hectares for special settlers, the head of the Uzbek beet growing enterprise, Fedrenko, traveled to the farm and forbade the farm from handing over the land to special settlers. Instead of going to "guilty parties," the plots should go to Uzbek workers. While the NKVD later reprimanded Fedrenko, they opted to transfer the settlers to a different farm rather than

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[94] Elena Zubkova (Hugh Ragsdale, trns.). *Russia after the War: Hopes Illusions and Disappointments, 1945-1957* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 40.

[95] Special settlers had to pay off the credit over the course of 5 years (later extended to 7 years). GARF, f. 10026, op. 4, d. 1025, l.l. 88-93. Gosudarstvennyi komitet oborony postanovlenia GOKO No. 5859ss ot 11 maia 1944 "O Krymskikh Tatarakh."

force the beet-growing organization to comply. During the dispute, the families remained exposed to the elements.[96]

Out of the 57 million rubles in credit that the Selkhoz bank provided for Crimean special settlers, Uzbek authorities never even claimed over 17 million rubles, and the credit just expired at the end of 1945. Broken down by oblast, Tashkent oblast actually overspent by 2 million rubles, so the persistence of dire condition indicates either money poorly spent, stolen and/or the initial sum was never enough to provide housing. All other oblasts claimed less than was allotted to them. For example, Bukhara oblast had a 4.4 million-ruble credit line for special settlers, but only claimed 380,000 rubles. Explaining the disarray of the loan plan, the Uzbek NKVD alleged that Selkhoz SSSR bank in Moscow failed to provide clear "instructions" to its Uzbek branches on the "order and conditions of loans to special settlers." The general cash flow problem during the war in rural Central Asia only exacerbated the problem.[97]

Even if special settlers had received land and credit according to plan, the building materials did not arrive in 1944. On June 7, 1945, the Sovnarkom SSSR repeated its request for building materials, although in smaller amounts, and again nothing arrived in the Uzbek SSR.[98] This lack of materials was also detrimental to many

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[96] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l.l. 52-53. "Dokladnaia Zapiska o khoziastvenno-trudovom ustroistve spetspereselentsev iz Kryma, rasselennykh v Uzbekskoi SSR, za vremia 1.7-44 g. po 1.7-1945 g." NKVD General-Maior Babadzhanov and Nachal'nik NKVD UzSSR Polkovnik Kirillov in Tashkent to Chernyshev (No. 5/6451). September 15, 1945.

[97] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l.l. 49-51. "Dokladnaia Zapiska o khoziastvenno-trudovom ustroistve spetspereselentsev iz Kryma, rasselennykh v Uzbekskoi SSR, za vremia 1.7-44 g. po 1.7-1945 g." NKVD General-Maior Babadzhanov and Nachal'nik NKVD UzSSR Polkovnik Kirillov in Tashkent to Chernyshev (No. 5/6451). September 15, 1945.

[98] GOKO order No. 6600s promised lumber, window glass, nails, and iron. The second order was Sovnarkom order No. 10244-RS. GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l. 49-51. "Dokladnaia Zapiska o khoziastvenno-trudovom ustroistve spetspereselentsev iz Kryma, rasselennykh v Uzbekskoi SSR, za vremia 1.7-44 g. po 1.7-1945 g." NKVD General-Maior Babadzhanov and Nachal'nik NKVD UzSSR Polkovnik Kirillov in Tashkent to Chernyshev (No. 5/6451). September 15, 1945.

of the Crimean Tatars who had received "housing" because many buildings were just for summer or agricultural use and needed doors, windows, roofs and stoves for the winter.[99] Similar to food, most special settlers never saw the money or building materials that were supposed to help them survive the winter of 1944-45.

Another abuse was that several farms, factories, construction projects, and even NKVD officers used thousands of Crimean Tatars as slave labor across the Uzbek SSR and other regions of special settlement. According to Chernyshev, throughout the summer of 1944 local Soviet organs ordered special settlers to work at factories, construction sites and in city departments without the permission of Moscow, and the local NKVD organs often colluded with this unapproved use of special settlers. Chernyshev's report eviscerated this slave labor as a deadly abuse. The practice caused "working special settler families, who had received homes, land plots, and gardens to loose everything provided to them when they were mobilized (into slave labor) and soon found themselves in extremely bad conditions." Only at the end of July 1944 did the NKVD attempt to end this practice with secret order.[100]

The Peak of Starvation, Disease, and Exposure, 1944-1946

The culmination of the above abuses accelerated the mass death of Crimean Tatars as wretched conditions spread disease and starvation. Most of the Soviet bureaucracy, from entire Soviet organs to individual farm and factory administrators, still

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99 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 28. "Dokladnaia Zapiska- otprieme i rasselenii krymskikh tatar po Namanganskoi obl." From Nach. UNKVD po Nam. Obl. Maior Gosbez. Gotsev, Upolnomochenniy NKVD SSSR Podpolkovnik Miliakov, Upol. UNKVD Podpolkovnik Trofimov, Upol. NKVD SSSR Podpolkovnik Vorob'ev. to Kobulov. June 1944.

100 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 92. Sov. Sekretno No. 1/1195. Chernyshov to Vsem NKVD/UNKVD. June 27, 1944.

refused to care for special settlers. While the NKVD easily concealed death and disease during the deportation, epidemics soon threatened the entire Uzbek state.

In a secret letter to Beria on July 10, Chernyshov warned that the Uzbek NKVD was reporting a full-blown epidemic with sharp increases in malaria and stomach illnesses among Crimean Tatars in several oblasts. In Tashkent oblast at the Baiaut Khovastskogo farm, 132 Crimean Tatars had a stomach virus and 36 had already died, while in Samarkand oblast's Pakhtakorsk district half of the 1,309 Tatars had malaria. Of 13,907 Crimean Tatars in Namansk oblast, 40% were ill with malaria or stomach viruses. At the notorious Narpai sovkhoz alone, 94 Crimean Tatars died in June from malaria and stomach viruses, including 33 children.[101] The Soviet Narkomzdrav initially ignored requests from the Uzbek Narkomzdrav for medical supplies.[102] In fact, the only evidence of medical assistance from Moscow during the peak of the epidemics was a claim that Moscow sent 200,000 dysentery pills and other medicines.[103]

The Uzbek NKVD pleaded with Beria to send medicine and extra doctors on August 8 because "amongst Crimean Tatar special settlers there has been an extraordinary increase in cases of malaria and stomach/intestinal illness." In Andijan oblast, authorities reported that 1,015 people had malaria and 813 had stomach ailments, while in Kashka-Darin oblast 4,324 out of 9,984 Crimean Tatars had malaria. Bukhara oblast was reporting 629 malaria cases, and 126 people had already perished from

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101 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 160, l.l. 19-20. Chernyshov to Beria. Sekretno. July 10, 1944.

102 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 160, l. 22. Sov. Sek. NKVD Telegramma 1956 (NKVD doc. 2830s). Kobulov to Beria. August 8, 1944.

103 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 160, l. 25. Narkomzrav SSSR- Zam. Narkomzdrava SSSR Kuznetsov to Chernyshevu (No. 650/116s). f. 9479, op. 1, d. 160, l. 25. September 23, 1944.

disease.[104] By August 15, the Uzbek NKVD counted 18,621 seriously ill special settlers (or 12% of the special settler population in Uzbekistan) and in certain districts over half of the Crimean Tatars were seriously ill. Narpai was again an example, with 667 people currently ill and an updated death toll of 229.[105]

Crimean Tatar accounts of the first 12 months of special settlement underline how starvation and disease killed individuals and decimated families. Menube Sheikhislamova's husband died fighting in the Red Army, and she was alone caring for their eight children. As the crisis worsened, Menube and seven of her children died. One lone daughter, Nera, did survive, but hunger left her disabled. According to Menube's aunt, Sanzika Ibragimova, the fate of her niece's immediate family was common. Out of the thirty families the NKVD deported from her village, only five remained at the end of 1945.[106] Uzbek physician Sulamif Prakhye, who worked at the Irgut district hospital in Samarkand oblast from 1942 to 1948, remembered feeling helpless during the crisis: "What could I do with only a meager supply of pills?" His patients were almost all women and children, and were either "skin and bones" or "swollen from malnutrition." The hospital crammed two to three people to a cot as they arrived at the door. Mothers often shared their cot with children, and Prakhye believes that hospital rations saved some children. With so many parents dying, the hospital became overwhelmed with

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104 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 160, l. 22. Sov. Sek. NKVD Telegramma 1956 (NKVD doc. 2830s). Kobulov to Beria. August 8, 1944.

105 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 160, l. 24. Chernyshov to Narkomzdrav SSSR, G. A. Miterevu. (No. 1/16561 Sov. Sekretno Srochno). September 2, 1944.

106 HU OSA 300-85-11 Box 1, Tom 1, AC No. 101, pg. 2. Otkrytoe pis'mo v zashchitu krymskikh tatar, podpisannoe "Russkie druz'ia krymskikh tatar", iavar' 1969g.

orphaned children between the ages of 6 to 13 who were suffering from "PDE-protein-deficiency edema."[107]

Calculating how many Crimean Tatars perished during the mass death of 1944-1945 is difficult. While NKVD documents covering the epidemics and famine for the fall of 1944 are open, most of the detailed NKVD documents from the winter of 1944-1945 remain sealed. The period from May to September 1944 was deadly enough, and at least 10,105 Crimean Tatars (or 7% of Crimean Tatars) died over those months.[108] Furthermore, all Crimean Tatar accounts of the period assert that mass death through a combination of disease, starvation, and exposure peaked during the winter months.[109]

While the NKVD accounts on the oblast-level remain sealed, larger population statistics and special settlement labor statistics support the Crimean Tatar assertion and provide an ominous picture. The Uzbek NKVD reported that on July 7, 1944, there were 150,904 special settlers (36,940 families.) with 78,754 on kolkhozes, 29,474 on sovkhozes, and 42,676 in industry. A year later, by July 7, 1945, there were only 128,627 special settlers left with 48,297 on kolkhozes, 29,196 on sovkhozes, and 51,161 in industry. In short, between July 1, 1944, and July 1, 1945, the NKVD removed 22,355 or 15(14.8)% of the Crimean special settlers in the Uzbek SSR from the registry. However, the July 7, 1945, count included 16,934 new special settlers. This included 1,390 births and new arrivals over that time-period (demobilized from the Army or

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[107] HIA, Aishe Seitmuratova ,"Mustafa Dzhemilev and the Crimean Tatars: Story of a Man and His People- Facts, Documents, How To Help" The Center for Democracy: New York, 1986, Box 99, Folder, 3, pg. 5, Center for Civil Society International Collection.
[108] Bekirova, *Krymskie Tatary*, 31.
[109] Bekirova's oral interviews and other research confirm that the bitter cold and exposure of the winter compounded all the health problems that had been apparent in the autumn. Ibid, 31.

transferred from other republics).[110] Considering this fact and the NKVD deflating numbers, the death toll for 1944-45 approached 40,000 people. There are caveats to this disturbing number because the NKVD removed several hundred Crimean Tatars arrested for various offenses from the list, as well as escapees or those moved to another republic. Still, these totals at the most would only account for a few thousand people.

Conditions did improve marginally throughout the spring and summer of 1945, but Tashkent continued reporting far rosier conditions to Moscow than inter-Uzbek communications reveal. Moreover, when the NKVD in Tashkent did admit to problems, they continued to scapegoat oblast-level and other regional authorities. In the Tashsel' district of Tashkent oblast, the director of the Instrumental'nyi (instrument) factory, Anteshev, and the director of Factory no. 309, Radzhapov, both allegedly withheld special settler pay for two to three months. Once again, Tashkent savaged the administration of Narpai for also withholding pay. At factories in several districts of Kashka.-Dar oblast and Namangan oblast, workers did not receive pay for several months.[111] The NKVD in Samarkand oblast complained that at three sovkhozes the administrators refused to pay the special settlers for the entire second quarter of 1945. At several beet sugar factories in the same oblast, factory directors fired any special settlers who got ill. With the families' lone breadwinner, most often female, jobless and ill, the situation led to an "increase in the cases of starvation and death."[112]

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[110] GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l.l. 44-45. "Dokladnaia Zapiska o khoziastvenno-trudovom ustroistve spetspereselentsev iz Kryma, rasselennykh v Uzbekskoi SSR, za vremia 1.7-44 g. po 1.7-1945 g." NKVD General-Maior Babadzhanov and Nachal'nik NKVD UzSSR Polkovnik Kirillov in Tashkent to Chernyshev (No. 5/6451). September 15, 1945.

[111] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l. 195. Zam. NKVD UzSSR General-Maior Zavgorodnii to Kuznetsovu. No. 5/655. January 2, 1946.

[112] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l. 50. "Dokladnaia Zapiska o khoziastvenno-trudovom ustroistve spetspereselentsev iz Kryma, rasselennykh v Uzbekskoi SSR, za vremia 1.7-44 g. po 1.7-1945 g." NKVD

Furthermore, many farm and factory directors, perhaps believing in the mass treason charges, continued to not provide housing on purpose. Housing problems remained widespread in Andijan oblast. In Tashkent oblast at the Farkhadstroe construction organization, 742 families (2,417 people) lived in dirt dugouts. A similar situation existed in the Piangarstroia Khatyrchinsk district of Samarkand oblast. At the Zira-Bulakskoom and Krasnogvardeiskom sugar factories in Samarkand oblast 143 families lived in "totally unacceptable dwellings."[113] At the Kyzyl-Kakhraman kolkhoz the director, Tadshiev, refused to give Crimean Tatar families work. Tadshiev also displayed abject cruelty when, for no apparent reason, he left Arifa Tairova and five family members for dead in an open field 10 km from the farm. Sick with malaria and suffering from exhaustion, the NKVD claimed that it intervened by providing the family a home elsewhere and arresting Tadshiev.[114] With winter again fast approaching, the NKVD counted 25,372 people living in housing "unfit for people."[115]

Knowing that a repeat of the past winter's mass death was likely, on September 15, 1945, Chernyshov ordered that special settlement authorities inspect housing for special settlers to determine if they were properly winterized.[116] Furthermore, he ordered

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General-Maior Babadzhanov and Nachal'nik NKVD UzSSR Polkovnik Kirillov in Tashkent to Chernyshev (No. 5/6451). September 15, 1945.

[113] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l. 49. "Dokladnaia Zapiska o khoziastvenno-trudovom ustroistve spetspereselentsev iz Kryma, rasselennykh v Uzbekskoi SSR, za vremia 1.7-44 g. po 1.7-1945 g." NKVD General-Maior Babadzhanov and Nachal'nik NKVD UzSSR Polkovnik Kirillov in Tashkent to Chernyshev (No. 5/6451). September 15, 1945.

[114] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 245, l. 17. "Dokladnaia Zapiska o khoziaistvenno-trudovom ustroistve spetxpereselentsev is Kryma, rasselennykh v UzSSR za III kvartal 1945 god. (NKVD 5/7666) Nachal'nik NKVD UzSSR General-Maior Kirillov to Nachal'nik Otdela spetsposelenii NKVD SSSR Polkovnik Kunetsov. November 5, 1945.

[115] GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l. 49. "Dokladnaia Zapiska o khoziastvenno-trudovom ustroistve spetspereselentsev iz Kryma, rasselennykh v Uzbekskoi SSR, za vremia 1.7-44 g. po 1.7-1945 g." NKVD General-Maior Babadzhanov and Nachal'nik NKVD UzSSR Polkovnik Kirillov in Tashkent to Chernyshev (No. 5/6451). September 15, 1945.

[116] NKVD decree no. 1/18899. GARF F. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l. 201. Zam. NKVD UzSSR General-Maior Zavgorodnii to Kuznetsovu. No. 5/655. January 2, 1946.

special renovation brigades to winterize the sub-standard housing.[117] However, NKVD, Soviet government, and Crimean Tatar accounts reveal that attempts to better prepare for the winter of 1945-46 did not prevent widespread sickness and starvation for a second year in a row. For example, in Tashkent oblast, 46 out of 60 special settler kolkhozes in the Mirazchul'sk district were not ready for winter in the fall.[118] Out of 111 families in the Farkhadstroi enterprise in Tashkent oblast, 12% still lived in terrible conditions over the winter and were starving. The situation at Farkhadstroi was so dire that Chernyshov issued a specific decree on March 2, 1946 that supposedly "solved" the problem.[119] As with the 1944-45 crisis, abusive factory and farm directors imperiled the survival of Crimean Tatars and starvation and disease ensued. So many families were starving in the Uzbekvino (Uzbek Wine) factory no. 3 and various wine sovkhozes in the Kashka-Darin oblast that on January 15, 1946, the Uzbek SNK ordered the Uzbek orgburo to fix the problem before the end of January.[120] The Narpai kolkhoz remained atrocious. The management never distributed the food and supplies that the Uzbek food organs had delivered to the farm after a special order in December 1945.[121] At the Motororemontom

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117 GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 245, l. 19. "Dokladnaia Zapiska o khoziaistvenno-trudovom ustroistve spetxpereselentsev is Kryma, rasselennykh v UzSSR za III kvartal 1945 god. (NKVD 5/7666) Nachal'nik NKVD UzSSR General-Maior Kirillov to Nachal'nik Otdela spetsposelenii NKVD SSSR Polkovnik Kunetsov. November 5, 1945.

118 GARF F. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l. 201. Zam. NKVD UzSSR General-Maior Zavgorodnii to Kuznetsovu. No. 5/655. January 2, 1946.

119 NKVD order No. 1/3208. GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l. 201. January 2, 1946. Zam. NKVD UzSSR General-Maior Zavgorodnii- Kuznetsovu. No. 5/655.

120 GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l. 202. January 2, 1946. Zam. NKVD UzSSR General-Maior Zavgorodnii to Kuznetsovu. No. 5/655.

121 NKVD Order No. 253-1-OPR. GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l. 204. January 2, 1946. Zam. NKVD UzSSR General-Maior Zavgorodnii to Kuznetsovu. No. 5/655.

(motor renovation) factory in Samarkand oblast, the factory managers still used orphans for slave labor.[122]

The lack of building supplies, land, money and other supplies also continued. At several factories in the Kashka.-Darin and Namangan oblasts workers did not receive pay for several months. Uzbek officials approved 10,403 families for building loans, but Selkhoz bank branches often still did not have the money to lend, suggesting a continued monetary bottleneck in Tashkent.[123] For a second winter in a row, Uzbek and NKVD officials failed to ensure that all special settlers had proper shoes, clothes, sanitary conditions and medical service.[124] In May of 1945, the Soviet Sovnarkom had requested the same materials, although in smaller amounts, and the responsible Soviet organs again failed to deliver the supplies.[125] The situation with children was especially pathetic. That winter 13,499 out of the surviving 25,076 school-aged special settlers could not go to school because of a lack of clothes and shoes, placing a continued burden on working mothers.[126] By October, these conditions were killing Crimean Tatars at an alarming rate. During the fourth quarter of 1945, the NKVD reported that 3,302 or 2.7% of the Crimean special settlers died. Similar to a year before, the majority of deaths were

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[122] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l.l. 199-200. January 2, 1946. Zam. NKVD UzSSR General-Maior Zavgorodnii to Kuznetsovu. No. 5/655.
[123] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l. 202. January 2, 1946. Zam. NKVD UzSSR General-Maior Zavgorodnii to Kuznetsovu. No. 5/655.
[124] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l. 195. January 2, 1946. Zam. NKVD UzSSR General-Maior Zavgorodnii to Kuznetsovu. No. 5/655.
[125] SNK SSSR Rasparazhenia No. 10244-RS, May 7, 1945. GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l. 49-51. September 15, 1945. "Dokladnaia Zapiska o khoziastvenno-trudovom ustroistve spetspereselentsev iz Kryma, rasselennykh v Uzbekskoi SSR, za vremia 1.7-44 g. po 1.7-1945 g." NKVD General-Maior Babadzhanov and Nachal'nik NKVD UzSSR Polkovnik Kirillov in Tashkent to Chernyshev (No. 5/6451).
[126] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l. 205. January 2, 1946. Zam. NKVD UzSSR General-Maior Zavgorodnii to Kuznetsovu. No. 5/655.

among the young and elderly, but starvation, cold, malaria, and other ailments affected a majority of special settlers.[127]

Sometimes Crimean Tatars dealt with the deteriorating conditions themselves by moving locations in search of food and shelter, and soon Uzbek authorities began to sanction such moves. In the winter of 1945-1946, many special settlers fled to the Tajik SSR. By January 1, 1946, the NKVD recorded 3,134 Crimean Tatars that arrived in the fourth quarter of 1945. These families arrived in a poor state, and most were sick and starving and all were "physically exhausted." The NKVD never charged these Crimean Tatars with escape because the farms they fled in the Uzbek SSR were literally starving them to death. Tajik authorities reported that many special settlers died on their journey and that mass death was imminent. The Tajik Sovnarkom and central committee requested a one-time aid package of 5000 kg of fat, 50 tons of bread, 10 tons of kerosene, and 3.5 tons of soap. While there is no evidence that the fat reached settlers, Tajik authorities do claim that they did receive bread by January, but this was weeks or months after many families had arrived.[128] While Tajik officials did not quote exact death totals from this period, some of these victims are perhaps included in the 235 individuals removed from the Tajik SSR special settler list in the fourth quarter of 1945.[129] Some Crimean Tatars also fled to the Kyrgyz SSR and the Kazakh SSR, but how many

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[127] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l. 195. January 2, 1946. Zam. NKVD UzSSR General-Maior Zavgorodnii to Kuznetsovu. No. 5/655.

[128] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l.l. 153, 156. January 26, 1946. Zam. Narkoma Vnutrennykh Del Tadzhikskoi SSR Polkovnik Mikalelian and Nachal'nik Otdela Spetsposelenii NKVD Tadzhiksoi SSR Kapitan Lakhov (No. 10/102) .

[129] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l.l. 153. January 26, 1946. Zam. Narkoma Vnutrennykh Del Tadzhikskoi SSR Polkovnik Mikalelian and Nachal'nik Otdela Spetsposelenii NKVD Tadzhiksoi SSR Kapitan Lakhov (No. 10/102).

Crimean Tatars ended up in these republics from 1945 to 1946, when they arrived, and under what circumstances, is not clear.[130]

The exact number of Crimean Tatars deported and the number of those who died from May 1944 until mid-1946 is impossible to confidently state. However, since the 1960s Crimean Tatar activists have argued that 46.2% of the total Crimean Tatar population perished because of deportation. Activists arrived at that percentage using the following numbers:

> While 10-11% of the Crimean Tatar population was lost in military actions of World War Two, the deportation of the whole nation in May 1944 resulted in the deaths of 46.2%[131] of the Crimean Tatars in 18 months… of 99,400 children, 45,922 died; of 13,300 16-18 year olds 6,144 died; of 93,200 women, 43,085 died; of 32,600 men, 15,061 died.[132]

All toll, the above count claims nearly 110,000 Crimean Tatars died. However, this claim rests on the assertion that the Soviet state purposely undercounted the total Crimean Tatar population beginning in the 1920s, an accusation that is difficult to prove or disprove.

Soviet figures on the number of people deported from the Crimean ASSR and the number who died in exile vary between different reports and Soviet organs. As Naimark notes, the specific numbers quoted by the NKVD are suspicious because the "impossible accuracy may reflect deeper problems with the veracity of the numbers."[133] This chapter has shown that Naimark is correct and the NKVD often concealed deaths and illnesses. Another reason for discrepancies is that NKVD and MVD counts of special settlers

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[130] By the late 1940s, many Crimean Tatars did reach these republics in search of work and education, and this trend continued after special settlement ended. Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples*, 115

[131] Crimean Tatars repeat exact percentage of 46.2% in most nationalist literature and has the figure has become an important part of deportation memory.

[132] HIA, Ayshe Seytmuratova, "Mustafa Dzhemilv and the Crimean Tatars," The Center for Democracy, 1986, page 5, Center For Civil Society International Collection, box 99, folder 3.

[133] Naimark, *Stalin's Genocides*, 12.

sometimes lumped Crimean special settlers of different nationalities together, while at other times counting each ethnicity separately. Often the Uzbek NKVD and Uzbek authorities used the terms "Crimean Tatar" and "special settler" interchangeably, since the vast majority of new special settlers in the republic were Crimean Tatars.

Despite discrepancies, *all* counts suggest that at least 40,000 Crimean Tatars died in special settlement. By far the most extensive report ever written by a Soviet official on the deportation was the 1991 research project by party worker V. N. Zemskov. Using access to Soviet archives, Zemtsov put the total number of Crimean residents deported in 1944 at 228,392, including 183,155 Crimean Tatars. Zemtsov also believed that NKVD simply never counted many demobilized Crimean Tatar soldiers. In trying to assess the death toll, the report claims that in 1949 only 186,535 Crimean special settlers remained, meaning the total "contingent" shrunk by 41,857 people from 1944 to 1949.[134] Considering the additions of at least 20,000 more special settlers over that period, Zemtsov's numbers suggest that between 50,000 and 60,000 Crimean special settlers died, and the majority of those were likely Crimean Tatars.

Other Soviet reports and statistics support Zemtsov's findings. For example, a joint Gosplan SSSR and Ukrainian Academy of Sciences research project from 1989 to 1990 found that the total Crimean Tatar population shrunk from 218,200 in 1939 to 165,000 in 1953, or a decrease of roughly 53,000 people. If one takes into account the over 10,000 deaths during the war, late arrivals and the "high birth rate" of Crimean Tatars from 1947 to 1953, the death total is roughly between 40,000 and 50,000

[134] The Soviet Government Commission on Nationalities ordered Zemtsov to write the report as it began Crimean Tatar return. GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 21, l.l. 79-80. "Nekotorye dannyi o deportatsii i reabilitatsii Krymskikh Tatar." By Zamistitel' Nachal'nika otdela goskomnatsa RSFSR, B. V. Truskov. August 14, 1991.

people.[135] Moreover, NKVD and MVD statistics further confirm the concentration of death in the Uzbek SSR. By March 1949, the MVD reported that only 115,101 Crimean Tatars remained in the Uzbek SSR, a decrease 36,503 people from June 1944. When adjusted for thousands of late arrivals and births the number goes well over 40,000.[136]

Mass death only ended in 1946 as the NKVD and the MVD special settler divisions contained the chaos and fully instituted the "spetskomendatur" regime in the Uzbek republic and other regions.[137] While a critical lack of experienced NKVD and MVD administrators had greatly undermined any organization of special settlement throughout 1944 and 1945, when the war ended the NKVD created "seminars" to train special settler commanders and their assistants. Because of the rapidly shrinking Crimean Tatar population, the MVD only created 76 of the 97 proposed Uzbek "spetskomendatur."[138] Thus, the special settlement "plan" did not really take effect until after the war and after mass death.

Brutal Bureaucracy

The term bureaucratic genocide best describes the intent, process and outcome of Stalin's policy towards Crimean Tatars from May 1944 to mid-1946. Stalin gave no specific order to kill Crimean Tatars because he did not have to. Stalin showed his intent

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[135] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 67, d. 9982, l.l. 73-73. Ekseptnoe Zakliuchenie po predlozheniiam po ratsional'nomu rasseleniiu Krymskikh Tatar I razvitiiu sotsial'noi sfery Krymskoi oblasti- SOPS AN Ukr. SSR." Zh. A. Zaionchkovskaia. 1990.

[136] For the number of Crimean Tatars in 1944 see GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l.l. 5-9. Tashkent NKVD, Polkovnik Gosbezopasnosti Mal'ytsev and Podpolkovnik Gosbezopasnosti Maslennikov to V. V. Vhernyshov (sekretno). June 25, 1944. On the 1949 MVD census see GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 483, l.l. 140ob-141. Statisticheskie svedeniia o rezul'tatakh perepisi vyselentsev- spets. Na territorii Uz. SSR. St. Oper. Upolnomochnym OSP MVD Uz. SSR Baibarodim. March 28, 1949.

[137] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 179, l. 27. Sekretar' TsK KP(b) Uzkekistana U. Iusupov and NKVD UzSSR Komissar Gosbezopasnosti 3 Ranga A. Kobulov to Beria. May 20, 1944.

[138] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 9. Tashkent NKVD, Polkovnik Gosbezopasnosti Mal'ytsev and Podpolkovnik Gosbezopasnosti Maslennikov to V. V. Chernyshov. (sekretno) 25.IV.1944.

to kill and ethnically cleanse Crimean Tatars the moment he declared the whole nation to be traitors. He knew the Soviet bureaucracy would kill thousands and he expected that the different parts of the bureaucracy would blame each other for the deaths. This is exactly what happened. Beria, Molotov and Soviet organs determined the logistics, local officials signed the death warrants, and the NKVD special settler division participated in the whole process by trying to follow absurd orders. This crime has similarities to others outside the Soviet Union. However, it was Stalin's state that perfected bureaucratic genocide, a crime that used inefficiency, irresponsibility, confusion, and loyalty to the system to destroy the national, political and social "enemies" of the Soviet Union.

Placing any one group on the lowest level of the Soviet social and political strata was a genocidal policy because these groups suffered mass death under Stalinist bureaucracy. If historians can claim that some mass death due the first collectivization and special settlement campaigns was unintentional, over a decade later no such excuse is acceptable. The documents discussed in this chapter have underlined that the entire Soviet bureaucracy expected mass death and participated in the crime.

However, as I will explain in the following chapters, the mass death of Crimean Tatars was not a singular goal. Stalin wanted to kill the Crimean Tatar nation, and many Crimean Tatars had to die to do so. But he also expected some individuals to survive. He believed that the survivors would be isolated, assimilated into farms and factories, and inconsequential as far as continuing the Crimean Tatar nation was concerned. In the long term, Stalin was wrong that he could leave some survivors and still kill the nation.

Chapter 3

Kabanov's Crimea: "De-Korenizatsiia" of Crimean Tatars

Moscow combined postwar recovery and ethnic cleansing into one process in Crimea. Because Crimea was a strategic location and matter of Soviet pride, even before the war ended the USSR began redistributing Crimean Tatar land and resettling Crimea with primarily Russian peasants in order to reestablish the Soviet economic and political system on the peninsula. The preeminent demonstration of the strategic and symbolic importance of Crimea was the Yalta Conference.[1] Moreover, there is perhaps no better indictment of the genocidal nature of twentieth-century great power politics than the fact that the conference, held by the soon-to-be victorious allies, occurred in a region that the host nation was in the process of ethnically cleansing. To the outside world and Allies at time of the Yalta conference, this dark side of recovery was of little concern.[2] After all, they were defeating Hitler.

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[1] Held at the Livadia Palace in Yalta from February 3-11, 1944, Serhii Plokny describes the meeting between Stalin, Winston Churchill, and Franklin D, Roosevelt as "the most secretive peace conference of the modern era." The leaders "moved armies" and decided the fate of nations in a "contest of geopolitical aspirations." With clashing "egos and values systems," they set the parameters for the Cold War. Also, Constantine Pleshakov and Vladislav Zubok argue that the meeting was an Allied acknowledgement of the "enormous Soviet sacrifices and successes" in defeating Hitler: see Serhii Plokny, *Yalta: The Price of Peace* (New York: Viking, 2010), 1; and Constantine Pleshakov and Vladislav Zubok. *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 32.

[2] Fisher, Nekrich and Crimean Tatar activists stated that these policies were important, but they did not have the archival access to examine the processes in detail. See Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 171-174 and Nekrich, *Punished Peoples*, 34-35. Furthermore, works published after the Soviet collapse have, understandably, focused on many of the immediate problems. For example, Edward Allworth underlines that the Crimean Tatar homeland underwent "significant alteration" in their absence, but does not describe those alterations in detail: see Edward A. Allworth, "The Elusive Homeland" in Allworth, *The Tatars of Crimea*, 267.

However, these policies mattered for those peoples that Stalin deported and were part of what made Crimean ethnic cleansing so extreme. Stalin's lie and the deportation and bureaucratic genocide of Crimean Tatars were just the first steps in Crimean ethnic cleansing. These economic and demographic policies were the next two phases of the project. By 1950, the land redistribution and renaming produced the near total Russification of urban and rural Crimea. The early economic stability of this new Crimea was precarious because the first voluntary resettlement campaign failed when Slavic farmers abandoned Crimean once they experienced the awful conditions. As a result, Stalin began a campaign of forced migration that eventually succeeded in creating a Slavic (primarily Russian) population to fill the void of war and deportation. Although resettlement occurred in other regions, the scale and duration of Crimean resettlement was unique and, unlike in Chechnya or Kalmykia, did not end after Stalin's death.[3]

As Crimean Tatar activists have stressed for decades, physically returning to Crimea did little to reverse the demographic changes, loss of possessions, and the "total renaming of population centers and the gifting Crimean Tatar national territory" after the deportation.[4] In the same letters in which activists decried Stalin and the NKVD, they also condemned the postwar Crimean administration and Soviet organs that implemented and enforced Crimean ethnic cleansing by restructuring Crimea as a social, political and economic entity. In the words of Crimean Tatars activists in 1990, this postwar Crimean

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[3] For example, the resettlement of Crimea was on a much larger, long-term scale than in Chechnya, even though the Soviet Union deported at least 100,000 more Chechens than Crimean Tatars. Moreover, most other resettlement campaigns ended when indigenous people returned after the release of special settlers in 1956. In Crimea, Crimean Tatars could not return and the resettlement continued until the late 1970s. For a comparison of resettlement in Crimea and Chechnya, see GARF f. 327, op. 2, d. 662, l.l. 2-9 Otchet pereselencheskikh otdelov pri Groznenskom i Krymskom oblispolkomakh o rabote za 1950g. March 25, 1951.

[4] GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l. 9. Telegraph to Sez"d RSFSR Delegatu Vaslovu, Vorotnikovu, Kozhokinu, Predsedatel'stvuiushchemu Kazakovu & Gazetu Sovetskaia Rossiia ot Sobraniia Krymskikh Tatar Goroda Chikinu- 420 people including Bekirov, Nasyrova, Osmanov, Abduraimov. May 23, 1990.

administration ensured that the results of Crimean ethnic cleansing had no "expiration date."[5] When Crimean Tatars returned, they found towns and districts with unfamiliar names and housing mostly new residents.[6] When the privatization of land, homes, and economic enterprises began in the 1990s, returning Crimean Tatars had little to privatize and almost no political or economic influence.[7] Therefore, this transformative aspect of Soviet ethnic cleansing is key to comprehending the immense challenges the Crimean Tatar movement faced in the areas of housing, economics, property and demography.

Finally, examining economic and resettlement records further confirms the absurdity of Stalin's false treason charges. Far from suspicions of all Crimean Tatars, Crimean Tatar leaders were key in creating and implementing the Crimean recovery plans from 1943 until a week before the deportation. In the month between liberation and the deportation, thousands of Crimean Tatar party members and leaders from the Crimean ASSR returned to Crimea. In fact, the deportation destroyed the original Crimean recovery plans and created nearly insurmountable hardships in rebuilding the Crimean population and economy. As this chapter underlines, only by forcing ethnic Slavs to move to Crimea was Stalin able to stabilize the Crimean economy.

The rebuilding/reorganization and resettlement projects occurred simultaneously and depended on each other for their ultimate success. This chapter discusses them separately as the most reasonable approach to understanding this large body of evidence. Since the rebuilding effort began earlier, the first section details this redistribution of land

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[5] GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l. 15. "Ne povtorit' istoricheskoi oshchibki"- Zaiavlenie Makhalinskikh Sobranii NDKT. 02.06.90.

[6] Williams interviewed elderly Crimean Tatars in the 1990s who found confiscated possessions that the new Slavic residents kept such as tables and wall-hangings. Williams *The Crimean Tatars*, 115.

[7] As Andrew Wilson argues, this allowed Crimean authorities to ignore Crimean Tatar political demands and pleas throughout the 1990s: see Andrew Wilson, "Politics in and around Crimea: A Difficult Homecoming" in Allworth, *The Tatars of Crimea*, 282-283.

and resources. The second section reveals the failures, force, and ultimate success of repopulating Crimea, and a final section explains the outcome and Crimean transfer to the Ukraine SSR. These policies changed Crimea in ways that would influence political events in the domestic and international spheres for decades to come.

Redistributing and Renaming

The war, occupation, and deportations shattered the Crimean ASSR. The situation was dire by the summer of 1944, and agricultural production would only deteriorate further.[8] Over half of Crimean farmland land remained fallow, and much of the cultivated fields died by autumn. Most fruit trees had already died. Water, the lifeblood of the arid region's farms, resorts, and cities, was scarce because the war had destroyed irrigation systems and most wells.[9] Ruined factories dotted Crimean cities, and the few in working condition mostly lacked the raw materials and workers to operate. This was especially true for factories that depended on agriculture such as bread factories, preserve canneries, grain mills and the wine and tobacco industries.[10]

To recover from this devastation, Soviet officials had to reorganize Crimea. Since the Crimean ASSR had actively promoted Crimean Tatar political, economic and cultural enfranchisement, Moscow recast the region as an oblast of the RSFSR, thus disassociating the region from its former role as the Crimean Tatar homeland. The downgrade in status liquidated or radically changed the Soviet institutions that Moscow had used to promote Crimean Tatars and smaller deported groups in the former republic.

[8] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 46, d. 70, l. 59. Dinamik posevnykh ploshchadei po Krymu. 1946.
[9] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 44, d. 970, l.l. 145, 37. Upravlenie Delami Sovmin SSSR M. Pomaznev- Goslpan Tov. Demidovu. November 12, 1949.
[10] GARF, f. 5446, op. 46, d. 1058, l.l. 8-10. Spravka "o predpriiatiiakh narkompishcheproma v Krymu." May 1944.

This transformation included most Crimean collective farms, some factories, the majority of Crimea's 435 Soviets and party branches, Komsomol branches, native-language schools, trade unions, and other organizations.[11] Simultaneously, the state confiscated all material items and harvested goods that Crimean minorities had processed. The other targets of this transformation were Crimean Tatar villages, place names, and other aspects of Crimean Tatar heritage that predated the Crimean ASSR. Crimean authorities simply leveled some historical sites such as graveyards, but mostly they redistributed Crimean Tatar land with remaining structures intact. In short, the new Crimean oblast administration first had to redistribute or eliminate much of the economic and political remnants of the Crimean ASSR.

In the beginning, Crimean ethnic cleansing did not determine all aspects of the Crimean recovery. Sevastopol functioned as its own entity, and Moscow was going to rebuild devastated Crimean industry regardless of the deportations. However, documents from Gosplan, the Supreme Soviet, the NKVD, the Ministry of Land, and other Soviet organs are explicit in describing how ethnic cleansing and rebuilding became the same process. As this section will underline, even Sevastopol naval installations and military factories that had had little to do with Crimean Tatar life before the war participated in land and resource redistribution.

The joint ethnic cleansing/recovery of Crimea after May 1944 had three primary actors, each with a different degree of participation. The first actor was the main economic recovery agency in Crimea, and the one that had the most important role in legitimate postwar recovery, the Gosplan Committee for the Recovery in Crimea led by

[11] On the distribution of Crimean ASSR Soviets see GARF, f. A-385, op. 44, d. 120, l. 27. Spisok raionov Krymskoi ASSR s kolichestvom obsluzhivaemykh imi sel'skikh i poselkovykh sovetov. Simferopol', 1926.

P. Ivanov. This Gosplan branch would be key in facilitating early land redistribution. The second actor was the Crimean Communist Party under the leadership of Pavel Tiuliaev. However, the party usually served as a rubber stamp to the third and most important actor, the Crimean Sovnarkom under the leadership of Aleksandr Kabanov. Originally, Stalin sent Kabanov to Crimea to oversee the confiscation of deported peoples' land, but by November 1944 Kabanov had become the leader of the Crimean Sovnarkom and subsequently the most authoritative figure in Crimea. In terms of replacing Crimean Tatar power in Crimea, the Sovnarkom post was key because, since the conception of the Crimean ASSR, the leader of the Sovnarkom had always been Crimean Tatar, while the party leader had usually been Russian.

In May 1944, Kabanov was still working for the Ministry of Agriculture (Narkomzem) and was just one of dozens of ministry workers organizing the confiscation process. During this initial phase, Kabanov dealt solely with seizing Crimean Tatar land, houses, and work animals, as well making a general assessment of the remaining population. Working alongside Kabanov, the Ministry of Milk and Meat (Narkom MMP) corralled milk cows and fowl, the Ministry of Food Production (Narkomzag) collected all "agricultural products," and the Ministry of Finance (Narkomfin) handled all financial issues and confiscated cash.[12] Kabanov and his colleagues had just begun confiscating Crimean Tatar possessions when Stalin increased their workload by deporting Greek, Armenian, Bulgarian and smaller minorities from Crimea in June.

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[12] Stalin formed a committee headed led by the Soviet Sovnarkom and consisting of five other members, each representing a separate Soviet ministry.
GARF, f. 10026, op. 4, d. 1025, l.l 90-91. Raschet vydeleniia produktov dlia spetspereselentsev-Prilozheniia No. 2 k Postanovleniiu GOKO 5859ss ot 11 maia 1944. Signed by Khriapkina.

Ivanov and his Gosplan team arrived in Crimea weeks before the deportation, and began implementing the pre-liberation plan that Crimean ASSR officials had drafted in exile. His first goal was to immediately restore the Sevastopol naval base and all other military installations, ports, railroads, motorways, communications, and industries vital to recovery.[13] He also began rebuilding and repairing housing and government buildings in urban areas. Because nearly every Soviet organ had an establishment in Crimea, he often served as an inspector and coordinator who interfaced between Gosplan, Crimean authorities, and dozens of ministries and economic enterprises.[14]

While Ivanov had no specific orders to combine ethnic cleansing and recovery, the reality of post-deportation Crimea made the synthesizing of the processes unavoidable. The deportation fully or partially depopulated over 800 of the 1,200 Crimean collective farms, and this was after these farms had sustained war loses. Even in some urban areas such as Sevastopol where Crimean Tatars had been a small minority, the deportation hindered Ivanov's work. To reiterate, most Crimean light industry, food factories, and resorts depended on products such as grapes, fruits, grains, tobacco, vegetables and meat that deported peoples had produced.[15] Moreover, because the deportation was a haphazard, Ivanov, Gosplan and Crimean officials only received notice of the plan on May 17, 1944, one day before the deportations began. Compounding the confusion, Moscow gave Gosplan and Crimean officials vague instructions about

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[13] RGAE f. 4372, op. 45, d. 133, l. 32. Otchet o rabote Uplonomochennogo Gosplana SSSR po Krymu, Ivanov. April 1945.

[14] In fact, in the GOKO deportations and confiscation orders, there was no outline of what to do with the Crimean political and economic system afterwards.

[15] For example, Crimean officials complained how the deportation had further devastated the wine enterprise "Krymvintrest" and the network of Massandra vineyard sovkkhozes. The same was true of the tobacco and citrus farms, as well as regular crops and vegetables such as peppers. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 44, d. 759, l.l. 67-68. Stennogramma Plenuma Krymskogo Obkoma VKP/b/. September 28-29, 1944.

providing a new plan.[16] From Ivanov's point of view, the only way for Crimean agriculture to recovery to prewar levels was through reorganizing and redistributing the kolkhozes, sovkhozes, MTSs, and the attached factories.

However, during the summer of 1944 Ivanov still had no concrete guidance from Moscow. Rural Crimea was in chaos, and Ivanov and Tiuliaev began the reorganization of Crimean agriculture without treating Russian farms differently than those of deported peoples. As the lead economic engineer, Ivanov reasoned that it did not matter who had lived on a farm before or why it was empty. Therefore, throughout the summer of 1944, Gosplan and the Crimean party dissolved and redistributed over 440 collective farms of deported peoples and nearly 200 Slavic kolkhozes. Kabanov alerted Moscow of this issue, and it became clear that Gosplan and Crimean authorities needed a direct order from the center before they were going to treat the farms of Slavs and non-Slavs differently.[17]

Kabanov explained to Ivanov and Tiuliaev that Stalin had decided to create a "new Russian Crimea." They had to preserve and repopulate all Slavic farms, while dissolving and redistributing all non-Slavic farms. Afterwards, Ivanov fused land redistribution with the general recovery process. First, he disassembled the former republic's autonomy by facilitating the RSFSR takeover of the Crimean ASSR's economic infrastructure. This measure gave the RSFSR more direct control over the industrial recovery and speed up redistributing confiscated land.[18] Next, Ivanov explored

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[16] GARF, f. 5446, op. 46, d. 1058, l. 125. Sovnarkom Rasporiazhenie No. 10789-r ot 17 maia 1944. Zam. Pred. SNK SSSR A. Mikoian.

[17] Many Russian farms were almost vacant due to the war and evacuation. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 44, d. 759, l.l. 103, 194-201, 107. November 27-29 Plenum of the Crimean Obkom (1944).

[18] For example, in May 1945 Moscow began placing factories of the Crimean Narkompishcheprom under the authority of Narkommiasomolproma RSFSR. Having removed the factories form the republic

how Crimean industry and enterprises could benefit from the post-deportation land rush. With the guidance of Ivanov, many Crimean economic entities claimed the land of deported peoples.

After this initial misunderstanding, Stalin decided that building a new Crimea required one concrete leader. Given the circumstances, Kabanov became the head of the new Crimean government. He understood the level of devastation and controlled most of the remaining Crimean resources (outside of Sevastopol). While Ivanov and Tiulaev would continue their roles, after November 1944 Kabanov effectively became their boss. Only by examining Kabanov's efforts does the full extent of the combined recovery/ethnic cleansing become clear.

The redistribution effort that Kabanov managed was confusing in some cases, while straightforward in others, and is best understood by categorizing specific examples into two different groups of redistributed land. The Soviet government redistributed the first group of farms in massive orders that Kabanov arranged with Gosplan, other organs and economic enterprises. In general, these orders affected the Crimean wine and tobacco industry that Crimean Tatars had dominated. Kolkhozes and sovkhozes that Kabanov redistributed individually in or in small groups comprised the second group.

After Stalin's deportation orders, perhaps no other acts did more to transform Crimea than order 877 on the "Immediate measures to restore the establishments and sovkhozes of the Crimean People's Committee of Food Production" and similar mass redistribution plans. Ironically, the first group of mass redistribution plans originated as

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organization, the Narkommiasomolproma RSFSR then placed individual factories and operations into the Russian republic organizations that reflected their product. For example, the Simferopol poultry production plant became part of the "Rosglavmiaso trest." GARF f. A-259, op, 6, d. 536, l. 1.Sovnarkom RSFSR Rasporiazhenie No. 1231-r. Signed by Zam. Predsedatelia Sovnarkom RSFSR A. Gritsenko. May 30, 1945.

part of legitimate recovery efforts led by the Crimean Tatar head of the Crimean Sovnarkom, Seifulaev, and the Crimean ASSR government in exile. They began working on the economic restoration plans well before the deportations in 1943. Comparing the three working versions of the project to the final version is a vivid paper trail documenting how Moscow removed the wartime Crimean ASSR officials and fused ethnic cleansing with recovery plans from May to July 1944.[19]

In its final version that Stalin signed on July 15, 1944, order 877 dissolved twenty Crimean Tatar kolkhozes and reorganized six larger Crimean Tatar sovkhozes in seven Crimean districts. Many of the farms were part of the Massandar winery and the final plan reorganized the entire Crimean wine enterprise and placed it under the control of the food ministry (Narkompisheprom) of the RSFSR. Other farms were part of the tobacco and produce industries. The order also mandated the transfer of remaining homes and buildings in dozens of Crimean Tatar villages such as Degermenkoi and Kizilkoi to the new farms that would soon house new settlers.[20]

Gosplan and the Crimean Sovnarkom next created a mass redistribution plan affecting former Crimean Tatar and a few German kolkhozes in Ak-Mechet, Fraidorf, and Larindorf districts. The project dissolved the old kolkhozes and used the 82,635 hectares of farmland to create three large sheep sovkhozes.[21] Gosplan and Crimean officials then expanded the project, claiming more former Tatar farms. In the final

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[19] Seifulaev was working with Gosplan on the project up to a week before the deportations. The pre-deportation plan that includes Crimean Tatar farms and Seifulaev can be found in GARF, f. 5446, op. 46, d. 1058, l.l. 105-121. Proekt SNK SSSR Postanovlenie "O meropriiatiiakh po vosstanovleniiu predpriiatii Narkompishscheproma v osvobozhdennykh raionakh Kryma." The post-deportation plan is in the same delo. GARF, f. 5446, op. 46, d. 1058, l.l. 181-196. SNK SSSR Postanovlenie No. 877 ot 15 iiulia 1944 "O neotlozhnykh meropriiatiiakh po vosstanovleniiu predpriiatii Narkompishscheproma v osvobozhdennykh raionakh Kryma."

[20] Ibid.

[21] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 44, d. 1127, l. 3. Postanovlenie Sovnarkom Krymskoi ASSR. No. 706. July 16, 1944.

version approved on June 16, 1944, the project included all or some parts of over 40 former kolkhozes and encompassed 147,400 hectares, all of which the order dissolved and redistributed into five large sovkhozes. The order also created a Crimean wool enterprise that gained control of the structures and tools on the former farms.[22] A further amendment to the order gave one large Crimean Tatar sheep kolkhoz, Kenegez, to the land ministry (Narkomzem SSSR) for an unexplained reason.[23]

The redistribution of individual farms that comprised the second group was often confusing, but some general characteristics defined the process. Orders concerning the piecemeal restructuring of Crimean kolkhozes and sovkhozes usually began with organizations requesting or physically occupying Crimean Tatar land. Afterwards, Kabanov would make official requests to various organs in Moscow, and Moscow officials usually approved Kabanov's recommendations. Still, there were often disagreements because the redistribution of evenone farm could involve several different Soviet organs and enterprises competing for new land. As such, understanding this process requires examining some specific cases.

The story of the Stalin's Third Five-Year Plan kolkhoz outside of the village of Beshui in the Simferopol district displays how involved the redistribution process of Crimean Tatar land could become. In the fall of 1944 with the farm workers gone and many buildings "destroyed by Germans," the Simferopol cafeteria authority collected what fall harvest could be salvaged from the farm (albeit with no official permission to do so). In addition, they spent 55,000 rubles on new equipment, buildings, and livestock.

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[22] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 44, d. 1127, l.l. 27-28. Spisok Karakulevodecheskikh Sovkhozov Narkomvneshtorga, vosstanavlivaemykh I vnov organizuemykh v Krymu.
[23] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 44, d. 1127, l.l. 25-29. Sovnarkom SSSR "Postanovlenie "O vosstanovlenii i organizatsii v Krymu karakulebodcheskikh sovkhozov Narkomvneshtorgi SSSR."

At the same time, other nearby Slavic kolkhozes began grazing livestock on the farm and additional local organizations made claims to parts of the 2,920-hectare farm. The Southern-Coast Military Traders in Yalta and the Yalta Tuberculosis Sanatorium then approached the Simferopol Soviet for official permission to use parts of the farm. On December 16, 1944, the Simferopol Soviet granted them permission, but this did little good since the cafeteria authority already had de facto control of the land. In the meantime, another one of the nearby kolkhozes, Krasnyi Oktiabria, bypassed the Simferopol' Soviet and requested 60 hectares of farmland from the Crimean Sovnarkom, while the Kuibysheva Crimean Nature Preserve and Zoo followed suit and requested 400 hectares of forestland.[24]

With just this one Crimean Tatar kolkhoz, by early 1945 five different organizations had either occupied the land or legally claimed it. In an attempt to resolve the dispute, the involved parties presented their cases to Kabanov and the Crimean Sovnarkom. The Crimean Sovnarkom accepted the initiative of the cafeteria organization, and granted them 2,460 hectares for a period of five years and granted Krasnyi Oktiabria its desired 60 acres. In doing so, the Crimean Sovnarkom overruled the decision of the Simferopol district government and denied the Yalta military traders and tuberculosis sanatorium any claims, suggesting that they claim the land of "other empty kolkhozes."[25] The Crimean Sovnarkom then forwarded their order to the Soviet Sovnarkom for approval, and on April 30, 1945, Kosygin gave the cafeteria organization and the kolkhoz the requested amounts. Oddly, the Crimean Nature Preserve must have

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[24] GARF, f. 5446, op. 47, d. 3219, l.l. 1-2. Letter to Sovnarkom SSSR ot zam. Narodnogo Komissara Zemdeleniia SSSR Penzin, 2/IY, 1945.

[25] GARF, f. f. 5446, op. 47, d. 3219, l. 5. Postanovlenie Sovnarkom Krymskogo ASSR No. 278, March 14, 1945. Signed by Pred. Sovnarkom Krymskaia. ASSR V. Sederov and Uprav, Delam Sovnarkoma Krymskaia ASSR P. Zhukov.

had friends in high places because Kosygin added their requested 400 hectares to the final order.[26]

As the above story suggests, the fate of former Crimean Tatar farms in the second group had individual twists and turns based on a variety of factors, but Kabanov usually had the final say on land claims. For example, after the deportation of Crimean Tatars from the kolkhoz of Papanina near Bakchisarai, "settlers of Russian nationality" from the nearby Krasnyi Krym kolkhoz occupied their homes. In this case, the Russian farm workers had lost their own homes from German bombing.[27] As a result, Kabanov and the Crimean Sovnarkom drafted order 560 on October 16, 1945, recommending that Krasnyi Krym annex Papanina to solve the housing situation and save the fruit trees and berry bushes that Crimean Tatars had tended. Penzin at the Narkomzem in Moscow approved and both the Sovnarkom's of the RSFSR and SSSR blessed Kabanov's request.[28] Kabanov's Crimean Sovnarkom order 883 on December 11, 1945, reorganized the Krymsovkhoz Tresta Glavkonserva, a communal farm organization that produced canned preserves.[29] Kabanov divided the organization's Crimean Tatar sovkhozes of Tomak, Chotty, and Eshkene into five separate farms and gave them the Russian names of Primor'e, Stepnoi, Vesna, Pobeda, and Frunze. Mikoyan and the Sovnarkom in Moscow approved the restructuring on February 9, 1946.[30]

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[26] GARF, f. 5446, op. 47, d. 3219, l. 13. Rasporiazhenie Sovnarkom SSSR No. 7123-r ot 30 aprelia 1945, singed by A. Kosygin.
[27] GARF, f. 5446, op. 47, d. 3230, l. 18. Vypisko iz raportiki No. 88, utverzhdennoi Tov. Andreevym and signed Tov. Degiar' Sovnarkom RSFSR from November 19, 1945. (f. 5446, op. 47, d. 3230, l. 18)
[28] GARF, f. 5446, op. 47, d. 3230, l. 15. Resheni Ispolkom Krymskogo Oblsoveta Deputatov Trudiashchesiia No. 560, October 16 1945.
[29] GARF, f. 5446, op. 48, d. 1233, l. 15. Reshenie Ispolkoma Kryma no. 883, December 11, 1945. Signed by A Kabanov.
[30] GARF, f. 5446, op. 48, d. 1233, l. 24. Sovnarkom Rasporiazhenie SSSR no. 1605-r. Febuary 9, 1946. Signed by A. Mikoyan.

On a peninsula with scarce water resources, authorities coveted Crimean Tatar land with bodies of water. The large reservoirs on the Tatar kolkhozes of Sergo and Eni-Dun'ia led Kabanov to issue Crimean Sovnarkom order 644 that created water-foul farms. In addition, the order established the Arbatskii sovkhoz on the 5,977 hectare Crimean Tatar sovkhoz of Arma-Eli.[31]

Land claims from the military and the NKVD usually encountered little controversy. For instance, the Black Sea Fleet Factory 54 in Sevastopol desired 161 hectares from the Crimean Tatar kolkhoz Bolshevik, and Kabanov and Moscow granted the requested with no challenges from other organizations.[32] Having received that land, the Black Sea Fleet then requested an additional 1,808 hectares of land from the Eni-Kuvet and Bolshevik Crimean Tatar kolkhozes in Crimea's Zuiskskii district. Kabanov personally supported the transfer and argued that that the land was not great for new settlers, but perfect for livestock because "the Germans had leveled the houses and the Tatars had been deported."[33] Kosygin approved of the fleet's new pastureland on April 18, 1945. In addition, the same order also awarded the Crimean NKVD Spetstorg 1,781 hectares of the former Tatar Third International kolkhoz in the Simferopol district.[34]

But the post-deportation land rush was not endless. Not every organization got what it wanted, and Moscow did not endorse every request that Kabanov and the Crimean Sovnarkom made. The Sergo Ordzhonikidze Aviation Institute in Moscow contacted Kabanov and requested 295 hectares of land from the Ulu-Uzen sovkhoz, but

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31 GARF, f. A-259, op. 6, d. 764, l. 4. Sovnarkom Krymskogo ASSR Postanovlenie No. 644. September 22, 1944.
32 GARF, f. 5446, op. 47, d. 3219, l. 13. Rasporiazhenie Sovnarkom SSSR No. 7123-r ot 30 aprelia 1945, singed by A. Kosygin.
33 GARF, f.5446, op. 47, d. 3209, l. 9. Letter to Kosygin from S. Foteev on April 14, 1945.
34 GARF, f. 5446, op. 47, d. 3209, l. 10. Rasporiazhenie Sovnarkom SSSR No. 7123-r. Signed by Kosygin. April 18, 1945.

the RSFSR Sovnarkom rejected the proposal because they wanted the sovkhoz's fruits and vegetables to "stay in Crimea."[35] In other cases, Moscow upheld arbitration court decisions involving Tatar property and disputes that went against Kabanov's wishes.[36]

Moreover, disputes between new Crimean settlers and different Soviet organs over confiscating Crimean Tatar land continued well into the late 1940s as tens of thousands of new settlers arrived. For example, farmers from the Fourth Party Congress kolkhoz wrote directly to Stalin and complained that the Simferopol Military Trade enterprise had misused the land of the former Crimean Tatar kolkhoz Zhdanov.[37] The dispute lasted nearly two years as the farmers and enterprise accused each other of killing the farm's fruit trees. Despite the fact that the enterprise invested thousands of rubles into reconstructing the farm's buildings, Moscow was desperate to retain the new farmers in Crimea and awarded them the land in June 1947.[38] Despite such disputes, by late 1948 Kabanov and Soviet authorities had accomplished most of the redistribution.

The redistribution of Crimean Tatar farms and other land did much to erase Crimean Tatars' geographic footprint, but most of these orders only effected Soviet institutions and did not rename most of the villages and geography that predated the Soviet system. The new Crimean communist party realized this problem early and began changing place names not included in land redistribution. First, on July 16, 1944, the

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35 GARF f. f. A-259, op. 6, d. 769, l. 30. Zam. Pred. Sovnarkom RSFSR A. Gritsenko to Sovnarkom SSSR. May 26, 1945. (no. 207-8)

36 One important note is that while Crimea's most important peacetime industry was the massive tourist and healthcare resort complex, according to party documents the Soviet sanatoriums were simply not in the position to take on more territory in the immediate postwar period. Instead, the party ministries and organizations that controlled most sanatoriums spent years cleaning up and repairing the establishments that the war left neglected and plundered. GARF f. A-259, op. 6, d. 1520, l. 1. Sovnarkom RSFSR Rasporiazhenia No. 555-r ot 16 marta 1945 goda. By Zam. Predsedatelia Sovarkom RSFSR A. Sarotorszhskii. March 16, 1945.

37 GARF, f. 5446, op. 49, d. 4208, l. 25. Pis'mo "Po porucheniiu kolkhoznikov kolkhoza 4-ii S"ezd Soveta"- Stalinu. January 18, 1947.

38 GARF, f. 5446, op. 49, d. 4208, l. 34. Sovmin SSSR Rasporiazhenie No. 6695r. June 4, 1947.

Crimean Oblispolkom concluded that, "because of the changes of the situation in Crimea, we believe it is necessary to change the names of certain towns, district centers, MTSs and communal farms with any relationship to Tatar origins." The Oblispolkom then presented a list of name changes to Moscow for approval.[39]

Their plan was ambitious and Moscow chose to complete the project in several phases, beginning on the macro-scale with districts. On December 19, 1944, the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR renamed the 11 non-Slavic districts of Crimea and their administrative centers. For example, the Crimean Tatar Ak-Mechetskii district became Chernomorskii district, and the administrative center changed from Ak-Mechet to Chernomorsk. The Karasubazarskii district became Belogorsk district, and so on. Nine of the renamed districts were Crimean Tatar, while two were the German districts of Larindorf and Fraidorf that became Pervomaisk and Novoselsk, respectively.[40]

While these changes did go into effect and land redistribution largely took care of communal farm and MTS names, thousands of other villages maintained non-Slavic names. This concerned Kosygin and others in Moscow, and a RSFSR Presidium decree on August 21, 1945, proposed renaming all non-Slavic towns and locales in Crimea.[41] In response, the Crimean Sovnarkom created a special commission for erasing non-Slavic names headed by Crimean Oblispolkom memeber and land management expert, I. Vevooborotov.[42] Pouring over Crimean maps, they used patriotic terms, national heroes,

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[39] RGASPI f. 17, op. 44, d. 762, l.l. 112, 122-126. Protokol No. 46- Zasedaniia Buiro Obkoma VKP/b/ ot 16 VIII, 1944.

[40] GARF, f. A-385, op. 47, d. 120, l. 101. Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhonogo Soveta RSFSR No. 621/8 "o pereimenovanii raionov i raionykh tsentrov Krymskoi ASSR." Signed by Pred. Prez. Ver. Sov. RSFSR N. Shvernik and Sek. Prez. Ver. Sov. RSFSR P. Bakhmurov. December 14, 1944.

[41] GARF, f. A-385, op. 47, d. 120, l. 147. Spravka by Bukharov. October 20, 1967.

[42] GARF, f. A-385, op. 47, d. 120, l. 148. Zam. Zaveduiushchego Otdelom Klub Krasnykh Sledopytov G. Sazhin, Krasnogvardiskoe, Crimea to Pres. Ver Sov. RSFSR. December 1, 1970.

and geopgraphic features to create new names, all of which were Russian.[43] However, the implimentation of the thousands of name changes was slow and confusing, and the project stalled as the Soviet authorities in Crimea struggled to provide food and provisions to civilians.

Finally, in the spring of 1948, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet created a new commission to complete the Crimea renaming project that included members from the Crimean and RSFSR governments, as well as the topographic department of the Soviet armed forces.[44] The result of their labor was RSFSR Supreme Soviet Order 745/3 on May 18, 1948. The sweeping, eleven-page document immediately renamed 1,062 Crimean towns and villages, the vast majority of which were Crimean Tatar. It effected every district, not just the Tatar and German districts renamed in 1945.

When combined with already renamed districts and Soviet institutions, the result was the near-total Russification of Crimean geography. What was in 1941 the village of Ak-Kaia in the Karasubazarskii district became the village of Beloe Skala in the Belogorskii district by the summer of 1948. The village of Sheikh-Monai in the Ichkinskii district became Lebednika in the Sovetskii district, while the village of Kul'-Dzhankin in the Ak-Mechetskii district became Okhotniki in the Chernomorskii district. It was so radical that it even renamed Russian and Ukrainian villages because they too were associated with the defunct Crimean ASSR. For instance, the Ukrainian village of

[43] Crimean officials also tried to rename rivers, mountains, caves, and other geographical features, but with limited success. GARF, f. A-385, op. 47, d. 120, l. 147. Spravka by Bukharov. October 20, 1967.

[44] GARF, f. A 385, op. 47, d. 120, l. 123. Spravka k voprosu o pereimenovanii 1062 naselennykh punktov Krymskoi oblasti (Ukaz ot 18 maia 1948 g.). December 6, 1966.

Merkulova became Lebednianka, while the Mikhailovka Slaviansk farm soviet became the Borodino soviet.[45]

With the land redistribution and remaming policiy, Stalin erased the Crimean Tatar homeland as a geographic and economic entitiy in what was a stunning reversal of Soviet indigenization policies. However, initially much of the reorganization of Crimea was only on paper because there was no one to work the new farms and live in renamed villages. As such, a coplimentary policy aimed to populate this project.

Repopulating Crimea: A Coalition of the Reluctant and Willing

Combined with the wartime population loses, the deportation was catastrophic for Crimean demographics and imperiled the reconstruction of Crimea. Crimean officials and Stalin's inner circle admitted this fact. As Kosygin told Molotov in a September 1944 letter, the two violent events removed two-thirds of the prewar Crimean population.[46] According to Soviet counts, the war shrunk the Crimean population from 1,126,000 people in 1939 to only 633,000 people immediately after the April 1944 liberation. The deportation then removed another approximately 230,000 people, meaning by June 1944 only around 400,000 people remained in Crimea. The worst situation was on Crimea's mountainous Southern coast where most Crimean Tatars had lived.[47]

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45 GARF, f. A 385, op. 47, d. 120, l.l. 111-122(obs). Ukaz Prezidiuma Ver. Sov. RSFSR No. 745/3 "O pereimenovanii naselennykh punktov Krymskoi oblasti." Signed by Pred. Pres. Ver Sov. RSFSR I. Vlasov and Sekretar' Prez. Ver. Sov. RSFSR P. Bakhmurov. May 18, 1948.
46 GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 6460, l.l. 7-8. Spravka, A. Kosygin- Molotovu. September 9, 1944.
47 GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 3368, l.l. 19-20. Pis'mo s proetom postanovleniia GOKO No. 6372s. Kosygin i Malenkov- Molotovu. August 1944.

The wastefulness of the deportation is difficult to overstate. From republic-level plans down to the plans of individual farms, it interrupted a recovery that had already been underway for a month. Remaining Crimean leaders admitted that the deportation reversed much of the progress made in the month between liberation and the beginning of deportations. Even Gosplan's basic infrastructure repairs were nearly impossible with the new labor deficit. In one typical letter that illuminates the reality of the recovery effort, the officials of the Siuren-Koush Railroad complained that they had the rails to repair railroads, but no workers to lay the rails.[48]

The worst situation was in Crimean agriculture. The land office of the Soviet Sovnarkom admitted that the exit of Crimean Tatars killed most of the Crimean farms that still were partially functioning after the war. The new party secretary for the Seitler district, Puzakov, told the party that 12 of his farms were not functioning because of the "special settlement."[49] Tobacco industry officials described how Crimean Tatar tobacco farmers were tending their fields when the deportation ripped them from their crops.[50] A speaker at the Crimean party plenum remarked how they had created their work plan "before the deportation of Tatars," had begun implementing that plan in April 1944, and now were having to make extensive "corrections."[51] Officials in the Sudak district complained that there was not one grape-growing expert remaining, that the fruit trees

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[48] GARF, f. A-259, op. 6, d. 2606, l. 14. . Spravka. "O vypolnenii Narkommesttoppromom RSFSR postanovleniia SNK RSFSR ot 20 iiulia 1944 goda No. 549 "O pervoocherednykh meropriiatiiakh po vosstanovleniiu khoziiastva Kryma."" (No. 01-14-10) From Zam Narkoma Mestnom Toplivnoi Promyshlennosti RSFSR V. Beliaev to Sovnarkom RSFSR Orginstruktorskii Otdel N. Zamiatinu. October 24, 1944.

[49] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 44, d. 758, l. 14. Protokol No. 1 Zasedaniia Plennuma Obkoma VKP(b) ot 14 iulia 1944 goda. Sekretar Seitlerskogo RK Puzakov.

[50] GARF, f. 5446, op. 46, d. 1058, l.l. "O sostoianii Tabakovodstva v Krymu." Zam. Narkom Zagotovok SSSR V. A. Sharapov- Mikoianu I Narkomu Zagotovok K. P. Subbotinu. May 31, 1944.

[51] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 44, d. 758, l.l. 25-25ob. Protokol No. 1 Zasedaniia Plennuma Obkoma VKP(b) ot 14 iulia 1944 goda.

had died, and the tobacco was wilting.[52] Even the Crimean Party Secretary, Tiuliaev, along with the director of the Massandar wine enterprise, did not hesitate in underlining the deportations' role in the situation. In a report on the Massandar winery enterprise to Moscow, they described how "since the deportation of Tatar kolkhozes" all the grape vines were now in awful shape and had been "overrun with weeds" in absence of "Tatar grape growers."[53] A NKVD inspection of Crimean farms in August 1944 revealed a non-existent harvest.[54]

Crimean authorities needed these farms to reestablish the Soviet system in Crimea. Again, the lack of agricultural production meant that even operational Crimean factories were useless without raw materials, and the real production of bread and food products was only a fraction of prewar levels.[55] In desperation, Tiuliaev and Gosplan ordered thousands of factory workers and soldiers in Crimean cities to help save crops that the deportees had planted in the spring. The effort was fruitless and many Crimean factory directors balked at providing workers, and instead sent "homemakers, pensioners, and invalids."[56] Furthermore, stretching the urban Crimean workforce thin only slowed the reconstruction of Crimean infrastructure.

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[52] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 44, d. 759, l.l. 76-76ob. Stennogramma Plenuma Krymskogo Obkoma VKP/b/. September 28-29, 1944.
[53] GARF, f. 5446, op. 46, d. 1058, l.l. 78-81. Dokladnaia Zapiska "o sostoianii vinokombinata Massandra I meropriiatiakh po vosstanovleniiu vinogradstva I vinodeliia v Krymu." Obkoma VKP(b) Tiuliaev, Glavvino. Narkompishcheprom SSSR Director Vinkominata "Massandra Sobolev. May 26, 1944.
[54] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 44, d. 758, l. 34. Protokol No. 1 Zasedaniia Plennuma Obkoma VKP(b) ot 14 iulia 1944 goda.
[55] GARF, f. 5446, op. 48, d. 1233, l.l. 8-7. Letter to Sovnarkom SSSR on March 16, 1945 from Zam. Narodnogo Komisara Zemledeliia SSSR Penzin; GARF, f. A-259, op. 6, d. 2606, l.l. 31-33. "Krymskaia ASSR (O vosstanovlenii pishchevykh predpriiatii NKPP RSFSR v Krymu." By Zam. Narkom Pishchevoi Promyshlennosti Nestorovich. October 23, 1944.
[56] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 44, d. 758, l. 26ob. Protokol No. 1 Zasedaniia Plennuma Obkoma VKP(b) ot 14 iulia 1944 goda.

Soon, Crimean officials wrote blunt letters to Moscow demanding a fix to the labor deficit.[57] As a result, the land office of the Sovnarkom in Moscow and Gosplan pushed the matter of repopulating the peninsula, specifically citing the fact that the deportations had made realizing pre-war agricultural production "extremely difficult." By July 14, 1944, Crimean party leaders and Gosplan had compelled the Soviet Sovnarkom to act.[58] But who was going to go? As war raged there were few workers to spare between May 1944 and 1946.

However, Moscow considered Crimea a special situation and found the people. The wave of new settlement had two main groups. The first group was part of an official resettlement plan that, often forcefully, moved Slavic settlers from the mainland to the peninsula. The secondary group consisted of spontaneous and uncoordinated resettlement that the Soviet government and armed forces encouraged.

The first group of settlers began arriving after Stalin and the GOKO ordered the resettlement of 51,000 Russian and Ukrainian farmers (17,000 total kolkhoz families) to Crimea on August 12, 1944. The order specified that Kabanov had to provide the settlers the private plots and homes of "former Tatar, Bulgar and other deported farmers" with the purpose of restarting Crimean agriculture.[59] They also received home loans and a tax break.[60] The bulk of these families were from farms in the Voronezh, Krasnodar, Rostov, Tambov, and Stavropol' regions, with smaller numbers from other regions and the

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[57] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 44, d. 758, l. 2ob. Protokol No. 1 Zasedaniia Plennuma Obkoma VKP(b) ot 14 iulia 1944 goda. Sekretar' Tiuliaev.

[58] GARF, f. 5446, op. 48, d. 1233, l.l. 8-7. Letter to Sovnarkom SSSR from Zam. Narodnogo Komisara Zemledeliia SSSR Penzin. March 16, 1945

[59] While Beria and Molotov directed the deportations, Stalin assigned Kosygin to lead the Crimean repopulation project. GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 3368, l.l. 13-18. GOKO postanovlenie No. 6372s ot 12 avgusta 1944 goda. "O pereselenie kolkhoznikov v raiony Kryma."

[60] GARF, f. 5446, op. 46, d. 2301, l. 20. SNK SSSR Postanovlenie No. 1431 ot 15 Oktiabria 1944 goda.

Ukrainian SSR. Among these farmers were 819 "specialists" including 165 kolkhoz directors, 125 soviet chairs, tractor drivers, mechanics and other skilled professionals. The plan called on Crimean officials to travel to the designated oblasts and, working with local officials, choose the new settlers and complete the resettlement between September 1 and 15, 1944. While delayed a few weeks because of poor road conditions and wartime chaos, resettlement officials soon exceeded their target. By mid-October 1944, 85 convoys had brought nearly 65,000 settlers (17,082 families) to Crimea.[61]

This first plan to resettle Crimea with Slavic farmers failed for several reasons. First off, although Soviet officials referred to these settlers as "volunteers," the relocations were often forced and the Slavic settlers faced some of the same problems as special settlers. The plan was haphazard and Crimean party and government officials only had three-days notice that they would be receiving thousands of settlers, and hence were unprepared.[62] Because of the speed of the relocation, the NKVD and Crimean officials crammed the settlers into train cars before they could collect their last paychecks or back-pay from their former kolkhozes.[63] In contrast to special settlers, they traveled in passenger cars and not cattle wagons. They also had a shorter trip (usually 3 days) and actually received food rations en route.[64] Regardless, most "volunteer" settlers did not want to go, and this would soon become obvious.

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[61] GARF, f. 5446, op. 46, d. 1695, l.l. 27-30. "O pereselenii kolkhoznikov v raion'e kryma." Kosygin- Molotovu, Malenkovu, Andreevu, Mikoyanu, Voznesenskomu. October 13, 1944.

[62] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 44, d. 762, l. 239. Reshenia ot 8 sentiabria 1944 goda- Postanovlenia Obkoma VKP/b/ i Sovnarkom Krymskoi ASSR.

[63] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 45, d. 133, l. 40. Otchet o rabote Upolnomochennogo Gosplana SSSR po Krymu (Ivanov). April 1945.

[64] Most convoys arrived without reports of illness or death. However, convoy 636 from Voronezh oblast did report several children getting ill and that Crimean officials were not helpful on arrival. In this case, the Voronezh oblast party complained directly to Molotov about the convoy's problems, and Kabanov personally intervened on behalf of the convoy. See, GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 6460, l.l. 7-8. Spravka, A. Kosygin- Molotovu. September 9, 1944; GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 3368, l. 21. Telegram

A second reason for the failure (and another similarity to special settlement) were the awful conditions awaiting the "voluntary" settlers. The GOKO order had promised food, grain, livestock, fruit trees, loans for homebuilding and other supplies.[65] However, as was evident in Chapter Two, there was little food or animals left in Crimea to support the new settlers. The key difference between the special settlers and the Crimean settlers was that, since they want the project to succeed, Soviet authorities provided sufficient sustenance to the settlers to avoid mass starvation. Moreover, unlike Crimean Tatars, Soviet authorities often allowed settlers to take food, livestock, and other supplies with them.[66] While this extra food prevented mass death, food still became scarce during the first month in Crimea and a lack of livestock feed threatened herds.[67]

A third problem was that, despite the importance of Crimean resettlement, repairing Crimea's military bases was the top priority in the early Cold War and the demands of military officials often trumped the needs of resettlement.[68] As a result, housing was insufficient because promised lumber, construction materials and funding were unavailable.[69] Exacerbating the housing situation was the fact that the land redistribution and resettlement processes were often uncoordinated, sometimes

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Upolnomochennyi Voronezhskogo Obkoma Partii Tiurin I Nachalnik eshelona No. 634 Bartenev. September 14, 1944.

[65] GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 3368, l.l. 13-18. GOKO postanovlenie No. 6372s ot 12 avgusta 1944 goda. "O pereselenie kolkhoznikov v raiony Kryma."

[66] For example, one convoy of 50 families from Voronezh oblast included 232 cows, as well as smaller numbers of calves, goats, pigs, and several tons of vegetables and grain. Another convoy of 7,281 settlers from Tambov oblast arrived in Karasubazar district with 560 cattle, 630 sheep and goats, 20 pigs and 790 birds. However, in some cases the relocation authorities lost "lost" settlers' animals or refused to let them take everything. GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 3368, l. 33. Telegram Sekretar' Tambovskogo Okoma Volkov, Pred. Oblispolkoma Volokarinov i Upolnomochennyi GOKO Silin- Molotovu. September 24, 1944.

[67] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 45, d. 133, l 40. "Otchet o rabote Ivanov." September 20, 1945.

[68] GARF, f. 5446, op. 49a, d. 3407, l.24. Sovmin SSSR Rosporiazhenie No. 4053rs ot 14 aprelia 1947.

[69] GARF, f. 8131, op. 29, d. 289, l.l. 8-10. Pis'mo Pred. Krymskogo Oblispolkoma S. Postobalov i Sekretar' Krymskogo obkoma P. Titov- Malenkovu. "O Khode pereseleniia v kokhoze Krymskou oblasti." May 5, 1950.

conflicting, and always unclear on how many livable structures remained in any given village. When 200 settler families arrived in the Crimean Tatar villages of Biiuk-Uzenbash and Kuchuk Uzenbash, the settlers learned that the Germans had actually burned down all 643 Tatar homes during the occupation. Next, the settlers learned that Kabanov had already transferred the land to a factory so they could not even build new homes.[70] By September 1944, at least 2,640 farming families were homeless, and Crimean officials struggled to shelter them. By the winter of 1945-1946 thousands of families lived in temporary housing or with multiple families.[71] In contrast to special settlers, Crimean authorities prevented death from exposure, but could not ensure decent living conditions and the settlers, again, complained.[72]

The fourth problem was that the settlers had little clue about how to farm in the foreign climate and topography. Few of the farmers were familiar with tobacco cultivation and grape growing.[73] Unlike their old kolkhozes in the "black earth" heartlands of Western Russia and Ukraine, Crimean Tatar farms were widely dispersed in rugged and mountainous territory. For example, Ukrainian party officials were concerned that the settlers arriving at the Kzyl-Kermen kolkhoz would be isolated because the farm actually consisted of 75 small plots scattered across several mountainsides. At the Lenin kolkhoz in the Otarchisk agricultural soviet, the 90 hectares of pastureland were located in 33 separate plots, while the Leninism farm in the Tataro-

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[70] Where these particular settlers finally found shelter is unclear. GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 6460, l. 2. Pis'mo. Sekretar' TsK KP Ukr. SSR i Zam. Predsedatelia SNK Ukr. SSR V. Starchenko- GOKO (Molotovu). September 4, 1944.

[71] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 44, d. 762, l. 238. Reshenie ot 8 Sentiabra 1944 goda. "O zaselenii kolkhozov Kryma pereseliamymi kolkhoznikov iz drugikh oblastei, kraev i respiublik."

[72] GARF, f. 8131, op. 29, d. 289, l. 8. Pis'mo Pred. Krymskogo Oblispolkoma S. Postobalov i Sekretar' Krymskogo obkoma P. Titov- Malenkovu. "O Khode pereseleniia v kokhoze Krymskou oblasti." May 5, 1950.

[73] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 44, d. 759, l. 76. Stennogramma Plenuma Krymskogo Obkoma VKP/b/. September 28-29, 1944.

Osman agricultural Soviet had 34 separate pastures. As one Ukrainian official argued, "these farmers were used to growing grain, potatoes and vegetables… and scattering them on isolated mountainside plots created unfamiliar and difficult conditions."[74] This isolation also made the logistics of distributing household necessities daunting and this remained an annoying fact-of-life for the settlers until the early 1950s.[75]

The fifth problem was that there were no experts or farm directors to teach new settlers how to successfully farm in Crimea. The deportation of Crimean Tatars expelled most Crimean hydrology, winery, and tobacco experts and workers, and the cumulative knowledge that they had honed in the arid environment disappeared.[76] After the irrigation issue became obvious in the second half of 1944, the Sovnarkom ordered the Ministry of Land to send 50 skilled workers to Crimea to help create irrigation systems for the settlers.[77] Other orders also sent agricultural specialists to Crimea. Still, these specialists still had no knowledge of Crimean specifics. Moreover, the agricultural schools in Crimea were wrecked, and many of the former instructors dead or deported.[78] Even in Slavic kolkhozes with farmers who survived the occupation, the NKVD had removed most of the directors for operating kolkhozes under occupation, leaving survivors and the new settlers with poorly organized farms run by a depleted staff.[79] While the repopulation effort was massive, the repopulation plan in ideal conditions

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[74] GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 6460, l.l. 3-5. Pis'mo. Sekretar' TsK KP Ukr. SSR i Zam. Predsedatelia SNK Ukr. SSR V. Starchenko- GOKO (Molotovu). September 4, 1944.
[75] GARF, f. 327, op. 2, d. 626, l. 1. Reshenie Krymskogo Ispolkoma no. 1254 "O rezul'tatkh obsledovaniia sostoianiia pereselencheskikh kolkhozov Krymskoi oblasti." December 4, 1947.
[76] For example, the father of Crimean Tatar historian Gulnara Bekirova had been the director of the Sudak winery sovkhoz before the war. Bekirova, *Krymskie Tatary*, 34.
[77] GARF, f. A-310, op. 16, d. 650, l. 8. Zam. Narkom Zem. RSFSR Nazarov to Glavnoe Upravlenie Trudovykh Rezervov pri SNK SSSR P. G. Moskatovu. April 23, 1945.
[78] GARF, f. 5446, op. 46, d. 1695, l.17. "Vedomost' raspredeleniia po oblastiam kraiam I respublikam rabotnikov sel'skogo khoziastva, napravliaemykh dlia raboty v krym." July 1944.
[79] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 44, d. 759, l. 80. Postanovlenie Plenuma Krynskogo Obkoma. September 28-29, 1944.

would take a decade to replace war losses, meaning Crimean farms continued with a depleted labor force for years.[80]

The sixth problem was the fact that the Crimean party and government remained depleted. For example, in October 1944 only 30 percent of the prewar party members remained.[81] Many town and district party organizations barely existed. While there was a campaign to attract Komsomol members to Crimea, as the war still raged there simply was a lack of experienced men and women to replace the old cadres.[82]

The seventh and final problem was that many of the home regions that the settlers were leaving from were also devastated.[83] Not surprisingly, local Russian and Ukrainian authorities did not want to part with healthy farmers and their livestock. Russian and Ukrainian officials often resisted the orders and complained about the conditions and the fact that many settlers did not want to go to Crimea. At first, Kosygin responded by telling the officials and settlers to stop complaining and follow orders.[84]

With Kosygin's blessing, Crimean party workers and the NKVD began aggressive efforts to poach kolkhoz farmers, but this created even fiercer resistance. In Kursk, Voronezh, and Ivanov oblasts, local party workers and farm directors refused to assist Crimean authorities, and claimed that they had received no orders. In several other Russian and Ukrainian regions, local authorities forbid the selected farmers from leaving. A number of party and government workers also used force and intimidation to dissuade

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[80] For example, in Crimea's Kuibyshev district before the war and deportation there had been 26 Crimean Tatar kolkhozes with 13,657 people (3,117) families. However, the August order only brought around 9,000 new settlers to those kolkhozes. GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 6460, l. 6. Pis'mo. Sekretar' TsK KP Ukr. SSR i Zam. Predsedatelia SNK Ukr. SSR V. Starchenko- GOKO (Molotovu). September 4, 1944.
[81] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 44, d. 763, l. 127. "Doklad o rabote Krymskogo Obkoma." October 1944.
[82] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 44, d. 763, l. 130. "Doklad o rabote Krymskogo Obkoma." October 1944.
[83] For an example of the labor and livestock deficit in Voronezh oblast see RGASPI f. 17, op. 123,d. 148, l. 19. Voronezhskii oblast Sovnarkom "O meropriiatiiakh po vostanovlenniiu sel'skogo khoziastvo v raionakh voronezhskoi oblasti osvobozhdennykh ot nemetsko-fashistskikh zakhvatchikov." 1944.
[84] GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 6460, l.l. 7-8. Spravka, A. Kosygin- Molotovu. September 9, 1944.

Crimean authorities. For example, in the Riazan district of Iaroslavl' oblast the district party secretary had the police expel Crimean party workers and refuse their reentry into the district. Elsewhere, local party workers destroyed the promotional Crimean posters and forbade the distribution of Crimean party newspapers.[85]

Another tactic that local leaders employed to avoid losing productive farm families to Crimea was sending "invalids, elderly, and city dwellers" in place of farmers. The first secretary of the Cherkess district in Stavropol region said he would not send healthy farmers. And many others party leaders repeated this threat and followed through by sending "hairstylists, artists, nurses, and accounts," as well as the "chronically ill and people with sexually transmitted diseases."[86]

The second group of new settlers were not part of the official plan and consisted of the families of Soviet soldiers, some demobilized soldiers from the Red Army and Black Sea Fleet, and homeless kolkhoz families from the Western oblasts of Russia. Although the exact numbers and motivations of these settlers are hazy because their movements were often off the radar of Soviet bureaucracy, anecdotal evidence reveals that their numbers were significant. Catherine Merridale suggests that Soviet soldiers in Crimea saw themselves as "conquers" who "inhabited empty houses that were thick with ghosts."[87] For example, in Crimea's Kuibyshevskoi district at least 188 families of Black Sea veterans had settled in former Tatar homes by September 1944 even though Ivanov had designated the homes for official settlers. In a similar fashion, the families of sailors

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[85] GARF, f. 8131, op. 29, d. 286, l. 6. Pis'mo "O khode pereseleniia v kolkhozam Krymskoi oblasti." Titov- Malenkovu. May 5, 1950.
[86] GARF, f. 8131, op. 29, d. 286, l. 7. Pis'mo "O khode pereseleniia v kolkhozam Krymskoi oblasti." Titov- Malenkovu. May 5, 1950.
[87] Catherine Merridale, *Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945* (New York: Picador, 2006), 366.

also occupied deportee homes in Verkhniaia, Fotisala, Ianisala and other villages before the new settlers arrived.[88] In early September 1945, the head of the Orgbiuro of the Crimean Obkom Soviet M. P. Goroshkin wrote an urgent letter to the Central Committee of the Forestry Union in Moscow requesting "to please explain the rules for handling new settlers arriving to live in the homes of Crimean Tatars that had been deported from the kolkhozes." He explained that the bulk of new settlers have come on their own accord from the Rostov, Stavropol, Tambov Kuban, and Voronezh oblasts and that the kolkhoz and forestry managers have welcomed them. In addition, there were also new settlers who Red Army soldiers returning from the front and others who had been conscripted by the Nazis into German slave labor. With Crimean farms still in disarray, many of these people began working for the Soviet forestry service, producing lumber for rebuilding. As such, Goroshkin asked if he could offer these unofficial settlers Crimean registration and membership in the Forestry Union.[89] The answer from Moscow was that all Slavic persons with passports could settle in Crimea. Furthermore, the VTsSPS ordered all Crimean workers' unions to accept new Slavic members.[90] The result was that, as long as you were of a "safe" ethnicity such as Russian or Ukrainian, you could stay.

Not only could they stay, but by October 26 the Sovmin in Moscow ordered that resettlement benefits for official settlers be expanded to 1,000 families of these unofficial settlers.[91] In 1950, the Sovmin continued this policy and specified that Crimean farms

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[88] GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 6460, l.1. 1-3. Pis'mo. Sekretar' TsK KP Ukr. SSR i Zam. Predsedatelia SNK Ukr. SSR V. Starchenko- GOKO (Molotovu). September 4, 1944.
[89] GARF, f. 5467, op. 28, d. 319, l. 29. Letter to TsK Profsoiuza Lesa i Splava from Pred. Orgbiuro Krymskogo Obkoma Soiuza M. P. Goroshkin. September 1945.
[90] GARF, f. 5467, op. 28, d. 319, l. 28. Letter to Pred. Orgbiuro Krymskogo Obliskoma Soiuza M. P. Goroshkin from Instruktor Orgotdela TsK Soiuza Klimenova. September 22, 1945.
[91] GARF, f. 327, op. 2, d. 626, l. 4. Dokladnaia Zapiska "O rezul'tatakh proverki organizatsionno-khoziaistvenogo sostoianka pereselencheskikh kolkhozov osnovnykh pereselencheskikh raionov Krymskoi oblasti." October 1947.

had to accept the at least 1,000 new families of Soviet armed forces servicemen a year outside of the official plans and required this policy to continue indefinitely.[92] These orders not only provide a hint at how many families were moving on their own, but also showed that Moscow supported their actions. Regardless, even if most remained in Crimea, their numbers before 1950, while significant, could not rescue the faltering official resettlement.

Even by Stalinist standards of waste and inefficiency, the Crimean resettlement project had become a spectacular failure by the summer of 1945. Russian and Ukrainian settlers, for the most part, simply did not want to deal with the plethora of problems described above. They were technically volunteers and not special settlers, so they voted with their feet and left by the tens of thousands once they realized the harsh conditions of life on the peninsula. This was settlers' best form of protest to their predicament. Ivanov was the first to document the exodus. When he inspected 12 resettled kolkhozes in April 1945, he was furious to find that 932 families had already fled those locations and returned to their old farms.[93] On further investigation he found that 4,259 of the 17,040 families that had moved to Crimea as part of the original resettlement had already left Crimea.[94] The final attrition rate for the first waves of special settlers is staggering. From May 1944 to the end of 1946, at least 18,040 families (65,888 people) resettled in Crimea. By the end of 1950, at least 10,962 of those families had left Crimea.[95] Besides

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[92] GARF, f. 327, op. 2, d. 659, l.l. 3-7. Postanovlenie Sovmin SSSR No. 5530 ot 5 dekabria 1949 goda "O pereselenii v kokhozy Krymskoi oblasti."

[93] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 45, d. 133, l. 40. Otchet o rabote Upolnomochennogo Gosplana SSSR po Krymu (Ivanov). April 1945.

[94] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 45, d. 79, l. 100. Kratkyi otchet "o rabote otdela poverki vypolneniia planov po Krymskoi oblasti za iiun' Mesiats 1946." July 13, 1946.

[95] See RGAE, f. 5675, op. 1, d. 856, l.l. 1-11. Pis'mo Malenkovu "O GARF, f. 327, op. 2, d. 662, l. 19. Otchet "O prieme pereselentsev 1944-46 g.g. i ikh khoziaistvennom ustroistve po Krymskoi oblasti na 1.1.1951 goda."

wasted labor and time, Gosplan complained that the failure had already wasted at least 40.5 million rubles by July 1946.[96]

As the extent of the failure became clear, Crimean authorities attempted drastic measures. In particular, Crimean officials complained that settlers had learned how to profit from the resettlement benefits without actually staying in Crimea. Many farmers collected the building loans for home construction and then left Crimea and returned to their former farms. While Crimean authorities had the NKVD to coerce settlers into moving, they had no mechanism to make them stay. Crimean authorities loathed this fact, and demanded that the head Soviet prosecutor in Moscow allow them to charge settlers who left Crimean kolkhozes after taking home loans with a felony for theft (*ugolovnoe delo*).[97] However, the settlers were not special settlers, and the head SSSR prosecutor's office responded by saying that there was nothing technically illegal about taking the loans and leaving Crimea.[98]

The failure of resettlement did not stop the effort because the project was too important to Moscow. At the same time, the conditions improved little from 1944 to 1950 so the failures repeated themselves annually. For example, the 1950 resettlement plan brought a further 3,019 families (13,523 people) to Crimea. Over half of the families fled immediately, and by the beginning of 1951 only 676 of the new families remained.

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[96] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 45, d. 79, l. 100. Kratkyi otchet "o rabote otdela poverki vypolneniia planov po Krymskoi oblasti za iiun' Mesiats 1946." July 13, 1946.
[97] GARF, f. 8131, op. 29, d. 289, l.l. 18-19. Prokuratura SSSR- Prokurator Krymskoi Oblasti. June 1, 1950.
[98] GARF, f. 8131, op. 29, d. 289, l. 16. Gen. Prokurator SSSR (Gossovetnik Iustitsii 1ogo Klassa Safonov- Upravliaiushchemu Delami Sovmina SSSR M. T. Pomaznevu. December 5, 1949.

Finally, from 1948 to 1950, Gosplan and Crimean officials convinced Stalin's inner circle that the resettlement by attrition was not working.[99] First, an often-ignored August 26, 1948, Supreme Soviet decree that legalized home private home ownership (and hence private home sales) for Soviet citizens who built their own homes on state land gave new settlers more incentive to stay in Crimea.[100] Homeownership did have an appeal to Homo Sovieticus.[101] Next, in late 1949, Malenkov ordered a massive construction and propaganda campaign to rescue Crimean resettlement. Before the new construction project began, teams of Crimean party workers and regular Crimean workers traveled to the locales of potential settlers and distributed editions of the Crimean party paper, *Krasnyi Krym (Red Crimea)*, brochures on the Crimean travel and history, and plastered farm and party building with promotional Crimean posters.[102]

The key change with the new campaign was that homebuilding efforts were much more robust. Whereas before, materials never arrived, after 1950 the opposite was true. The Sovmin special settlement division distributed tractors, cars, petrol, machine tools, and generators, roofing materials and other hardware, and confirmed that Crimean settlers actually received the goods.[103] This included monthly inspections of every

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[99] GARF, f. 327, op. 2, d. 662, l. 18. Otchet "O prieme pereselentsev v 1950 g. i ikh khoziaistvennom ustroistve na 1.1.1951 goda."

[100] Discussion of the Supreme Soviet order "On the Right of Citizens to the Purchase and Construction of Individual Dwelling Houses" in Western academia has been inadequate. For an exception, see Peter B. Maggs, "The Security of Individually-Owned Property under Soviet Law," *Duke Law Journal* (Vol. 1961), 525-537. Available online at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1778&context=dlj. Accessed on March 17, 2017.

[101] In contrast to the sterile and cowered Soviet citizens that Alexander Zinoviev portrayed, Slavic settlers (and Crimean Tatars later) took advantage of the Soviet system when they could: see Alexander Zinoviev, *Homo Sovieticus* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986).

[102] GARF, f. 8131, op. 29, d. 289, l.l. 2-11. Pis'mo Pred. Krymskogo Oblispolkoma S. Postobalov i Sekretar' Krymskogo obkoma P. Titov- Malenkovu. "O Khode pereseleniia v kokhoze Krymskou oblasti." May 5, 1950.

[103] GARF, f. 327, op. 2, d. 662, l. 23. Otchet "O poluchenii materialov oborudovaniia i mashiny za 1950 god." 1951.

district with new settlers.[104] Moreover, Crimean authorities sent Crimean kolkhoz workers by the hundreds to personally log forests in the Arkhangelsk region and chaperone the lumber on special trains bound for Crimea. On Crimean farms and in cities receiving settlers, the government coordinated with construction organizations and organized several construction brigades to make sure the wood did not go to waste once it arrived. The Crimean party claimed that it quickly built several hundred new homes in the spring of 1950 as the building materials arrived. In addition, various industries and Crimean enterprises such as the Forestry Workers Union built dorms for workers, and whole families began occupying new dorms.[105]

Furthermore, considering settlers' complaints about the layout of Crimean Tatar farms, villages and houses, in the early 1950s Crimean construction directors began stressing to new settlers that they would be living in "Russian" and not "Tatar Houses." According to one Crimean official, he agreed with settlers that Crimean Tatar houses were "not suitable for inhabitation by Russian people." They often lacked heating stoves and had narrow corridors, thin doors, awkward stairs and sometimes windows only on the second floor or very low windows on the first floor. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the isolation of houses on the sides of mountains was not ideal for well-planned kolkhozes. As such, Crimean officials ordered the disassembly and rebuilding of Crimean Tatar homes in the Sudak, Alushta, Yalta and other districts to create housing clusters

[104] RGAE, f. 5675, op. 1, d. 479, l.l. 65-67. Pamiatka- Predstaviteliu Krymskogo Obkoma i Oblispolkoma. 1951.
[105] GARF, f. 5467, op. 22, d. 1123, l. 4. Protokol #1 Zasedaniia Prezidiuma Krymskogo Oblastnogo TsK Profsoiuza Rabochikh Lesa. January 11, 1952.

resembling mainland Russian villages and "Slavic living conditions."[106] In the long-term, this effort gave rebuilding and farm reorganization a crucial role in Crimean ethnic cleansing and transforming Crimea.

An effort to restore Crimean resorts coincided with the homebuilding drive. The resorts' successful recovery provided demand for Crimean agriculture and gave the new settlers purpose. While the full extent of Crimean resort recovery is outside the scope of this study, similar to Crimean repopulation efforts, the early recovery plans stalled because of the lack of building materials, personnel, the theft of construction materials and the reconstruction of military bases taking precedence.[107] As late as 1949, the condition of many Crimean tourist areas was embarrassing to Crimean authorities. Soviet workers came to Crimea to relax, not to wade through "flowing excrement" running down a hillside.[108] In response, the Sovmin SSSR in Moscow created the Commission of Crimean Resorts to undertake repairs and begin a general beatification program.[109] Stalin then issued numerous decrees throughout the early 1950s that prioritized the industry both as the foundation of the Crimean peacetime economy, and as an international symbol of Communist paradise.[110]

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[106] GARF, f. 327, op. 2, d. 659, l.l. 11-15. Dokladnaia Zapiska Nachal'nika Otdela organizatsii priema i khoziastvenogo uestroistva pereselentsev, I. G. Kostenko- Nach. Pereselnicheskoe Upravlenii pri Sovmin SSSR, M. P. Shalaevu. March 7, 1950.

[107] GARF, f. 7424, op. 1, d. 5, l.l. 16-19. Prikaz Upolnomochennogo Sovmin SSSR po Kurortam Kryma. October 25, 1949.

[108] This was the case at the Alta-Nikitskii Garden. GARF, f. 7424, op. 1, d. 5, l. 40. Prikaz Upolnomochennogo Sovmin SSSR po Kurortam Kryma no. 31. August 19, 1949.

[109] The commission oversaw necessary repairs, as well as the construction of boulevards and fountains and the planting of tens of thousands of eucalyptus and citrus trees. See GARF, f. 7424, op. 1, d. 5, l. 7. Prikaz Upolnomochennogo Sovmin SSSR po Kurortam Kryma. November 19, 1949. See also GARF, f. 7424, op. 1, d. 5, l. 7. Perechen k Prikazu Upolnomochennogo Sovmin SSSR po Kurortam Kryma no. 29. August 29, 1949.

[110] GARF, f. 5446, op. 86, d. 2378, l. 47. Rasporiazhenie Sovmin SSSR No. 1486r. January 24, 1952.

Crimean farm directors greeted new settlers with celebrations and the party claimed that settlers cheerfully exclaimed that they were happy to "follow the orders of comrade Stalin to transform the nature of Crimea, and grow on its fertile ground aromatic tobacco, citrus fruits, grapes, and grains." The Crimean party did exaggerate much of the pageantry and preparations, but the much lower attrition rates of settlers after 1951 indicate that Crimean authorities had improved living and working conditions.[111] More proof of the improved conditions was that for the rest of the 1950s the number of unofficial settlers and military families boomed. By 1953, Crimean officials realized that providing benefits to only 1,000 unofficial families a year was inadequate, and the Crimean party guaranteed another 5,000 families benefits if they moved themselves to Crimea. By mid-1953, Crimean authorities had registered 2,840 new families (10,388 people) outside of official resettlement plans. According to Crimean officials, news of improved conditions in Crimea spread with the help of military spouses.[112]

A Transformed Crimea and Transfer to the Ukraine SSR

Finally, although this topic deserves a more detailed examination independent of this study, the 1954 transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR was also important in the successful transformation of Crimea. The transfer was not a random decision by Khrushchev, but the result of Stalin's actions that began in 1947 and snowballed. The RSFSR failures to coordinate housing construction and reestablish water sources after the

[111] GARF, f. 8131, op. 29, d. 289, l.l. 2-11. Pis'mo Pred. Krymskogo Oblispolkoma S. Postobalov i Sekretar' Krymskogo obkoma P. Titov- Malenkovu. "O Khode pereseleniia v kokhoze Krymskou oblasti." May 5, 1950.
[112] Crimean authorities claimed that these unofficial settlers had moved from 45 different Russian oblasts, 18 Ukrainian oblasts, and 6 other socialist republics. RGAE, f. 5675, op. 1, d. 740, l.l. 1-8. V. Gorelov-Nachal'niku Glavnogo pereselenskogo upravlenia Cheremuliikinu. June 7, 1953.

war led Stalin to believe that RSFSR organs could handle neither the repopulation nor future canal building logistics. As such, this power transfer began with Stalin's decision that the Ukrainian "Ukrovodstroi" construction organization, and not similar RSFSR construction organizations, would control the Crimean canal construction meant to provide Crimea's steppe regions with water from the Dnepr.[113]

The most noticeable consequence of the Ukrainian takeover from 1950 to 1954 and the final transfer were upticks in irrigation and home construction that helped convince Russian settlers to stop abandoning Crimea en mass.[114] As early as 1951, Ukrovodstroi began running Crimean building projects related to the repopulation project.[115] From 1950 to 1953, Ukrovodstroi improvements in irrigation and repairing wells allowed the organized repopulation of Crimea to continue and at least 186,500 new settlers arrived.[116]

Stalin's death and the transfer did slow down and complicate the logistics of repopulation for a few years. His death put many of his policies into question, especially the return of deported peoples to their homelands. The final transfer meant that the RSFSR committee on settlement that had arranged resettlement from 1944 to 1954 no

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[113] For an example of how Stalin gradually placed Ukrainian construction enterprises in charge of Crimean infrastructure see GARF f. 5446, op. 86 d. 4294, l. 208 (Sovmin SSSR Postanovlenie ot 29 Maia 1952 g. No. 2506 "Ob organizatsii politotdelov pri stroitel'no-montazhnykh upravleniiakh Ukrodvodstroia."

[114] On the complete transfer of construction enterprises see GARF f. 112 (Min. Zhilishchni-Grazhdanskii Stroitel'stva RSFSR), op. 1, d. 408, l.l. 2-3. Prikaz po Ministervstvu Zhilishchno-Grazhdanskogo Stroitel'stva RSFSR no. 82. 1 April 1954.

[115] On how Ukrovodstroi took the initiative in further expanding their work in Crimea see GARF f. 5446, op. 60, d. 14877, .l.l. 1-2. Min. Klopkovodstva SSSR Iu. Iusupov- Malenkovu. 16 May 1952.

[116] Both Crimean Tatars and later Soviet commissions quoted these figures from a published report titled *Narodnoe khoziastvo Krymskoi oblasti* (Odessa, 1967). See also, GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l.l. 15-16. Pis'mo "Ocherednoi shag v napravlenii likvidatsii krymsko-tatarskogo naroda kak natsii." October 4, 1967. As with all Soviet numbers, the real totals likely differ from these well-rounded numbers. Adding to the confusion, Sovmin plans only listed the number of families, not individuals, and it is not clear if these numbers counted unofficial settlers. Regardless, every source agrees that tens of thousand of settlers arrived annually between 1944 and 1954. See GARF f. 5446, op. 86, d. 2908, l.l. 24-26. Sovmin SSSR Postanovlenie No. 3464. "O pereselenii v kolkjozy i sovkhozy Krymskoi oblasti v 1953 godu." July 24, 1952.

longer participated in the project, and the Ukraine SSR needed time to organize new population transfers.[117] However, the lull in new settlement benefited the repopulation program by allowing Crimean home construction to catch up with demand.[118] Once the mass repopulation effort restarted (albeit with larger percentage of Ukrainian settlers), the housing situation had improved dramatically. Per official resettlement plans another 300,500 people settled in Crimea between 1958 and 1966, with very low attrition rates.[119]

As the rest of this study will underline, and as Crimean Tatars understood all-too-well, the redistribution, renaming and repopulation policies were crucial to the success of Stalin's overall plan of ethnic cleansing and transforming Crimea. "Of course we don't represent a majority of the Crimean population," admitted Crimean Tatar leader and activist Mustafa Dzhemilev to writer Anna Reid in 1993. By that time, Crimean Tatars had achieved their primary goal of returning to Crimea, but the results of Stalin's redistribution, renaming, and repopulation campaigns undermined Crimean Tatar rights in their "native land." This is why Crimean Tatar activists have documented and criticized the policies described in this chapter since the 1950s.[120] Because Crimean Tatars no longer had a room in the Soviet "communal apartment," Stalin remodeled the room for a new national tenant. This "remodeling" dismantled Soviet institutions designed for Crimean Tatars, as well was pre-Soviet Crimean Tatar homes, villages and cultural sites. Taken together, these policies provided the economic, geographic and

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[117] Gosplan had a plan to settle 2,400 families in 1954, but only around one hundred families ended up moving. GARF, f. 5446, op. 87, d. 1500, l. 6. Pis'mo Gosplan (G. Kosiachenko i A. Kozlov)- Malenkovu. July 1953.

[118] GARF, f. 9520, op. 1, d. 322, "Ekskursii po gorodu Simferopoliu." TEU VTsSPS. June 1, 1956.

[119] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l.l. 15-16. Pis'mo "Ocherednoi shag v napravlenii likvidatsii krymsko-tatarskogo naroda kak natsii." October 4, 1967.

[120] Anna Reid. *Borderland: A Journey through the History of Ukraine* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2000), 186-187.

demographic foundations of the new "Russian" Crimea. The fact that the Russifying region became part of Ukraine is another glaring contradiction in Soviet policy towards Crimea and Crimean Tatars. As chapter five and chapter eight explain, while not having many immediate consequences outside of economics and resources, the transfer created a complicated situation that became detrimental to Crimean Tatars decades later.

Chapter 4

The New Crimean Narrative, 1944-1954

From 1944 to 1954, Stalin and the Soviet state cleansed the Crimean room of the Soviet "communal apartment" and turned a former Russian colony into a Russian homeland.[1] As chapter two elucidates, Stalin began this systematic expulsion of Crimea's non-Slavic peoples with the 1944 deportation of Crimean Tatars and other minorities. While Stalin's Crimean ethnic cleansing was a process of destruction, it also included creative elements. After the deportations, Soviet officials decided to replace diverse Crimean historical and cultural heritage with a new Crimean narrative, a rewritten history for a region they had just ethnically cleansed.

While the Soviet Union deported indigenous populations in over a dozen republics and oblasts during World War II, the Crimean project was unique. The Soviet ethnic cleansing of Crimea was a multifaceted project that included deportation, land redistribution/renaming, resettlement, falsifying Crimean partisan accounts of the war, and the rewriting of Crimean history. Even if some of the policies were comparative to Soviet actions in other regions, in Crimea Soviet authorities took each of the above policies to the extreme. This is particularly true with the new Crimean narrative.

Crimea was different in its importance to the Soviet Union as a military base, a symbol of Soviet might, and in peacetime as an "all-union" resort. As a result, when

[1] On the metaphor of the Soviet communal apartment see Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," *Slavic Review*, no. 2 (Summer 1994).

Moscow began the mass resettlement of the peninsula with Slavic settlers, it decided that the new settlers, workers, and tourists needed a proper historical narrative to attach to the new Crimea. This ideological factor became one of the main elements that separated the ethnic cleansing of Crimea from similar policies in regions such as the former Chechno-Ingush and Kalmyk ASSRs.

The new Crimean narrative argued, unequivocally, that Crimea had always been "Slavic" (usually equated with Russian) land since the ancient Scythians and that all other peoples, from Greeks to Armenians to Crimean Tatars, had been occupiers. At the heart of this narrative was the rebirth of Russian nationalism that Stalin had encouraged during the war. As David Brandenberger asserts, Soviet historians employed the "indiscriminate blurring of Tsarist and Soviet history" for wartime mobilization and received state support for their efforts.[2] In postwar Crimea, this rebirth transformed into an odd mixture of Russian nationalism and Slavophile ideas that were unified by the purpose of cleansing all other ethnicities from Crimean history. As such, the new Crimean narrative rejected the ethnic affirmative action (*korenizatsiia*) of Soviet nationality policy that throughout the 1920s and 1930s had ensured a place for Crimean Tatars and other minorities in the Crimean ASSR.[3] In the context of the Second World

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[2] David Brandenburger explains that Stalin began to use "iconography from the Russian national past" as early as 1937 as the threat of war increased. The actual war "led to an escalation of such Russocentric agitational rhetoric." There was a constant tension between the "seemingly heretical move" of "neonationalists" to employee Russian nationalism in the war effort and the "internationalists" devoted to framing the war in strict Marxist-Leninist terms. Russian nationalism proved to be a more pragmatic and successful mobilization tool and, after a 1944 conference and much arguing, the "Russocentric" interpretation of the war effort became widely accepted: see David Brandenburger, "…It is Imperative to Advance Russian Nationalism as the First Priority: Debates within the Stalinist Ideological Establishment, 1941-1945," in Ronald Suny and Terry Martin eds., *A State of Nations: Empire Building and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 275, 286-288.

[3] Of course, Fisher is correct that the relationship with the Soviet state, particularly with Crimean Tatar elites and peasants (and obviously Muslim leaders), was often antagonistic. Terry Martin posits that the "Tatar variant" of *korenizatsiia* included conflicts over "language politics" and "white collar jobs." Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 130-149; Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*, 56-57.

War, the narrative argued that the expulsion of the Nazis and the subsequent ethnic cleansing were the final acts of liberation after centuries of occupation. Since Slavs were the only indigenous people of the peninsula, the massive resettlement of Russian peasants and Russification of the peninsula took on its own form of indigenization.

This chapter reveals how removing unwanted remnants of Crimea's past and writing and popularizing the new Crimean narrative became a combined effort of party organizations, censors, academics, museum curators, excursion guides, and others. Together, they recast Crimean history to fit the demographic results of ethnic cleansing and made them seem permanent, just, and logical. Although this narrative was somewhat fluid with several details changing over time, the above core beliefs underlying the new Crimean narrative became the ideological basis for Soviet Crimea after World War II.

This narrative did not exactly replace Marxism-Leninism because Crimean scholars argued that Russian colonization and imperialism on the peninsula were actually progressive events. The narrative's creators cherry-picked quotes from Marxist-Leninist works in order to develop a unique iteration of liberationist politics where the colonizer (Russia) had to be liberated from the colonized (indigenous Crimean minorities). However, the new Crimean narrative would prove to have an appeal that often overpowered Marxism-Leninism and certainly outlasted it, remaining a defining aspect of present-day Crimean politics.

To be clear, this chapter does not argue that Crimea was not or should not be part of either a Russian state or Ukrainian state. Moreover, the new Crimean narrative was not the reason Stalin ethnically cleansed Crimean minorities. Rather, the new Crimean

narrative was an after-the-fact justification that Soviet authorities designed to target new settlers and party members in postwar Crimea. It signaled a profound and permanent change in how Moscow had handled the peninsula for centuries (outside of Sevastopol). One only needs to compare the present-day positions and demographics of indigenous peoples in the current Tatar, Kalmyk, and other autonomous republics in the Russian Federation with Crimean Tatars in order to understand this change.[4]

Censorship: Removing Crimean Tatars as a Noun, Subject, and Adjective

In January 1945, the Sovnarkom of the USSR appointed Anatolii Nikitovich Zotiev to the head Crimean ASSR Glavlit (the local branch of the main Soviet censorship organ). From 1945 to 1947, Zotiev expunged Crimean Tatars and the Crimean peninsula's multi-ethnic past from literature, media, and all party publications in Crimea. Unlike efforts to write the new Crimean narrative examined latter in this study, Moscow tightly directed Zotiev's effort. He had to write extensive quarterly reports to the Sovnarkom Committee of War Secrets and Glavlit in Moscow, as well as contact

[4] During the Soviet collapse, Volga Tatars, Kalmyks and other non-Russian peoples with autonomous republics or newly sovereign states were in a position to negotiate the new local government structure and ownership of resources in their regions. As Matthew Evangelista summarized, "the Soviet authorities created the formal institutions of self-rule" that eventually "provided the basis for the assertions of autonomy during the post-Soviet transition": see Matthew Evangelista, *The Chechen Wars: Will Russia go the Way of the Soviet Union?* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2002), 3. In one example, the Tatar republic negotiated with Yegor Gaidar to retain republic control of half of Tatarstan's petroleum resources (eventually creating the Tatneft corporation) and ensure the place of both Tatars and Russians in the republic's political fabric. On Gaidar and Tatars, see GARF f. 10121, op. 1, d. 21,l.l. 113-121. Stenograph of Kazan Meeting, December 1991. At the same time, as Ronald Suny argues, while some nationalities were able to consolidate power and culture during the Soviet collapse, the "destabilizing pressures of Russification, both demographic and linguistic" had been severe in several Soviet republics: see Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 158. No region is better evidence to that than Crimea. Crimean Tatars had no such chance to participate in Crimean politics during the Soviet collapse.

Moscow about a plethora of words and ideas that might violate the new party line on Crimea.[5]

As with the postwar population in Crimea in general, the war and deportations had left Crimean Glavlit woefully understaffed, with only a handful of "inexperienced" censors. Zotiev complained that the "sharp lack in all cadres" in Crimea threatened his work and the reestablishment of the Soviet system in Crimea.[6] Moscow responded by sending new, experienced censors to Zotiev, and he went from only a handful of workers in March 1945 to 38 workers that July. Reflecting the larger repopulation of Crimea, the majority of newcomers were Russian with a few Ukrainians.[7]

Zotiev and his staff had a painstaking task. Crimean Glavlit, at the insistence of Glavlit SSSR, issued order no. 73 that banned all books that did not reflect the "ethnographic changes."[8] One problem for Zotiev was that neither Crimean nor Moscow officials had a list of all books that contained mentions of Crimean Tatars or other deported groups, so this required a scan of almost every book on the peninsula. In practice, their work became removing or editing anything concerning "Tatar life, existence, and their participation in the cultural life and agriculture of the peninsula, as well as Soviet indigenization policy."[9] During the first quarter of 1945, the campaign targeted mainly bookstores and party organs. They outright banned many books about pre-war Crimean history because that story was impossible to write without Tatars.

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[5] GARF f. 9425, op. 1, d. 333, l.l. 23-26. Glavnoe Upravlenia po Okhrane gosudarstvennykh tain-Zotiev. 1944.
[6] Ibid.
[7] GARF f. 9425, op. 1, d. 333, l.l. 51-58. Otchet o rabote Glavlita Krymskoi ASSR. January1- June 1, 1945.
[8] GARF f. 9425, op. 1, d. 333, l. 26.
[9] GARF, f. 9425, op. 1, d. 333, l.l. 82-90. Otchet o rabote Krymoblita. June 1-October 1, 1945.

During the first months of 1945, Glavlit reviewed over 45,300 books and banned 44 of them.[10]

For the rest of 1945 and then into 1946 and 1947, Zotiev used his increasing number of censors to expand his operation reviewing literature. For example, during the first half of September 1945 Glavlit removed 10,060 copies of books written by Crimean Tatars and nearly 80,000 books translated into Crimean Tatar. In Crimea's 301 working libraries over a two-year period, from 1945 to 1946, Glavlit inspected 794,130 books, 2,126 of which were banned.[11] Furthermore, the campaign expanded into educational institutions, radio, and the party press. After initial inspections of a library, bookstore or establishment, Glavlit workers carried out follow-up inspections every two to three weeks and continued to remove hundreds of new books. A particular headache were books published elsewhere in the Soviet Union where Crimean "changes" had not yet been explained. Any book with taboo material had all but two copies destroyed. To conduct these time-consuming searches, Glavlit summoned local party organs and police to assist Zotiev's staff.[12]

In addition, Zotiev tasked himself and his best censors with carefully editing offending literature that they did not ban outright.[13] In some cases, current Russian

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[10] GARF f. 9425, op. 1, d. 333, l. 26.

[11] GARF, f. 9425, op. 1, d. 467, l.l. 101-110. Otchet Krymskogo Oblita za 1946. 11 January 1947.

[12] Two copies of each destroyed book were then kept in "closed fonds" at libraries in Simferopol, Evpatoria, Sevastopol, Yalta, Feodosia and Kerch. GARF, f. 9425, op. 1, d. 333, l.l. 82-90. Otchet o rabote Krymoblita. 1 June-1 October 1945.

[13] A secondary goal in Zotiev's work was censoring literature available in Crimea of instances of poor Russian handling of the peninsula or of any problems in Crimea that would discourage new settlers. One example was Zotiev's editing of Russian writer Alexander Griboedov's works in which he freely criticized Russian cultivation techniques. One Griboedov quote Zotiev censored was his complaint that Crimea proved that "no people so easily conquered land and at the same time so poorly used it as Russians." The censorship of Griboedov's opinions (along with those of Pushkin, Chekhov and other Russian cultural figures) was important because they were symbols of the ethnic Russian claim to the peninsula. GARF, f. 9425, op. 1, d. 570, l. 6. Krymskii Oblit Tekstovaia Svodka. 16-13 January 1947.

writers in Crimea seemed to not have received the memo that they could not mention Crimean Tatars. For example, Zotiev personally censored the work that author Sergeev Tsenskogo wrote in 1945 and removed phrases such as "Tatar land, Tatar barns, Tatar villages, Tatar cows, etc." Every time the author used Tatar as an adjective to qualify a noun, censors dropped it just leaving the noun standing alone.[14] After a while, Zotiev became weary of having to edit out every phrase in Tsenskogo that could "in any way be construed as positive towards Tatars."[15] Furthermore, Tsenskogo was actually very critical of the initial Russian colonization of Crimea. For example, in Volume 1 of his 1945 *Izbrannye Proizvedenie (Selected Works)*, Zotiev found that Tsenskogo believed that Russians had given Tatars little in return for the "green mountains, blue sea, and blue sky" that the Russian aristocracy had turned into their playground. Zotiev removed the whole passage from the book.[16]

Unfortunately for the deported peoples, Zotiev excelled at removing Crimean Tatars and other minorities from Crimean history. However, Zotiev was not in the business of writing the new Crimean narrative. In fact, over the course of his censorship campaign he recognized the dire need for Soviet power to establish a new historical narrative to replace the one he was erasing. In September 1945, he came upon an article in *Sovetskii Krym (Soviet Crimea)* by an A. Tseniugalova titled "Osobennosti krymskogo klimatika (The Particulars of Crimea's Climate)." This article highlighted the need to replace the historical void in Crimea so vividly that he thought Moscow should immediately address the problem. On September 14, 1945, in a letter to the head of the Soviet Glavlit in Moscow, Bol'shakov, Zotiev explained:

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[14] GARF, f. 9425, op. 1, d. 467, l.l. 70-73. Tekstovaia svodka 16. 4 September 1945.
[15] GARF, f. 9425, op. 1, d. 333, l. 85.
[16] GARF, f. 9425, op. 1, d. 467, l.l. 70-73.

> I am sending you an article and I would like your opinion on whether or not such articles are publishable. As you are aware, in Crimea there are now new residents- kolkhoz immigrants, Soviet and party workers, and others. They show a real interest in wanting to become acquainted with their new home. But all of the old local literature has already been destroyed or for different reasons has been drastically changed. Various organizations in Crimea are requesting new regional literature. Comrade Bol'shakov, could you please give me an answer to this question![17]

In other words, the Soviet Union has just ethnically cleansed Crimea, erased much of the previous history of the region, and the new settlers and workers needed a proper narrative to attach to their new home.

This was a problem for Zotiev because it displayed the demographic and ideological void that Soviet ethnic cleansing in Crimea created, and the party's failure to immediately fill it. As Zotiev noted in a another instance of pressing Moscow to produce a new narrative, he said that the only sure thing in Crimean history besides that Tatars were traitors was the past, present and future of Sevastopol as a crucial naval base.[18] Otherwise, how the party should portray the rest of Crimean history was not clear.

Writing the New Crimean Narrative

While firmly overseeing the removing of Crimean minorities, redistributing land, resettlement, and censorship, Moscow provided only a minimum of guidance in how to rewrite Crimean history. At first, from May to November 1944, there was no order from Moscow indicating what ethnicity would be the region's new indigenous population. Finally, during the Crimean party Obkom plenum from 27 to 29 November 1944, Moscow clearly indicated that the "new Crimea" was Russian. At the direction of the

[17] GARF, f. 9425, op. 1, d. 333, l. 73. Sekretno, A. Zotiev - Nachal'nik otdela posleduiushchei tsenzury glavlita tov. Bol'shakov. 14 September 1945.
[18] GARF, f. 9425, op. 1, d. 333, l. 36. Letter Zotiev-Bolshakov. 13 April 1945.

Central Committee in Moscow, Stalin's handpicked representative in Crimea, Crimean Sovnarkom leader Aleksandr F. Kabanov, declared that "new settlers replacing Tatars, Bulgars, Greeks and Armenians" were building "a new Crimea with a Russian makeup." However, aside from this loaded declaration, Kabanov and the Crimean party and government were far too busy accommodating tens of thousands of new settlers and rebuilding the devastated region to elaborate on how the "new Crimea" should be presented in history books and party publications.[19]

When this ideological vacuum finally began to strain the work of Zotiev and other party apparatchiks in 1945, Crimean academics and newcomers filled this void with a new and specifically Crimean version of Russian nationalism and Slavophilism. The Soviet government and party gave Crimean academics (relatively) broad creative freedom and the funds to pay for the academic project. This new Crimean narrative quickly became popular on the peninsula, and even those local and Moscow officials who criticized the narrative for its contradictions and divergence from Marxism-Leninism had to grudgingly accepted the imperial nostalgia as the new, postwar reality.

The archeologist Pavel Shults and the historian Pavel Nadinskii were the two scholars who led the academic thrust of the rewriting of Crimean history. Under the authority of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (*Akademii Nauk SSSR*, hereafter AN SSSR), they began writing the new Crimean narrative in 1945. Since Crimean Tatars were the largest indigenous people in Crimea, the first task was establishing new indigenous populations to replace Crimean Tatars. In 1945, the only starting points that Shults and

[19] This proclamation came after the Crimean Party and Gosplan began dissolving abandoned Russian kolkhozes along with the kolkhozes of deported peoples. Moscow sharply rebuked this action, gave Kabanov near total control of postwar Crimea, and made it clear that all kolkhozes would be repopulated with new Russian settlers. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 44, d. 759, l.l. 103, 194-201. November 27-29 Plenum of the Crimean Obkom.

Nadinskii had were the Crimean plenum remarks and the fact that Russian and Ukrainian settlers were now replacing those Crimean residents lost because of the war and deportations. To make the argument that Slavs (and specifically Russians) were the peninsula's true indigenous population, they had to reinterpret the Crimean archeological and historical record.

The ancient Scythians presented a potential Slavic starting point. This idea was not new, but borrowed from controversial linguist Nikolai Marr. Both Shults and Nadinskii adopted Marr's claim that Scythian and Tavridian languages were related to early Slavic languages. Although most linguists maligned Marr's work and he fell out of communist favor by the late 1940's, at the time Shults, Nadinskii, and Crimean party officials believed this theory was perfect for proving the Russian and Slavic origins of human inhabitance in Crimea.[20] Folding their new narrative into the wartime epic of patriotic struggle and liberation from Nazi occupation, they postured that all non-Slavs in Crimea were always occupiers of Slavic and Russian land. Following this logic, the expulsion of Nazis and minorities from Crimea was simply the last act in two millennia of Slavs battling occupiers of their land, the first of which were Greek colonists. Their future work was to provide evidence for this hypothesis.

Shults was the most prominent and accomplished academic to participate in writing the new Crimean narrative. Paradoxically, this man who gave credentials to the new theory was born into a well-educated German family in St. Petersburg in 1903.

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[20] The controversies surrounding Marr's theories are beyond the scope of this study and are covered in numerous volumes; On the theory and Crimea, see Aibabin, A. I. *Etnicheskaia istoriia rannevizaniiskogo Kryma.* (DAR/Natsional'naia Akademia Nauk Ukrainy Institut Vostokovedeniia Krymskoe Otdelenie, Simferopol', 1999). Available online at https://byzantina.wordpress.com/2011/09/26/aybabin/. Accessed on December 12, 2014; On Marr in general, see Velmezova, Ekaterina. *Les lois du sens. La sémantique marriste.* (Genève, 2007); see also Alpatov, V. M. *Istoria odnogo mifa: Marr i marrizm.* (Moscow: Editorial URSS, 2004).

However, by the end of his career his admirers considered him a "bright representative of the Russian intelligentsia." An incredibly efficient scholar, he studied at Petrogradskii Universitet during World War I, where he specialized in Scythian and Samarian sculpture, worked at the Hermitage, and conducted excavations in Crimea after the Civil War ended. By 1925, he was a senior scholar in the antiquity division of the Academy of History and Material Culture, and from 1933 to 1934, he conducted more excavations of Greek sites in Crimea. He spent the early days of World War II in Crimea guiding partisan units before being seriously wounded. Afterwards he taught at MGU until early 1945 when Moscow ordered him to launch a Scythian-Tavridian archeological expedition to help establish the new Crimean narrative.[21]

When Shults came back to Crimea at the beginning of 1945 with the support of AN SSSR, he was known by his students and other academics for his earlier publications, his engaging lectures, his heroics during the war, and for taking rifles into the field, including impromptu hunting expeditions after work. There is no greater proof of Shults's authority and the importance of his project than the fact that, while the war was still going on, Moscow provided him the men, material, and funds for a two-year expedition to unearth the Slavic past of Crimea.[22]

Shults, in early 1945, went to work excavating a site known as "Scythian Neapoli" and other locations with dozens of workers divided into three teams.[23] On the

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[21] O. A. Makhneva, *U Ponta Evksinskogo: pamiati Pavla Nikolaevicha Shul'tsa.* (Krymskii filial Instituta arkheologii NAN Ukrainy: Simferopol', 2004), 241-243.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Makhneva, *U Ponta Evksinskogo,* 241-243; Ironically, while Shults used Scythian artifacts to undermine Crimean Tatar claims to Crimea, a Crimean Tatar politician, amature archeologist, and direct descendant of Khanate royalty, Aleksandr Ivanovich Sultan-Krym-Gireia, made the original discovery in 1827 in the Tatar village of Kermenchik near Simferopol. Russian imperial archeologists eventually tied "Scythian Neapoli" to the Scythian king Skilura. http://krimea.info/lyudi-kryma/shulc-p-n-tavro-skifskaya-ekspediciya.html. Accessed 12 December 2014.

one hand, post-Soviet archeologists consider the actual excavations of Shults, especially the Scythian mausoleum found at "Scythian Neapoli," quite extraordinary.[24] On the other hand, even his admirers such as student and protégé O. A. Makhneva admit that the 1945-1947 Crimean exhibition was, first and formost, a political project to establish a new indigenous population for the peninsula. However, Makhneva claims that Shults's political task was replacing not Tatars from Crimean history, but rather Goths. In actuality, while maligning Goths was important, Shults assigned fellow archeologist E. V. Veimarn to that project.[25]

During the immediate postwar period it was Shults who presented his work as uncovering what lay beneath the "so-called Turkish" ruins in six articles and numerous lectures.[26] He argued that, "in the characteristics of (Scythian) cities, homes, dishes, wood carvings, and ornaments there were noticeable points of similarity with ancient Slavic culture, and with Russian and Ukrainian national art."[27] For Crimean authorities, historians, and Moscow party officials (at least for the time being), the suggestion of similarities between Scythian and early Slavic artifacts was enough to confidently state that Slavs, and no one else, were the true indigenous people of Crimea.

Besides providing this archeological foundation, Shults played an important administrative role in creating the new Crimean narrative. By late 1947, the Presidium of

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[24] For example, see Aleksei Smirnov, *Skify* (Moskva: Lomonosov, 2014), 1-13.
[25] V. Ui. Iurochkin, "Gotskii i slavianskii voprosy v poslevoennom krymu" in *Rshtsaios: sbornik statei k 60-letiiu prof. S. B. Sorochana/ Narteks. Byzantina Ukrainensis. Tom 2* (Khar'kov: Maidan, 2013), 396.
[26] P. N. Shults, "Raskopki Neapolia Skifskogo" v Udal'tsov, A. D. i Passek, T. S. redaktori. *Kratkie cobshcheniia o dokladakh i polevykh issledovaniiakh instituta material'noi kul'tury. Vypusk XXI*. (Moskva-Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1947), 16-21. Available at http://arheologija.ru/shults-raskopki-neapolya-skifskogo/. Accessed 12 December 2014; see also GARF f. A-513 (Gosudarstvennyi Publichnaia Istoricheskaia Biblioteka Ministerstva Kul'tury RSFSR), op. 1, d. 129, l. 51. A.A. Baevskii; N. M. Savitska; S. V. Chekryzhova; E. N. Yakovleva, *Istoriia Russkogo Kryma: korotkii Ukazatel' Literaturi* (Gosudarstvennaya Publichnaya Istoricheskaya Biblioteca. Moskva. 1948).
[27] Shults, "Raskopki Neapolia Skifskogo," 21.

the AN SSSR tapped Shults to help establish a Crimean branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (hereafter AN Crimea) in Simferopol. Because much of the new Crimean narrative was unclear on several important points in Crimean historiography, the mission of Shults and the AN Crimea was to solidify the narrative. His official position was the director of the division of Crimean history and archeology, where he made appointments, allocated resources for research, and served as a primary editor at "*Krymizdat,*" a publishing house for Crimean scholars.[28] Consequently, as a scholar and administrator, Shults had an enormous influence on Crimean history because Crimean scholars adopted his theories and respected his advice and academic appointments.[29]

Unlike Shults, Pavel Nadinskii-Posiagin (1894-1961) had absolutely no formal education. He was a Russian Bolshevik who joined the party in 1917, fought in the civil war, and contracted a debilitating illness. After the civil war, Nadinskii joined the Cheka and, in 1933, the party assigned him to Crimea. However, his health worsened in Crimea and he had to have both legs and his left arm amputated. Despite his lack of formal education and poor health, he possessed writing and rhetorical skills and the party deputized him as postwar Crimea's official historian. With the ethnic cleansing of fifth columns and the ethnic German Shults heading the AN Crimea, the Russian chekist was a perfect fit to historicize the new Crimean narrative. Nadinskii, as the historian V. Iu. Iurochkin argues, served as Shults's "commissar on the ideological front," claiming the

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[28] Iurochkin, "Gotskii i slavianskii voprosy v poslevoennom krymu," 396.

[29] As historian Aleksei Tepliakov argues, many non-Russian chekists outdid themselves before, during, and after the war in discriminating against nationalities considered to be fifth columns as a way to shield themselves from being considered part of an ethnic fifth column. Shul'ts was not a chekist, but he was an ethnic German surrounded by Russian chekists, including his second-hand man, Nadinskii, and worked on a peninsula where the Nazi army had just been defeated and the small ethnic-German population deported. But with this caveat, the people under his guidance at the Crimean AN enthusiastically adopted his theory to support their nationalist assertions: see Aleksei Tepliakov, "Shovinizm i natsionalizm v organakh VChK-MGB-MVD SSSR," in *Sovetskie natsii i natsionalnaia politika v 1920-1950 gody* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2014), 649-657.

"historical rights" of Slavs, and particularly of Russians, to Crimea. If Shults provided academic legitimacy to the new Crimean narrative, Nadisnkii provided it Bolshevik legitimacy.[30]

In 1952, Soviet Academic G. A. Novitskii summed up the basic thesis of Nadinskii work as "since ancient times the Crimean Peninsula has been Slavic land."[31] *Krymizdat* first published his thesis in 1946, and it appeared in several more articles in 1947 and 1948.[32] With the main task of assigning an ethnic claim to Crimea established, Nadinskii began writing a book to cement his argument, which Shults and *Krymizdat* published in 1951.

In *Ocherki po istorii Kryma (Essays of Crimean History),* Nadinskii took Shults's theory on Scythians, and wrote a chronological narrative of how they "were one of the sources of Russian culture" and that the small Tavridian kingdom on the peninsula that had relations with the Kievian Rus were descendants of these Scythians.[33] He argued that the Greeks were invaders and all of the other peoples, even those who "took large parts of Crimean territory and ruled for considerable amounts of time," were always foreign occupiers, of which Tatars and Turks were the worst. Often equating Slavic with Russian, Nadinskii argued, the full history of Crimea made one thing certain, "only Russians have an indisputable claim to Crimea."[34]

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[30] Iurochkin, "Gotskii i slavianskii voprosy v poslevoennom krymu," 392.
[31] GARF, f. 10010, op. 1, d. 495, l. 4. (Speech of G. A. Novitskii from " Stenogramma zasedaniia uchenogo soveta instituta po sviashchenogo itogami sessii otdeleniia istorii i fil'osofii i krymskogo filiala akademi nauk po istorii kryma, 13 iiunia, 1952, N. I. Institut Kraevedcheskoi i Muzeinoi raboty").
[32] P. N. Nadinskii, "Russkie na Krymsko, poluostrove/stranitsa iz istorii Kryma" in *Sovetskii Krym, no. 3* (Simferopol': Krymizdat, 1946), 63-74.
[33] He ignored that fact that Soviet linguists and ethnologists believed that modern Crimean Tatars were partially descended from Tavridians.
[34] P. N. Nadinskii, *Ocherki po istorii Kryma, chast' 1* (Simfereopol': Krymizdat i Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1951), 1-3, 7, 19-21, 25.

In a state founded on the Marxist liberation of working class and indigenous people from the bonds of capitalism and imperialism, the most signifigant stance Nadinskii took was that the Russian annexation of Crimea in 1783 was not an imperialistic expansion. He argued Crimea was never a Russian colony with a majority Tatar population because it had always been Slavic land. As a result, historians should employ the term "*vossoedinenie*," or "reuniting" when describing the 1783 Russian annexation of Crimea to Russian instead of using "*prisoedinenie*" or "uniting." For Nadinskii, the Russian annexation was a progressive step that liberatied Slavic land and deserved praise from Marxists. Furthermore, his book and articles idolized the general who helped Catherine the Great capture Crimea, Aleksandr Suvorov. For Nadinskii, Suvorov was a liberator of Slavic peoples.[35]

Despite the quick pace Nadinskii and Shults achieved in writing the new narrative, by 1947 the Crimean Obkom of the KPSS was too impatient to wait for Nadinskii's full book for evidence that Russians were the indigenous people of Crimea. Subsequently, the Crimean party appealed to the *Gosudarstvennaya Publichnaya Istoricheskaya Bibloiteka* (The State Library of Public History) in Moscow to publish a comprehensive annotated bibliography to support the claim. Completed in 1948, the creators of the 248-page bibliography gave it a self-explanatory name: *Istoriya Russkogo Kryma (The History of Russian Crimea)*.

The extraordinary outcome of the annotated bibliography was that all works on Russian and Slavic peoples in Crimean history now stood alongside the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. Certainly, the party had used pre-revolutionary historians and ethnographers in establishing the chauvinistic nature of empires, but the citations and

[35] P. N. Nadinskii, "Suvorov v Krymu" in *Sovetskii Krym* (Simferopol: Krymzdat, 1947).

annotations of this bibliography were different. For the most part, the citations were only included if they supported the Russian nationalist narrative and, most importantly, the progressive nature of the Crimean annexation in 1783 and Russia's influence on the Black Sea region.

In all there were 10 different sections including Marxism, Scythians and Tavrids, Russians in Medieval Crimea, Imperial Russian Crimea, Soviet Crimea, Crimea as an all-union resort, historical sites, the Russian ownership of property in Crimea, and Crimea in art and literature. The only thin section was the Scythian and Tavridian period, which was "currently being uncovered by archeological excavations," but proved that "the ancestors of Russians were the indigenous people of Crimea." The two sections on Russians in Crimea had the specific goal of documenting "Russian crusades in Crimea after its capture by different peoples." The final product was a base of evidence not supporting the road to communism, but Russian and Slavic claims to Crimea stretching back 2,000 years that the bibliography designed to justify the deportation of minorities and the subsequent Slavic indigenization policies.[36]

In early 1952, with the narrative now published in multiple versions and supported by the bibliography, Crimean officials awaited Moscow's approval of their theory.[37] Since the order to create a "new Russian Crimea" came from Stalin's man in Crimea, Kabanov, it is not surprising that the party and the head of AN SSSR, Aleksandr Nesmeianov, approved of the declaration of Russians and Slavs as the indigenous people

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[36] GARF f. A-513, op. 1, d. 129, l.l. 3-6.

[37] In addition, poetry and short stories in dozens of local party publications further romanticized the new Crimean narrative. For example in June 1947 the Yalta paper *Stalinskoe Znamia* published Petrov's poem "Na Iuzhnom Beregu" (On the Southern Shore) in which he described Crimean as a gift from "motherland of the Rus" and her soldiers. GARF, f. 9425, op. 1, d. 570, l. 66 a-c. Iurii Petrov "Na Iuzhnom Beregu" in *Stalinskoe Znamia*, Yalta, June 18, 1947.

of Crimea. More importantly, Malenkov, Suslov and other party officials ordered that the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia (Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia)* and the Soviet standard history textbook (*Istorii SSSR*) both be edited to remove any "idealization" of the Tatar and Turkic periods in Crimean history, and any mention of the Russian annexation and colonization of Crimea as in anyway being "colonial." Following Nadinskii, the books now portrayed the annexation, colonization, and Russification of the peninsula as progressive events. With these changes, the Soviet Union implemented the basics of the new Crimean narrative on a Soviet-wide level.[38]

Popularizing the New Crimean Narrative

Even as the narrative began to solidify, the accomplishments of Shults and Nadinskii did not ensure the success of the new Crimean narrative among the masses. Instead, the popular writing and consumption of the new Crimean narrative depended on the workers of cultural and tourist institutions. This aspect of establishing the new Crimean narrative was often a rough process, sometimes lacking guidance central from Moscow.

No cultural worker had a more unenviable position in postwar Crimea than the director of the Bakchysarai Palace Museum, M. G. Kustova. She was directing a museum housed in the Crimean Khan's 16th century capital building. Moreover, during the Crimean ASSR's existence the museum had showcased Crimean Tatar cultural and political accomplishments. From 1944 to 1948, saddled with the paradoxical project of creating anti-Tatar exhibits in a Tatar palace, she became frustrated and eventually vented directly to Kliment Voroshilov.

[38] RGASPI f. 17, op. 133, d. 377, l. 17.

There were several obvious reasons for her frustration. First off, in late May 1944, other than the "fact" that Crimean Tatars were traitors, she received no direct advice as to how to create a new historical reality before scholars had advanced the new Crimean narrative. For example, was there a cut-off date for when she could discuss Crimean Tatars in the Russian Empire? A similar conundrum was how to contrast the terrible Tatars with the elegant palace they built? The only direction she had were Zotiev's guidelines for liquidating all of the "old, prewar exhibits" that had "bragged of the power of Crimean Khans." Tatar art and cultural relics were no longer evidence of the peninsula's indigenous people, and Kustova's staff disposed of these remnants of Tatar "kulak existence."[39]

The lack of direction created a headache for Kustova. By late 1944, she already had to engage in agitprop on a massive scale for vacationing soldiers, generals, students, and the tens of thousands of new Slavic kolkhoz settlers and party workers flooding onto the peninsula. Kustova simply had no time to make sure her exhibits and lectures met the expectations of Moscow and Crimean party officials. Regardless, her staff was soon providing crash courses in Crimean history.[40] And the people came, with over 82,000 visitors between 1944 and 1948. Kustova attempted to streamline her task by creating a new exhibit "to display just how horrific the crimes committed by the Crimean Horde were, how they turned Russian and Ukrainian land to ash, and how the Russian people fought a heroic fight against the Tatar attacks."[41]

However, no party officials in Crimea and few in Moscow were willing to critique, comment on, or approve her work even though she was already hosting visitors

[39] GARF f. R-5446, op. 50, d. 2831, l. 47. M. G. Kustova - Voroshilov. October 14, 1948.
[40] GARF f. R-5446, op. 50, d. 2831 l.l. 50-51.
[41] GARF f. R-5446, op. 50, d. 2831, l. 49.

and providing lectures on a daily basis. Even mentioning Crimean Tatars was too toxic for most, and dozens of requests by Kustova for feedback went unanswered. For example, she sent a rough outline of the exhibit plan and excursion text to the RSFSR's Central Committee's Art Council of Ministers in 1945, but the committee only approved it a year later. This meant for a year she operated on the hope that she and her staff had not crossed any lines.[42]

Once the museum had completed all the exhibit materials for the project on 7 November 1947, they compiled a portfolio for final approval. Yet again, she received no feedback even as the amount of visitors to the museum was increasing. Kustova's professional dedication to the museum profession further endangered her position, leaving her torn between preserving the museum as a historical artifact, and her Soviet devotion to following the party line. In fact, when compared to other books, lectures, excursion texts, and tourist guides written in Crimea after the war, the text for the Bakhchisarai Palace excursion, while full of Tatar treachery, Russian nationalism, and Slavic lore, still presented an extensive portrayal of the diplomacy, culture and architecture of the Crimean Khanate.[43]

Finally, by October 1948, Kustova had had enough. Crimean and Soviet officials were happy to send workers, soldiers, and settlers to the museum for educational purposes, but they did not want to take any responsibility for its operation or content. In a blunt, handwritten letter to Voroshilov on 14 October 1948 she insisted that she could not proceed with her orders to educate about Crimea if she could not get one Soviet official, at any level, to comment on whether or not her exhibits, palace tour, and lectures

[42] GARF f. R-5446, op. 50, d. 2831, l.l. 49-50.
[43] GARF f. 5446, op. 50, d. 2831, l.l., 4-29. Bakhchisarai Place Excursion Text by N. I. Matveenko, 1947.

were following the party line. Further, she proclaimed that it was "physically impossible" to hide the fact that the palace was the home of the Crimean Khans so long as it was a museum.[44]

The letter was a risky and a fascinating example of how people navigated postwar Stalinism. While Kustova had received no feedback for a year, she was likely aware of Kabanov building a "new Russian Crimea" and structured her letter to Voroshilov accordingly. She said that to the museum workers, the fact that the Palace was the home of the Khans was the least important fact. Rather, the palace was a "monument to Russian culture, especially after the architectural editions made to the palace after Crimea became part of Russia." Fortunately, for Kustova, the palace was "undeniably" linked with Russian culture because its fountain was the subject of a Pushkin poem.[45] But, she asked, "since the palace is a palace where the Khans lived, how should I address this reality?" She had written dozens of party, government, and academic officials and no one was willing to even comment on anything "associated with the treason of Tatars." She insisted that the museum staff deserved an answer because they were dedicated communists working to "create a genuine patriotic feeling- the feeling of the greatness of Russia culture." She concluded the letter by asking Voroshilov to end the "conspiracy of silence" and, in blunt fashion, asked, "whether or not it (the museum) is even needed?"[46]

Kustova's hand-written plea worked. In fact, this was the type of problem that Shults had to solve in his new position at AN Crimea. Voroshilov immediately contacted

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[44] GARF f. 5446, op. 50, d. 2831, l.l. 47-51.

[45] On Pushkin and the Bakhchisarai Palace, see Katya Kokanson, "Pushkin's Captive Crimea: Imperialism in *The Fountain of Bakhchisarai*" in Monika Greenleaf and Stephen Moeller-Sally eds. *Russian Subjects: Empire, Nation, and the Culture of the Golden Age* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998), 123-148.

[46] GARF f. 5446, op. 50, d. 2831, l. 47.

Shults to investigate the museum and ordered the Arts Committee of the Soviet of Ministers of the RSFSR to send A. E. Udal'tseva (AN SSSR) and N. D. Baklanova (Soviet Academy of Architecture or *Akademii Arkhitekturi SSSR*) to assist Shults.[47] Their recommendations had the museum present, as best it could, the new Crimean narrative. The Russian architectural additions, Pushkin's poem and other Russian writings about Crimea occupied most of the museum's excursion, while mentions of the Crimean Khanate were kept to a bare minimum and were only negative.

Most fascinating was how, on the recommendations, Kustova ordered paintings of famous Russians to visually occupy the palace. In the diplomatic hall where the khans had entertained foreign ambassadors, she hung a painting of the Russian military leader of the Azov campaigns against the Crimean Tatars (1695-96), Boris Sheremetev. She dedicated another room to General Suvorov, the Russian "liberator" of Crimea who Nadinskii idolized. As the leader who "reunited" Crimea with Russia, several rooms celebrated Catherine the Great, her victory in Crimea, and her visit to the palace in 1785. Finally, Kustova dedicated a large hall to the "reunification" of the 1783 annexation and Petomkin's governance of the Tavridian Government thereafter. The only room that maintained a theme somewhat connected to the Tatars was the harem, where a painting titled "The Captives of Constantinople" hung, highlighting the sexual practices and slavery of the Turkic-dominated Black Sea.[48]

Several other regional (*kraevedcheskii*) museums throughout Crimea also had to remove Crimean Tatar material, but obviously lacked Kustova's paradoxical situation.

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[47] GARF f. 5446, op. 50, d, 2831, .l.l. 1-2. Nachal'nik Glavnogo Upravlenie Ucherzhdeniyami Izobrazitel'nykh Iskusstv P. Sysoev i Nachal'nik Otdela Muzeev Glavizo P. Ryabinkin k Cov. Min. SSSR P. F. Abolimovy. 27 October 1948.

[48] GARF f. 10010, op. 1, d. 495, ll. 24-25. Remarks by A. N. Smirnov on 13 June 1952.

These regional museums also had more local control. A close associate of Shults, V. P. Babenchikov, created many of the new historical and archeological exhibits at the most important of these museums, the Central Regional Museum of Crimea (*Tsentral'nyi Kraevedcheskii Muzeia Kryma*) in Simferopol. Babenchikov was an experienced archeologist who, along with the museum's lead historian, Kobets, assisted Shults in his archeological excavations. Babenchikov and Kobets also coordinated with Nadinskii and Shults in writing their own articles promoting the new Crimean narrative. They simultaneously created new museum exhibits with titles such as "Russian Slavs in Crimea," "Russian heroes," "Soviet Crimea," and "Tatar slavery." As the archeological digs, article writing, and exhibits progressed, the museum held a small conference with Shults and began providing "consultations" to the local branches of the museum in Feodosiia, Evpatoriia, Yalta and other locations. Meanwhile, Babenchikov and other staff began hosting excursions and lectures to acquaint Crimean teachers with the new history. Similar to Kustova's palace museum, the visitors came, with the museum hosting 46,014 people in 1944 and 54,075 people in 1945 (including 26,982 soldiers, 17,966 students, and 9,127 other citizens).[49]

As the new Crimean narrative solidified, Babenchikov and the museum prospered. They presented more than 300 lectures in 1946 and participated in the Soviet-wide "know your region (*znai svoi krai*)" campaign.[50] By 1949 Shults had given Babenchikov a concurrent research position at the AN Crimea and he continued his work

[49] GARF f. 10010, op. 5, d. 264, l.l. 1-7ob . "Otchet Tsentra l'nogo Kraevedcheskogo Muzeia Kryma za 1945 goda." Direktor Oleinikov i Zam. Direktora Doich. Early 1946.

[50] GARF f. 10010, op. 5, d. 264, l. 14. Proizvodstvennyi Plan Raboty Tsentral'nogo Kraevedcheskogo Muzeia Kryma na 1946 god. Oleinikov i Doich.

at the museum and completed a dissertation on Scythians that provided further support to the new Crimean narrative.[51]

Under the direction of Simferopol', the local branches of the regional museum had the same agenda. At the Kherson museum, Director Martinov, a fresh graduate of MGU, focused on the occupations of Crimea, beginning with the Greeks and ending with the Tatars. Because Nadinskii's articles "were the only materials" for Crimean workers to describe modern Crimean history, every museum in Crimea took a "strong" position on the use of "*vossoedenenie*" and dedicated a room to the reunification of the peninsula to the mainland.[52] In sum, despite the initial problems of Kustova, all Crimean museums had the clear goal of educating the new Crimean settlers and tourists alike of the new Crimean narrative.[53]

If some museum employees felt a professional obligation to keep up a façade of historical accuracy, workers and administrators in the Crimean branch of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (*Vsesoiuznyi tsentral'nyi sovet professional'nykh soiuzov*, hereafter VTsSPS) had no such qualms. And it was their work in running dozens of Crimean resorts and tourist bases that gave Crimea's largest and most important cultural industry the lead role presenting the new Crimean narrative to locals and visitors. As soon as Shults and Nadinskii penned their first articles in 1945, tourism workers set about presenting the new theory for popular consumption, creating accessible summaries with personal touches.

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[51] GARF f. 10010, op. 5, d. 264, l.l. 20, 24. Plan na 1949 god. Krymskii Oblastnoi Kraevedcheskii Muzei. 15 January 1949.

[52] GARF f. 10010, op. 1, d. 495, l.l. 36-37 Remarks by A. B. Zaks on 13 June 1952.

[53] Immediately after the War, museum workers avoided displays about the pre-war and wartime Soviet period because they did not yet know how to address Crimean ASSR history. An important exception was the "Naval-War Museum" in Sevastopol that chronicled the city's grueling siege, the Black Sea Fleet's service, and the city's liberation in 1944.

As the Methodological Director of the Alushta Tourist Base, I. Kirrilov was responsible for writing the excursion guides and texts for tours originating from his base and convincing tourists that Crimea had always been Russian. Kirrilov began his tour of Alushta by declaring that the Crimea has had a special place in the history of the Russian people since the ancient Scythians. Citing Nadinskii, the 400 years of Tatar rule was an occupation similar to the recent Nazi occupation, and Catherine's conquering of Crimea was not imperial expansion, but the Russia/Slavic liberation from the Asiatic hordes, again comparable to the liberating qualities of the Red Army.[54] He continued by referring to the Russian Empire under Peter I as "our government" as he described the Russian attempt to return "Russian ancestral lands *(russkikh iskonnykh zemel)*" to Russia. Similar to Kustova, Kirrilov continued the trend of pushing Russian architecture and literary figures to the center of Crimean history, with Pushkin's poem about Bakhchisarai appearing on page seven of the tourist guide.[55]

As for Crimean Tatars, they never had a legitimate role on the peninsula and were "always enemies of the Russian people and the proletarian revolution."[56] Dismissing the Crimean Tatars' political and ideological role in the Crimean ASSR, he claimed all Crimean Tatars had been against the Revolution and welcomed the German occupation of Crimean in 1917. They had also collaborated with the Mensheviks and imperialist interventionists during the civil war. To highlight the "pattern" of Crimean Tatar treason,

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[54] GARF f. 9250 (VTsSPS SSSR), op.1, d. 153, l. 10. VTsSPS, Metodicheskaya razrabotka ekskursia sevodya i budushi. I. Kirrilov, March 19, 1949.
[55] GARF f. 9250, op.1, d. 153, l.l. 1-23.
[56] GARF f. 9250, op.1, d. 153 l. 12.

he repeated verbatim the 25 June 1946 RFSFR directive that accused all Crimean Tatars of treason and dissolved the Crimean ASSR (making it an RSFSR oblast).[57]

As for after the Tatars' deportation, Kirrilov admitted that the "makeup of the Alushta district population had drastically changed," with Russian "volunteer" settlers arriving from Voronezh oblast. This transformation had only been positive because, just as with the first Russian "liberation" of 1783, an influx of Russians arrived to modernize agriculture and the economy.[58] In short, he had no issue describing the ethnic cleansing and demographic engineering because he saw nothing wrong with it. Tatars were always enemy occupiers and the new influx of Russian settlement was natural because the peninsula has always been Russian land. The only place Marxism actually factored into his narrative was a quote he took from a letter Engels wrote to Marx on 23 May 1851. In the letter, Engles said that the Russian Empire was playing a "progressive role" in developing the Black and Caspian Seas. Kirrilov's use of the words "Soviet" and "socialist" were nearly absent."[59]

While Kirrilov was just one man, he was an influential prolific writer of excursion texts and had a long and respected career. In fact, hundreds of excursion writers repeated this version of the new Crimean narrative in thousands of other excursion texts written in Crimea for the rest of Soviet history. The main excursion writer at the Yalta tour base, Chernets, focused even more on Russian writers and architectural additions. Still, he also made clear that all Tatar rule was a "dark age," Crimea was "Russian land that had been

[57] GARF f. 9250, op.1, d. 153, l.l. 12, 19.
[58] GARF f. 9250, op.1, d. 153, l.l 19, 22.
[59] GARF f. 9250, op.1, d. 153, l.l. 11, 22.

stolen," Tatars were eternal enemies of Slavs, and that the only Crimean indigenous peoples were descendants of Slavic Scythians and Tavrids.[60]

At the Yalta "House of Tourism *(Dom Turista)*," the introductory meeting for visitors by tourism specialist Figin began with a declaration that Crimea was vital to the history of "great Russian military leaders, poets and writers." While the heroism of the Soviet people was evident in Crimean history, the "Russian people" had the most important role in Crimean history.[61] Unlike Kirrilov, Figin at least made an attempt place his feelings within a Marxist framework. For example, he said that "based on the strict scientific theories of Marxism-Leninism, Soviet historians have studied Crimean's past and architectural remnants and determined that the peninsula has always been Russian land, eternally soaked with Russian blood," and that the Scythians were the forefathers of Eastern Slavdom. Shults had confirmed these "facts" with his 1945-47 expeditions of because he "uncovered the remains of a Scythian city near present day Simferopol'." In addition, tourists learnt that all Russian attempts to take Crimea were simply attempts to liberate part of the Russian Motherland, and that the 1783 annexation of Crimea was a "gathering of Slavic lands."[62]

As Crimean museums and the VTsSPS honed their presentations of the new Crimean narrative, they began coordinating exhibits together, further unifying their cultural agitation. The Central Regional Museum of Crimea invited Chernets to

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[60] GARF f. 9250, op.1, d. 153, l.l. 54-88. VTsSPS, Metodicheskaya razrabotka dlia Yalta-Alushta, Chernets. March 19, 1949.
[61] GARF f. 9250, op.1, d. 153, l.l. 121-132. VTsSPS, Metodicheskaya razrabotka dlia Yalta Dom Turista, Figin. 17 May 1948.
[62] GARF f. 9250, op.1, d. 153, l.l 124-125.

Simferopol' to lecture in 1946, and the museum and the VTsSPS opened an exhibit on Crimean sanatoriums in 1949.[63]

Thanks to Crimea's cultural workers, the arguments of Shults and Nadinskii overwhelmed the memory of the deported peoples. Guided by the new Crimean narrative, new Slavic settlers were meant to believe that they were simply reclaiming their ethnic birthright established by their Slavic forefathers after centuries of struggle against Greek, Genoese, Tatar and other occupations, with World War II being the final liberation of Crimea.

Critiquing the New Crimean Narrative

The elevation of Slavic and Russian identity over Soviet identity, the absurdity of many Russian nationalist claims, and, above all, the sometimes-blatant disregard for Soviet Marxism-Leninism made a backlash from the center inevitable. However, this backlash failed to meaningfully dislodged or alter the new Crimean narrative. As this section displays, the attack on the new Crimean narrative actually revealed that key Soviet academics and the AN SSSR fully supported the basic account. Aside from removing a few contradictions, these academics provided only a hollow critique, thereby condoning the total Russification of Crimea.

As soon as Nadinskii and others began writing, there was pushback because, without direct orders, staffers in Glavlit, Gosplan, the VTsSPS and other organizations had no reason to equate the Crimean deportations with Russification. In fact, the leader of cleansing Crimea's history, Zotiev, rejected the new Crimean narrative as a Russian project. While it was his job to remove mentions of Crimean Tatars and even remove

[63] GARF f. 10010, op. 5, d. 264, l. 16; GARF f. 10010, op. 5, d. 264, l. 26.

critiques of Russian imperial policy, he drew the line with the Soviet period. For example, in October 1945 Zotiev censured an Evpatoriia newspaper for referring to "Russian people" fighting for the peninsula because the "Soviet armed forces were made up of all Soviet nationalities."[64]

He specifically had a problem with "incorrect" explanations of the Russian annexation of Crimea in 1783, and he disliked Nadinskii's nationalist assertions.[65] In a 25 October 1946 letter to an assistant of the War and Government Secrets Division of the Soviet of Ministers in Moscow, M. D. Ovsiannikov, he criticized Nadinskii's article *The Crimean Pages of Suvorov's Biography* (*Krymskie Stranitsy v biografii Suvorova)*. He argued that Nadinskii had not used "facts" to claim that Russia's imperial expansion, annexation of Crimea, and Suvorov's career were "progressive."[66] However, Ovsiannikov ignored Zotiev's complaint. Ovsiannikov did not even comment directly on Nadinskii's argument, but merely responded that journals could publish the article.[67] In this indirect way, Zovtiev's bosses allowed the new Crimean narrative to continue.

The most flamboyant writer of the new Crimean narrative, Kirrilov, was also not immune to criticism. In fact, the edited transcripts of his excursion texts reveal that the head of the Crimean branch of the Tourist-Excursion Division of the VTsSPS, A. V. Mokrousov, attempted to contain Kirrilov's affinity towards ethnic Russians. The handwritten edits removed the use of "Russian" as an adjective when describing new Crimean settlers and added "Soviet." When Mokrousov forwarded the text to Moscow

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[64] GARF f. 9425, op. 1, d. 333, l. 86. Otchet o rabote krymsckogo oblastnogo upravleniia po delam krymoblita za period s 1 iiulia po 1 oktiabia 1945. A. Zotiev. 4 October 1945..
[65] GARF f. 9425, o. 1, d. 333, l. 57. Zotiev - SNK SSSR po okhrane voennykh tain i nachal'niku glavlita N. Sadchikov. "Otchet o rabote Glavlita krymckogo ASSR za period s 1 ianvaria po 1 iiulia 1945."
[66] GARF f. 9425, op. 1, d. 333, l. 75. Pis'mo Zotiev - Zamestitel' upolnomochnogo Soveta Ministrov SSSR po okhrane voennykh tain v pechati, M. D. Ovsiannikov. 25 October 1946.
[67] GARF f. 9425, op. 1, d. 333, l. 76.

for final approval, the head of the Tourism-Excursion Division of the VTsSPS SSSR, G. Kosilov, and his head excursion writer, E Supina, still found plenty of over-the-top material. Kirrilov's use of "our government" to describe the Russian empire confounded them, and they even said that he spent so much time lambasting Crimean Tatars that it made them seem too important. Furthermore, similar to Zotiev, they believed the use of "reuniting" to describe Crimea's annexation was improper.[68]

Most troubling for the Moscow VTsSPS was that many excursion writers either left out Marxism-Leninism or only included it haphazardly at the end of texts.[69] In summing up the problem with the Crimean excursion texts written between 1945 and 1950, Supina told Mokrousov that Crimean excursion writers did not present a "modern internationalist" point of view and that this needed to change.[70] But the critiques by the VTsSPS headquarters in Moscow did little to influence the writing and dissemination of the new Crimean narrative, especially since texts sent for approval had sometimes already been in use for a year or more.

Finally, in the summer of 1952, Moscow decided to formally critique Crimean creativity. Several Moscow academics at the AN SSSR and the Institute of Regionalism and Museum Work (hereafter IKMR) had specific problems with the new Crimean narrative. Some, including A. N. Novitskii, A. N. Smirnov, N. A. Smirnov, Ia. I. Linkov, V. K. Gardanov, A. B. Zaks, and P. N. Tarkov had open contempt towards the authors' work and attempted to inject Marxism into the narrative and eliminate contradictions.

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[68] GARF f. 9520, op. 1, d. 153, l. 1. "Zakliuchenie" razrabotka Kirrilova "Alushta." Nachal'nik Turistsko-Ekskirsionnogo Upravlenie VTsSPS SSSR G. Kosilov i Zavidushi Metodsektorom E. Supina. 12 January 1950.

[69] GARF f. 9520, op. 1, d. 153, l. 24. "Zakliuchenie" po metodicheskoi razrabotke turpokhoda na goru Chatyrdag. Zamistitel' Nachal'nika Turistsko-Ekskirsionnogo Upravlenie VTsSPS SSSR O. Ovanesov i E. Supina. January, 1950.

[70] GARF f. 9520, op. 1, d. 153, l. 119. Pis'mo Nachal'nik Turistsko-Ekskursionnogo Upravlenie VTsSPS SSSR G. Kosilov - Director Turistsko-Ekskursionnogo Upravlenie Krymskogo VTsSPS. 3 March 1950.

The fact that some AN SSSR scholars led the crackdown was cynical, since just a year before they had presented the new Crimean narrative as a success and published Nadinskii's book. Still, it would be wrong to assume that this meant before 1952 all Moscow historians agreed with all the aspects of the new Crimean narrative.

The first indication of friction came in the summer of 1951 when a delegation from IKMR traveled to Crimea. After touring the Bakchisarai Palace Museum and several other museums, the delegates immediately wrote a letter to AN SSSR and reported that the exhibits were haphazard and "weak on Marxism." At first, the AN SSSR replied that it could "spare no experts" to investigate the matter.[71] However, in the summer of 1952 this lack of oversight ceased with a combined effort by the AN SSSR and the IKMR that culminated with an academic conference on 25 May 1952 at the AN Crimea. Before and after the conference, the academics inspected Crimean museums, educational institutions, and tourist excursions. After the conference and inspections, academics debated recommendations at a follow up meeting in Moscow on 13 June 1952.

It became clear at the conference that the critiques of 1952 were not because Moscow academics condemned the Crimean ethnic cleansing, Slavic resettlement, or claims that Crimea was Russian land. Moreover, they believed that the primary goal of the conference was to solidify and even celebrate the new Crimean narrative's key assertions.[72] The problem with the new Crimean narrative was that "locals" such as Nadinskii wrote a history that only fit "the local (Crimean) framework," and this local version quickly became popular in Crimea. For example, during his visit to Crimea, Ia. A. Linkov described how an employee at the Kherson Historical Museum proclaimed

[71] GARF f. 10010, op. 1, d. 495, l. 36. Remarks by A. B. Zaks on 13 June 1952.
[72] Russian nationalists, Crimean party officials, AN SSSR and Crimean Tatar activists all agreed that this was the most important legacy of the conference.

that he now had a "Crimean point of view" concerning Russian history. Instead of the traditional "Russian point of view" that focused on Kiev and Moscow as the hearths of the Russian nation, Crimean Slavs, thanks to the new Crimean narrative, now considered the role of Crimea to be equal in importance, if not more, because Scythian civilization predated Kiev and Moscow.[73] For Moscow academics, a Russo-centric narrative for Crimea was fine, but it could not undermine Moscow's role in Russian national history.

At the Simferopol' conference, historians B. A. Rybakov, B. N. Grekov, and others highlighted the "mistakes" of Shults and Nadinskii and outlined the needed amendments. Not surprisingly, first on Moscow's chopping block were the theories of Marr connecting Scythian civilization to Slavs. The KPSS had already denounced Marr in the late 1940s as anti-Marxist, but afterwards Shults and Nadinksii still promoted his Scythian hypothesis. Besides suggesting that Slavdom in Crimea predated that of Kiev and Moscow, academics disliked the argument that Greek colonizers in Crimea were occupiers that subjugated Slavs. This "broke the (Marxist) historical process" that began with classic Greece, and held that Greek colonies in Crimea were progressive city-states comprised of working class refugees fleeing repression.[74] Finally, some historians found the Scythian theory objectionable because the "primitive" Scythians could not possibly have given birth to the great Slavic and Russian cultures.[75]

As a respected academic, Shults "should have known better," and at the Simferopol' conference he rejected the Scythian theory and denounced Marr, instead shifting Slavic origins in Crimea to the ancient Tavridian kingdom.[76] Nadinskii perhaps

[73] GARF f. 10010, op. 1, d. 495, l.l., 29-33. Remarks by Linkov on 13 June 1952.
[74] GARF f. 10010, op. 1, d. 495, l.l 4, 14
[75] GARF f. 10010, op. 1, d. 495, l.l. 19-22.
[76] GARF f. 10010, op. 1, d. 495, l. 8.

never had the respect of Moscow academics and they lambasted him. *Outlines of Crimean History* was "not a real scholarly work," argued A. B. Zaks.[77] He had written a sloppy populist history that had little to do with Marxism/Leninism and, even if it "did not create the mistakes," it "repeated and popularized them."[78]

Besides the Scythian issue, Nadinskii's detractors believed that using the term "*vossoedinenii*" and portraying the 1783 annexation as progressive were incompatible. The problem, as historian A. N. Smirnov argued, was the "reuniting" claim detracted from the progressive nature of Russian "crusades" into Crimea during the middle ages. In his view, since the middle ages Russia and Crimea were always united in Slavdom despite the Turkic "occupation." Furthermore, "*vossedenenie*" mostly refers to the uniting of people, and not geographic regions. Nadinskii's sloppy application of the term could also lead readers to believe that Russians and Crimean Tatars were united in the Russian empire ethnically.[79]

In their Simferopol' presentations, Grekov and Rybakov argued that "connections" between "indigenous Crimeans" with ancient Eastern European Slavs, Kiev, and "the gradual Slavic penetration and settlement in Crimea" alone supported the Russian claim to Crimea. They said that Nadinskii was correct in suggesting that Russia's annexation of Crimea was "progressive," but historians had to base this narrative on "Marxism" and the claim that Russians bought progress before and after 1783. They needed to avoid fantasies about the Scythian origins of Slavic civilization and instead needed to provide "fact-based" evidence. This included contrasting the capitalist advancements, aristocratic palaces, and culture of the Russian empire with the

[77] GARF f. 10010, op. 1, d. 495, l. 36-37.
[78] GARF f. 10010, op. 1, d. 495, l. 34.
[79] GARF f. 10010, op. 1, d. 495, l.l. 19-22.

Khanate. This shift away from the Scythian origins of Russian Crimea was meant to de-localize that new Crimean narrative and ensure that Moscovite Russians, and not "primitive" Scythians, were the founders of "Russian Crimea."[80]

While the intervening academics believed it was their duty to provide "excursionists, tourists and new settlers with a more comprehensive Marxist history of Crimea," they doubted that even these minor changes would disseminate into popular history. In fact, their reports on the popularity of the new Crimean narrative in museums, excursions, and outlets on the peninsula confirmed its success.[81] At the Bakhchisarai Palace Museum, Smirnov reported that Kustova "personally escorted us around the museum and requested help in improving the exhibits." While he sympathized with her efforts, he disliked the crude way in which she had decorated the museum with Russo-centric paintings, and the exhibit on the "reuniting" of Crimean to Russia remained.[82] Smirnov was dismayed that, "every ten minutes in Bakchisasarai a car pulls up to the palace and unloads tourists and it's the same at the Kherson museum and others." In his visit to the Kherson museum, Linkov was "horrified" to see how the museum exhibited the Greeks as occupiers.[83] Moreover, the director of the Kherson museum, in Smirnov's opinion, was too inexperienced to enforce Moscow's guidelines among her workers.[84]

Meetings and further inspections after the conference only increased their pessimism. Before the trip to Crimea, N. A. Smirnov wrote an essay titled "*Vkliuchenie Kryma v sostav Russkogo gosudarstva* (The Inclusion of Crimea in the Russian State)"

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[80] GARF f. 10010, op. 1, d. 495, l.l. 6-7, 19-20.
[81] GARF f. 10010, op. 1, d. 495, l. 25.
[82] Similar to 1948, he found that Kustova was still paranoid about her exhibits.
[83] GARF f. 10010, op. 1, d. 495, l.l. 24-26, 31. The only Crimean museum that met their approval was the *Voenno-Morskoi Muzei* (Naval-War Museum) in Sevastopol.
[84] GARF f. 10010, op. 1, d. 495, l.l. 24-26.

with the specific goal of arguing against the use of the term "*vossoedinenie*." However, after arguing his point in dozens of "lectures and private meetings" that summer, he found that Crimeans reacted to his argument with skepticism, if not outright hostility. He said that both Crimean party officials and cultural workers argued that they "have gotten used to saying '*vossoedinenie*,' have already disseminated this idea amongst the new population that just came to Crimea, and therefore do not want to change this term and there is no reason why they should." When Smirnov pushed the matter, a Crimean museum employee replied, "so what, Slavdom existed in Crimea in ancient times, this is ancient Russian land." Zaks also convened a meeting with the staff of the Simferopol' museum and found the museum employees "incredibly stubborn" and attached to the term and their interpretation of the new Crimean narrative. A meeting with Kustova's staff yielded similar results. Zaks concluded that most cultural workers in Crimea had "conservative" worldviews and that the scholars at AN Crimea were no better. He believed that only "serious" Marxist historians from Moscow could fix the problem. Grekov also presented a paper at the Simferopol conference arguing for the use of the term "*vkliuchenie*" instead of "*vossoedinenie,*" but similarly believed his Crimean interlocutors ignored his suggestion.[85]

At the June follow up meeting in Moscow, Linkov summarized the problem: "Crimean historians have written a history that does not consider the larger history of the motherland and should not be allowed in Soviet science." Unfortunately, the new Crimean narrative had already become ingrained in "the bulk of our historical researchers of Crimean history." Linkov further lamented that they (Moscow academics) could create committees and make recommendations, but they did not "have the strength" to enforce

[85] GARF f. 10010, op. 1, d. 495, l. 20.

orders because of their limited influence on the peninsula and the convictions of the Crimeans. Especially alarming was that the "popular historical literature" published in Crimea since the war had only multiplied these problems because the "mass of workers who come to Crimean resorts" read the mistakes of Shults and Nadinskii.[86]

A. N. Smirnov agreed that Crimean research monographs, tour guides, excursions and articles in local party newspapers displayed an absence of "preparation" in Marxist methodology and "hyper-exaggerated" the academic mistakes. Smirnov believed that the Crimean AN should form a special commission just for the purpose of policing the popular history, guidebooks, and excursion/tourist literature.[87] However, he believed any such effort was doomed: "I get the impression that local workers will not use the term 'uniting,' and whether or not they will in the future only time will tell."[88]

Their predictions were right. Not only did Crimean officials ignore their pleas, so did the leaders of AN SSSR and AN Crimea. From the perspective of AN Crimea, the critiques were minor asides. The purpose of the conference was confirming the new Crimean narrative and ending the Soviet "idealization of the Tatar and Turkic period."[89] In a letter to Malenkov after the conference, the presidium of AN SSSR supported AN Crimean's perspective and described the outcome of the conference. The letter repeated the tenants of the new Crimean narrative, evening using "reuniting" despite the fact that Moscow academics had argued against the term.[90] With the exception of removing the

[86] GARF f. 10010, op. 1, d. 495, l.l. 30-34.
[87] GARF f. 10010, op. 1, d. 495, l.l. 30-34, 26-27.
[88] GARF f. 10010, op. 1, d. 495, l. 21.
[89] RGASPI f. 17, op. 133, d. 377, l.l. 16-20. Pis'mo Iu. Zhdanov i A. Mitin- Cek. TsK Suslovu. 19 January 1952.
[90] RGASPI f. 17, op. 133, d. 377, l.l. 245-247. "Ob itogakh raboty ob"edinennoi sessii otdeleniia istorii i filisofii i krymskogo fililiala akademii nauk SSSR, posviashchennoi istorii kryma." Prezident AN SSSR Nesmeianov i uchenyi sek. Prezidiuma AN SSSR A. V. Topchiev- Malenkovu. 13 June 1952.

Scythian thesis, the historians critical of the narrative could get neither their bosses nor Crimeans to make other minor changes. The plan for the Crimean AN for 1953 continued on the same track as before, "uncovering Crimean Slavic heritage."[91] As such, by 1953 the Soviet state had scrubbed the historical record (as far as the Soviet state and citizens were concerned) of Crimean Tatars' legitimate place in Crimea and created a new, anti-Tatar epic.

A Profound Legacy

From 1944 to 1953 historians and cultural workers employed an odd mix of Russian nationalism and Slavophilism to justify Stalin's policy in Crimea. They wrote a popular, triumphant history that connected with the mindset of the war-weary Slavic settlers that repopulated the peninsula. Moscow academics tried to inject more reason and Marxism into the narrative, but they mostly failed. This is partly because, as this paper has displayed, even the Moscow academics critical of the narrative supported the overall argument that Crimea had always been Russian. Their bosses also saw no need to alter a narrative that supported Stalin's Crimea policy and it stood as the new status quo for Crimean history.

In the long term, the new Crimean narrative mattered for everyone with a stake in Crimea's future. The Soviet Union created an awkward situation by combining the new Crimean narrative with the deportations, land redistribution, Slavic resettlement, and the 1954 transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR that chapter three describes. The key paradox to the above cascade of events was that the 1954 transfer of Crimea to the

[91] RGASPI f. 17, op. 133, d. 377, l. 249. Prezidium Akademii Nauk SSSR Postanovlenie No. 307 ot 13 iiunia 1952.

Ukrainian SSR did not alter the new Crimean narrative. Both Stalin and Khrushchev believed that "the economic and geographic connection of the peninsula to Ukraine" was reason enough to put the direction of Crimean development in the hands of Ukrainian SSR institutions. At the same time, authorities in Moscow, Kiev, and Simferopol' all explicitly stated that the Crimea being economically and politically a region of Ukraine and being culturally and ethnically Russian were not mutually exclusive.[92] In late April 1954, both *Pravda* and *Izvestia* published speeches by party leaders that directly quoted Nadinskii on how Crimea was "Russian ancestral land," and how for centuries non-Slavs had been trying to "steal Slavic land." In short, Ukraine became the keeper and developer the peninsula. The transfer also coincided with the celebration of the "300 years of '*vossoedenenie'* of Ukraine with Russia." Moscow officials applied the term to the understanding of the relationship between the Russian and Ukrainian people that the Russian Empire had "reunited" three centuries earlier. In this context, the Crimean transfer was not a "gift," but a brotherly gesture that made sense economically, and was only possible because both the Russian and Ukrainian nations were united. As such, before 1991 the annexation changed little on the ground and rarely challenged the new Crimean narrative because, as Slavs, Ukrainians were not occupiers.[93]

Then the Soviet Union collapsed. Overnight, Crimea became a strategic region where one state controlled land with a majority population that believed itself to be

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[92] The official wording was that the transfer happened because of "shared economies, territorial closeness, and tight agricultural and cultural connections. GARF f. 7523 (Ver. Sov. SSSR), op. 57, d. 963, l. 5 (Ukaz Presidium Ver. Sov. SSSR "O peredache Krymskoi oblasti iz sostava RSFSR v sostav Ukr. SSR." 19 February 1954.

[93] One such speech was that of RSFSR Presidium Chairman Mikhail Tarasov that appeared in *Izvestia* and *Pravada* on 28 April 1954. See GARF, f. 7523, op. 58, d. 191, l.l. 2-10. Teksty rechei chlenov Prez. Ver. Sov. SSSR vystupavshchikh po voprosu peredachi Krymskoi oblasti iz RSFSR v Ukr. SSR. See also GARF f. 385, op. 26, d. 87, l.44. Vystupleniia deputatov v sviazi s utverzhdeniem Ukaza o peredache Krymskoi oblasti is sostava RSFSR v sostav Ukrainskoi SSR. 28 April 1954.

connected to another state, all while the ethnically cleansed indigenous population began returning and remained disenfranchised. This created political ire between Russia, Ukraine and Crimean Tatars after the 1991 Soviet collapse and shaped the events of 2014.

As the following chapters reveal, Crimean Tatars acknowledged the success of the new Crimean narrative and fought its falsehoods by directly confronting them well before 1991. They savaged the work of Nadinskii and Shults, challenged the purveyors of the new Crimean narrative in the government, the party and security services, and exposed the chauvinistic nature of tour guides, excursion texts, accounts of World War II, and museum exhibits. This effort even included directly confronting authors and tour guides in person.[94] Along with challenging specific authors and texts, Crimean Tatar activists acknowledged the significance of the May 25, 1952, Simferopol conference and condemned its outcome for solidifying the politics of "Crimea without Crimean Tatars."[95] Unfortunately, in 2016 the political and economic disenfranchisement of Crimean Tatars and animosity towards their place in Crimean history remains. The new Crimean narrative helped create this reality by providing a durable nationalist myth that easily outlasted the Soviet collapse.

[94] One of the first such incidents was when Crimean Tatar authors Shamil' Aliandinov and Eshref Shem'i-Zade traveled to Crimea in the summer of 1958 and visited the Bakchisarai Palace-Museum that Kustova had transformed. Bekirova, *Krymski Tatary*, 81.
[95] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l. 72. Pis'smo ot 6 oktiabria 1966 goda.

Chapter 5

Crimean Tatar Rehabilitation, Resistance and Exile

Death, national degradation, and imprisonment are the main legacies of special settlement for Crimean Tatars. Moreover, there is no disputing that the Soviet state forced the Uzbek SSR and other regions to house special settlers. Crimean Tatars first reacted to the terrible conditions by writing individual petitions for rehabilitation and escaping. Early petitions were often very personalized, with individuals and perhaps their family members writing letters. Escapees fled anyway they could, but the arid terrain of the Uzbek SSR often hindered their success. As this chapter underlines, while a handful of petitions and escapees succeeded, the majority of Crimean Tatars remained in special settlement until 1956.

However, the relationships between the exiles and host regions were not entirely destructive. What Paul Stronski remarked about the postwar population of Tashkent applies, in a more limited capacity, to Crimean Tatars. That is, people "reacted to, adapted, and ultimately helped shape" events "during times of intense turmoil in Soviet history."[1] Crimean Tatars in exile participated in broad developments such as industrialization and economic, educational, and party advancement during and after the special settlement. This "adaptation" did not mean acceptance of Stalin's ethnic cleansing and exile. Rather, it fostered Crimean Tatar survival as individuals and as a nation. Both the experience of early resistance and the limited assimilation of Crimean

[1] Stronski, *Tashkent*, 5.

Tatars into political and economic systems in exile were crucial to the beginning of a robust protest movement in the 1960s.

To explore this final dynamic of the immediate postwar period, this chapter begins by outlining Crimean Tatar reaction to special settlement. The second half of this chapter then examines social, political and economic trends as special settlement chaos ended in 1946, and Crimean Tatars and their host regions attempted to find some normalcy and opportunity in their otherwise antagonistic union.

Early Resistance and Rehabilitation in Special Settlement

From 1944 to 1953, Crimean Tatars resisted special settlement through the legal channel of petitioning the NKVD/MVD for rehabilitation and the main illegal protest of escape.[2] Petitioning and escape usually had the combined goals of finding food, finding family members, seeking release from special settlement, and, sometimes, returning to Crimea.

In the first weeks after the deportation, Crimean Tatars did not hide their discontent. Within days of arriving in the Uzbek SSR numerous Crimean Tatars, without permission, journeyed to Tashkent and bombarded authorities with petitions questioning the legality of their deportation and seeking the whereabouts of family members. In some cases such as the Bukhara oblast kolkhoz of Narpai, a group of Crimean Tatars chose two representatives to travel to Tashkent on their behalf.[3] Other Crimean Tatars demanded to know when they would receive the promised "goods or money in exchange for their livestock and grain confiscated in Crimea." In Namagan oblast, the NKVD

[2] There were no violent protests against the NKVD such as those that Anne Applebaum describes. Applebaum, *GULAG,* 401-408.
[3] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 174, l. 49. Dokladnaia Zapiska iz Tashkenta. November 13, 1944.

reported that the 15,000 Crimean Tatars "all complained about the lack of food" in June 1944.[4] Crimean Tatars exiled to other Soviet regions also complained to local authorities, especially since most were now separated from relatives in the Uzbek SSR.[5] The NKVD in Tashkent and elsewhere ordered low-level NKVD officials to record the complaints.[6] However, immediately after the deportation the NKVD forwarded the complaints to Crimean authorities (the special settlers' last place of legal residence) and these early requests were mostly dead-ends.[7]

Outside of the important exceptions of veterans and party members discussed later in this section, the only evidence of Crimean Tatars influencing Soviet policy during special settlement was an isolated case in Moscow and Tula oblasts. Over 4,000 Crimean Tatars had been working in the Moscow coal consortium since the early days of the war and had continued mining after the deportation (though now as special settlers). With their families living in awful conditions after deportation, the coalmines saw a quick rise in escapes. The miners soon began sending mass requests to Moscow asking that they be reunited with their families that had been deported.[8]

The head of the Moscow Coal Consortium, Zasyanko, did not want to lose the miners. He proposed that the families be allowed to join the miners in Moscow and Tula

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[4] GARF. f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 27. "Dokladnaia Zapiska- otprieme I rasselenii krymskikh tatar po Namanganskoi obl." Nach. UNKVD po Nam. Obl. Maior Gosbez. Gotsev, Upolnomochenniy NKVD SSSR Podpolkovnik Miliakov, Upol. UNKVD Podpolkovnik Trofimov, Upol. NKVD SSSR Podpolkovnik Vorob'ev- Kobulov. June 1944.

[5] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 63. Zam. Nach. UNKVD Iaroblasti Podpolkovnik Nemirovskii and Nach. Oper. Otdela Iaroblasti Maior Muromtsev. Iaroslavl' NKVD. June 13, 1944.

[6] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l.l. 42-43. "Dokladnaia Zapiska- O prieme i rasselenii spetspereselentsev po Tashkentskoi Oblasti." Nachal'nik UKNVD Podpolkovnik Matveev i Upol. NKVD SSSR Polkovnik Admin. Sluzhby Tarkhonov- Kobulov. June 14, 1944.

[7] GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 1679, l.l. 7-8. "Dokladnaia Zapiska" o rabote otdela po spetsdelam prok. Krymskoi Oblasti za 1-i kvartal 1952 goda. Prokuror Krym. Obl. N. Khlamov. April 14, 1952.

[8] GARF, f. 5446, op. 49a, d. 3343, l. 1. Sovet Ministrov Rasporiazhenie Sedmovo marta, 1947 goda. Signed by Beria.

oblasts, and his bosses at the Ministry of Fuel Enterprise Construction agreed.[9] Beria approved the proposal and championed the idea to Stalin. Arguing that the policy change would undermine Stalin's falsified mass treason charges against Crimean Tatars, Molotov objected. Beria won the dispute, and in a letter to Molotov explained that the plan was the best economic outcome because the Crimean Tatar workers were productive at the mines.[10] On August 17, 1947, Stalin ordered that families of miners be allowed to register as special settlers at the mines.[11] By 1948 several hundred miner's families had arrived, and the mine consortium eventually allowed a large number of Crimean Tatars to travel to the Uzbek SSR and other regions to find their families.[12]

However, the above case was isolated and the majority of early Crimean Tatar petitions only informed the NKVD of what they already knew. Crimean special settlers were unhappy, disoriented, and not receiving rations and these conditions were leading to a humanitarian catastrophe.

The only Crimean Tatar special settlers that successfully petitioned the Soviet state for increased rights and release were a small number of Crimean Tatar party members, veterans (or active duty soldiers), and women with non-Tatar spouses. These developments began with a debate over the basic rights of special settlers. As early as July 1944, Chernyshov argued that new special settlers should retain all their rights as Soviet citizens, with the exception of the right to leave special settlement. His opinion

[9] GARF, f. 5446, op. 49a, d. 3343, l. 3. Pis'mo Min. Stoitel'stva toplivnykh Predpriatii SSSR- Beria. April 30, 1947.
[10] GARF, f. 5446, op. 49a, d. 3343, l. 8. Sekretnoe Pis'mo, Beria- Molotovu. July 18, 1947.
[11] GARF, f. 5446, op. 49a, d. 3343, l. 9. Sovmin SSSR Postanovlenie No. 2890-931s. August 17, 1947.
[12] GARF, f. 5446, op. 49a, d. 3343, l. 8. Sekretnoe Pis'mo, Beria- Molotovu. July 18, 1947.

came to light as Crimean Tatar soldiers and officers, and in some cases their commanders, began petitioning for their rights to receive "social welfare and pensions."[13]

Uzbek SSR authorities objected to such rights, and understanding the awkward Uzbek position is important. Special settlers were supposed to be traitors and the Uzbek party was busy lecturing mid-level Uzbek bureaucrats about the danger of Crimean Tatar treason. Moreover, the NKVD had already stripped many special settlers of their internal passports. Now, Moscow was demanding that local Uzbek officials, who had just learned about Crimean Tatar treachery, had to return to their jobs and provide these "enemies" with rations, loans, jobs, homes and pensions for military service.

Why did Chernyshov and the NKVD "champion" the rights of special settlers in this case? Chernyshov was not a great humanitarian, but he was a pragmatic administrator who wanted to secure benefits because he was looking for anyway to keep special settlers alive. Nor was the NKVD was not alone in this opinion. In one of the more astonishing letters of 1944, Soviet General Andrei Khrulev, at the time the Chief of the Rear of the Red Army and Soviet Armed forces (and former Deputy Defense Commissar), demanded that his officers and their families forced into special settlement receive pension payments. In fact, Khrulev organized payments so that the financial branch of the People's Commissariat of Defense (*Narkom Oborony*) provided the funds directly to oblast-level special settlement authorities, bypassing the gridlock of the banks, financial ministries and republic governments.[14]

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[13] GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 7535, l. 2. Pis'mo Zam NKVD SSSR Chernyshov- Sovnarkom SSSR Kosyginu. August 10, 1944.

[14] GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 7535, l. 3. Pis'mo Narkom Oborony SSSR Nachal'nik Tyla Krasnoi Armii General Armii A. Khrulev- Zam. Pred. Sovnarkom SSSR Kosyginu. August 15, 1944.

The letters and pressure from the NKVD and military did influence the Sovnarkom. In a secret letter to Molotov on August 17, 1944, Kosygin said that the Sovnarkom had begun a debate on providing pensions for special settlers because of "numerous requests about the payments of payments and benefits" from "places of special settlement."[15] Kosygin agreed with Chernyshov that special settlers were "entitled to the same social benefits and equal conditions as other citizens." Eventually, the NKVD, Red Army, Sovnarkom and Uzbek officials reached an informal compromise that pensions had to be paid to officers, veterans, veteran families, invalids, and mothers with multiple children.[16] To clarify that they understood Chernyshov and the Sovnarkom's order correctly, the Uzbek Sovnarkom directly asked Moscow if this meant "paying pensions to the families of special settlers still serving (in the armed forces)," and they received an affirmative answer.[17] It is impossible to calculate how many Crimean Tatars actually received pensions and benefits before 1946, and likely few ever saw such benefits. Still, many former officers and party members were certainly better off material-wise than regular Crimean Tatar special settlers.[18]

These petitions did not stop with requesting benefits, and as mass death began hundreds of Crimean Tatar veterans and party members began petitioning the Soviet state for their release.[19] Numerous letters arrived at the Soviet Central Committee in Moscow

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[15] GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 7535, l. 15. Sekretnoe Pis'mo A. Kosygin- Molotovu. August 17, 1944.
[16] GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 7535, l. 17. Soversheno Sekretno Pis'mo A. Kosygin- V. M. Molotovu. August 18, 1944.
[17] GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 7535, l. 5. Pis'mo Zam. Pred. Sovnarkoma Uzbeksoi SSR Ia. Aliev- Sovnarkom SSSR Uprav. Delami Mitrichevu. July 20, 1944.
[18] This was likely because most arrived at later dates and were more likely to find work. During 1944 and 1945 its is doubtful that many Crimean Tatar veterans even knew about this right since there is no evidence the Uzbek SSR published the order.
[19] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 160, l. 48. Chernyshov i Kuznetsov- Beria. October 31, 1944.

and at Malenkov's office.[20] The influx of requests from Crimean special settlers was large enough that by October 1944 Beria had to decide how to handle the issue. Chernyshov and his deputies told Beria that they believed Crimean Tatar party members, veterans, and Crimean Tatar women married to non-Tatar servicemen should have the right to dispute their special settler status.[21]

Beria knew there could be no blanket rehabilitation of Crimean Tatar veterans and party members, so he decided to meet with Chernyshov on October 31, 1944, and create a process for handling the requests. At the meeting they considered several cases that Chernyshov had already decided. Sundus Useinov was one of the first rehabilitated Crimean Tatars and her case was an important precedent that Beria took into account. She was the wife of slain Crimean Tatar partisan Server Useinov, and she had argued that the release of her and her daughter Lelia would honor her husband's sacrifice. Even before the meeting with Beria, Chernyshov agreed and approved their release on September 12, 1944.[22] After reviewing such cases and their options, Beria and Chernyshov agreed that they would grant release from special settlement to veterans and party members on an individual basis, and only after a NKVD investigation of every case.[23] In some instances such as the Useinov case, the NKVD could also rehabilitate family members of the petitioner. Beria clarified that release from special settlement did

[20] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 160, l.l. 148-149. Pis'mo Chernyshov- Beria. August 21, 1944
[21] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 160, l. 27. Pis'mo Chernyshov i Kuznetsov- Beria. August 1, 1944.
[22] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l. 101. Zakliuchenie 12 sentiabria, 1944.
[23] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 401, l. 6. Spravka "po postanovleniiu Biuro Krymskogo Obkoma VKP/b/ ot 13 sentiabria t. g. o faktakh vozvroshcheniia v krym spetsposelentsev." By I. O. Nach. Otdela Spetsposelenii MVD SSSR Polkovnik Konstantinov. September 23, 1948.

not mean that an individual automatically had the right to return home (to Crimea). Special permission to return to Crimea was possible, but only in some cases.[24]

After the meeting with Beria, similar petitions and rehabilitations accelerated. Based on his wartime record, "Hero of the Soviet Union" Uzeir Abduramanov argued that the NKVD should immediately release him, his father, three sisters, two brothers, and wife from special settlement, and allow them to return to Crimea. On September 12, 1945, Chernyshov released Abduramanov and his family members with permission to return to Crimea.[25] A few weeks later on September 25, 1945, Mustafa Selimov, the former First Secretary of the Yalta Party District Committee and former partisan, won his freedom.[26] Many of the letters to Moscow are fascinating accounts of individual Crimean Tatars transitioning from a Soviet soldier to an "enemy of the state" overnight. For example, Alimzhan Satdarov's letter described how the NKVD had deported him from Crimea while he was on active duty in the 180th Rifle Reserve Division, and how he had been wounded and received commendations earlier in the war. The MVD investigated his wartime record and approved his release on September 20, 1947.[27]

Some Soviet military leaders continued to defend Crimean Tatar soldiers. For example, Red Army Airborne officer Abdal Bakobashevich was one of several Crimean Tatar service members whose commanding officers sent letters supporting their release. Chernyshov not only released Bakobashevich on May 20, 1945, but also allowed him to

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[24] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 160, l. 48. Pis'mo Chernyshov i Kuznetsov- Beria. October 31, 1944.
[25] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l. 7. Zakliuchenie 12 sentiabria, 1945.
[26] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l. 80. Zakliuchenie 19 sentiabria, 1945.
[27] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 401, l.l. 96-100. Spravka: Ha osvobozhdennykh iz spetsposeleniia tatar s pravom vozvrashcheniia v Krym. (Sov. Sekretno) By I. O. NAchal'nika Otdela Spetsposelenii MVD SSSR Polkovnik Konstantinov. September 22, 1948.

return to his position at the headquarters of the Eighth Airborne Army.[28] Red Army officer Vait Khabulaeva was one of thousands of Crimean Tatars whose officers did not deport them in May 1944. He continued fighting until the war ended and, after being demobilized, he found his wife in special settlement and successfully petitioned for her release in January 1947.[29] Other Crimean Tatars that the NKVD and MVD released from 1944 to 1948 include (but are not limited to) partisan leaders such as Ramazon Kurt-Umerov and Seit-Ali Ametov, former assistant to the Crimean prosecutor Nadzhie Nasyrova, and the former 2nd Secretary of the Staro-Krymsk district Party, Usein Adzhiev.[30]

While Crimean Tatar men in military and/or party positions wrote most petitions, there were exceptions. Zare Khalidova, a Crimean Tatar woman, was serving as a captain in a Red Army medical unit in 1944 when the NKVD deported her mother, Tenzile Khalidova, to Kostromskoi oblast. Similar to many of her male Crimean Tatar comrades, Khalidova's service shielded her from deportation, and she continued serving until 1946. After demobilization, Khalidova requested her mother's release and, after a brief investigation, Chernyshov signed her mother's release order on September 30, 1946.[31] Aisha Memetova was another female Crimean Tatar petitioner. Her mother had been a Crimean party member and the Germans had executed her for underground

[28] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 401, l. 105. Spravka Na krymskikh Tatar osvobozhdennykh iz spetsposeleniia bez prava v"ezda v Krymskuiu oblast' by Konstantinov. September 1948.
[29] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 401, l. 118. Spravka Na krymskikh Tatar osvobozhdennykh iz spetsposeleniia bez prava v"ezda v Krymskuiu oblast' by Konstantinov. September 1948.
[30] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 401, l.l. 111, 116, 121. Spravka Na krymskikh Tatar osvobozhdennykh iz spetsposeleniia bez prava v"ezda v Krymskuiu oblast' by Konstantinov. September 1948.
[31] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 401, l. 98. Spravka: Ha osvobozhdennykh iz spetsposeleniia tatar s pravom vozvrashcheniia v Krym. (Sov. Sekretno) By I. O. NAchal'nika Otdela Spetsposelenii MVD SSSR Polkovnik Konstantinov. September 22, 1948.

activities. Based on her mother's service, Chernyshov approved Memetova's release from special settlement in Sverdlov oblast on January 31, 1945.[32]

Beria and Chernyshov also released some Crimean Tatar women with non-Crimean Tatar spouses. Although the NKVD outlined no racial theory as to why they allowed such rehabilitations, documents suggest an underlying assumption that Crimean Tatar women married to non-Tatars (and their children) were seemingly purified by their Slavic husbands. After her deportation to the Uzbek SSR, Crimean Tatar Munire Davydenko's husband, a Russian officer, petitioned for her release and Chernyshov freed her on November 9, 1945. When V. F. Val'ko, an ethnic Ukrainian and a Red Army Major, found out that his Crimean Tatar wife, Fatima Ramazanova, had been deported to the Kazakh SSR, he and his son (also in the army) began petitioning the NKVD for Fatima's release. Chernyshov approved her unconditional release on September 17, 1946. E. I. Dymchenko, Alime Asan-Sary, Aishe Selimova, M. F. Martynova and over a dozen more Crimean Tatar women also gained their freedom thanks to petitions from Slavic husbands.[33]

While usually Slavic husbands wrote mixed-marriage petitions, there were exceptions. For example, T. S. Valednik-Murzig had been married to a Jewish man who died in 1939. Based on the fact that her husband had not been Crimean Tatar, she petitioned for her and her daughter's release. Chernyshov even gave them permission to return to Evpatoriia when he ordered their release on January 15, 1947. Other cases

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[32] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 401, l. 102. . Spravka Na krymskikh Tatar osvobozhdennykh iz spetsposeleniia bez prava v"ezda v Krymskuiu oblast' by Konstantinov. September 1948.

[33] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 401, l.l. 96-100. Spravka: Ha osvobozhdennykh iz spetsposeleniia tatar s pravom vozvrashcheniia v Krym. (Sov. Sekretno) By I. O. NAchal'nika Otdela Spetsposelenii MVD SSSR Polkovnik Konstantinov. September 22, 1948.

prove that relations between Crimean Tatar special settlers and local Uzbeks and other ethnicities in special settlement were not always antagonistic. After arriving in the Pakhtarskogo district of Samarkand oblast (Uzbek SSR), Razis Memetova met ethnic Uzbek Dostuva-Iadgarom and they married in May 1945. Memetova's husband then petitioned for her release on the grounds that he was an ethnic Uzbek. The process did take several years, but on January 9, 1948, the MVD released Memetova. Uris Mustafaeva-Tsuprunova also met her husband, Grigorii Tsuprunov, in special settlement. Grigorii was ethnic Russian and a Red Army officer when the couple married on June 16, 1946, in Chirchik, Uzbek SSR. When the army transferred Grigorii to Stalinabad he petitioned for Uris's release from special settlement and the MVD approved the request and allowed her to travel to Stalinabad.[34]

NKVD/MVD records on the totals of rehabilitated Crimean special settlers are detailed. Between 1945 and September 20, 1948, Chernyshov approved the release of 173 Crimean Tatars. This included 71 releases in 1945, 34 in 1946, 42 in 1947 and 26 in 1948. Of the 173 rehabilitated Crimean Tatars, only 33 (25 adults and 8 children) were allowed to return to Crimea.[35] And a handful of Crimean Tatars did return. For example, Evstafii Osmanovich, a rehabilitated Baltic fleet veteran, registered in Gurzuf in 1947.[36] Most of the returning Crimean Tatars registered in Yalta, where the MVD reported

[34] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 401, l.l. 96-100. Spravka: Ha osvobozhdennykh iz spetsposeleniia tatar s pravom vozvrashcheniia v Krym. (Sov. Sekretno) By I. O. NAchal'nika Otdela Spetsposelenii MVD SSSR Polkovnik Konstantinov. September 22, 1948.
[35] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 401, l. 6. Spravka "po postanovleniiu Biuro Krymskogo Obkoma VKP/b/ ot 13 sentiabria t. g. o faktakh vozvroshcheniia v krym spetsposelentsev." By I. O. Nach. Otdela Spetsposelenii MVD SSSR Polkovnik Konstantinov. September 23, 1948.
[36] GARF, f. 9476, op. 1, d. 403, l. 56. Spisok Tatar, prozhivaiushchikh v krymskoi oblasti i podlezhishchikh napravleniiu na spetsposelenie. Zam. Nach. Otdela Spets. MVD SSSR Pol'kovnik Konstentinov. October 28, 1948.

registering 19 rehabilitated Crimean Tatars between 1945 and 1948.[37] A further 200 cases of Crimean special settlers were still under review in September 1948.[38]

Since these rehabilitations were only possible for a miniscule number of Crimean Tatars, the majority of Crimean Tatars had no hope of leaving special settlement. When desperation to find family members or seek better conditions boiled over, special settlers turned to the more open method of resisting the deportation: escape. As David Shearer underlines, "escape was not as difficult as one might expect" because, unlike the GULAG, special settlements "had no barbed wire" and people could just leave.[39] Special settlements also lacked permanent guards and were closer geographically to urban centers such as Tashkent.[40] By the end of August 1944, at least 334 Crimean special settlers had escaped, with the largest number (189 people) escaping from Tashkent oblast. The NKVD claims that they were able to capture 22 of the August escapees over the next months, but only because many had left to find family members, making escapees' destination easy to surmise.[41] By October 16, 1944, Chernyshov informed Beria that the NKVD had arrested a further 1,577 Crimean special settlers for escape.[42] This number would climb dramatically in the months to come as mass death gripped the special settlement population.

The chaos of early special settlement made preventing escapes difficult. The proliferation of escapes in early August 1944 led Beria to pressure NKVD officials in

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[37] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 401, l. 69. Nachal'nik Ialtinskogo Otdela UMVD Polkovnik Babich in Yalta - Nach. Uprav. MVD Po Krymskoi Oblasti General Maioru Kalininu. September, 1948.

[38] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 401, l. 6. Spravka "po postanovleniiu Biuro Krymskogo Obkoma VKP/b/ ot 13 sentiabria t. g. o faktakh vozvroshcheniia v krym spetsposelentsev." By I. O. Nach. Otdela Spetsposelenii MVD SSSR Polkovnik Konstantinov. September 23, 1948.

[39] Shearer, *Policing Stalin's Socialism*, 429-430.

[40] While daunting, Anne Applebaum proves that some GULAG prisoners still managed to escape. Applebaum, *GULAG,* 390-401.

[41] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 174, l.l. 48-49. Dokladnaia Zapiska iz Tashkenta. November 13, 1944.

[42] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 66. Chernyshov i M. Kuznetsov- Beria. October 16, 1944.

Tashkent to enhance security and prosecute all escapees.[43] In addition, the NKVD established a network of informants inside the Crimean Tatar community to report on the general attitudes of Crimean Tatars and locate escapees.[44] Regardless, the increased surveillance did not stem escape. For example, a year later in the third quarter of 1945 a total 1,551 special settlers escaped.[45]

Outside of the Uzbek SSR, Crimean Tatar escape also exploded. The case of escapee Sale Ashirov in Gorky oblast was typical for the period. Ashirov's mother said that he went to work on October 7, 1944, and never came home.[46] Out of around 10,000 Crimea Tatars in the oblast, the NKVD reported that 2,385 escaped between June and September 1944. However, because most escapees were searching for family in the Uzbek SSR, NKVD operatives had captured all but three escapees by October 1.[47]

In addition to seeking family and escaping horrid conditions, some Crimean Tatars escaped with the goal of returning to Crimea. Similar to escaped prisoners and special settlers of all ethnicities, Crimean Tatars often hid with friends and forged passports. A small number of escapees chose to confront Crimean authorities and demand compensation for confiscated possessions. In one extraordinary case, a Crimean

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[43] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 174, l. 11. Pis'mo Kuznetsov- Zam. NKVD Meer v Tashkente. August 19, 1944

[44] Informants reported that the Crimean Tatar displeasure with the deportation was the result of them being "anti-Soviet" and "nationalists" or "fascists" (depending on which report you read). GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l.19. Upolnomochennyi NKVD SSSR po AND OBL Kapitan Gosbezopastnosti Romashov to Upolnomochennomy NKVD SSSR po Uzbekskoi SSR Mal'tsevu. "Dokladnaia Zapiska o rezul'tatakh priema I rasseleniia spetspereselentsev (K.T.) po Andizhanskoi Obl." June 1944; GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 24. "Dokladnaia Zapiska- O rabote po rasseleniiu krymskikh tatar v Kashka-Dar'inskoi oblasti, UzSSR." Nach. NKVD K/Dar'inskoi Obl. Podpolkovnik Gosbez. Samarodov and Nach. Po NKVD UzbSSR Podpolkovnik Gosbez. Nikolaev to Kobulov. June 13, 1955.

[45] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 245, l. 26. "Dokladnaia Zapiska o khoziaistvenno-trudovom ustroistve spetxpereselentsev is Kryma, rasselennykh v UzSSR za III kvartal 1945 god. (NKVD 5/7666) Nachal'nik NKVD UzSSR General-Maior Kirillov to Nachal'nik Otdela spetsposelenii NKVD SSSR Polkovnik Kunetsov." November 4, 1945.

[46] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 174, l. 138. Dokladnaia Zapiska iz Gorkogo- Nach. Uprav. NKVD po Gor. Oblasti Gos. Kom. Zverev and Nach. OSP Upravleniia NKVD po Gor. Oblasti St. Leitenant Gos Bez Sukhatev to Kuznetsovu. November, 20, 1944.

[47] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 174, l. 98. Dokladnaia Zapiska iz Gorkogo- Kuznetsovu. October 11, 1944.

Tatar named Abdul Beitullaev escaped from special settlement and returned to Crimea in early 1946. He somehow petitioned a Simferopol court to have his home and land returned, won the case, and then sold his home. The Crimean MVD eventually arrested him, but the case was so shocking that Crimean police jailed several local police and officials for their part in allowing Abdul to individually undo Stalin's wishes.[48] While the above case was extreme, by 1945 so many escaped Crimean Tatars were evading authorities that the head of the Crimean MVD, A. Kalinin, scolded the Crimean "passport tables" and revised instructions for preventing escaped special settlers from returning.[49]

The best quantitative picture of early Crimean Tatar escape and return to Crimea comes from MVD records. During the peak of mass death in 1945, Crimean authorities detained 529 escaped Crimean Tatars and received 607 BOLOS (be on the look out) for escaped Crimean Tatars. By 1948, Crimean authorities had "detained and sent back to special settlement" 771 Crimean Tatars, arrested an additional 228 escaped Crimean Tatars for prosecution (although most were re-deported along with detainees), and received a total of 1,738 BOLOS for escaped Crimean Tatars.[50]

The fact that a small number of Crimean Tatars were returning to Crimea did not go unnoticed in Moscow. In September 1948 Stalin traveled to his Yalta dacha. According to Crimean officials and other sources, at some point during his visit he became aware that some rehabilitated and escaped Crimean Tatars had returned to

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[48] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 401, l. 11. "Dokladnaia Zapiska o rezul'tatakh vypolneniia prikaza MVD SSSR No. 0586-48 g. o proverke sostoianiia pasportnogo rezhima v gorodakh I naselennykh punktakh Krymskoi obl. Nach. 1 Spetsotdela MVD SSSR Polkovnik Kuznetsov, Zam. Nach. Otdela Spetsposelenii MVD SSSR Polkovnik Konstantinov, and Nach Otdeleniia GUM MVD SSSR Maior Militsii Novikov to MVD SSSR General-Polkovnik S. N. Kruglovu. October 25, 1948.

[49] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 401, l.l. 8-8ob. Nachal'nik Krymskogo Oblastnogo Upravleniia MVD General Maior A. Kalinin to MVD SSSR General-Polkovnik S. N. Kurglovu. September 17, 1948.

[50] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 404, l.l. 13, 17-18. "O sostoianii bor'by s pobegami vyselentsev v Krymskoi Oblasti." Nachal'nik Upralenie Militsii MVD SSSR Gen-Leit. A. Leont'ev i Prok. SSSR Star. Cov. Uist. Butovich- MVD SSSR Gen-Pol. S. N. Krugolovu. 1948.

Crimea. Stalin became infuriated and on September 13 called the Yalta Party Secretary, Bulatov, to his Dacha and berated him for allowing any Crimean Tatars to return to Crimea.[51] The veracity of accounts surrounding Stalin's rant is questionable because the crackdown on Crimean Tatars occurred during a Soviet-wide assault on all released or escaped special settlers.[52] Regardless, the incident was a clear signal to Soviet authorities that absolutely no Crimean Tatars, under any circumstances, should reside in Crimea and that Chernyshov and Beria should cease rehabilitating any Crimean Tatars.

To end rehabilitations, the MVD and MGB began forwarding release petitions to the Crimean oblast prosecutor's office instead of reviewing individual petitions in-house as Chernyshov had done.[53] The Crimean authorities, unlike the NKVD and MVD from 1944 to 1948, simply ignored the requests. For example, of the over 20 requests sent by Crimean special settlers in the 1st quarter of 1952, there is no evidence that Crimean authorities granted any releases.[54]

To end the return of escaped and rehabilitated special settlers to Crimea, the MVD in Moscow and Crimea first issued three related orders that demanded Crimean passport tables treat everyone with suspicion. The policy change then culminated on November 26, 1948, with a Supreme Soviet SSSR order that forbid any special settler of any ethnicity from returning to their homelands and prescribed even harsher penalties for

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[51] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 401, l.l. 8-8ob. Nachal'nik Krymskogo Oblastnogo Upravleniia MVD General Maior A. Kalinin to MVD SSSR General-Polkovnik S. N. Kurglovu. September 17, 1948.
[52] According to Shearer, the crackdown was Moscow's reaction to the chaos of the postwar Soviet registration and passport system. Shearer suggests that, because the rehabilitations only exacerbated the problem, Stalin chose to end them indefinitely. Shearer, *Policing Stalin's Socialism*, 430-431.
[53] As part of "bureaucratic reorganizations" to help separate civilian policing from political policing in 1945, the NKVD became the MGB (Ministry of State Security) until becoming in the KGB in 1954. Shearer, *Policing Stalin's Socialism*, 405-407.
[54] GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 1679, l.l. 7-8. "Dokladnaia Zapiska" o rabote otdela po spetsdelam prok. Krymskoi Oblasti za 1-i kvartal 1952 goda. Prokuror Krym. Obl. N. Khlamov. April 14, 1952.

escape and aiding escapees.[55] Simultaneously, from October 5 to15, 1948, the Crimean MVD swept Crimean towns, factories and farms and began a new, albeit small, wave of deportations of any "suspicious" persons.[56] The Crimean MVD even deported some Crimean Tatars such as Svtafii Osmanovich who had received MVD permission to return to Crimea. In general, the October security sweep generated widespread panic because any Crimean resident who were former German labor conscripts or lived under occupation became concerned about deportation.[57]

In addition, Moscow gave Crimean and Uzbek authorities the permission to prosecute all escapees and those who had forged names or passport details with article 58 of the Soviet penal code (which covered anti-Soviet activities and treason). One of the main problems for Crimean authorities from 1944 to 1948 was that they could rarely prosecute escapees for escape because that required collecting documents from special settlement authorities in remote locations. In fact, Crimean prosecutors only tried 22 Crimean Tatars for escape before 1948. Usually, Crimean authorities just re-deported the hundreds of escapees they detained.[58] Allowing Crimean authorities to charge escapees with article 58 meant that documenting their escape was irrelevant because their very

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55 This order is reproduced in full by Allworth in "Mass Exile, Ethnocide, Group Derogation: Anomaly of Norm in Soviet Nationality Policy," 182.

56 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 404, l. 23. Prikaz Nachal'nik Uprav. MVD po Krym. Obl. , No. 0073, 22 Iulia 1948 ,"Ob usilenii rozyska bezhavshikh spetspereselentsev."; GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 404, l. 24. Prikaz Nachal'nik Uprav. MVD po Krym. Obl. , No. 00109, 5 Oktiabria,1948. "Ob usilenii pasportnogo rezhima I vyiavlenii spetspereselentsev bezhavshikh s mest poselenii."; GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 403. l.l., 1-8. Dokladnaia Zapiska "O rezul'tatakh vypolneniia preikaza MVD SSSR No. 0586." Maior Novikov-Piasnomu. October 28, 1948

57 Similar to escaped Crimean Tatars, some Slavic Crimeans who had been captured by Germans or had been conscripted into Nazi labor changed their names when they returned to Crimea. They feared that the new sweep could uncover their true identities and the NKVD in Crimea did make such arrests. RGASPI, f. 574, op. 1, d. 1, l. 104. "O nedostatkhakh v rabote c kadrami v samarkandskoi partorganizatsii." S. Ignat'ev- Iusupovu. September 1949.

58 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 404, l. 7. "O sostoianii bor'by s pobegami vyselentsev v Krymskoi Oblasti." Nachal'nik Upralenie Militsii MVD SSSR Gen-Leit. A. Leont'ev i Prok. SSSR Star. Cov. Uist. Butovich-MVD SSSR Gen-Pol. S. N. Krugolovu. 1948.

presence in Crimea was an "anti-Soviet" crime. The case of Emira Kasan confirms simplified prosecutions. After escaping and evading Uzbek authorities, she returned to Crimea, living with Russian friends in Alushta. The MGB began investigating her whereabouts in early 1952 and soon arrested her and turned her over to Crimean Oblast prosecutors for violating article 58.[59]

Article 58 also allowed Crimean and Uzbek prosecutors to detain suspects indefinitely until they decided how to prosecute the escapee. Consequently, prosecutors often arrested Crimean Tatars for one crime, and then prosecuted them for a different crime. For example, in 1952, the Crimean MVD arrested escapee Davydova-Memetov for article 58 (specifically spying), but at trial article 58 was not a factor and a Crimean court sentenced her to 10 years for escaping from special settlement.[60] The case of escapee D. A. Apazidi displays that Uzbek authorities also began using article 58 to detain escapees. The Ferghana oblast MGB began investigating Apazidi in January 1952 and arrested him on December 18, 1952 with article 58.[61] Ferghana prosecutors then sent him to Crimea where Crimean prosecutors sentenced him to ten years for escape.[62]

As considerable jail time (usually a decade or more) became the consequence of escape after the 1948 decrees, instances of Crimean Tatar escape shrunk to just a few dozen every year.[63] During the 4th quarter of 1952 and most of 1953 the Ferghana oblast MVD did not charge a single special settler under article 58. This is despite the fact that

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[59] GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 1679, l. 23. "Dokladnaia Zapiska" o rabote po spetsdelam Prokurora Krymskogo Obl. za II kvartal 1952 goda. N. Khlamov.
[60] GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 2978, l. 10. "Dokladnaia Zapiska" 1 polugodine 1953.
[61] GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 1714, l.l. 8, 4, 10, 12. "Dokladnaia Zapiska" Prokuror Otdela po Spetsdelam Prokurora SSSR, Mladshii Sovetchik Iustitsii Vasil'ev. September 29, 1952.
[62] GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 1679, l. 35. "Dokladnaia Zapiska" o rabote otdela po spetsdelam prok. Krymskoi Oblasti za III-i kvartal 1952 goda. Prokuror Krym. Obl. N. Khlamov.
[63] GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 1714, l.l.1-15. "Dokladnaia Zapiska" Prokuror Otdela po Spetsdelam Prokurora SSSR, Mladshii Sovetchik Iustitsii Vasil'ev. September 29, 1952.

in Ferghana oblast, as in all oblasts with special settlers, special prosecutors made quarterly inspections of special settlers looking for such cases.[64] Similar sharp declines in cases from other oblasts during the same period suggest that special settlement authorities were, on the eve of Stalin's death, confident that they had reached a workable status quo in controlling unhappy special settlers.[65] Escape attempts had mostly stopped, and most Crimean Tatars calling for their rehabilitation or criticizing the state had either been rehabilitated or jailed.

Despite being a small number of individuals, this period of rehabilitation and escape was significant for two reasons. First, as will become apparent in the following section, rehabilitated Crimean Tatar party members such as Mustafa Selimov became authority figures to other Crimean Tatars, and helped secure economic stability for special settlers by taking administrative positions in farms, factories, and party Soviets. After the end of special settlement, Selimov and other such individuals became leaders of the protest movement and their early experience with petitioning the Soviet state would be crucial to the effort. Second, Stalin's 1948 reaction to Crimean Tatars returning to Crimea solidified anti-Tatar sentiment amongst the post-deportation Crimean administrators, particularly Crimean police and party members. The orders of 1948 and prosecutions of Crimean Tatars for "anti-Soviet activities" set a precedent in discouraging Crimean Tatar return. Crimean authorities would use this precedent to justify anti-Crimean Tatar policies for decades after the end of special settlement and the 1967 declaration giving individual Crimean Tatars the "right" to return to Crimea.

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[64] GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 1714, l.l. 18-20. "Dokladnaia Zapiska" Prokuror Fer. Oblast Abdullaev-Nachal'nik Otdel po Spetsdel Prokuror SSSR Komochkin, i Zamistitel' Prokurora Uzbekskoi SSR Borovikovu. January 13, 1953.

[65] GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 1714, l.l.1-15. "Dokladnaia Zapiska" Prokuror Otdela po Spetsdelam Prokurora SSSR, Mladshii Sovetchik Iustitsii Vasil'ev. September 29, 1952.

"Normal" Life in Special Settlement

Outside of the few hundred rehabilitated Crimean Tatars and the escapees, the vast majority of Crimean Tatars who survived mass death spent the rest of special settlement making their bleak situation bearable and seeking opportunity when it arose. Harsh circumstances and pragmatic concerns began a socioeconomic shift among Crimean Tatars with a trajectory towards urbanization and industrialization. As talented Crimean Tatars rose through the Uzbek socioeconomic system, an increasing number of them received educations in Tashkent and other cities and joined the Komsomol and party. Many would later join older veterans to become the networkers of the Crimean Tatar protest movement, serving as nodes of organized protest and communicating with rural Crimean Tatars, Soviet dissidents and Soviet authorities alike. To examine the origins of this transformation, this section explores the demographic legacies of mass death, what problems lingered after 1946, and what policies and trends arose from those circumstances as the Soviet state attempted to "normalize" special settlement.

In Crimea before the deportation, nearly 70 percent of Crimean Tatars had lived and worked in agricultural regions, but the opposite was true by 1989. Nearly 70 percent of Crimean Tatars had become urbanized and only 30 percent remained in rural areas of primarily the Uzbek SSR.[66] This change began because mass death shifted the surviving Crimean Tatars and new arrivals to increasingly industrial and urban settings. While the initial conditions at many industrial sites were atrocious for Crimean Tatars in 1944 and

[66] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 67, d. 9982, l.l. 65-67. Analiz- predlozhenii po ratsional'nomu rasseleniiu krymskikh tatar i razvitiiu sotsial'no sfery krymskoi oblasti pazrabotenykh SOPS Ukr. SSR AN. Iu. Osmanov. USSR. 1991.

1945, the NKVD was able to more quickly improve conditions in such areas because they were geographically and logistically closer to the urban centers of Soviet power.

NKVD documents on the population dynamics of Crimean Tatar special settlers reveal the beginning of this change. Initially, the NKVD based the resettlement of Crimean Tatars in the Uzbek SSR on the group being primarily agricultural, as well as the security concerns and "national degradation" goal described in chapter one. The official plan was to settle 94,500 deportees in kolkhozes, 36,300 in sovkhozes and 23,200 at industrial sites.[67] By November of 1945, the reality of mass death had significantly changed this dynamic, with NKVD numbers recording 44,303 Crimean Tatars on kolkhozes, 27,697 on sovkhozes, and 50,101 in industry.[68] These numbers not only reflect the mass death on kolkhozes, but the transfer of survivors into industry and how the NKVD placed over 16,000 Crimean Tatars who arrived after May 1944 on industrial sites instead of farms.

The number of Crimean Tatar special settlers outside of the Uzbek SSR was smaller, with around 32,000 people by July 1944, but the trend towards urbanity and industry was similar. As described in chapter two, these populations were concentrated in Molotov oblast (10,002), Mariinskoi ASSR (8,597), Gorkovskii oblast (5,514), Sverlodskoi oblast (3,591) and Ivanovskoi oblast (2,800) and smaller groups in Iaroslavl' oblast and other regions.[69] Again, while smaller and widely dispersed, these populations were consequential because many Crimean Tatars in Gorky and Molotov oblasts were

[67] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, 179, l. 29. NKVD UzSSR Komissar Gosbezopasnosti 3 Ranga A. Kobulov to Beria. May 1944.
[68] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 245, l. 15. Dokladnaia Zapiska o khoziaistvenno-trudovom ustroistve spetxpereselentsev iz Kryma, rasselennykh v UzSSR za III kvartal 1945 god. November 5, 1945.
[69] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 63. Zam. Nach. UNKVD Iaroblasti Podpolkovnik Nemirovskii and Nach. Oper. Otdela Iaroblasti Maior Muromtsev. Iaroslavl' NKVD. June 13, 1944. See also GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 67. Spravka- O sostave i kolichestve vyselennykh iz Kryma spetspereselentsev." By Zam. Nach. Otdela Spets. NKVD SSSR Polkovnik Mal'tsev. July 1, 1944.

party members, politicians, high-ranking veterans, and well-educated, and the NKVD placed most in industry. Moreover, most of these special settlers would gradually move to Uzbek cities and industrial sites between the late 1940s and 1960s, and help bolster the burgeoning Crimean Tatar urban population and the growing protest movement.

While bureaucratic genocide began the population shift, by 1946 Moscow's solutions to the remaining problems in special settlement further drove this change. Beyond ending mass death, a crucial remaining problem for "normalizing" special settlement conditions was the ideological paradox that began after the deportation: how to uphold Stalin's lie of Crimean Tatar treachery, while at the same time assimilating Crimean Tatars into the socioeconomic and political structures in exile. As described in chapter one, from 1944 to 1946 these contradictory goals and the "mixed messages" from Moscow to Uzbek officials about Crimean Tatars had contributed to mass death.[70] Afterwards, the Uzbek party and government continued portraying special settlers as a dangerous influx of enemy elements that needed to be repressed, and did so for the rest of special settlement. For example, a 1950 Uzbek Party Central Committee meeting referred to special settlers as traitors, and stated that many special settlers were "actively working against us (the SSSR)" or had a "harmful influence" on Uzbek workers.[71] Moreover, the resettlement of Crimean Tatars in the Uzbek republic continued to cause resentment, and the NKVD noted how many Uzbeks wondered why these "traitors" were not deported to more unpopulated regions or even executed.[72]

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[70] Stronski, *Tashkent*, 132.

[71] RGASPI, f. 574, op. 1, d. 23, l.l. 20-21. Stenograficheskaia zapis' besedy Upol. TsK VKP(b) po Uzbeksoi SSR S. D. Ignat'eva s chlenami Biuro TsK KP(b) Uzbek SSR. August 10, 1950.

[72] Paul Stronski sums up the Uzbek attitude towards Crimean Tatars. *Stronski,* 132-133. See also GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 8. Tashkent NKVD, Polkovnik Gosbezopasnosti Mal'ytsev and Podpolkovnik Gosbezopasnosti Maslennikov to V. V. Chernyshov. (sekretno) 25.IV.1944.

The truth is no one ever found a concrete solution to this paradox, and this was a common problem with Stalinist "punishments." As Lynne Viola argues, Gulag and special settlement planning created "utopian quagmire and dystopian nightmare" because the system was permanently undermined by the "disjunctures between planning and reality," and this discord was an "essential feature of Stalinism."[73] Nonetheless, the dystopia did "function" in some respects. After World War II, the primary goal of special settler authorities was to retain some of the human capital even while the general Stalinist policies were creating immense destruction and waste. In the Uzbek SSR, Moscow relied on the NKVD/MVD convincing some regional authorities that the deportation was an overall positive because Crimean Tatar workers were a boost to the economy.[74] To realize the "economic benefit," in 1946 Moscow and the MVD special settlement division launched a concerted effort to incorporate Crimean Tatars into the Uzbek economy.

The obstacles special settler authorities and special settlers faced were immense. As mass death ended in 1946, Uzbek resentment and distrust towards Crimean Tatars translated into chronic unemployment because many factory and farm directors still refused to employ special settlers. An investigation into the situation found that only 38% of working-age Crimean Tatars were unemployed nearly two years after the deportation. Nor was the workforce ideal. Over 10,000 Crimean Tatar men in the Soviet Armed Forces had died during the war and thousands of others continued service in the army and work force outside of special settlement. According to the MVD, by the beginning of 1946 "the majority of Crimean Tatar families in special settlement were

[73] Lynne Viola, *The Unknown Gulag*, 190.
[74] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 8. Tashkent NKVD, Polkovnik Gosbezopasnosti Mal'ytsev and Podpolkovnik Gosbezopasnosti Maslennikov to V. V. Chernyshov. (sekretno) 25.IV.1944

headed by women," often caring for multiple children. In short, malnourished mothers, children, and the elderly were the bulk of the Crimean Tatar workforce in 1946.[75]

Moreover, as was true since the first months of deportation, "employment" was a strong word. Official and unofficial work for special settlers was still often equivalent to slave labor. For those on payrolls, the pay and rations received were, by Moscow's own admission, "very small" if received at all.[76] Another endemic problem, and one that Soviet Finance Minister Arsenii Zverev acknowledged, was that "when compared to regular workers at the same kolkhozes, the special settlers usually receive far less working days." Even if a kolkhoz did pay Crimean Tatars for time worked, their wage was often a pittance because they were allowed to work only a few days a week.[77]

Compounding the financial problems for Crimean Tatars, the promised compensation for possessions confiscated in Crimea never arrived. After the failure of the reimbursement plan in 1944 and early 1945, the Soviet Sovnarkom gave the Narkom Zemledeliia and the Uzbek Sovnarkom over seven million rubles from the Sovnarkom reserve fund to fully reimburse all special settlers by the end of 1945. The Uzbek Sovnarkom again failed to do so, never even touching over half of the money.[78]

On the housing front, the Sel'khoz Bank of the USSR claimed that by 1946 Crimean Tatars had received over 52 million rubles in building loans. However, this number is dubious because local authorities stole much of the money. For Crimean Tatars who did claim the loans, the vast majority used the money to survive in the short-

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[75] GARF, f. 5446, op. 48a, d. 2740. l. 9. Pis'mo L. Karpov- N. A. Voznesenskom. April 2, 1946.
[76] GARF, f. 5446, op. 48a, d. 2740. l. 8. Pis'mo L. Karpov- Voznesenskom. July 13, 1946.
[77] GARF, f. 5446, op. 48a, d. 2740. l.l. 2-3. Pis'mo Minfin SSSR A. Zverev- N. A. Voznesenskom. July 5, 1946.
[78] GARF, f. 5446, op. 48a, d. 3378, l. 1. Pis'mo Zam Narkomzem SSSR i Benediktov- Sovnarkom SSR. March 13, 1946.

term. The Ministry of Finance estimated that 88 percent of the 52 million rubles went to purchasing bread, grain, shoes, clothes, livestock and other necessities. Combined with the lack of pay, the loans became a huge burden for Crimean Tatars and the Selkhoz bank alike. When the Selkhoz bank requested 3 million rubles in interest payments in 1945 from Crimean Tatars, it received none of the money. This led Moscow to demand that Uzbek farm and factory directors pay the special settlers not just for the settlers' benefit, but also to help pay back the more than 8 million rubles in interest that special settlers owed in 1946.[79] As Finance Minister Zverev argued, no one wanted special settlers accruing debt because this financial drain could keep the special settlement situation from stabilizing.[80]

Numbers on housing for Crimean Tatars confirm the failure of the loans to stimulate home building. By 1946, only 208 new houses had been built for the 46,358 Crimean Tatar families in the republic. Much of the money that authorities actually used for Crimean Tatar housing was to renovate 9,780 homes. The land situation remained dismal, with only 2,318 families receiving plots in 1946. When Crimean Tatars bought building materials, the items usually sat idle because most Uzbek authorities still refused to distribute land for homebuilding. The result was that the majority of Crimean Tatar families (36,370 according to the NKVD) remained in "overcrowded" dorms or structures "not worthy of human habitation."[81]

To solve these problems and prioritize the economic benefits of special settler survivors, Moscow issued and finally enforced a new round of orders on Crimean special

[79] GARF, f. 5446, op. 48a, d. 2740. l. 8. Pis'mo L. Karpov- Voznesenskom. July 13, 1946.
[80] GARF, f. 5446, op. 48a, d. 2740. l.l. 2-3. Pis'mo Minfin SSSR A. Zverev- N. A. Voznesenskom. July 5, 1946.
[81] GARF, f. 5446, op. 48a, d. 2740. l. 8. Pis'mo L. Karpov- Voznesenskom. July 13, 1946.

settlers, usually focused on the Uzbek SSR. To achieve the full placement of all Crimean Tatars in the Uzbek SSR into jobs and homes, Beria reiterated the responsibility of Uzbek officials with a decree on July 28, 1946, that demanded Uzbek authorities prove that Crimean Tatars had homes and employment, and also gave Crimean Tatars an extra four years to pay off loans for home construction.[82] Simultaneously, Moscow pressed Uzbek Sovnarkom head Abdurakhmanov to actually distribute the money earmarked for compensating Crimean Tatars for confiscated possessions. The Ministry of Finance placed the unclaimed funds directly into the Uzbek budget for 1946. Moreover, the Sovnarkom passed a specific order granting an additional 500,000 rubles to Crimean Tatars for the reimbursement of confiscated fruit trees and beehives. In addition, the NKVD also increased the prosecution of NKVD officers and enterprise directors who abused Crimean Tatars or denied the benefits discussed in the above orders.[83] As with pensions, there is no way to tell how much money Crimean Tatars actually received, but conditions did improve dramatically after 1946.

Another part of the effort in 1946 was the controversial step to allow all deportees to participate in the 1946 Supreme Soviet elections. When the NKVD ordered Uzbek officials and special settlers to prepare for voting, both sides were confused. Uzbek officials wondered why "traitors" were now allowed to vote. Crimean Tatars, according to Uzbek and NKVD officials, also could not comprehend why their votes would matter. After all, the NKVD had stripped many Crimean Tatars of their passports during the deportation, so many "voters" were not even sure of their citizenship status. For their part, Uzbek officials claimed that Crimean Tatar skepticism towards the vote was not

[82] Soviet of Ministers order No. 9323-RS, 28 July 1946. GARF, f. 5446, op. 48a, d. 2740. l. 10. Sovmin SSSR Rasporiazhenie No. 9323-RS. 28 Iiulia, 1946.
[83] GARF, f. 5446, op. 48a, d. 3378, l. 6. Sovmin SSSR Rasporozhenia No. 3136rs. April 16, 1946.

from the rage over death and deportation, but the work of "anti-Soviet" agitators and fascist collaborators. To combat the skepticism, a secret order from the Uzbek Central Committee ordered all local parties to interface with both the special settlers and special settler authorities and create informational meetings. For many Crimean Tatars, the meetings and the subsequent elections were their first post-deportation experience with local party leaders.[84] However, as Crimean Tatar Bekir Aca allegedly argued in one such meeting, why should they vote "if there are no Crimean Tatars to elect?" [85] Soviet elections were cosmetic to begin with, but at the very least the effort was a further signal to Uzbek authorities that Crimean Tatars were now a permanent part of the Soviet system in the Uzbek SSR.

Simultaneous to the above factors, the NKVD handling of Crimean Tatar party members and skilled workers played key roles in shaping special settlement. While famine and disease were raging and Tashkent and Moscow negotiated the future of Crimean Tatars in the Uzbek republic, special settler authorities began a concerted effort to place former Crimean ASSR government and party workers, agricultural experts, and skilled workers into jobs that utilized their expertise. But why would any Soviet directors or party deputies welcome Crimean Tatar elite if so many others refused to give regular Crimean Tatars employment?

One reason was that many of Crimean Tatars remained party members. Pragmatically, since Stalin's mass treason charges were false, the NKVD saw no reason

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[84] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 245, l.l. 268-268ob. Ocobaia Papka "Ob ucilenii massovo-politicheskoi raboty sredi spetspereselentsev v sviazi s vyborami v Verkhovnoi Sovet SSSR." Vypiska iz protokola No. 253 zasedaniia biuro TsK KP(b)Uz ot 7.XII. 1945g. No. 253/8.

[85] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 245, l.l. 38-40. Spetssoobshchenie "O nastroeniiakh spetspereselentsev s predstoiashchimi vyborami v Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR." Nachal'nik Otdela Spets. NKVD UzSSR Podpolkovnik Kirillov. November 1945.

to expel all Crimean Tatar party members. On the ground, the NKVD sought their authority among the deportees to help "normalize" life in special settlement.[86] In June of 1944, the NKVD placed all deported party members into the district party organization in their place of exile, and the local party reviewed their cases on an individual basis. Doubtless, the fact that many Crimean Tatars remained in the party was awkward. To lessen this contradiction, Moscow intentionally deported many Crimean Tatar party members, bureaucrats and specialists to Gorky and Molotov oblasts, separate from the bulk of the Crimean Tatar population. Once in these oblasts, NKVD and local officials placed many of the higher-ranking party members and those with economic-oriented educations in mid-level positions.[87]

Furthermore, the NKVD often kept party cohorts from specific Crimean districts and towns together in special settlement in an apparent effort to maximize their economic benefit for the host regions. For example, the former chief land manager for Crimea's Sudak district, Dzhamal Dediaev, became an inventory specialist at the Gorky oblast Bumkombinat (paper factory) in the summer of 1944. Abdul-Aziz Chorman, a former inspector for the Sudak party committee, became a supply agent for the factory, while former Sudak agitation and propaganda director, Emir Khalilev, became the director of cultural activities. Ganis Mustafaev, Abdureman Aliev, Elizhe Arabadzhieva and other Sudak Crimean Tatar agricultural experts and educators also received positions at the factory and its attached settlements. The factory could not find an equivalent job for every Sudak Crimean Tatar party member and some, such as Shabadin Khalilev (a former assistant to the Crimean ASSR judicial committee) and Kerim Shal'verov (a Sudak

[86] This incorporation of exiled elite into local government was nothing special in Soviet or even Russian imperial history.
[87] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 160, l.l. 148-149. Chernyshov to Beria. August 21, 1944.

middle school director) became loaders (*gruzchiki*).[88] Similar to Gorky oblast, in Molotov oblast authorities gave hundreds of Crimean Tatar doctors, engineers, teachers, agricultural specialists, tractor drivers, beekeepers and other skilled workers jobs in their fields.[89] These concentrations of Crimean Tatar elite do conflict with Stalin's goal of killing the Crimean Tatar nation through attrition, but, again, such paradoxes were common and the NKVD sought economic pragmatism with educated special settlers.

The placement of Crimean Tatars into the Uzbek political and economic system was more complicated, but proceeded nonetheless. On the one hand, the rhetoric of the Uzbek party towards Crimean Tatars was more vitriolic than in other regions and, as discussed earlier, the shear number of special settlers in the republic caused panic and resentment. On the other hand, even before the war many of the Uzbek regions where Crimean Tatars now resided had understaffed and unorganized farms, factories, and party and Komsomol organizations. The war had only exacerbated the problem. For instance, the Uzbek party Central Committee described the Uzbek Komsomol organization as so disorganized in the mid to late 1940s that the Uzbek Komsomol Central Committee was "basically not functioning." In the meantime, 30-35% of party positions in several oblasts during the postwar period were vacant.[90]

To combat these problems, Moscow launched a renewed industrialization and educational campaign designed to transform the Uzbek republic into a global example of

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[88] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 134. Spisok Spetspereselentsev krymskikh tatar, razmeshchennykh na territorii Gor'kovskoi oblasti, spetsialistov, imeiushchikh vysshee obrazovanie. By Nach. OPVI UNKVD GO St. Leitenant Gosbez. Gorbachev. September 4, 1944.

[89] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 137. Iz Molotova to Kuznetsovu from Zam. Nachal'nika UKNVD Molotovskoi Oblasti Po Kadram Maior Gosbez Natarov. September 5, 1944.

[90] RGASPI, f. 574, op. 1, d. 23, l.l. 25, 23, 65, 68.. Stenograficheskaia zapis' besedy Upol. TsK VKP(b) po Uzbeksoi SSR S. D. Ignat'eva s chlenami Biuro TsK KP(b) Uzbek SSR. August 10, 1950.

Soviet agricultural and industrial progress.[91] Throughout this period, Tashkent constantly implored regional party authorities to fill the vacancies in cadres with qualified individuals, but these professionals simply did not exist.[92] The industrialization aspect of the plan focused on Tashkent and Ferghana oblasts, but immediately stalled.[93] Furthermore, attempts to relocate thousands of Uzbeks to new farms and factories in Tashkent oblast failed.[94] This glut of party leaders, managers and regular workers motivated some Uzbek officials to fill work and party cadres with "kulaks, pan-Islamists, special settlers," and other groups in exile.[95]

Vital to this process were the Crimean Tatars leaders that the NKVD had deported to the Uzbek SSR. Similar to the situation in Gorky and Molotov oblasts, the NKVD placed remaining elite Crimean Tatars in positions utilizing their skills. The only restrictions that the NKVD placed on Crimean Tatar jobs in Uzbek special settlement were bans from the ministries of railroads, transportation and communication.[96] It is critical to understand that there was a direct relationship connecting the rehabilitations and continued party membership granted to a small number of Crimean Tatars and the entrance of Crimean Tatars into the Uzbek economy. A prime example is Mustafa Selimov, who was the former First Secretary of the Yalta district party and a partisan

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[91] On the place of Tashkent in this "Sovietization" campaign see Stronski, 4-8.
[92] RGASPI, f. 574, op. 1, d. 23, l.l. 25, 23, 65, 68.. Stenograficheskaia zapis' besedy Upol. TsK VKP(b) po Uzbeksoi SSR S. D. Ignat'eva s chlenami Biuro TsK KP(b) Uzbek SSR. August 10, 1950.
[93] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 45, d. 148, l. 17. Chlen Gosplana SSSR A. Lazrishchev- Upolnom. Gosplana SSSR, Uzbekskoi SSR Finikovu. January 31, 1945.
[94] RGASPI, f. 574, op. 1, d. 24, l.l. 9-11. Pis'mo Upol. TsK VKP/b/ po Uzbekskoi SSR S. Ignat'ev-Malenkovu. June 6, 1950.
[95] Moscow was well aware of this fact, and certainly had some trepidation, but more so with Uzbek nationalists and pan-Islamists than with special settlers and kulaks. RGASPI, f. 574, op. 1, d. 24, l. 85. Pis'mo Tashkent (VKP/b/ Uzbek SSR)- Stalinu, Malenkovy, Ignat'evu. March 25, 1950.
[96] NKVD Order No. 1/1447 from August 4, 1945 outlined these restrictions, and they were likely a reaction to increasing Crimean Tatar escape attempts. GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l. 197. Zam. NKVD UzSSR General-Maior Zavgorodnii to Kuznetsovu. January 2, 1946.

veteran. As described earlier in this chapter, he was one of the first Crimean Tatars that Chernyshov released in 1944. Remaining a party member and being an expert in hydrology, he moved to Tashkent and became the deputy director of the Tashkent Institute of Hydrology.[97] Dzheppar Bekabadn was not rehabilitated, but he retained his party membership and was a pedagogical specialist, former editor of the Crimean Tatar party newspaper *Kyzyl Krym (Red Crimea)*, and a former partisan. In the Tashkent oblast industrial city of Bekabad, party and economic enterprises were so desperate for qualified individuals that they even ignored the ban on Crimean Tatars working in transportation and appointed Akimov as the deputy boss of the Farkhadskoi railroad political division. For Crimean Tatar party members such as Selimov and Akimov, their skills and careers outweighed their ethnicity and Stalin's mass treason charges.[98] By September 1944, the NKVD reported that 11 Crimean Tatars who were former secretaries and assistants of Crimean district parties and soviets now worked in party organizations in Ferghana and Tashkent Oblasts, and at the Farkhadstroi building organization. Another five Crimean Tatar workers from the Crimean ASSR's prosecutor's office also received desk jobs.[99] Former Crimean Tatar NKVD and MVD officers were not allowed to work in the NKVD or MVD proper, but many received low-level assignments in the their local MVD special settlement commissariats.[100]

The NKVD also began funneling skilled Crimean Tatars into factories and kolkhozes that were receptive to Crimean Tatars. By November 1945, of the 984 Crimean Tatars in the Uzbek SSR with higher education, 864 had been placed in their

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[97] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l. 80. Zakliuchenie 19 sentiabria, 1945.
[98] *Chronicle of Current Events* 31 (May 17, 1974), 114.
[99] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l.l. 136-136ob. Telegraph, (No. 73046 Sov. Sek.) Meer- Kuznetsovu. September 4, 1944.
[100] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 160, l.l. 148-149. Chernyshov to Beria. August 21, 1944.

specialized areas. For instance, by September 1944 the NKVD had placed 119 teachers and 71 agricultural specialists in their respective positions.[101] The same was true for skilled workers, and out of 2,150 Crimean Tatar skilled workers such as tractor drivers and blacksmiths, 1,765 were soon working in their fields.[102] By November 1945 the Samarkand Engine Repair Factory employed Crimean Tatars such as blacksmith Khalil Bektimirov and production line worker Ibraim Kadyrov. Once Crimean Tatar party members and skilled workers had secure positions at certain Uzbek enterprises, the acquisition of non-skilled Crimean Tatars accelerated. Sites such the Nizhne-Bosuiskoi hydroelectric station and the Krashniy Dvigatel factory in Samarkand accumulated large Crimean Tatar workforces, as did numerous enterprises in the growing industrial towns of Begovat and Chirchik in Tashkent oblast.[103] The same trend applied to Tashkent proper. In September 1945 the Tashkent Train Renovation Factory solved its labor shortage by requesting and reciving 700 special settlers from rural regions.[104]

The influx of special settlers into these regions did not solve larger Uzbek problems or change the fact that special settlements (and the Gulag) were, in reality, economic drains.[105] It did mean that, eventually, some regional authorities saw a potential benefit in placing Crimean Tatars in work and party cadres. And it was this

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[101] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 135, 135ob. Telergraph, (No. 73047 Sov. Sek.) Meer to Kuznetsovu. September 4, 1944.
[102] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 245, l. 16. Dokladnaia Zapiska o khoziaistvenno-trudovom ustroistve spetxpereselentsev is Kryma, rasselennykh v UzSSR za III kvartal 1945 god. November 5, 1945.
[103] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 245, l.l. 38-40. Spetssoobshchenie "O nastroeniiakh spetspereselentsev s predstoiashchimi vyborami v Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR." Nachal'nik Otdela Spets. NKVD UzSSR Podpolkovnik Kirillov. November 1945.
[104] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 45, d. 148, l. 120. Upol. Gosplana Uzb. SSR- Zam. Pred. Gosplana SSSR Zelenovskomu. September 22, 1945.
[105] As Elena Zubkova argues, forced labor in the GULAG and special settlements was always unproductive because the waste from terrible conditions for workers offset the savings of paying the prisoners and special settlers meager wages: see Elena Zubkova, translated and edited by Hugh Ragsdale, *Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945-1957* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 165.

potential benefit that allowed Beria to argue that the deportation was an economic plus for effected regions in 1946.

As the inclusion of Crimean Tatar party members and workers in the Uzbek Republic became more acceptable, the situation presented a small, but important new cohort of Crimean Tatars the opportunity to advance in party politics. A 1948 MVD census on special settlers provides evidence of this shift. The Uzbek region with the largest concentration of Crimean Tatars, Tashkent oblast, listed 198 Crimean Tatars as communist party members. The census did not indicate when these Crimean Tatars became party members, so it is likely that the majority had retained their membership from before the war. However, the census confirms a new influx of Crimean Tatars into postwar Soviet society, recording 32 new candidates for party membership and 402 young Crimean Tatars who had joined the Komsomol.[106] Census numbers from Samarkand oblast recorded 164 Crimean Tatar party members, 14 candidates for the party and 215 Komsomol members, while in Ferghana oblast the smaller Crimean Tatar population still had 49 party members, 4 candidates and 73 Komsomols.[107] The census confirms that not only did Uzbek officials abide by the orders that Crimean Tatar party members would maintain their membership in special settlement, but by the late 1940s they were allowing Crimean Tatars, young and old, into party life.

This development was particularly important for young Crimean Tatars. As Paul Hagenloh argues, the Soviet police state at times granted minors and the children of

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[106] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 483, l.l. 261ob-262. Statisticheskie svedeniia o rezul'tatakh perepisi vyselentsev-spetsposelentsev na terriotorii Tashkentskoi Obl. Uzb. SSR. Nachal'nik UMVD Tash. Obl. Polkovnik Kirillov. March 30, 1949.

[107] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 483, l. 132. Statisticheskie svedeniia o rezul'tatakh perepisi vyselentsev-spetsposelentsev na terriotorii Samarkandskoi Obl. UzSSR. Zam. Nachal'nik UMVD po Sam. Obl. Maior Kokanbaev. March 13, 1949; GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 483, l.l. 298ob-299. Statisticheskie svedeniia o rezul'tatakh perepisi vyselentsev-spetsposelentsev na terriotorii Ferghanskoi Obl. UzSSR. Podpolkovnik Muradov. March 14, 1949.

special settlers more flexibility in receiving educations and geographic mobility because Soviet police considered them to be the "least-threatening group of special settlers."[108] Crimean Tatar experience confirms this observation, as the advancement of young Crimean Tatars into the Komsomol translated into a parallel increase of Crimean Tatar special settlers becoming full-time students. This development was especially significant since the vast majority of Crimean Tatars in the Uzbek SSR (67,607) had received only primary educations and another 22,796 Crimean Tatars were illiterate.[109] In this context, educational advancement was a key opportunity in exile.

By 1948, young Crimean Tatars such as El'vedin Seitov and Refat Abibullaev remained on the special settler lists, but were allowed to leave their oblasts to go to schools in cities such as Angren, Chirchik, Kokand, Tashkent, and even to Alma-Ata in the Kazakh SSR.[110] Others remained in their oblasts for education. The 1948 MVD census of special settlers recorded 585 full-time Crimean Tatar students in secondary education in Tashkent Oblast and 179 such students in Ferghana Oblast.[111]

Partially due to this search for education, but also the continued search for relatives or better conditions, the legal migration of Crimean Tatar special settlers between republics and oblasts increased in the late 1940s and early 1950s. This

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[108] Sometimes special settlement authorities issued young special settlers restricted passports that allowed youth to go to school away from their parent's home. Hagenloh, *Stalin's Police*, 302-303.

[109] Under one thousand Uzbek Crimean Tatars had "higher educations" and only 5,861 had rsecondary educations. GARF, f. 10026, op. 4, d. 1025, l. 81. Obrazovatel'nyi uroven' vzroslykh spetsposelentsev iz Kryma po dannym na mart 1949g.

[110] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 483, l.l. 210, 219-220. Spisok na vyselentsev-spetsposelentsev sostoiavshikhsia na karochnom uchete v OSP UMVD Nam. Obl. Nach. OSP UMVD po Namaganskoi Obl. Kap. Ganchar. 1949.

[111] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 483, l.l. 261ob-262. Statisticheskie svedeniia o rezul'tatakh perepisi vyselentsev-spetsposelentsev na terriotorii Tashkentskoi Obl. Uzb. SSR. Nachal'nik UMVD Tash. Obl. Polkovnik Kirillov. March 30, 1949; GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 483, l.l. 298ob-299. Statisticheskie svedeniia o rezul'tatakh perepisi vyselentsev-spetsposelentsev na terriotorii Ferghanskoi Obl. UzSSR. Podpolkovnik Muradov. March 14, 1949.

migration originated with the mass of Crimean Tatars that fled to the Tajik SSR in 1945 described in Chapter Two. However, in the late 1940s, more Crimean Tatars received MVD permission to move to the Tajik republic and by the beginning of 1952 the MVD reported that 4,256 Crimean Tatars resided in the Tajik SSR, and by mid-1952 new arrivals brought the number of Crimean Tatars in the Tajik SSR to 4,389. Those from failing farms who did not move to the Tajik SSR moved to more friendly farms in Ferghana and Tashkent oblasts. By January 1952, Tashkent oblast had 31,632 Crimean Tatars, with 914 new arrivals in the last quarter of 1951. Combined with statistics on other oblasts for 1951, the last quarter of that year alone saw at least 3,000 Crimean Tatars moving from oblast to oblast.[112] In the meantime, Crimean Tatars from Gorky and Molotov oblasts began moving to Uzbek cities by the thousands in 1948.[113]

This intra-special settlement migration was important for Crimean Tatars as individuals and as a nation. Again, as part of destroying the Crimean Tatar nation, Stalin had intended to keep Crimean Tatar populations under one hundred people at any given farm or factory and keep them confined mostly to rural areas. However, by the early 1950s Crimean Tatars were increasingly concentrated on farms with reasonable conditions and in cities and towns with factories and educational institutions. Most importantly, Crimean Tatars congregated in the same areas as family members and other families from the same Crimean village. As Mubeyyin Altan argues, these concentrations of Crimean Tatar relatives and neighbors helped maintain the importance of Crimean Tatar family units and neighborly relations as the basis of the Crimean Tatar

[112] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 646, l.l. 130-138. Tsifrovye svedeniia o nalichiia dzizhenii spetsposolntsev MGB Uzb. Nach. L. Polko. 1952.
[113] GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 646, l.l. 39-40. "Spravka" Kapitan Romanenko. August 14, 1952; GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 646, l. 99. Tsifrovye svedeniia o nalichiia dzizhenii spetsposolntsev za 2oe polugodia 1953 goda- MGB Tadzhikskoi SSR. Zam. Nach. UMGB Tad. SSR Podpolkovnik Nigiatov.

nation.[114] After the end of special settlement, these existing networks helped foster the quick formation of organized protest.

On the eve of Stalin's death, a MVD census on special settlers was the last official count of Crimean Tatars until the late 1980s. On the special settler lists, there were 165,259 Crimean Tatars remaining in the USSR, but the actual census only counted 160,734 Crimean Tatars with 46,461 men, 64,053 women, and 50,220 children.[115] The vast majority (around 127,000) were in the Uzbek SSR. Reflecting the concentration of Crimean Tatars increasingly in urban areas, the city of Ferghana had nearly 4,000 Crimean Tatars, while the industrial city of Chrichik in Tashkent oblast had over 5,000 Crimean Tatars. Some of the most important kolkhozes for the Crimean Tatar protest movement were the three "Dal'verzin" farms in Tashkent oblast's Begovat district that had well over 3,000 Crimean Tatars by this time. Such numbers reinforce the fact that the NKVD plans of housing no more than 100 Crimean Tatars in any one location, and keeping them separated from most native Uzbeks, quickly collapsed when faced with the conditions of the postwar Uzbek SSR.[116]

The Scene Before Stalin's Death

The above investigation of the developments during special settlement is in no way meant to downplay the hardships. Crimean Tatar advancement in the party and educational sphere was meant to assimilate them into exile, and not help produce

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[114] Mubeyyin Batu Altan, "Structures: The Importance of Family- A Personal Memoir" in Allworth, *The Tatars of Crimea*, 101-102.
[115] GARF, f. 10026, op. 4, d. 1025, l. 79. Chislennost' spetsposelentsev krymskogo kontingenta po sostoianiiu na 1 Ianvaria 1953g.
[116] GARF, f. 9749, op. 1, d. 657, l.l. 1(ob), 4(ob), 31(ob)-32. Dislokatsiia rasseleniia spetposelentsev v Uzbekskoi SSR po sostoianiia na 1 ianvaria 1952. By Nach. 9 otdela MGB UzSSR Podpolkovnik Iazev in Tashkent. Sov. Sek. January 17, 1952.

resistance. In particular, education in special settlement for Crimean Tatars meant Russification, and the intentional absence of Tatar language and culture.[117] Also, individuals who did take advantage of party and educational opportunities were not automatically free of special settlement constraints or repression. For example, Il'ia Luiksemburg recalled how Selik, his Crimean Tatar classmate at the Tashkent Agricultural Technical Institute, complained that Tashkent authorities refused to issue him a new passport even after he became a student. More ominously, when Selik started an argument with a professor, the institute expelled him.[118] Women with multiple children (now the largest Crimean Tatar demographic) had to rely on the Uzbek state.[119] And even then there was a huge gray area for tens of thousands of workers who were also owed pensions and had been stripped of their passports.

Nevertheless, as the next chapter will display, the quick development of the Crimean Tatar movement to return to Crimea and related mass resistance would not have developed the way it did without the above factors. By 1953 thousands of Crimean Tatar party members, Komsomol members, veterans, students and skilled workers had become part of the Soviet system in the Uzbek SSR and other regions. Most Crimean Tatars, with the permission of special settlement authorities, had congregated in Uzbek cities, industrial regions, and farms where they found a measure of stability. These outcomes of

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[117] As Peter Blitstein argues, 1958 education reform made Russification in Soviet schools in non-Russian regions endemic. However, for deported ethnic groups such a Crimean Tatars, the Russification of education had begun once survivors began schooling and the 1958 reforms only made the preservation of native languages more difficult for such groups: see Peter A. Blitstein, "Nation-Building or Russification?: Obligatory Russian Instruction in the Soviet Non-Russian Schools 1938-1953," in Ronald Suny and Terry Martin eds., *A State of Nations: Empire Building and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 266-267.

[118] Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 174.

[119] GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 7535, l. 20. Sovnarkom SSSR Pasporiazheniia No. 17383-rs ot 25 avgusta 1944.

special settlement gave Crimean Tatars the leadership, network, and numbers to demand reforms when de-Stalinization stalled.

Chapter 6

De-Stalinization and Crimean Tatar Resistance

Stalin's death on March 5,1953, gave Crimean Tatars and all special settlers the hope that total rehabilitation would soon follow. After Moscow rejected the mass return of Crimean Tatars to Crimea in 1956, Crimean Tatars created the longest and most intense protest movement in Soviet history.[1] In the words of a contemporary observer, Crimean Tatar resistance was unique for both its "high degree of overt organization and manifest mass participation."[2] For many Crimean Tatars, their desire to return to Crimea became a "religious-like" devotion and a pillar of national identity.[3] This protest movement resisted all aspects of Stalin's ethnic cleansing discussed in the first four chapters of this study. The mass participation, coordination of street protests, lobbying in Moscow, and letter writing campaigns forced the Soviet state to react. What followed was a case study of how Brezhnev's Soviet state attempted to balance concerns about its international image and constraints on mass repression with the real need to undermine a

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[1] The only Soviet protest movement to rival the Crimean Tatar effort in duration and organization was the Jewish "Refusnik" movement. While this movement had origins in the late-1950s and would eclipse the Crimean Tatar movement in international attention by the mid-1970s, it only became an organized effort in 1971: see Boris Mozorov, *Documents of Soviet Jewish Emigration* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 14-66 and Noah Lewin-Epstein, Paual Ritterband, and Yaacov Ro'I, eds., *Russian Jews on Three Continents: Migration and Resettlement* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 43-58, 65. Moreover, the Armenian protest in Yerevan's Lenin Square to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Armenian genocide and demand recognition of the crime had larger numbers for any single event, but was, according to Lehmann, a one-time effort proceeding the anniversary and there was not a similar event in the Armenian SSR until 1988. Lehmann, "Apricot Socialism," 9.

[2] Peter J. Potichnyj, "The Struggle of Crimean Tatars," *Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue Canadienne des Slavistes* Vol. 17, No. 2/3 (Summer and Fall, 1975), 318.

[3] Bekirova, *Krynskie Tatary*, 114.

large protest movement that was active in multiple Soviet republics and threatened to destabilize one of the Soviet Union's most strategic regions.

The result was a reform in 1967 that focused on granting individual Crimean Tatars the right to live anywhere in the Soviet Union instead of a state-led mass return to Crimea. No matter how cynical and self-serving the "reform" was, thousands of Crimean Tatars called Moscow's bluff and returned to Crimea. Some of these returnees became legal residents, while Crimean authorities deported thousands of other returnees in an uneven, but effective, effort to deter a larger return. Overall, this period of Crimean Tatar resistance underlines that popular protest in the post-Stalin Soviet Union yielded results and exposed Soviet weaknesses in ideology and state functions. The Soviet state had real insecurities about how Soviet citizens and the world viewed policies towards even a small ethnic group on the periphery of the world's largest state.

This chapter begins with an examination of Crimean Tatars during the initial "thaw" and their exclusion from full rehabilitation. The second section tracks the formation of the Crimean Tatar protest movement and its various avenues to petition and pressure both local authorities and the center. The third section uncovers the anatomy and thinking behind the September 5, 1967 decree that granted minor concessions to Crimean Tatars. The final section examines the aftermath and reality of the reform, and its meaning for both Crimean Tatars and the Soviet state.

"De-Stalinization"

Beria began the mass rehabilitation of Crimean Tatars and other special settlers immediately after Stalin's death. He released all Crimean Tatars who were under 16,

full-time students, women over 55, men over 60, members and candidates of the KPSS, veterans, and some families of those killed during World War II. Despite Beria's arrest in June 1953 and the nullification of some orders, during 1954 and 1955 the release of special settlers accelerated.[4] If on the eve of Stalin's death the MVD had counted 160,734 total Crimean Tatars in special settlement, by the end of 1955 only 118,351 Crimean Tatars remained on special settlement lists. In short, the first wave of mass rehabilitation freed approximately 40,000 Crimean Tatars.[5]

Finally, on April 28, 1956, the Supreme Soviet issued order 135/42 and ended special settlement status for all Crimean Tatars, along with smaller ethnic groups deported from the North Caucasus and Georgia. However, an addendum attached to the order forbade Crimean Tatars from returning to Crimea and separated Crimean Tatars from other rehabilitated ethnic groups such as Chechens and Ossetians who were able to return to their homelands.[6] In sum, it was a partial rehabilitation of Crimean Tatar

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[4] William Taubman asserts that Beria was not a "closet liberal," but viewed such reforms as a pragmatic approach to shielding himself from his own crimes. At the same time, his consistent attempts to release veterans and party members from special settlement from 1944 until his death suggests that he was never comfortable with blanket condemnations of ethnic groups, even when he had championed those very ethnic cleansing policies. Moreover, David Shearer notes that Beria cited "citizens rights" as well as economic waste and the "impracticalities of enforcement." Elena Zubkova argues that economic and resource "wastefulness" of the GULAG and special settler systems was the primary reason for policy change. This subject deserves a broader examination beyond the instances of Crimean Tatar rehabilitation: see William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), 244-357; Shearer, *Policing Stalin's Socialism*, 432-433; Zubkova, *Russia after the War*, 165.

[5] RGAE f. 4372, op. 67, d. 9982, l. 74. Ekspertnoe Zakliuchenie Zh. A. Zaionchkovskaia. 1990. See also GARF, f. 10026, op. 4, d. 1025, l. 79. Chislennost' spetsposelentsev krymskogo kontingenta po sostoianiiu na 1 Ianvaria 1953g; GARF, f. 10026, op. 4, d. 1025, l. 85. "Spetsposelentsy iz Kryma/ 1944-1956gg." V. N. Zemskov. December 9, 1991.

[6] GARF, f. 7523, op. 75, d. 675, l. 3. Ukaz Ver. Sov. SSSR no. 135/42 "O sniatii ogranichenii po spetsposeleniiu s krymskikh tatar, balkartsev, turok-grazhdan sssr, kurdov, khemshilov i chlenov ikh semei vyselennykh v period V. O. V." April 28, 1956. A separate order a month before released Greek, Armenian, and Bulgar deportees from Crimea. GARF, f. 7523, op. 75, d. 675, l. 2. Ukaz Verkh. Sov. SSSR no. 135/42 "O sniatii ogranichenii po spetsposeleniiu s Grekov, Bolgar, Armianin i chlenov ikh semei vyselennykh v period V. O. V." March 27, 1956.

individuals and not a rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatar nation in Crimea.[7] And this nation was growing despite exile, with a population of around 190,000 by 1959.[8] Also, while the living conditions of most Crimean Tatars had improved in the Uzbek SSR after 1956, the general problems of housing and access to food and consumers goods remained and former special settlers were anxious to return home.[9]

This partial rehabilitation was deliberate. In the months after Stalin's death, Crimean oblast prosecutorial records show a sharp increase in rehabilitation requests from Crimean deportees and a general anxiety among officials that deported people were going to return home.[10] Again, while the Soviet Union ethnically cleansed several regions during the war, the ideological, economic and demographic transformation of Crimea was unique. The entire Soviet system, not just Stalin, had transformed Crimea and neither Khrushchev nor Crimean leaders had a desire to undo the results of the ethnic cleansing.

Several related factors informed this belief that the new status quo in Crimea was optimal. First, Stalin's death did nothing to change that "Crimea was, is, and will remain the Soviet strongpoint on the Black Sea."[11] Second, as the Cold War and Soviet support of global anti-colonialism accelerated, Crimea became a tool of Soviet diplomacy and soft power. The Yalta Conference was just the beginning of Moscow using Crimea to promote an idealized version of post-war Soviet socialism. Anastas Mikoyan was perhaps

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[7] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447, l. 27. "Sovetskikh grazhdan krymskikh tatar, vernuvshikhsia na svoiu rodnuiu zemliu- v krym- posle 23 letnogo izganiia i "reabilitatsii po ukazu ot 5 sentiabria 1967 goda. Kh. Ibragimov i dr. v Moskve- Ver. Sov. SSSR. January 23, 1968.

[8] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 67, d. 9982, l. 74. Ekspertnoe Zakliuchenie Zh. A. Zainchkovskaia. September 1990.

[9] Deficits included appliances, shoes, clothes, and cooking implements. GARF, f. 5451, op. 58, d. 5341, l. 15-58. Otchet o rabote oblastnogo soveta profsoiuzov za period raboty s 24 sentiabria 1965 goda po 18-e Avgusta 1967.

[10] GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 2978, l.l. 26-27. "Dokladnaia Zapiska" II polovina 1953 goda.

[11] GARF, f. 385, op. 26, d. 87, l. 44. Vystupleniia deputatov v sviazi s utverzhdeniem Ukaza o peredache Krymskoi oblasti iz sostava RSFSR v sostav Ukrainskoi SSR. M. P. Tarasova. April 28, 1954.

the most reform-minded politburo member, but he was also involved in fashioning Crimea as a destination for anti-colonial leaders. He developed a coordinal political relationship with Crimean leader Aleksandr Kabanov, and often relaxed with Kabanov and his family in Crimea.[12] From the late 1940s onwards, Mikoyan hosted hundreds of international visitors, especially anti-colonial leaders from Africa, Latin America and Asia at Crimean resorts and historical sites. While the ethnic diversity and enjoyment of leisure at camps and resorts made sense, the tours included some odd choices. For example, a 1961 photograph with Ghana President Kwame Nkrumah displays how Mikoyan paraded foreign delegations around Crimean Tatar architectural and historic sites such as the Bakchisarai Palace, which museum workers such as Kustova had transformed into celebrations of Russian imperial ambition. In the photo, Mikoyan stands with Nkrumah in front of the mosque with the Arabic script adorning the entrance still visible (the irony of Crimea as an example of Soviet internationalism is difficult to understate and was not lost on Crimean Tatars).[13]

In its interactions with the West, the Soviet Union used such events as the Brussels' World's Fair to show documentary films on Crimea and Sevastopol to portray an image of military might combined with a workers' paradise.[14] Pictures in the Soviet Pavilion portrayed how Pioneers spent their summers at Artek and other Crimean camps, and Soviet hosts distributed samples of "Gold Award-winning" Massandra wine.[15]

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[12] GARF, f. f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1644, l.l. 1-3. Dnevnik poezdki A. M. Mikoyana v otdykhe v Krym. 1961.
[13] GARF, f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1644, l.l. 8-9. Pictures of Mikoyan and Nkrumah at Bakchisarai. September 1961.
[14] GARF, f. 9470, op. 1, d. 6, l. 67. Spravka "O podgotovke i otgruzke kinosiuzhetov dlia pristendovogo pokaza v sovetksim pavil'one na vsemirnoe vystavke 1958g v Briussele." April 8, 1958.
[15] On Crimean photography, see GARF, f. 9470, op. 1, d. 12, l. 239ob. Predlozheniia po rasshireniiu ekspozitsii pavil'ona SSSR. April 1958. On wine, see GARF, f. 9470, op. 1, d. 13. l. 81. Spisok 25 eksponentov priniavshikh uchasie v konkurse po gruppe pishchevkusovykh tavarov. April 1958.

Similar to hard power considerations, Stalin's death did nothing to change this important role of the peninsula as a diplomatic asset.

Third, after 1944 the rejuvenation of Crimean tourism also became a symbol of normalized life after decades of turmoil for Soviet citizens. The number of Soviet citizens traveling to Crimea with state tourist vouchers doubled from around 500,000 to over a million annually between 1965 and 1974.[16] As Mikoyan stated, on the southern shore of Crimea "everyday you can meet fishermen from Sakhalin, Siberian lumberjacks, metal workers of the Urals, and specialists and academics from Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and all ends of the Soviet Union."[17] The enjoyment of Crimean rest and relaxation, beaches, chess tournaments, hikes up Chatir Dag and other tourist activities was appreciated by most Soviet citizens. As displays and publications in Crimean libraries declared, Soviet citizens had the "right to relaxation" and exercising this right in Crimea helped define postwar Soviet life.[18]

The marriage between ethnic cleansing and the Crimean tourist industry expanded after Stalin's death as both became relatively successful and sustainable. Such anti-Tatar excursion guides such as Ivan Kirillov received "Masters of Soviet Tourism" commendations. All Crimean historical and tourist texts remained proudly anti-Tatar.[19] Stalin had purposely reconstructed the "all-union resort" with participants in Crimean ethnic cleansing and these Crimean leaders guarded their positions. Their belief that

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[16] RGAE, f. 9480, op. 9, d. 2481, l. 88. Zam. Pred. Oblispolkoma Kryma V. Semenchuk-Goskomitet Soveta Mnistrov SSSR po nauke i tekhnike. 1974.
[17] GARF, f. f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1644, l. 5. Dnevnik poezdki A. M. Mikoyana v otdykhe v Krym. 1961.
[18] Oddly enough, while a proposal was made, Crimean authorities never replaced the Crimean Tatar name of Chatir Dag, a mesa-like mountain. For a sample of activities and photographs see GARF, f. 9493, op. 3, d. 2035, l.l. 1-20. Rabota VTsSPS v Krymu. January 1953.
[19] GARF, f. 9520, op. 1, d. 464, l. 83. Postanovlenie No. 2 Ukrainskogo respublikanskogo soveta po turizmu "o prisvoenii zvaniia Master Turizma SSSR." November 3, 1962.

there was no place for Crimean Tatars in the new Crimea was sincere and, again, remained after Stalin's death.[20]

Frustration and the Birth of Crimean Tatar Protest

Crimean Tatars were shocked that they would have to remain in exile even though most deported ethnic groups were returning to their homelands. By denying Crimean Tatars this right, Soviet policy prompted the quick formation of Crimea Tatar "initiative groups" to petition for returning to Crimea. As discussed in previous chapters, the Soviet state had allowed many Crimean Tatars to retain their party membership and rehabilitated some individuals with exemplary military and party records. A combination of this older generation along with Crimean Tatar students born in exile became the primary initiators of the protest movement.

The regional government's attitude towards Crimean Tatars changed little after 1956. Tashkent still refused to acknowledge the Crimean Tatar nation as separate from other Tatars. The central government condoned this policy, and the 1959 Soviet census as a result recorded only 46,800 Crimean Tatars because Uzbek officials counted most Crimean Tatars as Volga Tatars.[21]

Uzbek officials continued to assimilate Crimean Tatars into the republic. From 1956 to 1967, more than 766 Crimean Tatars served in their local party and governments

[20] The transfer of Crimea from the Russian SSR to the Ukrainian SSR in March 1954 made Moscow even more reluctant to consider Crimean Tatar reform in 1956. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, the need to increase water and electricity needed for the Crimean recovery and repopulation motivated both Stalin and Khrushchev to empower Ukrainian enterprises and ministries in the region and that resulted in the transfer. Khrushchev hoped that the transfer would be the final status change for Crimea. As the 1980s proved, Crimean Tatar return would mean a new debate over Crimea's status.

[21] GARF, f. f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l.l. 694-695. Spravka "o chisle Krymskikh Tatar (po materialam vsesoiuznykh perepisei naseleniiakh 1939 i 1959 gg)." January 26, 1967.

and the Uzbek state awarded more than 500 economic achievement medals to Crimean Tatars. Educational and party advancement gave Crimean Tatars important positions. For example, E. A. Ashipova became the head engineer at the Iangaiulskii Candy Factory, I. A. Kaimazov headed the Ferghana Building Enterprise, and A. A. Appazov served as the deputy to the Ferghana city KPSS Chairman. In perhaps an odd position for a Crimean Tatar, Ia. P. Abliakimov served as a political ideology instructor for the Ferghana oblast party. At the same time, Soviet trust in the youngest Crimean Tatar generation born in exile translated into opportunities in the Komsomol, artistic and cultural activities, and education.[22]

This political and social advancement was real, but it did not remove Crimean Tatar frustration. In fact, the two trajectories of activism and social mobility were not mutually exclusive. Many Crimean Tatars on an upward political or social trajectory faced discrimination and used their positions in the Soviet state as a platform for dissent. The experience of Zul'fira Asanova reveals how mobility and activism were interrelated. Born in 1948, she was a member of the first generation of Crimean Tatars born in exile.[23] Asanova was a gifted dancer and her talents enamored Uzbek artistic representatives. In 1957, she represented the Uzbek SSR in the World Youth Festival in Moscow, one of the defining global events of the "Thaw."[24] Ironically, her accomplishments earned her a trip to the Crimean pioneer camp "Artek." The camp designated her "Laureate of the First Degree" and afterwards she studied at a choreography school in Tashkent. Her story

[22] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l.l. 27-29. Spravka "k voprosu ob obrazovanii natsional'noi avtonomii krymu i vozvroshcheniia tatar v krym. Zhdanov. April 6, 1967. See also GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l. 21. Spravka k nekotorym voprosam istorii rasseleniia tatar. A. N. Zharkovskii. February 6, 1967.
[23] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l. . Perechen- "Voprosov, postavlennykh hekotorymi grazhdanami Tatarskoi natsional'nosti v pis'makh I zaiavleniiakh, postupivshikh v 1966 godu v adres Ver. Sov. SSSR." 1966. (hereafter "Perechen'").
[24] On the significance of the festival, see Zubok, *Dr. Zhivago's Children*, 100-111.

reveals the opportunities and continued repressions for Crimean Tatars after 1956. A young Crimean Tatar went from special settlement to representing the Soviet Union to the world within the span of two years. At the same time, Uzbek authorities concealed the fact that she was Crimean Tatar. When her coaches proposed that she travel abroad with her dance troupe, the Uzbek KGB intervened. Incensed, Asanova and her mother contacted Crimean Tatar activists and wrote a letter of protest to Moscow accusing Uzbek authorities of ethnic discrimination. Her story became part of the budding protest movement.[25]

The early Crimean Tatar activists Asanova contacted often had military and party experience. As discussed in chapter 5 and as Weiner argues, the war created "an assertive Soviet individual" who defended their rights by citing frontline service and exploits.[26] Moreover, Crimean Tatars were a unique instance where, in a concentrated and popular manner, veterans translated that assertiveness into dissent after 1956. With his background of partisan service, early rehabilitation, and career advancement in exile, Mustafa Selimov was a protest pioneer. A natural leader, he helped found an "initiative group" in the Kubyshevskii district of Tashkent in 1956. A "dead" man organized a similar group in Fergana oblast. While Ilya Vergasov claimed Crimean partisans had executed Bekir Osmanov in 1942, in reality Osmanov was alive, a decorated veteran with party membership, and working as an agricultural specialist in Fergana oblast. The protest group he founded in Fergana would become one of the most active over the next decades. Some "initiative groups" organized themselves in specific factories or farms with large Crimean Tatar concentrations. For instance, party members Muarem Martinov

[25] Perechen', l. 60.
[26] Weiner, *Making Sense of War*, 367.

and Dzheppar Akimov helped organized groups in the city of Bekabad and surrounding branches of the Dal'verzin sovkhoz.[27]

These "initiation groups" mastered the art of collecting stories and opinions from across the USSR and penning mass petitions and collective letters to the Supreme Soviet, Soviet of Ministers, KPSS Central Committee, and dozens of other Soviet organs.[28] After authoring the texts, the activists traveled throughout their regions collecting Crimean Tatar signatures. One letter to the KPSS Central Committee had 14,000 Crimean Tatar signatures attached. Tens of thousands of individual letters also flooded government offices in Moscow throughout 1957 and early 1958.[29] The Politburo debated how to handle the situation for several months and Khrushchev requested that party and government bureaucrats keep him abreast of Crimean Tatar developments. Still, after some debate in March 1957, Khrushchev and the Party Central Committee did nothing.[30]

Crimean Tatars expanded their activities in response to Moscow's inaction. Throughout 1958, Crimean Tatars inundated Moscow with manifestos and individual letters. One letter presented to Moscow by 81 Crimean Tatars in Abhakhzia (Georgian SSR) is a prime example of how Crimean Tatar activist literature included multiple-page indictments of Soviet policy that cited sources and underlined the hypocrisy of Soviet policy towards Crimean Tatars in both the domestic and Cold War context.

Addressed to Khrushchev, the letter began by framing their argument in the context of the "Thaw" and the 20th Party Congress. Crimean Tatars were upset that the

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[27] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l. 117. Spisok naibolee aktivnikh storonikov idei vozvrashcheniia Tatar v Krym i preddostavleniami natsional'noi avtonomii- po dannym TsK KP Uzbek SSR. January, 1967.
[28] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l. 117. Spisok naibolee aktivnikh storonikov idei vozvrashcheniia Tatar v Krym i preddostavleniami natsional'noi avtonomii- po dannym TsK KP Uzbek SSR. January, 1967.
[29] Perechen', l. 60.
[30] GARF, f. 5446, op. 92, d. 887, l. 174. Zpiska A. Kalinin- Khrushchevu i G. S. Stepanovu. May 30, 1958.

"correction of Stalinist mistakes" had not erased Stalin's accusation of mass treason because most Crimean Tatars had not collaborated and tens of thousands had fought for the Soviet Union. The letter then pivoted to how in 1922 Lenin had guaranteed the right of Crimean Tatars to party and government positions, cultural autonomy, and language rights within the Crimean ASSR. Activists argued that anything short of Moscow reinstating these rights would be an insult to Lenin's legacy, an affront to Soviet nationalities policy, and prove de-Stalinization to be hollow.[31]

Activists next argued that Khrushchev's inaction made the Soviet Union's role in Crimean history similar to that of imperial Russia and threatened Soviet Marxism. They cited a *Time* magazine interview, a *Pravda* article, and a speech in Kyiv, in each of which Khrushchev had praised Lenin and the nationalities principles on which Lenin had founded the Crimean ASSR.[32] The letter accused Khrushchev of hypocrisy for criticizing U.S. racism, while discriminating against an ethnic minority in his own country. Crimean Tatar activists placed their cause on the side of Lenin's revolutionary ideals because they believed that their situation was a liability for a state supporting Cold War anti-colonialism.[33]

Finally, Crimean Tatars criticized Soviet officials by name for the past or current roles in ethnic cleansing and Crimean policy. In particular, the letter condemned Kabanov, Mokrusov, Nadinskii, Shults, and Zotiev. Activists also cited Crimean excursion guides that "paint Crimean Tatars with the blackest paint possible" in regards

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[31] GARF, f. 5446, op. 92, d. 887, l.l. 1-5. Krymskie tatary v Abkhazskoi ASSR- Khrushchevu. May 10, 1958.

[32] Crimean Tatars took Khrushchev's quotes from questions he and the Presidium answered in *Time*, "Foreign News: Don't Call Me Boss," August 19, 1957. http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,809723,00.html. Accessed on March 17, 2016.

[33] GARF, f. 5446, op. 92, d. 887, l.l. 1-5. Krymskie tatary v Abkhazskoi ASSR- Khrushchevu. May 10, 1958.

to both centuries of Crimean history and World War Two. They decried Crimean officials who referred to Crimean Tatars "in the past tense" and publishing houses that published negative material.[34]

In short, just one year after the end of special settlement Crimean Tatars were already aware of the methods and extent to which Crimean officials had transformed Crimea. All three tropes highlighted in the letter- the demand for return, the hypocrisy of Soviet policy, and the disgust with the new Crimea- became prominent in Crimean Tatar arguments for the rest of Soviet history.

The ability of Crimean Tatars activist to organize and communicate these grievances with the Soviet state and other Crimean Tatars was key to beginning a the prolonged protest movement. These early pronouncements of Crimean Tatar frustration revealed that tens of thousands of Crimean Tatars were willing to sign their names on protest petitions.[35] Moreover, Crimean Tatar activists began traveling to Moscow to confront the government and party. In an attempt to deescalate the situation, Mikoyan met with Crimean Tatars on March 19, 1958. While Mikoyan made no promises, Crimean Tatars viewed the meeting as the beginning of a reform process and an affirmation that Moscow could not ignore their efforts. The massive letters and petitions continued, sometimes with thousands of attached signatures.[36] Letter readers at the Soviet of Ministers in Moscow collected the letters and petitions into two large binders and noted in inter-agency correspondence the "high level" of mass participation and

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[34] Ibid.

[35] The earliest petitions include signatures in both Russian and in the older Crimean Tatar Arabic alphabet. There Arabic script disappeared on petitions in the 1960s as Russification intensified. GARF, f. 5446, op. 92, d. 887, l.l. 100-101. Pis'mo Khrushchevu. August 18, 1958.

[36] This letter, with 111 pages of over 3,000 signatures, was large enough to get its own "delo" in the Soviet Archives. GARF, f. 5446, op. 92, d. 888, l.l. 1-111. Pis'mo Krushchevu iz And. Obl. May 8, 1958.

"coordination between Crimean Tatars." They also complained that the volume of Crimean Tatar mail was overwhelming the office spaces at the Supreme Soviet, Soviet of Ministries and the KPSS Central Committee.[37]

Unrelenting Pressure

For Crimean Tatars, one of the most frustrating aspects of the Crimean transformation and their inability to return to Crimea was their knowledge of population and job growth on the peninsula, and they understood that the only reason they could not participate was because of their ethnicity. Crimean authorities claimed that there was no room for Crimean Tatars even as they began a new building boom that created thousands of jobs in tourism and supporting industries. Instead of Crimean Tatars returning, migration from Russia and Ukraine increased.[38] Advertisements in Soviet state media bragged about the successful resettlement of thousands of families in Crimea and implored more Soviet citizens to join them. While Crimean government, party and police were committed to anti-Tatar policies, activists noticed that when faced with increased quotas, some farm and enterprise managers ignored the ethnicity of new workers. Many Crimean Tatars that visited Crimea during military service understood this fact. Moreover, from May 15 to 25, 1965, a delegation of Crimean Tatar activists visited

[37] GARF, f. 5446, op. 92, d. 887, l. 173. Sov. Min. Spravka. March 1958.

[38] On the tourist boom, see GARF f. 9520, op. 1, d. 801, l.l. 26-32. Stenogramma II plenuma Ukrainskogo respublikanskogo soveta po turizmu. November 25, 1965. On claims that there was "no room" for Crimean Tatars in Crimea see GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l.l. 63, 83. "Perechen' voprosov nekotorymi grazhdanami tatarskoi natsional'nosti v pis'makh i zaiavleniiakh postupivshikh v 1966 godu v adres Ver. Sov. SSR." Tov. N. I. Kazakevich. 1967. (Hereafter "Perechen' voprosov")

Crimea and found numerous kolkhozes, enterprises and even educational institutions that seemed indifferent to ethnicity issues.[39]

With this knowledge, several hundred Crimean Tatars attempted to return to Crimea. For example, Seitbilial Seitumerov and his family moved to Sevastopol' after the April 1966 earthquake in the Uzbek SSR, and began classes at the Sevastopol Instrument Manufacturing Institute.[40] However, police refused his family registration in the city. The Emirsaliev family also left the Uzbek SSR for Crimea in June 1966, and started living in a home with the Neskov family. They said police harassed them, but they were able to enroll their children at the local school.[41] This group of Crimean Tatars was small, but they put Crimean authorities on notice about their intentions to return, and some early returnees such as Seitumerov became members of the Moscow lobby and used their Crimean experience to assist future returnees.[42]

From 1962 to 1966, resistance expanded and Crimean Tatars created an increasingly sophisticated protest movement anchored by lobbyists in Moscow, thousands of activists in the Uzbek USS and Tajik SSR, and a growing group of returnees in Crimea. Thousands of individual letter writers such as Rimzi Ablialitov demanded a response from the party and government.[43] Alim Murtazaev, a party member and scientific specialist at the Tashkent Science and Research of Agriculture Institute, drafted

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[39] For example, a November 2, 1965 edition of *Slava Trudu* in Bakhchisarai announced that "2,122 new families had settled in the district over the last three years." Other articles promised "benefits" such as home loans. See Perechen' Voprosov, l. 77.

[40] The earthquake caused death, destruction, and a new housing crisis in Tashkent city and oblast, the Uzbek region with the highest concentration of Crimean Tatars. Stronski, *Tashkent,* 233, 252-253.

[41] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 404, l. 82. Obrashchenie Krymskikh tatar D. Emirsalev i drugie iz goroda Simferopol'. February 22, 1967.

[42] Seitumerov later attended university in Odessa and participated in the lobby in the early 1970s. GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 404, l. 79. Kollektivnaia telegramma krymskikh tatar po delu studenta Seitumero. January 28, 1971.

[43] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l. 116. Pis'mo Rimzi Ablialitov- Ver. Sov. SSSR. April 5, 1966.

a return proposal and visited his Supreme Soviet deputy, Mustafa Chachi, in 1966. Crimean Tatars in Tashkent such as doctor Dil'tad Il'iasov and engineer Izzet Khairov used their positions in the urban center to coordinate the transfer of these letters and samizdat documents from the Uzbek SSR and Tajik SSR to the Moscow lobby. By 1967, Crimean Tatars began the bi-monthly publication of *Information (Informatsia,* hereafter *Info)*, a samizdat newsletter that chronicled the protest campaign's actions in Central Asia, Moscow, Crimea, and elsewhere. Crimean Tatars never hid the creation of the newsletter and often told Moscow who worked on a certain editions and in what hotel room they were staying in Moscow.[44]

In addition to *Info* and letters about current repression, Crimean Tatars expanded their attacks on Soviet disinformation about World War Two and the new Crimean narrative. Long letters formatted as research papers repeated indictments of "Nadinksii-type academics," Crimean tourist industry managers such as Mokrusov, and the Crimean branch of the Academy of Sciences. Despite Crimean Tatar "rehabilitation," Vergasov in particular continued to slander their nation. In a 1966 edition of *Zvezda* he argued that Stalin "should have deported Crimean Tatars during collectivization."[45] When Vergasov published another article, "Zhivi Sevastopol'," in *Pravda,* a Crimean Tatar schoolteacher in Samarkand, I. Dzhepparova, wrote a scathing denunciation of Vergasov.[46] Activists then took the letter to the *Pravda* editor, A. Ia. Blatin, and the propaganda office of the KPSS to complain.[47] To counter the anti-Tatar accounts of the war, Crimean Tatar activists lobbied the *Pravda* and *Komskomolskaia Pravda* editors to publish accounts of

[44] Perechen' Voprosov, l.l. 73-76, 92.
[45] Perechen' Voprosov, l.l. 73-76, 92.
[46] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l. 73. *Info* No. 42. March 16-31, 1967.
[47] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l. 77. *Info* No. 43. April 1-15, 1967.

decorated Crimean Tatar partisans such as Alim Adbennanov and Abdul Dagdzhi.[48] Other letter writers protested the 1967 publication of the fourth edition of Nadinskii's book, as well as several new anti-Tatar partisan histories.[49] One partisan fighter spoke for thousands of Crimean Tatar veterans when he pleaded for Moscow "to make right with the dead and honor those who died" fighting for Soviet citizens.[50]

By 1967, the Crimean Tatar letter-writing campaign was "unprecedented," with the volume of mail overwhelming the Supreme Soviet, Soviet of Ministries, and KPSS Central Committee letter-receiving offices.[51] The Supreme Soviet alone received at least 9,125 individual letters from Crimean Tatars in 1966, and the number increased in 1967. Activists touted the volume of letters and wide geographic distribution of letter writers in *Info*. Most letters arrived from the Uzbek SSR, but also from the RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR, Georgian SSR, Azerbaijan SSR, and other Central Asian republics. For example, from February 15 to March 1, 1967, activists reported that Crimean Tatars sent 6,754 letters to Moscow. Brezhnev received 1,832 letters, while 1,766 went to Kosygin. Of those letters, 2,839 originated in Samarkand oblast.[52] From March 16 to 31, 1967, Crimean Tatars in Tashkent sent 844 letters, and school children wrote 121 letters.[53] The Supreme Soviet, Soviet of Ministries, Party and Politburo got the most mail, with Brezhnev, Podgornii, and Kosygin being the most popular recipients. In total, from 1964 to 1967 the TsK KPSS, the Supreme Soviet, and the Soviet of Ministries received around

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[48] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l. 78. *Info* No. 45. May 1-15, 1967.
[49] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 103, d. 2123, l. 28. Doklad Vtorioi Sekretariia Krymskogo obkoma KPSS, A. N. Makukhinu. March 6, 1967.
[50] Perechen' Voprosov, l.l. 109-112.
[51] Supreme Soviet front office worker N. N. Kazakevich described mountains of mail on covering their desks. GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l.l. 4-9. Spravka "Osnovanye voprosy, postavlennye nekotorymi tatarami v pis'makh, adresovannykh v tsentral'nye organy. N. N. Kazakevich. 1967.
[52] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l. 59. *Info* No. 40. February 15 – March 1, 1967.
[53] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l.l. 70-71. I*nfo* No. 42. March 16 to 31, 1967.

100,000 letters, over 24 tons of mail.[54] While Soviet authorities attempted to dispute the veracity of the signatures and letters, by 1967 the volume of mail outweighed any doubts about the validity of signatures.[55]

As the movement expanded, another goal became getting as many Soviet officials and institutions as possible on record with their thoughts on the Crimean Tatar situation. In 1966 alone, representatives of the Supreme Soviet and other Soviet officials met with Crimean Tatar representatives in Moscow at least 33 times.[56] For example, on March 22, 1966, members of the Moscow lobby met with Georgadze and he made vague promises to address their concerns.[57] Sometimes, officials gave very diplomatic answers, such as the rector of MGU, Petrovskii, who insisted that he "never had an opinion and never will" because he had never "lived in Crimea."[58] When several activists discussed Crimean Tatar history with the head of the Commission on Nationalities Relations at the Academy of Sciences, M. S. Dzhunusovyi, he claimed that he was in no position to "confront" Soviet policy.[59] The assistant director of the Soviet Institute of Ethnography, S. I. Bruk, was more encouraging, stating that Stalin's policy was "regrettable" and that the study of Crimean Tatars should be part of a larger rehabilitation project.[60] The assistant to the director of the Institute of Nationalities History, L. S. Gaponenko, also

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[54] In comparison, the Armenian letter writing campaign that preceded the demonstration of the 50th anniversary of the Armenian genocide in 1965 included 3,000 letters according to Zubkova. See Elena Iu. Zubkova, "Vlast' i razvitie etnokonfliktnoi situatsii v SSSR 1953-1985 godu," Otechestvennaia istoriia, no. 4 (2004): 22; "Perechen' Voprosov," 51-53.

[55] For example, Kazakevich suggested that Crimean Tatars collected signatures in "dishonest ways," asking regular citizens to sign about one topic and then stapling the signatures to protest letters. GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l. 8. Spravka "Osnovanye voprosy, postavlennye nekotorymi tatarami v pis'makh, adresovannykh v tsentral'nye organy. N. N. Kazakevich. 1967.

[56] Perechen' Voprosov, l. 51.

[57] Ibid., l. 82.

[58] Ibid., l. 94.

[59] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l. 73. *Information* No. 42. March 16-31, 1967.

[60] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l. 77. *Information* No. 43. April 1-15, 1967.

agreed that the repression of Crimean Tatars was "wrong."[61] Activists also approached cultural figures. For example, in December 1966 activists met with the Abkhaz writer and *Literaturnaia Gazeta* editor, Georgii Gulina. He said Crimean Tatars should be allowed to return to their homeland, but urged "patience."[62]

Along with the letter and petition campaign and meetings, Crimean Tatars began organizing street demonstrations. Arsen Al'chikov, a party member and engineer in Tashkent Oblast, was one of the first street organizers. After attending inconsequential meetings with Mikoyan on August 23 and 25, 1965, he and fellow activists Muaret Martynov and Dzheppar Akimov organized demonstrations in front of the Bekabad party headquarters where they gave speeches condemning the Soviet treatment of Crimean Tatars. The party expelled him for participating, but this just caused him to spend more time in Moscow.[63]

Akimov's party expulsion is systematic of how Soviet authorities began relying on bureaucratic tools to discourage Crimean Tatar protest from expanding and individual Crimean Tatars from moving to Crimea. These "legal" and extralegal efforts defined the consequences of participating in individual and group acts of resistance. First, in the wake of releasing special settlers and Gulag prisoners, the Soviet Union strengthened the passport and registration regime to stem a flood of returnees to certain cities and regions.[64] While most passport and registration violations were administrative offenses, there was a stipulation in the law that an individual with multiple violations could face an

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[61] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l. 77. *Information* No. 43. April 1-15, 1967.
[62] Perechen' Voprosov, l. 106.
[63] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l.l. 118-119. Spisok naibolee aktivnikh storonikov idei vozvrashcheniia Tatar v Krym i preddostavleniami natsional'noi avtonomii- po dannym TsK KP Uzbek SSR. January 1967.
[64] Beria had initially wanted to end the internal passport and registration system and described the restriction as "arcane." His execution reversed this effort. Shearer, *Policing Stalin's Socialism*, 432-435. The order was Sov. Min. Postanovlenia No. 2666-1124 from October 21, 1953.

"*ugolovnoe*" (equivalent of a felony) charge. Another order in May 1962 further limited individuals who had served prison time for passport violations.[65] In practice, authorities in Crimea and Moscow targeted Crimean Tatars by first refusing them registration and then finding other passport violations to threaten individuals with prison time or deportation.

Another method of repression was "*profilktika*," a series of "preventative" threats to expel activists from jobs and the party or Komsomol. For example, the Kuibyshev district party in Tashkent gave Mustafa Selimov a "strong" warning to cease and desist activism or risk losing his party position and job.[66] If an individual ignored these warnings, there was a chance Soviet authorities would act on their threats. In addition to Akimov, Bekir Osmanov also ignored warnings and the Ferghana party revoked his party membership in December 1966.[67] In similar fashion, the party expelled Arsen Al'chikov.[68] From January 1966 to January 1967, Uzbek officials summoned at least 766 Crimean Tatar activists and protest participants to *profilaktika* meetings "in order to acquaint them with the serious crimes of defaming the USSR.[69] In the meetings, Uzbek officials such as Almalyk people's deputy Iadgar Nasriddinov claimed that Crimean Tatars would never leave the Uzbek SSR. She also accused activists of "stealing" from the Uzbek state by using their money and time to sustain the Moscow lobby and

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[65] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447, l. 44. "Sovetskikh grazhdan krymskikh tatar, vernuvshikhsia na svoiu rodnuiu zemliu- v krym- posle 23 letnogo izganiia i "reabilitatsii po ukazu ot 5 sentiabria 1967 goda. Kh. Ibragimov i dr. v Moskve- Ver. Sov. SSSR. January 23, 1968.

[66] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l. 118. Spisok naibolee aktivnikh storonikov idei vozvrashcheniia Tatar v Krym i preddostavleniami natsional'noi avtonomii- po dannym TsK KP Uzbek SSR. January, 1967.

[67] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l. 117. Spisok naibolee aktivnikh storonikov idei vozvrashcheniia Tatar v Krym i preddostavleniami natsional'noi avtonomii- po dannym TsK KP Uzbek SSR. January, 1967.

[68] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l.l. 118-119. Spisok naibolee aktivnikh storonikov idei vozvrashcheniia Tatar v Krym i preddostavleniami natsional'noi avtonomii- po dannym TsK KP Uzbek SSR. January 1967.

[69] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l. 7. Spravka "Osnovanye voprosy, postavlennye nekotorymi tatarami v pis'makh, adresovannykh v tsentral'nye organy. N. N. Kazakevich. 1967.

described activists as "drunken rabble-rousers."[70] Activists claimed that by December 1966, Uzbek party branches had expelled at least eleven Crimean Tatars.[71]

The case of Mustafa Dzhemilev is a prime example of how advancement in Soviet society, resistance, *profilaktika* and punishment intertwined in practice. Beginning as a student and Komsomol member in the early 1960's, his interests at TashGU shifted to activism. Together with other Crimean Tatar students, Dzhemilev organized the "Union of Crimean Tatar Youth." The KGB disbanded the group within months, but Dzhemilev soon assisted the organization of other "initiative groups" throughout the Uzbek SRR.[72] He then helped create the Moscow lobby and began coordinating the publication of samizdat text and the petitioning of Soviet authorities. Uzbek police and KGB repeatedly arrested and detained Dzhemilev for real and fabricated offenses. On November 2, 1965, Moscow police arrested him for a passport violation at the Lenin Library, transported him to the Kazan train station, and forced him aboard a train to Tashkent.[73] A few months later, in January 1966, a criminal complaint alleged that Dzhmeliev defamed the USSR during an intoxicated rant on a Tashkent city bus. The Party and KGB gave him numerous chances to denounce his activism, but he refused and lost his place at the university in Tashkent and his Komsomol membership.[74] None of the warnings or punishments, including numerous prison sentences, stopped Dzhemiliev from becoming a prominent Crimean Tatar leader.

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[70] Perechen' Voprosov, l. 86.
[71] Perechen' Voprosov, l. 103.
[72] GARF, f. 8131, op. 36, d. 391, l.l. 7-8. Pervyi Zam. Prokuror Uz. SSR V. Zotov- T. I Shipocich. March 24, 1966.
[73] GARF, f. 8131, op. 36, d. 391, l.l. 14-18. "Zaiavlenie" Dzhmeliev-Rudenko. February 16, 1966.
[74] GARF, f. 8131, op. 36, d. 391, l.l. 7-8. Pervyi Zam. Prokuror Uz. SSR V. Zotov- T. I Shipocich. March 24, 1966.

The intensity and popularity of the protest movement was its greatest strength and the repressions backfired for Moscow as arrests caused new protests. For example, when Amet Umerov and Riza Izzetov entered the Central Committee building on July 16, 1966, police officers detained them and locked them in a police station bathroom for nine hours. According to activists, officers from Moscow's 66th precinct often made such arrests.[75] Moscow police also targeted apartments and hotels where Crimean Tatar activists congregated. During the 23rd KPSS Congress of 1966, arrests shrank the Moscow lobby to only 21 representatives by early April, but more Crimean Tatars replaced those that police expelled. Representatives also began picketing Moscow police headquarters and met with police officials on June 21, 1966. Commissar Volkov insisted that Moscow police reserved the right to detain anyone for "passport violations and disturbing the peace."[76] Soon, the only area in Moscow where Crimean Tatars could register was in the VDNKh (Exhibition of Achievements of National Economy) district, particularly the Altai and Tashkent hotels. Even under pressure, the lobbyists remained. For example, cramped into room number 146 in the second wing of the Altai, Emin Nemetullaev and six other activists spent a week in December 1966 drafting letters and compiling a new *Info* edition.[77]

Crimean Tatar activists "were never shy" about their role in samizdat, organizing demonstrations, or participating in the Moscow lobby.[78] As the KGB and police began a new wave of arrests, the detentions exacerbated the situation in the Uzbek SSR by also creating new protests over the arrests. One such situation occurred when the KGB

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[75] Perechen' Voprosov, l.l. 90-91.
[76] Perechen' Voprosov, l. 94.
[77] Perechen' Voprosov, l. 106.
[78] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l. 8. Spravka "Osnovanye voprosy, postavlennye nekotorymi tatarami v pis'makh, adresovannykh v tsentral'nye organy. N. N. Kazakevich. 1967.

arrested Timur Dagdzhi, a correspondent for Uzbek state radio, and another Crimean Tatar activist named Server Shamuratov. The incident caused protests in Andijan, Ferghana, Angren, Bekabad, Tashkent and other Uzbek towns in September 1966. When the Uzbek police arrested a Crimean Tatar farmer during one of these protests, ten of his colleagues from the Dal'verzin sovkhoz began a new protest at the local police precinct and the police captain requested assistance from the army.[79] The arrest of Aisha Seitmuratova, at the time a high school history teacher in Samarkand and an acquaintance of Dagdzhi, caused further protest, propelling Seitmuratova to the forefront of the protest movement.[80]

Repressing Crimean Tatars became a logistical problem because protests were so numerous and large. For example, an October 6, 1966, a demonstration commemorating the Crimean ASSR drew more than 2,000 Crimean Tatars in Bekabad. When police arrested El'dar Shabanov for speaking at the event, more than 1,000 Crimean Tatars protested his arrest at the Bekabad police headquarters. Police called in soldiers and the KGB to disperse the crowd with force, and a melee ensued, injuring dozens of protestors. On October 18, 1966, Crimean Tatars picketed around the Lenin statue in front of the Uzbek Party headquarters in Tashkent. Tashkent police reacted by walling off the Lenin statue with boards. Crimean Tatars continued demonstrating until police dispersed the gathering and arrested several Crimean Tatars. Soon, smaller Uzbek towns such as Kuvasak, Angren, and Bekabad were erecting barricades around Lenin statues and arresting dozens of Crimean Tatar protestors. Police prepared paddy wagons (known as

[79] Perechen' Voprosov, l.l. 97-99.
[80] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l. 8. Spravka "Osnovanye voprosy, postavlennye nekotorymi tatarami v pis'makh, adresovannykh v tsentral'nye organy. N. N. Kazakevich. 1967.

"*Cherniy Voron*" or black birds) in advance as soon as they learned of protest plans.[81] In addition to statues of Lenin, police stations, and public squares, Crimean Tatars demonstrated at cemeteries where Stalin' victims were buried, at funerals for Crimean Tatar veterans, and at mosques during Islamic holidays.[82] At the height of tensions, the suspicious police killing of a Crimean Tatar driver, Feti Alieva, caused a spontaneous protest of nearly 5,000 Crimean Tatars in Iangi-Iul' and smaller protests across the Uzbek SSR.[83] Throughout 1966 and the first-half of 1967 Soviet authorities detained hundreds of Crimean Tatars for protesting. While they released many without charges, prosecutors in the Uzbek SSR charged and tried 59 Crimean Tatars for "anti-social activities" or "hooliganism" and tried another 76 Crimean Tatars on "petty hooliganism" charges.[84]

Moscow was clearly worried by the summer of 1967. When officials in Moscow read accounts of protests from Crimean Tatars and Uzbek officials, they often underlined the large participation figures and sent alarmed memos to their superiors.[85] Uzbek authorities told Moscow that the situation was "rapidly deteriorating" and "becoming dangerous" in Uzbek oblasts. In particular, Moscow fretted that the movement was "far too easily" capturing the imagination of Crimean Tatar youth. Discussions over containing youth enthusiasm for the movement appear in central organ documents as a key catalyst in forcing the deliberations over reform during the summer of 1967.[86] It was also hard to ignore the direct confrontation of the Moscow lobby that, between January

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[81] Perechen' Voprosov, l.l. 97-98.
[82] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 404, l.l. 197-202. Kollektivnoe pis'mo krymskikh tatar prozhivaiushchikh v Gulistane. May 6, 1967.
[83] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 404, l.l. 209-217. Pis'mo Zhiteli Pos. Mosckovskii, Andizhanskoi Oblasti. May 23, 1967.
[84] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l. 7. Spravka "Osnovanye voprosy, postavlennye nekotorymi tatarami v pis'makh, adresovannykh v tsentral'nye organy. N. N. Kazakevich. 1967.
[85] Perechen' Voprosov, l.l. 104-105.
[86] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l.l. 4-9. Spravka "Osnovanye voprosy, postavlennye nekotorymi tatarami v pis'makh, adresovannykh v tsentral'nye organy. N. N. Kazakevich. 1967.

1966 and mid-1967, sent at least 3,000 Crimean Tatars to Moscow.[87] In short, the will of Crimean Tatars to sustain mass protest forced the Soviet Union to explore solutions besides repression.

The Moscow lobby surged to more than 400 Crimean Tatars in mid-1967 and when Moscow police arrested several activists, a tense standoff occurred outside several police stations. After meeting with several KGB officials on July 17, activists arranged a meeting in the Kremlin with Georgadze, Andropov, Rudenko, and Shelkov for July 21, 1967. After several hours of delay, 20 Crimean Tatars, including previously detained activists Reshat Dzhemilev and Aishe Seitmuratova, sat down with Soviet officials and reviewed the Crimean Tatars' multiple complaints. Then Crimean Tatars asked about a member of the Supreme Soviet, Aleksandr Zharkov, who had assured them that reforms were imminent.[88] Andropov revealed that the Politburo was considering a Supreme Soviet reform project, but Andropov admitted that Crimean Tatars "might not be satisfied" with the end-result. Activists then asked if the Politburo would enforce any new reforms. Andropov replied that Crimean Tatars could report "violations" to Moscow and continue their lobby in the city.[89]

Creating the September 5, 1967 Decree

The Soviet government understood that the Crimean Tatar movement enjoyed popular support and in response created a combination of reform and repression to relieve the pressure. The final language and goals of this reform emerged from the central organ

[87] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447, l.l. 21-26. Krymskie Tatary iz Sukhumi, A. A. Molla i drugie. January 17, 1968.
[88] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l. 81. *Info* No. 43. April 1-15, 1967.
[89] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l.l. 105-111. *Info* No. 50. July 1-21, 1967.

office workers reading the materials and corresponding with activists, such as the deputy to the Chairperson of the Supreme Soviet, Mikhail Skliarov. From 1963 to 1969, he coordinated the intake of mail and meetings with citizens at the Supreme Soviet offices in the Kremlin.[90] He personally read countless Crimean Tatar letters, typed dozens of reports and met with Crimean Tatar representatives on numerous occasions. While often giving Crimean Tatars a cold reception in person, his memos and reports indicate that he disliked discrimination against Crimean Tatar veterans and, at the very least, understood that the protest was a problem that Moscow had to address.[91]

As protests increased, Skliarov and his colleagues immersed themselves in *Info* editions, letters, the historical treatises, and other documents. These bureaucrats soon became de facto experts on the Crimean Tatar "problem." Their reports and opinions informed Soviet leaders such as Andropov, Podgornii and Georgadze and became the primary reference material in policy debates.[92] As a result, throughout the spring and summer of 1967, Skliarov, Zharkov, N. Kazakevich and others at the office of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet worked on a reform project at the request of the Politburo. They drafted a list of key questions that Crimean Tatars asked and filled in answers based on current official and unofficial Soviet policy towards Crimean Tatars.[93] The initial goal was to give Soviet officials coherent answers to every Crimean Tatar complaint and identify areas where officials offered poor explanations of Soviet policy.

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[90] In 1969, Georgadze commended Skliarov for his effort in handling the crisis. See GARF, f. 7523, op. 156, d. 1494, l. 21. Rasporiazhenie No. 19. Georgadze. April 25, 1969. See also, GARF, f. 7523, op. 156, d. 1494, l. 1. Dopolnenie k lichnomu listku po uchetu kadrov. Mikhail Skliarov. June 1986.

[91] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 433, l. 35. Spravka Skliarov-Podgornomu. May 17, 1968. GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, l. 122. Pis'mo B. Iakovlev (TsK KPSS)-Skliarovu. May 29, 1968.

[92] RGASPI f. 17, op. 142, d. 2038, l. 57. Prilozhenie No. 2 k punktu Postanovlenie No. B-111 "Dlia izpol'zovaniia v besedakh ideologicheski vospitatel'nogo i predupreditel'no profilakticheskogo kharaktera." April 1974.

[93] Rudenko and other prosecutors also provided the bureaucrats with details of Crimean Tatar arrests and prosecutions. GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l. 64. Pis'mo Rudenko-Georgadze. March 27, 1967.

They then distributed the document to Soviet officials to formulate a reform that addressed the questions Soviet policy failed to answer in a convincing manner.[94] Thus far, Crimean Tatar activists had exploited the inconsistencies in policy to their advantage.

The actual document was a chart with Crimean Tatar questions, "thesis answers," and information that was "critical to answering the question," and the "source" of the answer. The questions were as follows (paraphrased for brevity):

1) What is your authority to speak on the Crimean Tatar issue and what central organ do you represent?

2) Are you familiar with the history of Tatars that used to live in Crimea and the reason for their deportation from Crimea?

3) Over the last several years Tatars, both individuals and selected representatives, have delivered a large quantity of letters to the central organs. Are you aware of the quantity and contents of these letters?

4) What decisions have been taken in regards to the following requests from the letters?

5) Will there be an organized return of Tatars to Crimea?

6) Will Tatars have national autonomy?

7) When will those deported during the Great War have full political rehabilitation?

8) When will political prisoners arrested for protesting be released?

9) *Ocherki Istorii Kryma* (Nadinskii's book) rewrote the history of Tatars in Crimea. The Crimean branch of the Academy of Sciences published this book in 1951 and 1964. This history poisons Tatar history, especially during World War II. When will Moscow stop this slander?

10) When can we expect the corrected historical record and facts to be relayed to Uzbek and Crimean authorities and all Soviet citizens?

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[94] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l.l. 41-50. Proekt postanovleniia Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po sostavu tovarishchei, kotorym budet priniat' grazhdan tatarskoi natsional'nosti, gotovit Sekretariat Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR. Early 1967.

11) Why have Crimean authorities refused to grant registration to couples when only one of the spouses is Crimean Tatar? (Or do Crimean authorities have the right to deny Russians and Ukrainians registration based on the ethnicity of their partner?)

12) Why did Stalin enact GOKO order on May 11, 1944 to punish all Crimean Tatars when: a) from the first days of the war many Crimean Tatars fought in the ranks of the Soviet armed forces: b) other Crimean Tatars fought against the Nazi occupation as in the Crimean partisan organization?

13) Why were some Crimean Tatars who turned 16 after the April 28, 1956 "rehabilitation" allowed to return to Crimea when Crimean Tatars who were children during the war or veterans were never allowed to return to Crimea?

14) Will the Soviet government issue a decree, new law, or guidelines to answer the questions and concerns that Tatars have raised in their letters to Soviet central organs?

15) Do Crimean Tatars who have traveled to Moscow and met with government, central organs, and cultural figures have the right to return to their home region (namely the Uzbek SSR) and inform local officials of the answers they received in Moscow?

The questionnaire revealed the anxieties of Soviet officials and the inconsistencies in their Crimean Tatar policy. On questions about discrimination and return to Crimea, the document instructed Soviet officials to acknowledge the validity of Crimean Tatar concerns, but counter that the economic and geopolitical aspects of returning to Crimea made "finding a quick solution" difficult. However, they did stress that all Crimean Tatars had the right to travel to Crimean resorts for "credible health reasons." To questions about "Crimean Tatar autonomy" in Crimea, Moscow officials argued that autonomy was impossible because the Crimean ASSR was "multiethnic" (ignoring that the Crimean ASSR was both multiethnic and had guaranteed Crimean Tatars positions in the government and party). The most threatening answer to Crimean Tatars

concerned arrests, saying that Soviet police would continue to arrest those who "disturbed the peace."

For several questions, there was either confusion or no official policy. For example, the proposed answers to questions about the 1944 deportation and 1956 rehabilitation cited documents that presented both justifications and condemnations of the deportation. Skliarov and others noted that some Soviet officials agreed with Crimean Tatars that the deportation had been unjust, while others continued to argue that all Crimean Tatars were traitors. Based on Crimean Tatar letters, this inconsistency gave Crimean Tatars an effective line of attack against the Soviet government.[95]

Central organs had *no* response to complaints about the new Crimean narrative or anti-Tatar accounts of World War II and Stalin's false mass treason charge. They also had no answer for the clearly illegal act of denying Slavs residency because they were married to a Crimean Tatar. Moscow was also unwilling to confirm that the opinions of central organs superseded the opinions of local officials in the Uzbek SSR and Crimea. Moscow officials also balked at debating the question of Crimean Tatars not born in Crimea because "there was no law saying that a Crimean Tatar born outside of Crimea could not live in Crimea." After all, the 1956 rehabilitation order stated that Crimean Tatars "could not return to their birthplace." Young Crimean Tatars argued that they had full rights in Crimea since they were not born there.

Other general observations reveal further policy confusion on the part of Soviet leaders. For example, the document starts with the politically safe terminology

[95] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l.l. 41-42.. Proekt postanovleniia Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po sostavu tovarishchei, kotorym budet priniat' grazhdan tatarskoi natsional'nosti, gotovit Sekretariat Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR. Early 1967.

(preferred by the Uzbek state) of "Tatars who formerly lived in Crimea." After several pages, even the Soviet bureaucracy tired of its own absurdities. Authors switched to "Crimean Tatar," an ethnicity that officially no longer existed. Second, the document underscores the unwritten understanding that sometimes officials in Soviet republics and peripheral regions had a good degree of autonomy in how they interpreted and enforced directives from the center. As was common throughout Soviet history, this distance was a deliberate attempt to shield leaders from the consequences of their policies. Crimean Tatars understood this reasoning and forced Moscow to reckon with its own ability and desire to exert full control over its vast empire.

A strict totalitarian regime would have never given credence to Crimean Tatar complaints, but the post-Stalinist USSR was a changed USSR. The fact that Moscow debated how to answer these questions revealed a success of de-Stalinization. Larger-scale arrests and executions were never an option. The Soviet Union was still going to arrest some individuals and deny an entire ethnic group some rights, but the mass murder of the Stalinist police was over. Instead, the Soviet Union attempted to use target policies to undermine the accusations of hypocrisy and divide the main activists from the rest of Crimean Tatars. Since the late-1950s, the Poliburo had assigned Georgadze the task of handling nationality questions and problems concerning both migration and immigration, and he mulled decree drafts during the summer of 1967.[96]

Finally, Georgadze and the Supreme Soviet issued decree 1861 on September 5, 1967. As a result of this, Crimean Tatar individuals had the "right to live anywhere in

[96] From 1957 to 1959 Georgadze tackled the cases of Soviet citizens repatriating from Israel and granted some families the right to return to the USSR. Then, beginning in 1962, the Soviet Union allowed some Jewish families to immigrate before canceling the policy in the wake of the 7 Days War in 1967: see, Lewin-Epstein, Ritterband, and Ro'I, *Russian Jews on Three Continents,* 43-58, 65.

the Soviet Union," including Crimea. The decree confirmed that Stalin's mass treason charges were false, and declared that the sins of some collaborators could not be "applied to the entire Tatar population of Crimea." However, in response to questions about mass return, the decree claimed that most Crimean Tatars had "put down roots" in exile so there was no need for a mass return plan. Most of the decree focused on a limited rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatar language and cultural affairs in the Uzbek SSR.[97]

In a separate order several weeks before the Supreme Soviet decree, the KPSS Central Committee instructed the Uzbek party and government to focus on Crimean Tatar cultural and economic advancement in exile.[98] The Uzbek state established a Crimean Tatar publishing division at the Garfura Gulialga publishing house. This publisher then produced Crimean Tatar language textbooks, Crimean Tatar songs, and 39 books in Crimean Tatar language by the end of 1967, with the promise by 1970 to publish 180-200 more books. On the educational front, Crimean Tatars again had the right to learn the Crimean Tatar language in Soviet schools.[99] Moreover, the party stressed that *Lenin Bagaria* and other party publications continue portraying Crimean Tatars' proper place as the Uzbek republic.[100]

The goal of the reforms was to minimize the influence of activists, maximize the opportunities for Crimean Tatar cultural life in exile, and leave postwar Crimea intact.

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[97] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l.l. 1-3. Ukaz Prezidiuma Ver. Sov. SSSR No. 1861 "O grazhdanakh tatarskoi natsional'nosti, prozhivavshikh v Krymu." September 5, 1967. Signed by Podgornyi and Georgadze.
[98] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 103, d. 1831, l.l. 89-90. Postonovlenie TsK KPSS ot 17 Avgusta 1967 "O grazhdanakh Tatarskoi natsional'nosti."
[99] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 103, d. 1831, l.l. 162-163. Protocol No. 44, Zasedaniia Biuro TsK KPSS Uzbekistana 18 Oktiabria, 1967.
[100] Ibid, 90.

Moscow hoped that the individual right to return to Crimea would appease veterans, students, and non-professional activists, and take a crucial talking point away from the Crimean Tatar movement. Among mid-level Moscow government officials working on the reforms such as Skliarov, there was a genuine, if naïve, expectation that Crimean Tatar Veterans, party members, Komsomol members, and workers whose skills were in demand in Crimea could, in reasonable numbers, reintegrate themselves into the postwar Crimean social and economic fabric without disturbing the status quo.

The Soviet Union could now answer much of the questionnaire and claim to both international and domestic audience that any Crimean Tatar had the right to live in Crimea or anywhere else in the USSR. In contrast to the United States, they could claim there was no racial or ethnic discrimination in the Soviet Union. Much in line with the idea of the "Good Tsar," future discrimination was not the fault of the center, but the deviation of corrupt local officials. Within weeks of the decree, thousands of Crimean Tatars embraced their new "rights" and moved to Crimea.

The Battle to Return

After September 5, 1967, Crimean Tatars claimed the legal right to return to their homeland, while Crimean officials used legal and extra legal means to stop them. In essence, the reform shifted part of the responsibility of repressing Crimean Tatars from the Uzbek SSR to Crimean authorities and the Ukraine SSR. Moscow began directing complaints about Crimean issues to the Ukraine SSR government in Kyiv, where Crimean Tatars found most Ukrainian officials indifferent to their complaints. Kyiv

often referred complaints back to Crimean officials.[101] These "petty Stalins" of Crimea had many advantages. Still, they could not stop every Crimean Tatar from returning and a fluctuating battle of returning and re-deporting would continue for the rest of Soviet history.

Discrimination often had the legal cover of internal passport, residency, home ownership, and notary laws. Of those, internal passport and residency laws were the most common discriminatory tool against Crimean Tatars.[102] In fact, one cynical aspect of the Supreme Soviet decree was that Moscow enhanced Crimean passport laws two weeks before the reform. A Soviet of Ministers order on the "organizing of the Crimean passport regime" extended strict passport control to the most remote Crimean regions and stressed the importance of "sanitary norms."[103] Instructions for Crimean police claimed that the order "was not meant to serve as a radical means to limit Crimean Tatars" because any citizen could receive registration if they followed the "legal" route. In reality, the focus on "sanitary norms" presented another bureaucratic hurdle to Crimean Tatar return.[104]

While passport laws favored Crimean authorities, the August 26, 1948 Soviet property law (discussed in Chapter Three) provided Crimean Tatars some cover when returning to Crimea.[105] While this law was often meaningless to Soviet urbanites, the

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[101] From October 13 to 18, 1967, Crimean Tatars in Kyiv complained to the Ukraine SSR party and Supreme Soviet. On passports, the head of the Ukrainian Police passport division, Colonel Mishutin, said that he would review individual complaints, but that general complaints from activists were not his concern. GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l.l. 138-141. *Info* No. 56. October 10-31, 1967.
[102] Soviet law required citizens to receive a residency permit "*propiska*" in their internal passports with in 78 hours of arrival in a city and 7 days in rural areas. GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447, l. 44. Krymskie Tatary iz Sukhumi, A. A. Molla i drugie. January 17, 1968.
[103] GARF, f. 5446, op. 101, d. 1339, l. 2. Sov. Min. SSSR Postanovlenie No. 804 "Ob uporiadochenii pastportnogo rezhima v Krymskoi oblasti." August 24, 1967.
[104] GARF, f. 5446, op. 101, d. 1339, l. 1. Pis'mo Mazurovku (Sov. Min. SSSR). August 24, 1967.
[105] Maggs, "The Security of Individually-Owned Property under Soviet Law," 525-537.

mass home building effort for Slavic settlers repopulating Crimea after 1944 gave the peninsula a large pool of private homes. By 1967, there were plenty of homes to buy and no legal obstacle to a Crimean Tatar buying a home in Crimea. In practice, the ability of Crimean Tatars to purchase homes from Slavic homeowners had mixed results. As the rest of this chapter demonstrates, thousands of Crimean Tatars did buy houses in Crimea. On the other hand, Crimean authorities often fabricated violations of internal passport, land use, private transaction, and notary laws to declare the home purchases illegal.

With the reform and legal codes setting the ground rules, the struggle to return to Crimea began. The number of Crimean Tatars who succeeded was largely dependent on how aggressive Crimean authorities were willing to discriminate against returnees and how much personal risk and abuse Crimean Tatars were willing to endure. Another factor was that, while most of the Crimean officials were against Crimean Tatar return, there were exceptions. This fact, combined with the goodwill of some Slavic Crimeans and the need for labor, assisted thousands of determined Crimean Tatars in gaining residency, homes, and work.

Examining several personal accounts reveals how the complicated mesh of legal battles and discrimination developed after September 5, 1967. Following residency procedures, Crimean Tatars often tried to secure housing before applying for registration and Crimean authorities targeted these transactions. In Simferopol, Eksender Umerov and Emadin Shaikhametov purchased an apartment, but authorities refused to notarize the sale.[106] Also in Simferopol, Remzi Umerov rented a room from a Russian woman, but a

[106] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447, l.l. 38, 42. Krymskie Tatary iz Sukhumi, A. A. Molla i drugie. January 17, 1968.

Simferopol KGB officer ordered the passport office to deny Umerov registration citing an invalid rental contract.[107]

Older Crimean Tatars returned to their birthplaces where they sometimes found help or empathy from old neighbors, but the police and other officials often undermined these interactions. Muarrem Martynov returned to his former village of Kapsikhor (now Morskoe) and purchased a home from Petr Shumaiko, but the kolkhoz notary rejected the sale.[108] Seiiar Dzhemaletdinov returned to General'skoe in the Alushta district. His long-time Russian friends found him a house that Ukrainian settlers had begun building but abandoned in 1965, and also provided paint and materials to finish the house. After a week, Alushta district prosecutors and police detained and deported the Dzhemaletdinov family.[109] Soon, Crimean authorities began to warn Russians and Ukrainians not to rent or sell property to Crimean Tatars.[110] Crimean police even fined some Crimean residents such Marina Romanovna for selling space to Crimean Tatars.[111]

When Crimean farm and factory managers were willing to hire Crimean Tatars, law enforcement again discouraged both management and employees. Indris Khaitas and Izzet Kara left Gelindzhke, Uzbek SSR, and boarded a train for Crimea on September 17, 1967. They arrived with their families at their old village of Uskut (renamed "Privetnoe") and approached the local kolkhoz about work. While the Russian manager said they could use more farmhands, police refused to register Khaitas and Kara at a local

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[107] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447, l. 9. *Info* No. 58. December 1-15, 1967.
[108] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447, l.l. 38, 42. Krymskie Tatary iz Sukhumi, A. A. Molla i drugie. January 17, 1968.
[109] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447, l. 34. Krymskie Tatary iz Sukhumi, A. A. Molla i drugie. January 17, 1968.
[110] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447, l. 10. *Info* No. 58. December 1-15, 1967.
[111] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447, l.l. 38, 42. Krymskie Tatary iz Sukhumi, A. A. Molla i drugie. January 17, 1968.

hotel and threatened to charge them with trespassing. Next, several Russian and Ukrainian farmers offered to assist them and one elderly woman let them stay overnight. The next day the two families traveled to Simferopol to file a complaint at the party headquarters where a clerk told them that Crimean Tatars were not welcome in Crimea.[112] Crimean authorities then detained the families for passport violations and demanded that the families to leave or receive jail time.[113]

Mixed ethnicity couples had an equally tough time moving to Crimea, even when non-Crimean Tatar spouses tried to leverage their ethnicity to get residency. For instance, Mariia Sarminoi, an ethnic Russian, and her Crimean Tatar husband, Fakhri Ismailov, moved to Crimea on April 8, 1968. The family returned to Ismailov's home village, Sinavnoe, in the Bakhchisarai district. Ismailov's former neighbor, Grigorii Avlakhov, found an elderly Russian woman, Maria Pogorelova, who owned a house, lived alone, and was willing to rent a room to the couple. Despite meeting sanitary norms, the local farm director and the police refused to register the family citing sanitary violations. The couple then spent 20 days searching for jobs before the Crimean oblast labor board found Ismailov a job with the Crimean Canal Construction Enterprise (Krymvodstroi) in the Belogorsk district. However, Belogorsk officials refused to register Izmailov. Afterwards, Sarminoi traveled to Alushta and, as a Russian, received work and registration at the "Kristall" buffet. Despite her legal registration, Crimean police arrested Sarminoi when she went to find her husband at a Simferopol encampment of unregistered Crimean Tatars (her husband was out searching for work at the time).

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[112] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l. 22. Pis'mo Indris Khaitas i Izzet Kara- Podgornomu. September 29, 1967.
[113] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l. 28. Spravka Prokuror g. Alushta Krymskoi Oblasti Niko'skii. September 1967.

Police deported her along with seven other Crimean Tatars to Baku, where police beat them and put them on a train to Tashkent. In the meantime, Crimean police deported her husband later that week.[114]

Similar to the experience of many Crimean returnees over the next several decades, the first deportation did not stop Ismailov and Sarminoi. They reunited in Tashkent and again flew to Crimea on June 4. The couple wrote letters to Moscow, participated in protests in Simferopol, and then Simferopol police arrested them for petty hooliganism. After their release from jail on July 11, Crimean police forced them onto an airplane, flight 2270 to Tashkent.[115] Sometimes, after enduring multiple deportations, families and individuals achieved registration. For example, Fefzi Poska and his family faced deportation five times before receiving registration, while police expelled Asan Chobanov and his nine relatives twice allowing them to become legal residents.[116]

Demobilized Crimean Tatar soldiers often found jobs in Crimea, further undermining the claim that there was no work for Crimean Tatars. However, they encountered the same discrimination. Enver Kapari was twenty-two years old in July 1971 when he demobilized from the army, traveled to Crimea, and found a job at the Armory Factory in Simferopol. Despite finding a job, the Simferopol police refused him residency and forced the factory administration to fire him. Likewise, Eiiandin Dzhemetdinov left the army in May 1970 and found a job in the Evpatoriia city construction service, similar to the treatment of Kapari, the police refused to register him

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[114] HU OSA, 300-85-11, Box 1, Tom 3, AC No. 191, pg. 2 . Zaiavlenie po povodu novykh gonenii na krymskikh Tatar. Krymskie Tatary-Podgornomu. July 11, 1968.
[115] HU OSA, 300-85-11, Box 1, Tom 3, AC No. 191, pgs. 1-4. Zaiavlenie po povodu novykh gonenii na krymskikh Tatar. Krymskie Tatary-Podgornomu. July 11, 1968.
[116] HU OSA, 300-85-11, Box 5, Tom 12, AC No. 1882, pgs. 3. Neoproverzhimye fakty iz zhizni krymskikh Tatar za period s 1967 po 1973 goda. January 1973.

and forced his boss to fire him. The Evpatoria police also decided to send a signal to other managers and fined Kapari's manager 50 rubles for hiring him in the first place.[117]

Some Crimean managers tried to defend their new workers in the face of discrimination. When Enver Asanov left the army, he found a job in the town of Armyansk and his boss provided him a dorm room to expedite his registration process. When Asanov and his boss approached the Armyansk passport table, officer Tachenko denied Asanov registration because there was "not enough room in the dorm." Asanov claims that his boss proceeded to argue at length with Tachenko because he needed workers and there was space in the dorm, but to no avail.[118]

Crimean authorities also destroyed or stole legal documents. For example, Rustem and Nariman Ametov received registration on October 6, 1967, but three days later police in Belogorsk confiscated their passports and expelled the from Crimea.[119] This tactic became so common that activists warned returning Crimean Tatars to make copies of all documents.[120]

As Crimean Tatar return increased, so did coordinated and violent deportations of families. On May 27, 1968, a raid on an encampment on the shore of the Simferopol Reservoir involved 50 police officers.[121] In letters to the UN Committee on Human Rights, Crimean Tatars related how police often conscripted local men as "muscle." For example, B. Kashka and his family returned to the town of Kizilovka in Belogorsk district and bought a home from M. F. Kravchenko in the Spring of 1969. After police

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[117] GARF, f. 7532, op. 106, d. 529, l. 4.
[118] Ibid.
[119] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447, l. 9. *Info* No. 58. December 1-15, 1967.
[120] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l.l. 127-128. Izveshchenie. September 27, 1967.
[121] HU OSA, 300-85-11, Box 5, Tom 12, AC No. 1882, pgs. Neoproverzhimye fakty iz zhizni krymskikh Tatar za period s 1967 po 1973 goda. January 1973.

refused them registration, on June 26, 1968 police and local men evicted the family, beat the adults, and stole several thousand rubles.[122] In a similar case, Regber and Aishe Akhtemov described how drunken "people's volunteers" beat them and the police forced them on a train to Baku. As they waited to board the train, they met seven other Crimean Tatar families (39 people) awaiting deportation who had also been attacked by police-led mobs.[123]

While Crimean authorities often preferred deportation to prosecuting Crimean Tatars in Crimea, by June 1969 Crimean authorities had convicted 26 Crimean Tatars for "crimes" related to their return, mostly for multiple passport violations.[124] One of those cases was that of Mamedi Chabanov who moved to Crimea after army demobilization in late 1967. Police arrested him for a passport violation in August 1968, and a Crimean court gave him a three-year prison sentence.[125] People's courts also sentenced hundreds of other Crimean Tatars such as El'dar Shabanov to bans from Crimea for periods of two years or more.[126]

While the fluidity of the situation described above makes estimating return and deportation numbers difficult, both Crimean Tatar activists and Soviet authorities acknowledged the mass-return attempt. Between September 5 and October 25, 1967, Crimean Tatar activists claimed that over 5,000 Crimean Tatars arrived in Crimea and attempted to get registration, jobs, and buy homes. In one lone concession by the Uzbek

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[122] HU OSA, 300-85-11, Box 5, Tom 12, AC No. 503, pgs. 1-4. Obrashchenie Bekir Kashka-Komieteu zashchity prav Chelovaka pri OON. July 1969.
[123] HU OSA, 300-85-11, Box 5, Tom 12, AC No. 504. pgs. 1-
[124] Crimean Tatars claimed that up to 12,000 returnees had propyska by June 1969. HU OSA AC 137, pg. 7.
[125] HU OSA, Box 5, Tom 12, AC No. 1882, pgs. 3. Neoproverzhimye fakty iz zhizni krymskikh Tatar za period s 1967 po 1973 goda. January 1973.
[126] HU OSA, 300-85-11, Box 5, Tom 12, AC No. 639, pgs. 1-8. Zhaloba. El'dar Shabanov. July 9, 1970.

KGB, Uzbek authorities allowed 148 Crimean Tatar families to relocate to Crimea with the Soviet resettlement and labor board in 1968 By June 1969, at least 12,000 Crimean Tatars, or around 900 families, had returned to Crimea and several thousand had received registration and bought homes.[127] However, there is little doubt that Crimean authorities deported several thousand of those returnees.

When Crimean officials finally tallied return totals a decade later, their count revealed lasting results. Between September 1967 and February 6, 1979, Crimean officials believed that 10,316 Crimean Tatars (1,930 families) had resettled in Crimea. Of these, 6,869 people (1,212) families had received registration, while 3,447 people (718 families) remained without registration.[128] Given the more sophisticated deportation and repression measures implemented by Crimean authorities from 1976 to 1979, it is reasonable to say that a majority of the 6,869 Crimean Tatars (1,212 families) with registration in Crimea in 1979 received their residency from 1967 until the early 1970s. This also indicates that Crimean authorities deported around half of the nearly 10,000 Crimean Tatars that returned to Crimea from 1967 to 1972.

Outside of Crimea, reform had the unintended consequence of expanding the geographical scope of Crimean Tatar population and activism outside of the traditional bases in exile and the Moscow lobby. The fact that Crimean officials were in charge of deportations meant that they did not have the resources or authority to force many deported Crimean Tatars to return to their former residences in exile. Many deportees from Crimea chose to live adjacent to Crimea in Krasnodar krai, Zhaporazhia oblast Kherson oblast and the Caucasus. Smaller numbers of re-deportees relocated to Moscow,

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[127] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l.l. 36-38. Protest pred. K. T. naroda, nakhodiashchikhsia v Moskvu. October 25, 1967. See also CCE, Vypusk 7, April 30, 1969. Pgs 135-138.
[128] Pis'mo Goncharenko-Rekunkovu, l.1.

Kyiv, Odessa, and other cities. Crimean Tatars quickly established themselves in these locations and continued their activism.

While finding housing, registration and jobs in these regions was far easier than in Crimea, some local authorities did discourage Crimean Tatar immigration. For example, the Odessa Morexodnoe Uchilishche (Odessa Naval School) originally admitted Asan Ablyazizov, but then expelled him when they realized he was Crimean Tatar. E. Seitvapov had a similar experience at the Kievskoe Vyschee Voenno-Morskoe Politicheskoe Uchilishche (Kiev Higher Naval and Political School) in 1970. After serving in the Soviet Armed Forces, Seitvapov's commander enrolled in him the academy, but the school's administration removed him "because of his nationality."[129]

In some cases, authorities in these regions employed the same passport and housing laws to undermine Crimean Tatar rights. Enver Ibraimov owned a home and received registration in the Kherson oblast town of Alekseveka, but the police refused to register his son after his army discharge. In another case, Aider Mustafaev bought a house and registered in the Kherson oblast town of Genichesk. In 1972 he left to study in Melitopol', but when he returned police denied him registration at his home for violating "sanitary norms." The head of the Genichesk government, Gaidamaka, actually took the time to find the former owners of the house and remonstrated him for "selling to Tatars." Mustafaev then bought a bigger house in Genichesk and Gaidamaka again refused to register Mustafaev he claimed that the city of Genichesk would just not allow Tatars to receive registration. More Crimean Tatars had similar issues in Genichesk.[130]

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[129] GARF, f. 7532, op. 106, d. 529, l. 6. Obrashenie molodezhi Krimskikh Tatar uga Ukraini I Kryma v svyazi c 50- letem obrazovanniya SSSR. 38 signatures, July 21, 1971.
[130] GARF f. 7532, op. 106, d. 529, l.l. 1-2. Obrashenie to Ts.K. KPSS, S.M SSSR., Verh Sov. and Min. Oborony from Tatars from Khersonskoi Oblasti with 743 signatures.

Regardless, the Crimean Tatar population grew and activism blossomed in these areas as many Crimean Tatars found jobs and homes, with deportations of Tatars outside of Crimea rare. For example, in March 1972, Crimean Tatars in Kherson oblast wrote a letter to Moscow with 743 signatures.[131] By 1979, Soviet authorities believed that the Crimean Tatar population in the Krasnodar krai was over 15,000 people.[132] Crimean Tatar activists believed the actual number was pushing 30,000, which included many unregistered individuals by 1978. For example, in the Krasnodar krai town of Nizhe-Bakansky alone there were more than 6,000 Crimean Tatars by 1978.[133]

Another unforeseen consequence was that the reform was important to more than just Crimean Tatars. Meshketian Turks, Volga Germans, Kurds, Crimean Bulgars and smaller ethnic and religious groups modeled their own petitions, letters, and lobbies on the Crimean Tatar example. For example, in a January 1968 letter, Meshketian Turk activists cited the September 5, 1967 decree as a "hopeful sign of returning to Leninist nationalities politics" and requested a similar order allowing their small nation to return to the Georgian SSR.[134] Another Meshketian collective letter said the decree meant that Moscow could no longer make excuses that reform was not possible.[135] Bulgars deported from Crimea asked why the reform did not cover Crimean deportees of other ethnicities.[136] Some Volga Tatar nationalists were impressed by the Crimean Tatar samizdat effort and began their own publications in the 1970s.[137] After September 1967,

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131 Ibid.
132 GARF, f. 8131, op 28, d. 5809, l.l. 50-56. Spravka "O khode vypolneniia Post. No. 700." UVD Krymoblispolkoma. February 8, 1979.
133 *Khronika*, No. 51, Spring 1978, 124-125.
134 GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 443, l.l. 182-186. Protokol. January 20, 1968.
135 GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 443, l.l. 196-199. Obrashchenie. November 27, 1967.
136 GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 443, l. 164. Pis'mo V. A. Verenkiotova-Ver. Sov. SSSR. Early 1968.
137 Rorlich, *The Volga Tatars,* 171.

Skliarov and other authorities noted a sharp increase in letters from these groups and Kurds and other groups began their own lobbies in Moscow. None of these groups received similar reforms, and memos hint that this was likely because after September 1967 the center realized its citizens took decrees on civil rights quite seriously.[138]

The Legacy of 1967: Crimean Tatar Protest in Crimea

Moscow created a paradox by acknowledging Stalin's false charges and allowing some individual Crimean Tatars to return to Crimea, while also letting Crimean officials continue anti-Tatar policies born of ethnic cleansing. Land redistribution, resettlement, and the new Crimean narrative remained. The failure of the Soviet government to offer neither Crimean Tatars a mass return plan nor allow Crimean authorities to deport all Crimean Tatar returnees guaranteed that the protest movement would continue. However, from a pragmatic point of view for Crimean Tatars, their resistance and the 1967 reforms returned Crimean Tatars to the political and demographic landscape of Crimea nearly 23 years after Stalin's total ethnic cleansing of the peninsula. At least on paper, the September 5 decree "rescinded" the mass treason charge and made Crimean Tatars "full Soviet citizens" again.[139] After the thaw ended, the Soviet Union did not want to have an "open dialogue" with its citizens.[140] The dialogue was never truly open, but Crimean Tatars at least forced an uncomfortable conversation. The accomplishment, however modest, was no small feat in the Soviet state, and would only grow in importance as Crimean Tatar resistance continued.

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[138] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 443, l. 178. Spravka Zam. Pri Presidium Ver. Sov. SSSR A. Dumin. February 22, 1968.
[139] Nikolai Stariko i Dmitrii Beliaev, *Rossiia, Krym, Istoriia* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Piter, 2015), 126.
[140] Zubkova, *Russia after the War,* 201.

Crimea was now a key hub of Crimean Tatar resistance. By late October 1967, Simferopol' police were expelling dozens of Crimean Tatars from the city for hooligan-related offences.[141] On April 11, 1972, at Park Pobeda in Simferopol, a tour guide began an excursion with the usual opinion that Crimean Tatars were traitors and illegitimate inhabitants in Crimea. Several Crimean Tatar students in the crowd began arguing with the tour guide. As the confrontation continued, several KGB operatives arrived and detained the students. In a similar fashion, at the Livadia sanatorium, Crimean Tatars confronted the excursion leader, Stanovskii, for reading a lecture on partisans that cited Vergasov and Nadinskii falsehoods about Crimean history and World War II.[142] Park Pobeda, Lenin statues and oblast party buildings became rallying spots for Crimean Tatars and confrontations with Crimean authorities increased.[143] Activists in Crimea also collected job announcements and confronted Crimean officials over the availability of work.[144]

Soviet officials argued that since Crimean Tatars had the right to live wherever they wanted, there was no longer a need for the Moscow lobby.[145] On October 10, 1967, police expelled Crimean Tatars from several hotels and detained several demonstrators near Lenin's mausoleum on Red Square. Undaunted, activists in Moscow collected accounts of deportations from Crimea and insisted that Moscow uphold their right to live

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[141] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447, l.l. 42-43. Krymskie Tatary iz Sukhumi, A. A. Molla i drugie. January 17, 1968.
[142] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447, l.l. 38, 47. Krymskie Tatary iz Sukhumi, A. A. Molla i drugie. January 17, 1968.
[143] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447, l.l. 1-3. *Info* No. 58. December 1-15, 1967. See also GARF, f. 7532, op. 106, d. 529, l. 6.
[144] GARF, f. 7690, op. 5, d. 3371, l.l. 42-50. Stenogramma "Pervoi Krymskoi oblastnoi profsoiuznoi rabochykh electrostantsii i elektrotekhnicheskoi promyshlennosti." November 28, 1969.
[145] GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l.l. 36-38. Protest pred. K. T. naroda, nakhodiashchikhsia v Moskvu. October 25, 1967.

anywhere in the Soviet Union.[146] Just in the first two weeks of February 1968, Crimean Tatars sent 3,447 letters to Moscow. By March 1968, there were 58 Crimean Tatars in Moscow and new editions of *Info* listed the names and residency of lobby members in Moscow over the given period.[147] When Crimean Tatar activists met with the head of passport services, Lt. Colonel Bezrukov, at the MOOP headquarters in Moscow he expressed "dismay" that Crimean police were breaking the law and told Crimean Tatars to report the offenders.[148] Bezrukov's promise was insincere, but the point of such meetings was to inform Soviet law enforcement and other central organs that the divide between official policy and actual treatment of Crimean Tatars was on the record.

In the Uzbek SSR, protest continued and became more confrontational. When Crimean Tatars gathered around the Lenin statue in Chirchik during the Crimean Tatar spring holiday of Derviza on April 21, 1968, local police directed fire trucks to hose the crowd. Dozens of soldiers and KGB operatives then beat protestors with batons before arresting more than 300 people.[149] While letter writing and protest in the Uzbek SSR waned in intensity in early 1970s with only several hundred letters a month and smaller demonstrations, the campaign never ended.[150] In fact, as underlined in the next chapter, the reforms and new repression inspired both collaboration with Soviet dissidents and a second wave of mass return in the mid to late-1970s.

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146 For example, see GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 404, l.l. 1-2. Pis'mo Merzie Abibulaev-Ver. Sov. SSSR. November 16, 1967 and GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 404, l. 2. Pis'mo G. Adzhieva-Ver. Sov. SSSR. November 29, 1967.

147 GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 443, l.l. 25-27. *Info* No. 63. February 16-March 1, 1968.

148 While the center reprimanded some Crimean police and officials, the enforcement was never near enough to end discrimination. GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447, l. 9. *Info* No. 60. January 1-15, 1967.

149 HU OSA, 300-85-11, Box 1,Tom 2, AC 137, pgs. 6-7. See also GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447, l.l. 59-61. Telegram- tatary iz Chirchika, Aider Bariev i drugie. April 22, 1968.

150 GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 476, l. 12. *Info* No. 81. December 1-15, 1968.

Chapter 7

Dissidents, Repression and a Second Return

It was during the Brezhnev-era "stagnation" of the late-1970s that Soviet repressions against Crimean Tatars and Crimean Tatar resistance ironically reached their most radical forms. While historians usually characterize this period as a combination of stalled political and economic reforms with general domestic stability, the relationship between Crimean Tatars and the Soviet state was overtly antagonistic and sometimes violent.[1] Crimean Tatars never accepted ethnic cleansing, discrimination, and stalled reforms as "normal."[2] Throughout the Brezhnev-era, Crimean Tatar activists encouraged camaraderie with Soviet dissidents and international human rights activists in order to enhance their ability to put Soviet abuses and hypocrisy under the microscope. Popular and international support encouraged Crimean Tatar activists to begin a second return attempt in 1976. In response, for the first time since Stalin died, Moscow coordinated mass deportations of an ethnic group. In the wake of enhanced repressions, Crimean Tatar activism reached the frustrating climax of self-immolation. Nevertheless, the

[1] Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle believe that the term "stagnation" is an unhelpful characterization for the period, which primarily served Gorbachev's assertion that his ideas were radical. They also cite current opinion polls revealing a nostalgia for the period's stability. This chapter asserts that, at least in the case of Crimea, "stagnation" was not a stable period. On the other hand, chapter 8 argues that Gorbachev's plan for Crimean Tatar return was very radical: see Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle, *Brezhnev Reconsidered* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 4-5.

[2] As Jeremi Suri argues, this "stagnation" was in part an international phenomenon linked to Cold War détente, and the desire of leaders to normalize the domestic and international status-quo in the wake of 1960s protests and international crisis: see Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and Détente* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 258-259.

persistence of Crimean Tatar resistance throughout this period and the return of several thousand more Crimean Tatars to the Crimea after 1976 helped create the national myths and pragmatic methods that they utilized a decade later when the final return began.

Understanding the accomplishments and transnational aspect of the Crimean Tatar movement during their cooperation with Soviet dissidents requires examining how dissent on the Soviet periphery was much more extensive than in Moscow.[3] In *Dr. Zhivago's Children*, Vladislav Zubok describes Soviet dissidents as "rebels without a cause" in a "long decline" after the 1956 "thaw." Combined attacks during the late-Khrushchev and Brezhnev-era from both the Soviet state and Russian nationalists decimated the dissident movement, making them irrelevant to the vast majority of Soviet citizens and forcing many into imprisonment or exile. The accomplishments of 1970s activism that included creating Helsinki Watch and circulating samizdat were actually dead ends for Moscow-based dissidents. Therefore, Zubok concludes, the era of stagnation meant defeat for intellectuals attempting to change the Soviet system.[4] Zubok is correct concerning broad reform and the consequences in Moscow, but the Soviet dissident movement was not just about Moscow.

For Crimean Tatars, a repressed ethnic minority on the Soviet periphery, the Soviet dissident movement was consequential. Many observers at the time recognized Crimean Tatar-dissident cooperation as "a unique phenomenon in the dissident movement."[5] As the previous chapter highlighted, the late 1960s Crimean Tatar

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[3] Furthermore, as Suri argues, studying the "interactions of ideas, institutions, and personalities at many levels" is essential to understanding the interplay of domestic discontent and global debates during détente. Suri, *Power and Protest,* 263.

[4] Zubok*, Dr. Zhivago's Children,* 259-334.

[5] See Peter J. Potichnyj, "The Struggle of Crimean Tatars," *Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue Canadienne des Slavistes* Vol. 17, No. 2/3, Russian and Soviet Central Asia (Summer and Fall, 1975), p. 318 and Peter

resistance was a popular movement that sprang from the pages of samizdat and spilled into the streets. This translation of written dissent into physical resistance impressed non-Tatar dissidents. They found a common cause with Crimean Tatar activism in a Cold World context where the Soviet Union paraded anti-colonial leaders through Crimea and Tashkent to highlight a "brotherhood of nations."[6] They realized that Crimean Tatars were pioneers in employing the language of the Nuremburg Trials and the UN Convention on Human Rights to describe their fate. Together, Crimean Tatars and dissidents helped establish an international "language of dissent."[7] As such, Crimean Tatars and their activism on the Soviet periphery were essential to the dissident movement' that, in the words of Donald Raleigh, "subjected the Soviet Union to critical scrutiny on the world stage, and posed a fundamental challenge to the Soviet myth economy."[8]

Moreover, the Crimean Tatar partnership with Soviet dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov, Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Petr Grigorinko, Grigorii Aleksandrov and others helped sustain Crimean Tatar resistance at certain points when many Crimean Tatar leaders were imprisoned. This partnership was essential in documenting the repression of Crimean

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Reddaway, "The Crimean Tatar Drive for Repatriation: Some Comparisons with Other Movements of Dissent in the Soviet Union," in Allworth, *The Tatars of Crimea*, 227. Some observers were skeptical about the collaboration's productivity: see Elizabeth Pond, *From the Yaroslavsky Station: Russia Perceived* (New York: Universe Books, 1981), 129.

6 While Crimea severed as an example of Soviet military might and Soviet tourism, Stronski argues that Tashkent became a "model" of socialist transformation and "progressive" urban development in a postcolonial state. Stronski, *Tashkent*, 234-250.

7 On the creation and "internationalizing" of dissent during the Cold War see, Suri, *Power and Protest*, 121-130.

8 By the mid-1960s, Western political scientists such as Fredrick Schuman cited Crimean Tatars as one example where "Soviet practice" does not conform to the "Soviet theory" of national self-determination and anti-colonialism. Leonard Shapiro also underlined how the Crimean Tatar situation was a clear violation of article 123 of the Soviet constitution on "the equality of all Soviet citizens regardless of race or nationality: see Fredrick Schuman*, Government in the Soviet Union*, Second Edition (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1967), 115; Leonard Schapiro, *The Government and Politics of the Soviet Union,* Revised Edition (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 89; Donald J. Raleigh, *Soviet Baby Boomers: An Oral History of Russia's Cold War Generation (*Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 265.

Tatars in Crimea, Central Asia and Moscow. They scrutinized Soviet authorities after the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 and pressured the Soviet government into new concessions in 1976 that fostered the second return effort from 1976 to 1979. When Soviet authorities repressed the second mass return, the Crimean Tatar-dissident partnership again recorded the consequences and, despite arrests and imprisonments, assisted the Crimean Tatar return movement success in surviving the most reactionary period of post-Stalin Soviet politics.

This chapter in addition argues that participation in Crimean Tatar resistance was a key reason that the Soviet state vigorously repressed dissidents. As Zubok admits, Slavic dissidents paid a price for their support of non-Slavic groups during a time of growing Russian nationalist sentiment.[9] Moscow saw dissident support of Crimean Tatar agitation in Crimea, Moscow and Central Asia as a direct threat to Soviet stability and international messaging. To be certain, Slavic dissident support of Crimean Tatars was never absolute or without complications, but both Crimean Tatars and the Soviet state recognized their contribution, albeit in very different ways.

Finally, Soviet efforts to stop the new return attempt by Crimean Tatars reveal that Crimean Tatars did not just receive support from Soviet dissidents, but also ordinary Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea. Oftentimes this took the simple form of a home sale or sheltering a returning Crimean Tatar and usually involved providing some money, but these seemingly mundane acts were nevertheless subversive. This suggests that, despite decades of anti-Tatar agitation, not every Crimean resident had strong anti-Tatar feelings. In fact, anti-Tatar Crimean officials viewed the willingness of some Slavic Crimeans to accept and even aid Crimean Tatar return as a threat. As a result, the late 1970's attack

[9] Zubok, *Dr. Zhivago's Children*, 304-308.

on Crimean Tatar return included the arrest, imprisonment, and, in some cases, even the deportation of non-Tatars along with Crimean Tatars.

This chapter has three sections. The first will trace the growth of the dissident movement and Crimean Tatar collaboration. Chronologically, this section overlaps some with previous chapters but focuses on the pinnacle of transnational and inter-Soviet cooperation during the 1970s. The second section will examine the second major Crimean Tatar return attempt from 1976 to 1979 and how dissidents, human rights activists, and even Western Cold War radio recorded and informed this saga. The final section reviews the consequences of the new return and repressions on the protest movement, dissident allies, and Crimea.

Common Ground: Crimean Tatars and Soviet Dissidents

In October 1962, Zaziev Gaziev walked into the Almalyk (Uzbek SSR) party headquarters and destroyed his Komsomol membership card. He was protesting the arrest of Grigorii Aleksandrov before Khrushchev's visit to the Uzbek SSR.[10] Gaziev was a Crimean Tatar activist, student and Komsomol member. Aleksandrov was the son of a Red Army officer and an MGU professor, and an exiled Russian dissident. However, the two young men shared a dorm in Almalyk. Most importantly, Aleksandrov was perhaps the first Soviet dissident to recognize the scope of Stalin's ethnic cleansing in Crimea, and his support of Crimean Tatar return began a decade before and continued

[10] After Zevid renounced his Komsomol membership, on November 3, 1962, the Uzbek Komosomol journal (*Komsomolets Uzbekistana*) published an article denouncing both Alexandrov and Zevid. In response, ten more Almalyk komsomol members quit in protest. Uzbek authorities detained Aleksandrov as a precaution during the trip that, according to William Taubman, was Khrushchev's attempt to escape the fallout over the Cuban Missile Crisis. Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 556-557 and *Komsomolets Uzbekistana*, No. 132 (4628). November 3, 1962.

until his death. In July 1942, when Aleksandrov was fourteen-years old, he became a German prisoner. The Red Army liberated him in 1944 and, as with millions of Soviets imprisoned by the Nazis, arrested him.[11] His mother, a MGU professor, gained his release and admission to the MGU law department in 1946, where he studied until 1950. However, the experience of imprisonment sullied his view of Soviet justice and he began writing poetry critical of Stalin and about the fate of Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks, Chechens and other deported groups. The head of the archives at the Lenin Library was a family friend, and he had access to both deportation accounts and the proceedings of the U.N. and Nuremburg Trials. In particular, he studied a Russian language translation of the U.N. deliberations in which Western governments accused the Soviet Union of genocide. Through contacts, he smuggled his writings to both Paris and Ankara. The Berlin-based émigré journal *Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik* and the Turkish journal *Emel* published his writing on Soviet deportations in the mid-1950s.[12] Because of these articles and other samizdat publications, Soviet authorities arrested him and sentenced him to 25 years hard labor. The MVD released him in 1955, but he continued to write and the KGB sent him to Tashkent and then to Almalyk.[13]

As the first Crimean Tatar "initiation groups" grew in the Uzbek SSR, relationships such as that between Aleksandrov and Zevid blossomed. For example, after

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[11] During the war, his two older brothers and older sister died in service. GARF, f. 10148, op. 1, d. 26, l.l. 1-11. Stat'i Ali Khamzina, interv'iu posviashchennye pamita G. M. Aleksandrova. June 5, 2003.

[12] *Emel* first published the writings in 1953 and then republished the material in 1993. Based in Ankara, Turkey, *Emel* is one the oldest journal of Crimean Tatar affairs published by Crimean Tatar diaspora: see *Emel* No. 196, 198 (1993). For more on *Emel*, see Lowell Bezanis, "Soviet Muslim Emigres in the Republic of Turkey" (The United States Department of State: Washington DC, 1993). Available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a251103.pdf. Accessed on February 25, 2017. *Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik* was originally a Menshevik exile journal based in Berlin. The information also appears in Svetlana Chervonnaia, "Kogda eshelony s deportirovannymi narodami ukhodili na vostok," *As Alan* 1(10), 2003.

[13] GARF, f. 10148, op. 1, d. 26, l.l. 1-11. Stat'i Ali Khamzina, interv'iu posviashchennye pamita G. M. Aleksanrova. June 5, 2003.

his release, Aleksandrov married Galina Aleksandrova, a bibliographer at Tashkent State University (TashGU). At the university, Galina noticed a "young and determined student of non-Russian ethnicity by the name of Mustafa Dzhemilev" and introduced the student to her husband. From this point onwards, Aleksandrov became a de facto member of the Crimean Tatar return movement. This early display of unity between Crimean Tatars and a non-Tatar dissident was the beginning of a collaboration that would continue in various degrees until 1991.[14]

As soon as Dzhemilev and other Crimean Tatars established the permanent lobby in Moscow, they built working relationships with Soviet dissidents such as Ludmilla Alexeyeva, General Pyotr Grigorenko, Andrei Sakharov and others. Their paths intentionally crossed because the two parties saw their relationship as mutually beneficial. For these dissidents, Crimean Tatars brought energy and stories of how the Soviet system repressed ordinary Soviet citizens on an everyday basis. For Crimean Tatars, the samizdat network and the growing connections with the West facilitated better communications with each other and the world.[15]

Much of the early interactions focused on finding a common language to discuss the 1944 deportation of Crimean Tatars their and mass deaths. For example, by the mid 1960s, Crimean Tatars were using direct quotes from the Nuremburg Trials and the U.N. convention on genocide. Soviet authorities wondered how they even had copies of the materials in Central Asia. The answer is that Aleksandrov illegally copied the texts at the Lenin Library in the early 1950s and smuggled them to the Uzbek SSR. By the mid-

[14] GARF, f. 10148, op. 1, d. 26, l.l. 1-11. Stat'i Ali Khamzina, interv'iu posviashchennye pamita G. M. Aleksanrova. June 5, 2003.
[15] Alexeyeva and Goldberg, *The Thaw Generation*,181-182.

1960s, both Moscow dissidents and Crimean Tatars were smuggling texts to the West accusing the Soviet Union of "genocide" against Crimean Tatars during the 1940s.[16]

Crimean Tatars and Soviet dissidents argued that contemporary Soviet policy in Crimea was anti-anti-colonialism. They identified which sections of the United Nations charter and Declaration of Human Rights that the Soviet Union violated with discriminatory polices in the 1960s and 1970s.[17] Their writings often compared Soviet policy to the U.S. and European treatment of Africans, African Americans and Native Americans, complete with references to Jim Crow laws and reservations. For example, in *Info* reports from 1967 and 1968, they argued that the "hunting of negroes during the 17th century was similar to the hunting of Crimean Tatars during the May 16-18, 1968 protests."[18] One report smuggled to Munich compared Soviet police to Tom Loker, the "slave catcher" character in *Uncle Tom's Cabin.*[19] Activists in Crimea claimed that Crimean police intimidation and harassment reminded them of articles about the Ku Klux Klan (*Kukluklanovtsev*).[20] Another article, titled "Uzbekistan: The Bulwark of National Discrimination and the Cruel Repression and Degradation of the Crimean Tatar Nation," argued that Stalin's "great power chauvinism" and ethnic cleansing were similar to

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16 As Naimark notes, the specifics of Soviet policies towards Soviet minorities fit the USSR's own definition during U.N. deliberations. Naimark, *Stalin's Genocides*, 22. On dissident use of genocide in regards to Crimean Tatars see, HU OSA, Otkrytoe pis'mo v zashchitu krymskikh Tatar podpisannoe "Russkie druz'ia Krymskikh Tatar." January 1969.

17 HU OSA, 300-85-11, Box 1, Tom 2, Samizdat Archive Association: Sobranie Dokumentov Samizdata (SAA:SDS) AC no. 137, p. 12)."Obrashchenie krysmko-tatarskogo naroda k kommunisticheskim i rabochim partiam i k liudiam kobroi voli." June 1969.

18 RGASPI f. 17, op. 142, d. 2038, l.l. 62-69. Prilozhenie No. 3 k punktu Postanovlenie No. B-111 "Vyderzhki iz klevetnicheskikh dokumentov izgotovlennykh i raspostranennykh krymsko-tatarskim avtonomistami." April 1974.

19 HU OSA, 300-85-11, Box 1, Tom 1 (SAA:SDS, AC no. 91, p. 6).

20 GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447, l. 34. Krymskie Tatary iz Sukhumi, A. A. Molla i drugie. January 17, 1968.

"American imperialism and racism."[21] Writings also targeted Soviet Muslims and Islamic nations across the globe, arguing that Moscow would someday have to "apologize to the Uzbek nation" for forcing them to house "the national reservation" of Crimean Tatars. Other comparisons included the situation of Palestinians after the 1967 Seven Days War and the Chinese occupation of Tibet.[22]

As Sarah Snyder argues, the burgeoning transnational human rights network helped make human rights "an important element of Cold War diplomacy and a central component of détente."[23] Crimean Tatar and dissident collaboration was an important element of the pressure that brought the Kremlin to the Helsinki Accords in which the Soviet Union and dozens of other countries agreed to language defining "human rights" and pledged (albeit in a non-binding agreement) to uphold these rights. To Crimean Tatars and their partners, the "third basket" of the accord on human rights codified the language of human rights and dissent concerning ethnic rights and the right to "movement" that they had been articulating for two decades.[24] When the Moscow "Helskinki Watch" group held its first meeting May 15, 1976, the group's first document protested the conviction of Dzhemiliev.[25] From 1975 until 1982, the Moscow Helsinki

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[21] RGASPI f. 17, op. 142, d. 2038, l.l. 62-69. Prilozhenie No. 3 k punktu Postanovlenie No. B-111 "Vyderzhki iz klevetnicheskikh dokumentov izgotovlennykh i raspostranennykh krymsko-tatarskim avtonomistami." April 1974.

[22] RGASPI f. 17, op. 142, d. 2038, l.l. 62-69. Prilozhenie No. 3 k punktu Postanovlenie No. B-111 "Vyderzhki iz klevetnicheskikh dokumentov izgotovlennykh i raspostranennykh krymsko-tatarskim avtonomistami." April 1974.

[23] Sarah Snyder, *End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (Cambridge University Press, 2011), I-X, 1-13.

[24] Signed on August 1, 1975. For the full act, see http://www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act. Accessed on March 27, 2017.

[25] Alexeyeva and Goldberg, *The Thaw Generation,* 282.

Watch monitoring of "Soviet compliance" put Soviet violations of the act at the forefront of the international human rights movement.[26]

Cooperation between Crimean Tatars and dissidents was also logistical. From the mid-1960s until the end of the Soviet Union, Crimean Tatars arrived in Moscow and often stayed with or visited dissidents. They brought with them letters, reports, opinion pieces, photographs and copies of *Info*. In apartments and hotel rooms, Moscow dissidents collected Crimean Tatar materials, and both reprinted them for distribution inside the Soviet Union and forwarded them to Munich, New York and other centers of tamizdat publication. As Andropov complained in a 1971 KGB memo, "Crimean Tatars visit Sakharov's apartment frequently to complain to him about the refusal to give them residence permits and jobs in Crimea."[27]

Once dissidents collected Crimean Tatar materials, a small group of Western journalists, diplomats and academics acted as "couriers" and stuffed documents into suitcases and handbags or used diplomatic mail. For example, one of the first Western academics to publish work on the Crimean Tatar movement, Peter Reddaway, was an experienced courier who trained younger academics such as Robert van Voren in the art.[28] The KGB was also convinced that American journalist Lars-Erik Nelson, who published an article on Crimean Tatar protests in 1969, was a conduit of Crimean Tatar

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[26] Snyder, *End of the Cold War*, 3.

[27] Document 31, Andropov to Suslov: Another update on the activities of the Human Rights Committee. May 31, 1971. Published in *The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov*, 124-125.

[28] Dutch academic Robert van Voren also described how an American diplomat and the British journalist Xan Smiley aided his own courier efforts. Sometimes dissidents also used telephones, but this was too risky for most. By the 1980s, van Voren claims that pictures of materials on film disguised to appear unused had become the most common method: see Robert van Voren, *On Dissidents and Madness:From the Soviet Union of Leonid Brezhnev to the "Soviet Union" of Vladimir Putin* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2009), 6-9, 22-26.

documents to the Western world.[29] Alexander Nekrich, for example was able to smuggle out an entire book, *The Punished Peoples*, in 1975.[30] Dissidents in exile then published documents in hybrid samizdat-tamizdat publications such the *Chronicle of Current Events* (hereafter *Khronika*). In particular, Nekrich and exiled Crimean Tatar activist Aisha Seitmuratova worked in the West to publish and distribute Crimean Tatar accounts after they fled the USSR in the mid-1970s.[31] Moreover, workers at RFE/RL and the Samizdat Association Archives (hereafter SAA) in Munich bound and published the materials.[32] This included thousands of pages of Crimean Tatar materials.[33] The RFE/RL and the Voice of America then selected compelling pieces to use in its ideological campaign against the Soviet state.[34] As radio broadcasts and other Western newspapers increased their coverage of Crimean Tatar repression, Crimean Tatars increased the flow of Crimean Tatar documents to Helsinki Watch.[35]

While their condemnation of Stalinism united dissidents and Crimean Tatars, they sometimes disagreed over tactical issues. Crimean Tatar activists and Moscow dissidents often disagreed about the characterization of the Soviet state. Some partners such as

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[29] His articles, Russian language knowledge, and Moscow posting support this assumption: see Timothy P. Cross, "Lars-Erik Nelson '64: A Subversive Among Cynics," *Columbia College Today*, May 2001. http://www.college.columbia.edu/cct_archive/may01/may01_profile_nelson.html. Accessed on February 27, 2017.

[30] Nekrich then left the USSR for the U.S. in 1976. Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples*, IX-X.

[31] Aishe Seitmuratova Report, New York, March 3, 1979. HIA, A. M. Nekrich Collection, Box 47, Folder 2, pp. 1-6.

[32] One the anti-communist ideology of RFE/RL, its connection to the CIA and the establishment and operations in Munich during the Cold War see Robert H. Cummings, *Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe 1950-1989* (London: McFarland & Company, Inc. Publishers, 2009).

[33] The full collections are available at HU OSA, 300-83-11, Box 1 Tom 1-3, Box 2 Tom 4-5, Box 3 Tom 7, and Box 5 Tom 12.

[34] RGASPI f. 17, op. 142, d. 2038, l.l. 53-61. Prilozhenie No. 2 k punktu Postanovlenie No. B-111 "Dlia izpol'zovaniia v besedakh ideologicheski vospitatel'nogo i predupreditel'no profilakticheskogo kharaktera." April 1974.

[35] Alexeyeva and Goldberg, *The Thaw Generation,* 288.

Aleksandrov viewed the entire Soviet state as toxic.[36] However, many Crimean Tatars used the few tools the state gave them (veteran status and Party and Komsomol membership and critical jobs) as leverage. In particular, the vigorous participation of Crimean Tatar veterans became a defining aspect of Crimean Tatar resistance. After 1975, another dispute erupted over dissidents drawing similarities between the Crimean Tatar right to return to Crimea and the right of Soviet Jews to immigrate to Israel.[37] While such tensions persisted, there is little evidence that the disputes seriously effected cooperation.

Crimean Tatar and Soviet dissidents also had contact with Crimean Tatar diaspora populations in Turkey, but this was a hazard that caused conflict with dissidents and many Crimean Tatar activists avoided or concealed extensive contact. As chapter one underlined, elements of the Crimean Tatar diaspora from Turkey had worked with the Nazi occupation and had participated in organizing Nazi collaborations brigades before the Third Reich abandoned the effort. Even the most accomplished Crimean Tatar writer and historian outside the Soviet Union, Edige Kirimal, spent most of his adult life in Germany, worked with the Third Reich to secure Crimean Tatar rights, and then spent the rest of his life teaching and writing in Munich.[38] If Crimean Tatars in the USSR did have contact with Kirimal or read his work, they concealed his influence.

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[36] Ibid., 63-64.

[37] The State of Israel discouraged Soviet Jews from coordinating with Moscow dissidents because the approached downplayed the Zionist ideas. However, this did not stop many Soviet-Jewish activists, including Iuri Shcharansky, from working with Moscow Helsinki Watch. Alexeyeva and Goldberg, *The Thaw Generation,* 292.

[38] Similar to Crimean Tatars in the USSR, he began using the term "genocide" to describe the deportation in the 1950s. He wrote over a dozen pieces on Crimean Tatars, but the first dedicated to genocide was "Complete Destruction of National Groups as Groups: The Crimean Turks" in *Genocide in the USSR: Studies in Group Destruction* (Munich: Institut zur Erforschung der UsSSR, 1958). Online at http://www.iccrimea.org/historical/crimeanturks.html. Accessed February 26, 2017. On Kirimal's life see Mustecip Ulkusal, "Dr. Edige Mustafa Kirimal'I Kaybettik," *Emel* 118 (1980), 1-5. It is available in an

The example of Petr Grigorenko highlights the confluence of ideological and logistical cooperation between Soviet dissidents and Crimean Tatars. For Crimean Tatars in Moscow, Lt. General Petr Grigorenko and writer Aleksei Kosterin served as dissent consultants. They organized petitions to international bodies such as the UN and ensured that Crimean Tatars were able to smuggle materials out of the USSR. After Kosterin suffered a heart attack in Moscow on March 17, 1967, Grigorenko gathered with nearly 250 Crimean Tatars in the Hotel "Altai" and began drafting documents to send to the West.[39] From that date forward, Grigorenko took extraordinary steps to record and disseminate Crimean Tatar materials. While Grigorenko's efforts were numerous, two specific aspects highlight his personal effort. First, through his military status (and before his first arrest) he had access to documents that Crimean Tatars and dissidents did not, and he made them public. For example, on March 10, 1969, he wrote an analysis of two Uzbek KGB documents. The first was a 1968 letter in which the Uzbek MVD and Uzbek KGB Lt. General S. I. Kiselev discussed the fact that Uzbek archives housed proof of Crimean Tatar mass death from 1944 to 1946. The second memo exposed how the KGB lied to the public about the death tolls. Grigorenko argued that this was proof of the continued Soviet effort to conceal Crimean Tatar mass death during the deportations. By 1972, couriers had delivered both the KGB documents and analysis to Munich where the SAA and Cold War radio stations further disseminated the damning materials.[40]

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abridged version online at http://www.iccrimea.org/historical/edigekirimal.html . Accessed on February 26, 2017.

[39] Peter Grigor'evich Grigorenko, *V podpol'e mozhno vstretit' tol'ko krys*… (New York: Detinets, 1981), 606-607, 612-626.

[40] HU OSA, 300-85-11, Box1, Tom 1, AC no. 152, p.p. 1-8. P. G. Grigorenko, Kommentarii k dvum dokumentam o deportatsii krymskikh tatar. March 10, 1969.

Another important aspect of Grigorenko's work was forwarding Crimean Tatar petitions and individual testimony to the United Nations. During the summer of 1969, individual testimonies of Crimean Tatars began arriving at the United Nation's Committee on Human Rights and the SAA began documenting these efforts. In these letters, Crimean Tatars such as Shevket Beitullaev and Aishe Akhmetova described how the Soviet Union was violating the United Nation's charter in Crimea.[41] Andropov and the KGB were aware that Grigorenko had orchestrated these contacts, and Andropov cited this activity as probable cause for the surveillance and arrest of Grigorenko.[42]

A second example of this cooperation is the story of Halich Dilyara, a Crimean Tatar mother of seven. In April of 1974, Crimean officials had denied her family registration in Crimea and refused to notarize their home purchase:

> "On April 1, 1974, my family and I left the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan and moved to the town of Pushkino in the Sovietskii region of the Crimea. We tried to buy a house for 1,500 rubles, but the notary office refused to finalize our contract because we were not registered. From the first day, I systematically worked at getting *propiski*, going to every government branch I could, but our problem with *propiski* remains unsolved. Our family has nine people, I have seven children, and they need to be supported, and without a *prosiska* I can't get a job."

Two years later, her family remained unregistered and they squatted in a house without work, healthcare or schooling. In mid-1976, Dilyara wrote to the Supreme Soviet in Moscow to complain. Crimean Tatar activists passed the letter to Moscow Helsinki

[41] HU OSA, 300-85-11 AC no. 491-495, no. 501-507. Obrashchenii k Komitet prav cheloveka pri OON. June-August 1969.
[42] RGANI, op. 28, reel 1.999, file 20. SSSR KGB pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR- Sekretno. June 10, 1968.

Watch and a courier smuggled the letter to Munich. RFE/RL then broadcast the story back into the USSR.[43]

World War II Veteran, Lt. Colonel Chalbash, heard a VOA broadcast and wrote several letters to the Soviet of Ministries protesting the treatment of Dilyara in November 1977.[44] As Chalbash's letters and other petitions mentioning Dilyara suggest, the story of individual Crimean Tatars humanized the return movement and helped maintain its popularity with everyday Crimean Tatars.[45] Equally as important, Soviet authorities did not ignore the story or the requests of Chalbash. In fact, these specific documents helped begin the debate between Kosygin, other Soviet of Ministries officials, and Crimean officials over what to do with the new surge of returning Crimean Tatars from 1976 to 1979. As Chalbash underlined, the situation that Halich described was the reality for thousands of more Crimean Tatars and Soviet authorities needed to address the situation.[46]

The depth of Crimean Tatar-dissident cooperation is also evident in the KGB response. The Soviet Union took the coordination of Crimean Tatars and dissidents seriously, especially their comparisons of the Soviet Union to European empires and United States and their reports to the United Nations about "Soviet genocide." The KGB concentrated on uncovering the "enemy actions" of Crimean Tatar leaders and their

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[43] Halich Enanovna Dilyara, letter to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., ca. 1976, Radio Free Europe-Russian Language Broadcast Archive: Azeri Language Service (RFE-RLBA: ALS), box 270, folder 2, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, CA.

[44] GARF, f. 5546, op. 111, d. 1368, l. 1. Telegram Veteran voiny Podpolkovnik Ostavke Chalbash-Kosyginu. November 11, 1977.

[45] By 1976, *Khronika* and the SAA had documented her story. See *Khronika, Vypusk 41 Events*, 3 avgusta 1976, l. 59.

[46] GARF, f. 5546, op. 111, d. 1368, l. 10. Telegram Kosyginu. November 10, 1977 and GARF, f. 5546, op. 111, d. 1368, l. 3. Spravka K. Mazurov- Chermodurovu. November 18, 1977.

dissident partners.[47] KGB investigations into Crimean Tatar-dissident connections began during the protests of 1967, and the secret police increased surveillance and arrests during the early 1970's. Viewing the Crimean Tatar movement as a Western "fifth column" and "quiet counter revolutionary force," KGB investigators read *Khronika* and *Info* and transcribed radio broadcasts to corroborate how stories passed from the individual Crimean Tatars, to the Moscow lobby, to *Khronika*, and on to RFE/RL and VOA.[48] As a result, collaboration with Crimean Tatars ended with jail for some Moscow dissidents as well as Crimean Tatars. By May 1970, the "Tashkent Process" arrests of Dzhemilev and Crimean Tatars coincided with the arrests of Grigorenko and other Moscow dissidents.[49]

However, Soviet repressions of leading activists failed to quash Crimean Tatar resistance and these arrests sometimes became international incidents. For example, the third arrest of Dzhemilev in June 1974 underlined the international dynamic and just how committed Soviet dissidents were to defending Crimean Tatar comrades. Sakharov, Elena Bonner, Grigorenko, and others organized an international protest campaign that included academics and politicians from France, the U.S., Turkey, and Italy. The Ministry of Soviets received letters from across the globe.[50] The fact that Soviet authorities had arrested Dzhemilev for an alleged plan to deliver a petition to U.S. president Richard Nixon underlined the increased Soviet scrutiny of international

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[47] GARF, f. 5446, op. 101, d. 1330, l. 3. Pis'mo Chekisti- TsK KP SSSR (Referentura po KGB). December 20, 1967.

[48] RGASPI f. 17, op. 142, d. 2038, l.l. 53-61. Prilozhenie No. 2 k punktu Postanovlenie No. B-111 "Dlia izpol'zovaniia v besedakh ideologicheski vospitatel'nogo i predupreditel'no profilakticheskogo kharaktera." April 1974.

[49] Alexeyeva and Goldberg, *The Thaw Generation*, 254.

[50] For example, one such letter from Thomas Johansson in Sweden explained what articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that the detention of Dzhemiliev violated. GARF, f. 8131, op. 36, d. 391, l. 21. Letter to the Soviet of Ministries from Thomas Johansson (Stockholm, Sweden). November 12, 1971.

contact.[51] Soviet prosecutors and the Central Committee even studied Western radio and media coverage of the trial, and complained that the Western press treated them unfairly. They argued that the US was hypocritical on minority rights and referenced the trials of Angela Davis and other African American activists.[52] Although the trial ended in Dzhemilev's conviction, the attention likely kept the Soviet Union from prosecuting other high-profile Crimean Tatar leaders.

The KGB often designed investigations to simultaneously entrap both Crimean Tatars and dissidents. For example, in late August 1973, the KGB arrested Pyotr Iakir and Victor Krasin for being members of the "Narodno-Trudovoi Soiuza," after they had given a press conference in Moscow in support of repressed Soviet citizens. According to the investigation, they had helped Crimean Tatars collect and publish events and stories in the *Khronika*. These dissidents had regular meetings with the Moscow lobby of Crimean Tatars, especially Mustafa Dzhemilev, his brother Reshat, as well as with Grigorenko. Moreover, the KGB charged that Krasin had worked with Crimean Tatar activists Rolan Kadyev and Zampir Asanov to write a Crimean Tatar Declaration to the United Nations and then smuggle the materials to New York City using "foreign correspondents."[53]

In addition to repression, the Uzbek SSR created counter arguments to dissident and Crimean Tatar claims. In state media and international correspondence, the Uzbek party increased the attention to Tashkent's role in the "anti-imperialist" effort of the

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[51] For a detailed account of the trial and protest see Gulnara Bekirova, "Omskii Protsess Mustafy Dzhemileva," March 24, 2011. Available at http://kirimtatar.com/index.php?option=com_content &task=view&id=531&Itemid=382 Accessed on March 27, 2017.

[52] GARF, f. 8131, op. 36, d. 391, l. 25.

[53] RGASPI f. 17, op. 142, d. 2038, l.l. 53-61. Prilozhenie No. 2 k punktu Postanovlenie No. B-111 "Dlia izpol'zovaniia v besedakh ideologicheski vospitatel'nogo i predupreditel'no profilakticheskogo kharaktera." April 1974.

"national liberation movement" around the globe.[54] Uzbek diplomats even enlisted several Crimean Tatar party members to travel with Uzbek delegations in visits to other communist countries. In another effort, the Uzbek KGB borrowed from the new Crimean narrative and argued that the Soviet state could not have committed genocide against Crimean Tatars because the nation had no national claim to Crimea.[55]

The Uzbek party and government also began publishing reports on "Tatar equality and progress." They highlighted the example of Dzhafer Memetov who followed the common social ladder for many Crimean Tatars in exile. After army service he had gone to university, become a party member, and then worked as the assistance to Dzerzhinskii Technical Kombinat in Ferghana.[56] Uzbek authorities stressed that Memetov was just one example of the larger trend in "Tatar" social and economic mobility. In 1975, the Uzbek party reported that 128 Crimean Tatars had been elected to oblast, city, and district party organizations, and eight were serving in the Uzbek and USSR Supreme Soviets. A further 861 Crimean Tatars served in village Soviets and over 1,800 Crimean Tatars held bureaucratic positions in Uzbek party, government and economic enterprises. Similar to the 1950s and 1960s, the Uzbek party highlighted that thousands of Crimean Tatars continued to finish university and received training in various skilled industries and jobs such as "doctors, agronomists, engineers, and technical work."[57] Tashkent also ordered

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[54] GARF, f. 5451, op. 58, d. 9863, l.l. 57-62. Doklad na plenume Andizhanskogo oblsovprofa "O zadachax profsoiuza oblasti v sviazi o resheniami XXIV s"ezda KPSS." May 19, 1971.
[55] RGASPI f. 17, op. 142, d. 2038, l.l. 62-69. Prilozhenie No. 3 k punktu Postanovlenie No. B-111 "Vyderzhki iz klevetnicheskikh dokumentov izgotovlennykh i raspostranennykh krymsko-tatarskim avtonomistami." April 1974.
[56] RGASPI f. 17, op. 143, d. 2144, l.l. 105-106. Tsentral'noi Izbiratel'snoi Komissii po Vyboram v Ver. Sov Uzb. SSR. 1975.
[57] RGASPI f. 17, op. 143, d. 2144, l.l. 17-18. Protokol No. 136- Zasedanie biuro Krymskogogobkoma KP Ukrainy ot 26 marta 1975 goda.

local party branches to allow more Crimean Tatar language publications.[58] According to Uzbek officials, there could be no discrimination if Crimean Tatars had gained important positions in the Uzbek republic and "cemented" themselves in exile.[59]

As earlier chapters demonstrated, the social mobility of Crimean Tatars did not end Crimean Tatar resistance. In fact, it increased Crimean Tatar leverage, the ability to organize, and Uzbek authorities remained convinced that universities remained a conduit for "enemy elements."[60] No matter what the Uzbek government claimed about Crimean Tatar assimilation, most Crimean Tatars never "put down roots" in the Uzbek SSR. While certainly many Crimean Tatars had attained decent jobs and even party membership, chronic problems in the Uzbek republic such as a housing deficit continued to plague residents.[61] Crimean Tatars understood that problems existed in Crimea, but those who continued to petition for return or return would rather fight such battles in their homeland instead of in exile.

Despite arrests, ideological assault, and the efforts of the Uzbek party, from 1967 to 1980 the vigorous cooperation between Crimean Tatars and Moscow dissidents persisted. This coordination between Crimean Tatars and Soviet dissidents resulted in a new mass-return attempt in the late 1970s, the near panic of Crimean and Moscow authorities, and the most extensive mass repression campaign of the Brezhnev-era.

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[58] RGASPI f. 17, op. 143, d. 2144, l.l. 60-64. Prilozhenie k punktu 12 Postanovlenie No. B-136 "Sov. Sekretno Meropriiatiia po dal'neishemu uluchenniu ideino-politicheskoi raboty sredi tatar ranee prozhivavshikh v Krymu." 1975.

[59] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 140, d. 2455, l. 132. Protokol No. 42- Zasedanie biuro Krymskogogobkoma KP Ukrainy ot 24 noiabria 1972 goda. See also RGASPI, f. 17, op. 140, d. 2455, l. 133. Postanovleniia TsK KPSS ot 26 oktiabria i TsK KP Ukrainy ot 14 noiabria "Ob otdel'nykh kategoriiakh grazhdan, pereselennykh v proshlom iz mest ikh prozhivaniia v drugie raiony SSSR."

[60] RGASPI f. 17, op. 140, d. 1995, l. 16. Stenogramma VII plenuma TsK KP Uzbekistana. July 30, 1972.

[61] RGASPI f. 17, op. 142, d. 2038, l.l. 2-3. Protokol No. 111 Zasedaniia Biuro TsK KP Uzbekistana ot 24 aprelia 1974.

Crafting a Reactionary Reform

Although Crimean Tatar return attempts waned in the mid-1970s amid rampant discrimination, dozens of Crimean Tatars continued to return each month. The Crimean Crimean oblast MVD, KGB, and prosecutors worked to streamline for repression the discrimination cocktail regarding residency, housing, notary, work, sanitation, and other legal codes for repression, and Moscow supported this effort with several orders.[62] In 1974, the KPSS Central Committee gave Crimean authorities a new repressive tool by ordering that any person moving to Crimea had to go through the "proper labor force organs" to gain employment. In practice, this made destroying a Crimean Tatar's work history book just as effective as other repressive methods. Moreover, the Central Committee ordered the Uzbek and Ukraine KGB to intensify the repression of "Crimean autonomists" before May 18, 1974, the thirtieth anniversary of Crimean Tatar deportation.[63] As is evident with Halich's story, these methods often worked.

Still, after a decade of investigations the Crimean Tatar network was still extensive and the oppressors were weary. Uzbek KGB operatives knew that every time they arrested one activist, others would take his or her place. In Ferghana, Bekir, Iurii and Muksim Osmanov ran one activist group. Seidamet Memetov operated a group in

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[62] GARF, f. 8131, op 28, d. 5809, l.l. 1-5. Pis'mo Prokuror otdela obshchego nadzora prokuratury SSSR N. N. Goncharenko- Pervomu Zam. General'nogo Prokurora SSSR A. M. Rekunkov "O proverke zhalob otdel'nykh grazhdan, udalennykh iz krymskoi oblasti za narushenie pastportnogo rezhima." February 14, 1979. (hereafter "Pis'mo Goncharenko-Rekunkovu").

[63] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 140, d. 2455, l. 132. Protokol No. 42- Zasedanie biuro Krymskogogobkoma KP Ukrainy ot 24 noiabria 1972 goda. See also RGASPI, f. 17, op. 140, d. 2455, l. 133. Postanovleniia TsK KPSS ot 26 oktiabria i TsK KP Ukrainy ot 14 noiabria "Ob otdel'nykh kategoriiakh grazhdan, pereselennykh v proshlom iz mest ikh prozhivaniia v drugie raiony SSSR."

Margilan. Shevki Mukhteremov organized in Samarkand. Amza Ablaev gathered letters around Iangiiul and Mustafa Khalilov coordinated protest in Tashkent.[64]

If Uzbek authorities knew the identity and activities of so many Crimean Tatar activists, why did they simply not arrest them all? As discussed in the last section, the 1974 Omsk trial of Dzhemeliev had taken time, effort, and was in the Western press. It certainly appears the attention caused caution with outright oppression, especially jail time. Uzbek officials may have stated in public that Crimean Tatar activism was the work of a small group of "anti-social" and "anti-Soviet" radicals, but they understood the popularity of the movement and so decided that arresting thousands of people was not an option.[65] As such, protest and return attempts continued throughout 1974 and 1975 despite the discomfort of Uzbek and Crimean officials.

With the movement surviving the above repressions, Crimean Tatar activists and dissidents partners viewed the XXV Communist Party Congress from February 24 to March 5, 1976 as another chance to push for full Crimean Tatar rehabilitation. Leading up to the congress, Crimean Tatar letters spiked and the Moscow lobby size increased. In Moscow, the Uzbek SSR, and Crimea, activists confronted people's deputies and demanded that the congress discuss an organized return to the Crimea and force Crimean officials follow the September 5, 1967 decree.[66] In response the Central Committee, ordered Crimean officials to grant "several families" registration before the congress opened. Moreover, the Central Committee promised "widespread registration to

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[64] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 140, d. 2083, l.l. 51-52. Protokol No. 111 Zasedaniia Biuro TsK KP Uzbekistana ot 24 aprelia 1974.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Personal accounts from the Declaration and petition from Crimean Tatar nationalists to the Belgrad Council, ca. 1977, HIA, RFE-RL, BA: ALS, box 270, folder 2, 10.

thousands after the closing of the congress."[67] In other words, Moscow asked that Crimean authorities make some concessions by registering Crimean Tatars such as Halich Dilyara who had returned to Crimea multiple times and had faced repression and deportation. While some Crimean authorities complied, many were furious. Local party and government leaders organized protests and meetings to warn residents that the returning Tatars will "take over all the schools and jobs." The rhetoric became virulently anti-Tatar, focusing on how "dirty feet" were soiling the Crimea. After the Party Congress, and continuing into 1977, thousands of new Crimean Tatar returnees converged on Crimea.[68] By 1978, Moscow had to either enforce the 1967 decree and Crimean Tatar rights or condone the deportation of unregistered Crimean Tatars.

Moscow concluded that since the Crimean Tatar movement was sending thousands of people to Crimea, the situation required mass repression on an unprecedentedly greater scale than with other repressions of the Brezhnev era. On August 15, 1978, the Soviet of Ministers issued secret decree 700. The decree (which did no stay secret for long) stated, "people who have arrived in the Crimean region in an unofficial manner and live there without passports, invalid passports, or without permits or registration… SHALL BE BANISHED from the region by organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)."[69] To undermine Crimean Tatar home rentals and purchases, attachments to the decree instructed Crimean law enforcement to use specific articles of the Ukraine SSR criminal code to inundate returnees with red-tape. For example, the instructions cited article 48 that allowed police to confiscate a home purchased with a

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[67] Ibid., 12.
[68] Ibid., 19-21.
[69] Decree of the USSR No. 700 USSR Council of Ministers, "The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, and Meskihetians"- Soviet Treatment of Some National Minorities, Report No. 6: Third Edition, ANC, Box 103, folder 19.

voided contract. As a result, Crimean notaries became clearinghouses for Soviet legal matters and they could usually find a pretext to void Crimean Tatar documents. The instructions suggested that Crimean authorities use the Ukraine SSR land code to stop Crimean residents from selling private plots to Crimean Tatars for home building.[70] The explicit goal of combining these laws was to make housing discrimination just as effective as passport/registration discrimination

The author of the decree, senior prosecutor N. Goncharenko, also sent unofficial instructions that encouraged Soviet law enforcement to get more creative with discrimination and deportation. At Goncharenko's behest, Crimean prosecutors created a clandestine "special division for the fight against Tatars." These prosecutors developed new tactics "because they better understood the particularities" of Crimea. First, "confiscating Crimean Tatar land purchases" became essential because it "removed any profit" they could earn from farming the land. Second, Crimean officials began (often illegally) bequeathing confiscated Crimean Tatar homes to kolkhozes. Next, prosecutors identified at least 2,000 uninhabited homes in Crimea they considered in danger of being "stolen by Tatars" and had police periodically inspect the homes for Crimean Tatars. In addition, the KGB ordered the Soviet Railroad and MVD at railroad stations to stop "shipping containers" from Crimean Tatars and only allow them to travel with hand luggage. For security, Goncharenko required Crimean police to have 100 to 120 officers on hand during deportation raids and that each deported family should be escorted by 20

[70] These also included articles 47 and 227 on the notarization of documents and article134 that restricted the purchase of the small plots for farming attached to homes. They especially focused on Statia 77 of the Ukraine SSR Land Code (Zemel' Kodeks Ukr. SSR). Pis'mo Goncharenko-Rekunkovu, l.l. 4-6.

police officers on the train to their place of exile.[71] In case Crimean officials had any doubts, in memos Goncharenko articulated that Crimean officials now had a mandate to "reverse" Crimean Tatar rights granted by the September 5, 1967, decree. Crimean Tatars could no longer "live anywhere," and Crimean authorities should not worry about legal contradictions. Goncharenko also admitted that Crimean Tatars were going to complain about these violations, and instructed Crimean officials to dismiss complaints with varies legal pretexts.[72]

With the 1975 Helsinki Accords and the activity of Moscow Helsinki Watch in mind, Soviet authorities began the new repressions with a public display touting that Crimean Tatars still had rights in Crimea even while Crimean authorities simultaneously decimated these rights. Alexeyeva is right that in the late-1970s Moscow had determined that repressions against dissidents and protests "outweighed the costs in terms of lost international prestige," but the large-scale effort against Crimean Tatars required some cosmetic cover.[73] The Crimean Oblsipolkom therefore passed a resolution on October 6, 1978 to "resolve" passport issues for Crimean Tatars who had returned to Crimea before October 15, 1978, and still did not have registration. At the very least, the Politburo wanted some war veterans and party members to gain registration so Soviet authorities had examples to counter complaints about discrimination. To fill this quota, Moscow prosecutors identified 27 families for registration. However, indicative of the strength of anti-Tatar sentiment among Crimean officials, the Crimean Obkom, led by first secretary

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[71] Many of these were handwritten instructions to specific Crimean officials. See GARF, f. 8131, op 28, d. 5809, l. 13. Zapiski Goncharenkogo. January 1979 and GARF, f. 8131, op 28, d. 5809, l.l. 14-18. "Sravnitelnaia Spravka" deistuiushchego poriadka primeneniia Pos. No. 700. January 1979.
[72] GARF, f. 8131, op 28, d. 5809, l.l. 14-18. "Sravnitelnaia Spravka" deistuiushchego poriadka primeneniia Pos. No. 700. January 1979.
[73] Alexeyeva and Goldberg, *The Thaw Generation*, 289.

V. S. Makarenko, refused to register the 27 families.[74] For his part, Goncharenko reminded Crimean officials that their new government and party decrees aimed at Crimean Tatars could not "mention just Crimean Tatars, because this would be a politically dangerous statement."[75] Crimean authorities did "comply" in this regard, and publicized that the mass deportations for passport violations could affect "anyone" not in compliance.[76]

Regardless of such shallow attempts to disguise anti-Tatar policy, in 1978 Moscow supported the destruction of the Crimean Tatar right to return to Crimea.[77] The repression began in 1967, but the decree codified the methods and emboldened the perpetrators. Goncharenko had supplemented older repressive tools with new ideas and created a more effective discriminatory regime in Crimean. This was the largest deportation and confiscation operation against a Soviet minority since Stalin.

Return and Re-deportation during the Height of Brezhnev's Stagnation

Crimean Tatars characterize the new repressions as a period of "political, physical, judicial sadism" for those stuck in the "closed circle" of living without registration. Crimean police officials and vigilantes launched an assault on Crimean Tatars that combined "legal" arrests with extra-legal violence, home demolition,

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[74] Moscow also rejected the Crimean prosecutor proposition of jailing larger number of Crimean Tatars because trials were bad for public relations. Pis'mo Goncharenko-Rekunkovu, l. 3.
[75] GARF, f. 8131, op 28, d. 5809, l. 13. Zapiski Goncharenkogo. January 1979.
[76] GARF, f. 8131, op 28, d. 5809, l.l. 50-56. Spravka "O khode vypolneniia Post. No. 700." UVD Krymoblispolkoma. February 8, 1979.
[77] GARF, f. 8131, op 28, d. 5809, l.l. 14-18. "Sravnitelnaia Spravka" deistuiushchego poriadka primeneniia Pos. No. 700. January 1979.

kidnapping, theft, vandalism, rape, and then deportation.[78] This campaign began in spurts after the Party Congress in 1976 and peaked in late 1978 after decree 700. The following detailed accounts of this discrimination are the results of the dissident network and Crimean Tatar complaints to Crimean prosecutors.

In 1977, Zera Mustafeva bought a house in the town of Molochnom. When she attempted to register and notarize the contract for her home, discrimination began:

> "On September 10 I went to the head of the local collective farm, T. Gaidaichuk, and said that I had bought a house and that I needed to get the contract notarized and that I would agree to any work on the farm. On September 13 Gaidaichuk and a policeman came to my house and delivered a warrant for my arrest for violations of the passport regime. I told them that I had not broken the law on my own accord, but rather I was waiting for my *propiska*."

Fours days later, while "on her way to the police station in an attempt to get registered," Gaidaichuk detained and deported her for violating the passport regime.[79] Another early victim of the repression campaign was Enver Ahmetov. He returned to the Crimea in June 1976 and bought a home in the town of Melihove. On July 1, he went to the local farm to register his passport and find work. Officials refused him registration and told him that his family was an "unwanted element." Then, on August 9 at 5:00am, local KGB evicted his family, broke their furniture, and stole their valuables."[80] In another example, on June 17, 1976, "Major Pisklov and Lt. Sinyalovskii oversaw the bulldozing of the Refamova family's home" in Belogorsk despite protests by Russian and Ukrainian neighbors. In the same neighborhood on August 9, police Lt. Harchenko "broke into

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[78] *Ibid*., 13.

[79] Letter from Zera Mustafa to the General Prosecutor of the City of Rudenko in the Crimean Regional Government and the Prosecutor of the Sakskovo Neighborhood, 1977, HIA, RFE-RLBA: ALS, box 270, folder 2.

[80] Letter from Enver Ahmetov to several human rights organizations, 1977, HIA, RFE-RLBA: ALS, box 270, folder 2.

Mustafa Abdulova's home and destroyed the interior." Then, on August 25, police evicted the family of Ya'ly Kendzhametova and bulldozed their home.[81] Against the wishes of Moscow, Crimean authorities also deported party members, although some such as Emirali Asanov received the home purchase money back after being "voluntarily deported."[82] Moscow Helsinki Watch declared, "the deportation and repression of Crimean Tatars was occurring according to the schedule of the KGB and police."[83]

Crimean Tatar leader Mustafa Dzhemilev experienced the same discrimination as regular Crimean Tatars. After his 1978 release from prison, he "asked that he be registered at his parent's new house in the town of Myromskoe."[84] Lt. Colonel Tsapenko in Belogorsk responded that, "the parents of the convict Mustafa Dzhemilev reside in the territory in gross violation of the passport laws." He also claimed that they would never get a residence permit in Crimea because they are "special settlers." For Crimean police, once a special settler meant always a special settler. To no one's surprise, Crimean police refused Dzhemilev a residence permit.[85]

Returning Crimean Tatars sometimes stayed with or bought homes from Crimean Tatars who had already had registration, but this was dangerous for both parties. When Lila Medzhitova and Derbish Derbishev returned to the Crimean village of Khlebnoe, they bought a house from Vait Ismailov. Ismailov was Crimean Tatar and sold the house

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[81] Personal accounts from the Declaration and petition from Crimean Tatar nationalists to the Belgrad Council, ca. 1977, HIA, RFE-RLBA: ALS, box 270, folder 2.
[82] GARF, f. 8131, op 28, d. 5809, l. 40. "Spravka" on deportations from October 15, 1978 to February 1, 1979.
[83] Letter to the farm council by Ponomareva and Vorotilova, 1977, HIA, RFE-RLBA: ALS, box 270, folder 2.
[84] Letter from Mustafa Dzhemilv to The Supreme Soviet, January 29, 1978, HIA, RFE-RLBA: ALS, box 270, folder 2.
[85] Letter from Lt. Colonel Tsapenko, Chairman of Oversight Commission Belogorsk District Council of Peoples Deputies, An overview of "Mustafa Dzhemilv and the Crimean Tatars" by Ayshe Seytmuratova, HIA, CFCSIC, box 99, folder 3.

after moving to Belogorsk. In January 1979, the Belogorsk government declared the home sale illegal, and deported Medzhitova, Derbishev and Ismailov from Crimea. Local authorities then transferred ownership of the house to the Khlebnoe sovkhoz. The family of Diliaver Adzhiumerov met the same fate in February 1979 after he sold a house to fellow Crimean Tatar returnee Sadyk Usta.[86]

Crimean officials and the culmination of decades of anti-Tatar rhetoric encouraged an increasing majority of Slavic Crimeans to view Crimean Tatars as a new Turkic "horde" threatening their villages and neighborhoods. Violent confrontations began to pit returning Crimean Tatars against their neighbors. In the village of Balki in the Belogorskii district for example, a fight broke out between Dani Asan and the Cherniakov family when Asan and his relatives began building a home on fallow land on the Zelenogorsk sovkhoz. A melee ensued when the Cherniakov family claimed the land and commandeered a tractor from the farm to bulldoze the home on October 15, 1978.[87]

At the same time, some Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea still had no problem with Crimean Tatars, and even came to their defense when Crimean police evicted families. As in the case of Enver Ahmetov in Melihov, Russian and Ukrainian neighbors sometimes protested and attempted to intervene when police deported their Crimean Tatar neighbors. Sometimes truck drivers refused to be deputized by police for deportation operations. In 1978, 26 Slavic farmers from the town of Bogatoe wrote and

[86] GARF, f. 8131, op 28, d. 5809, l.l. 38, 45. "Spravka" on deportations from October 15, 1978 to February 1979.
[87] GARF, f. 8131, op 28, d. 5809, l.l. 21-22. "Spravka" Prokuror Sledtsvennogo Upravleniia Sov. Iustitsii E. V. Martyn, g. Simferopol'. 1979.

signed a petition "complaining about the treatment of the Abimov family" after they were kidnapped from the farm in the middle of the night in 1976.[88]

Moreover, thousands of Slavic Crimeans did not hesitate in selling Crimean Tatars homes or renting them space. These arrangements often made sense for elderly Russians and Ukrainians who had settled in Crimea after World War Two and either hoped to return to their old region, live with relatives, or supplement their pensions. After moving to Voroshilogradskii oblast in 1978, E. S. Kovalevoi sold his house in the village of Zuia, Belogorskii district, to Nadyr Medzhitov for 16,500 rubles.[89] N. A. Shcherbatiuk sold his house in the village of Novozhilovsk to E. Suleimanov in 1978 when the pensioner decided to move to live with his son.[90]

As transactions between Slavic Crimeans and Crimean Tatars increased, Crimean authorities began to target both parties for deportation or prosecution. Adherents to the new Crimean narrative considered these Russians and Ukrainians to be "race traitors" to Slavic homogeny on the peninsula. Isolated incidents of targeting Slavic-Tatar interactions had occurred after the 1967 decree, but during the late-1970s these punishments became crucial to anti-Tatar discrimination.[91] Crimean prosecutors considered both the "distributors and receivers" in each transaction guilty of passport, land use, and other violations. They targeted Slavic "distributors" with administrative

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[88] Ibid.

[89] GARF, f. 8131, op 28, d. 5809, l. 38. "Spravka" on deportations from October 15, 1978 to February 1979.

[90] GARF, f. 8131, op 28, d. 5809, l.l. 21-22. "Spravka" Prokuror Sledtsvennogo Upravleniia Sov. Iustitsii E. V. Martyn, g. Simferopol'. 1979.

[91] For example, one 1972 report lists the evictions of the "Kurtseitov, Mazinov, and Gubanova" families, at least one of which was Crimean Tatar. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 140, d. 2455, l. 185. Protokol No. 43 Zasedaniia Biuro Krym. Obkoma KP Ukrainy ot 11 dekabriia 1972.

fines and/or deportation to discourage future home or land sales to Crimean Tatars.[92] For example, Liudmila Taranova sold her house to Ebazer Iunusov in December 1978 after moving in with her son in Simferopol. In response, Crimean authorities deported Iunusov and his family, and then fined Taranova for passport violations, confiscated the house and stole the 8,000 rubles she earned from the sale. Ekaterina Kuz"minicha was luckier and kept ownership of her house after paying administrative fines for selling to Crimean Tatars. Crimean prosecutors even pursued Tamara Cherkasova to Murmansk oblast to fine her for selling her house to Crimean Tatars in the Pervomaiskii district.[93]

According to prosecutorial records, Crimean police began deporting Slavic Crimeans who sold homes to Crimean Tatars as early as 1977. After all, Crimean police could deport anyone for passport violations. Eini and Anife Ablaev for example bought a home from Mikhail Drinevskii in the village of Bogatoe on November 29, 1978. They paid 7,000 rubles for the property, but made an agreement that Drinevskii could continue to live in the house. The next month police deported both the Ablaev family and Drinevskii to Krasnodar krai and seized the home. That same month, the police in Krasnogvardeiskii, Sovetskii district, deported Anatolii Reunov for selling his home to Enver Khalil. Vladimir Gidulianov faced a string of charges in January 1979 for selling his home to Crimean Tatars, and Crimean police deported him a month later. In some cases, Crimean authorities targeted Slavic Crimeans who sold homes years before the current repressions. Anatolii Zubov had sold his home to the Abliakimova family in April 1977, and Crimean authorities deported him as punishment on January 23, 1979.

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[92] GARF, f. 8131, op 28, d. 5809, l.l. 50-56. Spravka "O khode vypolneniia Post. No. 700." UVD Krymoblispolkoma. February 8, 1979.

[93] GARF, f. 8131, op 28, d. 5809, l.l. 37-40. "Spravka" on deportations from October 15, 1978 to February 1979.

Evgenii Potachkin had sold his home in October 1975 to Enver Memetov and Crimean police deported him over four years later for the "crime," on December 26, 1978.[94]

The relationships between the Slavs sellers and Crimean Tatar buyers were not always good, and these disputes had consequences. In at least one case, with homeowner Tamara Cherkasova and the Crimean Tatar family of Lenur Memetov, the arrangement whereby Memetov bought the house, but Cherkasova remained a resident, turned sour. Cherkasova asked local authorities to evict and deport the family and get her money back.[95]

Crimean Tatars and dissidents complained about the repressions. In 1978, Crimean Tatars filed 16 complaints for wrongful prosecution using article 196 of the Ukrainian criminal code. For example, Remen Saidametov and his wife moved to the village of Zemlianichnoe in August 1977. On April 28, 1978, a people's court convicted Saidametov of violating article 196 and deported him. His wife then wrote a complaint to the KPSS Central Committee that forwarded the material back to Crimean prosecutors who dismissed the complaint as frivolous.[96] As the stories of discrimination multiplied and the text of the secret order leaked, Andrei Sakharov wrote a scathing letter to the Supreme Soviet decrying the "cruel acts" against the Crimean Tatars and "the prosecution of Crimean Tatars who live without residence permits because of illegal, discriminatory policies of the local organs of power."[97] As repressions continued, human rights organizations tried to collect data on arrests and deportations. One report to

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[94] GARF, f. 8131, op 28, d. 5809, l.l. 37-40. "Spravka." October 15, 1978 to February 1979.
[95] GARF, f. 8131, op 28, d. 5809, l.l. 37-40. "Spravka." October 15, 1978 to February 1979.
[96] GARF, f. 8131, op 28, d. 5809, l. 27. "Spravka" Mladshii Sov. Iust. B. A. Bakharov. February 1979.
[97] Letter of Andrei Sakharov to the Chairman and Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, February 2, 1979, An overview of "Mustafa Dzhemilv and the Crimean Tatars" by Ayshe Seytmuratova, document index, HIA, CFCSIC, box 99, folder 3.

RFE/RL details the imprisonment of 34 Crimean Tatars sentenced to one and two year terms in labor camps for the failure to obtain registration, and their appeals.[98] As Goncharenko instructed, Crimean prosecutors dismissed the complaints.

The most dramatic reactions came from Crimean Tatars themselves. In Besh Terek on April 28, 1978, Musa Mahmut lit himself on fire in protest after police refused to register him. Afterwards, there were several copycats and Musa's "protracted legal battle for registration" and death by immolation became a national symbol of both the determination and the desperation of Crimean Tatars.[99] Mustafa Dzhemilev passed on the story to Aleksandrov, who penned the poem "Torch over Crimea (Fakel nad Krymom)" to both commemorate the tragedy and condemn the new wave of repression. Sakharov, Grigorenko, Bonner, and others wrote scathing letters about the incident and the RFE/RL and other Western press outlets reported on the escalation in the Crimean Tatar return campaign and Soviet repression.[100]

As intended, the wave of repression of the late 1970's effectively stopped Crimean Tatars from moving to Crimea until 1986. From 1973 to January 1979, Crimea prosecutors had charged 140 people with felonies for passport violations, charging 40 people in 1978 alone. They charged a further 4,250 Crimean Tatars with "administrative crimes" over the same period, with 1,732 charges in 1978 and 68 in January 1979. Police deported all Crimean Tatars with administrative violations.[101] By late 1978, the chance of new arrivals gaining residency was near zero. From October 15, 1978 to February 1,

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[98] Report from 1978, HIA, RFE-RLBA: ALS, box 270, folder 2.
[99] Uehling, *Beyond Memory*, 169-170, 212.
[100] GARF, f. 10148, op. 1, d. 26, l.l. 1-11. Stat'i Ali Khamzina, interv'iu posviashchennye pamita G. M. Aleksanrova. June 5, 2003.
[101] Prosecutors used ST. 196 of the Ukraine SSR criminal code for these charges. Pis'mo Goncharenko-Rekunkovu, l. 2.

1979, 29 new families (139 people) arrived and the police and KGB had deported 27 of the families by February 6.[102] This included the Khalilov, Aliev and Ametov families that Sovetskii district police deported in December 1978. In total, Crimean authorities deported at least 6,000 Crimean Tatars from 1976 to 1979.[103]

Despite the end of Crimean Tatar return in 1979, the final numbers of Crimean Tatars that returned between 1976 and 1979 was significant. In 1978, Crimean Tatar activist Ashe Seytmuratova estimated that by 1978 there were more than "700 unregistered families" in the Crimea.[104] KGB and Soviet Prosecutor figures suggests that the only area of agreement between Crimean Tatars and the Soviet government was on how many Crimean Tatars had returned to Crimea by the late 1970s and the extent of prosecution and deportation. By February 6, 1979, Crimean officials believed that 10,316 Crimean Tatars (1,930 families) were living in Crimea. Of these, 6,869 people (1,212) families had received registration, while 3,447 people (718 families) remained without registration. Out of those that remained without registration, 442 returned in 1976, 1,649 in 1977, and 936 in 1978. Unregistered Crimean Tatars included 2,050 people of working age, 1,125 children, 272 pensioners, 27 World War II veterans and 40 KPSS members.[105]

By district, Crimean Tatar return concentrated in Belogorskii (2,327 people), Leninskii (1,238 people), Kirovskii (1,126 people), Sovetskii (1,001 people) and Simferopol'skii (757 people). The portion of those Crimean Tatars with or without

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[102] Pis'mo Goncharenko-Rekunkovu, l. 2.
[103] GARF, f. 8131, op 28, d. 5809, l.l. 7-8. Pis'mo Prokuror Leninskogo Raiona-Gen. Prok. SSSR. February 2, 1979.
[104] Ayshe Seytmuratova letter written from exile in New York to Crimean Tatar nationalist, 8/3/1978, HIA, A. M. Nekrich Collection (AMNC), box 47, folder 2.
[105] Pis'mo Goncharenko-Rekunkovu, l.1.

registration varied in each district. In Belogorskii district, 1,015 people had registration, while 1,312 did not. In Kirovskii district, 412 people had registration, while 714 people did not. Sovetskii district was the most liberal with Crimean Tatar registration, with 808 registered Crimean Tatar to 193 unregistered Crimean Tatars.[106]

Although Soviet officials usually undercounted Crimean Tatars in any context, nothing in activist materials in the late 1970s suggests that the actual return numbers were any larger than the Soviet count. Therefore, whereas over 6,000 Crimean Tatars managed to stay in Crimea after returning during the first wave from 1967 to 1972, the enhanced repressions of the late 1970s halved the success of the second return wave, with roughly 3,000 Crimean Tatars returning and avoiding deportation.[107] Again, both Crimean Tatars and the Soviet government agreed that there were now over 10,000 Crimean Tatars in Crimea. The Crimean Tatar population in Krasnodarskii Krai and Kherson Crimean Tatar also continued to grow, while the Zaporozhsk oblast Crimean Tatar population reached 1,600 people.[108]

By 1979, Soviet and Crimean authorities hoped that they had settled the Crimean Tatar "problem." Moscow claimed that because thousands of Crimean Tatars were living in Crimea, that there was no ethnic discrimination in the Soviet Union. Those Crimean Tatars that faced deportations had broken laws and faced punishments no different from any other Soviet citizen. Although, Crimean officials were not pleased that now over

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[106] Pis'mo Goncharenko-Rekunkovu, l. 2.

[107] Of those 3,000 Crimean Tatars who returned and stayed from 1976 to 1979, most families traveled from the Uzbek SSR, but smaller numbers came from other regions. At least 10,000 Crimean Tatars left exile. Tashkent oblast had the most Crimean Tatars leave, followed Samarkand oblast, Ferghana oblast and, Andijan oblast. Prosecutors also noted some families arriving from the Kazakh, Tadjik, Kyrgyz and Turkmen republics, as well as from the Krasnodarskii, Kherson and Zaporozhsckii regions. GARF, f. 8131, op 28, d. 5809, l.l. 50-56. Spravka "O khode vypolneniia Post. No. 700." UVD Krymoblispolkoma. February 8, 1979.

[108] GARF, f. 8131, op 28, d. 5809, l.l. 50-56. Spravka "O khode vypolneniia Post. No. 700." UVD Krymoblispolkoma. February 8, 1979.

10,000 Crimean Tatars lived in Crimea, Moscow assuaged their discomfort with order 700 and the robust support that ended the new surge of Crimean Tatar return.

The Repressive Calm, Before the Storm

If Grigorenko was walking down a street in Simferopol, a Russian patriot would "punch him in the face" wrote Russian nationalist historian Aleksandr Shirokorad in 2014. To Russian nationalists, the Soviet dissident support of Crimean Tatar return was one of the movement's unforgivable sins. Crimean Tatars themselves erected a statue of Grigorenko in Simferopol to honor of his service to their nation.[109] In short, the Soviet government, Crimean Tatars, and now many Russian nationalists recognize the importance of the dissident-Crimean Tatar coordination in bolstering the protest movement and Crimean Tatar return for more than a decade. This effort was the fruit of Crimean Tatar and dissident collaboration that individuals such as Gaziev and Alexandrov initiated. Through the inter-Soviet network, radio broadcasts, *Khronika*, and other samizdat, Crimean Tatars across the Soviet Union received detailed accounts of those returning to Crimea. In 1976, Crimean Tatars returning to Crimea knew which police officers to avoid, which farms hired Crimean Tatars, and other useful information that, if they were lucky, allowed them to stay in Crimea.

The international coverage of the repressions led the Soviet Union to decimate the key collaborators from 1976 until Glastnost began. Soviet authorities had a litany of reasons to repress Soviet dissidents, from ideological general condemnations to attacks

[109] Shirokorad devotes a chapter to dissident-Crimean Tatar collaboration with the sarcastic title of "Repressed Peoples and Our Humanitarians." Most of the chapter regurgitates Nadisnkii, Vergasov and the main points of the new Crimean narrative: see Aleksandr Shirokorad, *Dissidenty 1956-1990* (Moscow: Algoritm, 2014), 94-111.

for their support for Refusniks in the mid-1970s. However, from the late 1960s until the end of the Soviet Union, the KGD, MVD and Soviet prosecutors cited dissident contact and coordination with Crimean Tatar resistance as one of the main causes (sometimes the sole cause) for charges against Soviet dissidents.[110] Again, this contact alarmed the KGB and central organs because it was a unique instance when dissident actions had consequences in the form of street protests and the movement of people destabilizing a strategic region. Dzhemilev faced a sixth prison term in 1984 for his continuing contacts with dissidents and Crimean Tatar activists in New York City. The Soviet government forced Sakharov and Elena Bonner into internal exile in Gorkii. Gorigorenko, Alexeyeva, Nekrich and other dissidents left the USSR under the threat of imprisonment.[111] Moscow police arrested the remaining Moscow Helsinki Watch members in September 1982 and *Khronika* ceased publication after 64 editions.[112]

Although the loss of this coordination and the repressions in Crimea and elsewhere worked to a large degree, they again failed to completely stop the protest movement. In Crimea, the Uzbek SSR, Moscow and elsewhere activists and regular Crimean Tatars continued advocating for their rights. Crimean Tatar protests endured for the very reason that had attracted non-Tatar attention in the first place- it was a popular movement that could not be completely stopped without violence or incarceration on a Stalinist scale. That was something even the most reactionary Soviet officials of the late-Brezhnev period were not willing to replicate.

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[110] For example, the KGB used Sakharov's diary, memoirs and letters to condemn him for claiming that Soviet policy towards Crimean Tatars was genocide. See Document 160, "The seizure of Sakharov's memoirs." Fedorchuk to Central Committee. November 1, 1982. In Rubenstein and Gribanov, *The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov*, 274-275.

[111] Theodore Shabad, *The New York Times*, "Crimean Tatar Sentenced to 6th Term of Detention," March 11, 1984. Available online at http://www.nytimes.com/1984/03/11/world/crimean-tatar-sentenced-to-6th-term-of-detention.html. Accessed on April 23, 2017.

[112] Alexeyeva and Goldberg, *The Thaw Generation*, 296-297.

This last return attempt created the Crimea that existed when Gorbachev's reforms began. Several thousand more Crimean Tatars had returned to Crimea, a fact that would be key in the late 1980s mass-return. At the same time, Crimean authorities dedicated themselves to the streamlined repression methods and increasingly racist tone that followed Goncharenko's instructions to decree 700. Moscow orchestrated these repressions and condoned illegal arrests and deportations. The anti-Crimean Tatar ideology that Partisan histories and the new Crimean narrative created in the 1940s remained a defining belief for Crimean party, government and police officials. While the good will of some Slavic Crimeans never ended, this period popularized anti-Tatar sentiment in a more visceral way because Crimean officials and police encouraged regular citizens to participate in the repression. Moreover, supporting or interacting with Crimean Tatars became dangerous as police threatened, fined, jailed, and sometimes deported Crimean residents who were neither Crimean Tatars nor dissidents.

In July 1979, the Crimean party and government celebrated the 325th anniversary of "Russian and Ukrainian Unity" with festivals celebrating Pushkin and Tolstoy.[113] The Crimean party ordered new youth programs to instill "the best traditions of the Russian and Soviet people." Nearly all party and government positions remained in the hands of Russians and Ukrainians. The new Five Year Plan included the construction of a Pepsi Cola plant, a new bread factory, new canal construction, and other projects.[114] New home construction for non-Tatars continued.[115] Crimean officials did not invite Crimean

[113] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 148, d. 2961, l. 73. Protokol No. 3 Sobraniia gorodskogo partiinogo aktiva Simferopolia. July 4, 1979.
[114] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 148, d. 2939, l.l. 76, 177, 183, 193a. Protokol XXXVII Krymskoi oblastnoi partiinoi konferentsii ot 5 ianvaria 1979 goda.
[115] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 140, d. 2455, l.l. 31-37. Perechen' zhilykh domov stroiashchisiia za schet gos. tsent. kapital'nykh vylozhenii. Obkom KP Ukrainy E. Epaneshnikova. October 27, 1972.

Tatars with registration to participate. Some Crimean Tatars may have returned, but the Crimean Tatar nation had not.

Chapter 8

Reversing Ethnic Cleansing, 1987-1991

The Soviet Union attempted to reverse engineer ethnic cleansing in Crimea from July 1990 to December 1991. Soviet of Ministries order 666 was one of the most radical political projects during an era of unprecedented Soviet reform. Crimean Tatar activists and individuals forced this policy by restarting mass-return to Crimea and a new wave of protests across the Soviet Union in 1987. Decades of resistance had taught Crimean Tatars that return was difficult, but possible, and they had created an extensive activist network and Crimean beachhead of around 10,000 returned Crimean Tatars that assisted new returnees. By 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev had a choice: support the 1978 mandate of Crimean authorities to arrest and deport new Crimean Tatar returnees or let them stay.

After some hesitation and even one reactionary order, Gorbachev relented. The resulting Soviet policy, order 666, was a repudiation of Stalin's 1944 deportations and ethnic cleansing and an acknowledgment that Crimea's largest indigenous population, Crimean Tatars, had the right to return to Crimea en masse without fear of deportation. As a creation of Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika, order 666 failed in tandem with the Soviet Union. Yet, to discount the reform because of the Soviet collapse is wrong because its one success was important. Crimean Tatars returned by the tens of thousands over the next several years and Crimean authorities could no longer use the Soviet police state to stop them. If anti-Tatar officials in Crimea had received military or KGB support

from 1989 to 1991, they could have undermined or stopped Crimean Tatar mass return similar to the two previous return attempts. At a crucial moment, Gorbachev rescinded Soviet support of maintaining ethnic cleansing in Crimea.

Bekir Osmanov, the decorated partisan and protest organizer that Crimean historians slandered, died on May 26, 1983, just a year after finally receiving registration in Crimea. Enshrining the importance of protests and sacrifice for both activists and regular Crimean Tatars, he ordered his relatives to bury him beside Musa Mahmut, the father who had self-emolliated in protest of anti-Tatar discrimination.[1] Unlike other small Soviet peoples with national movements that coalesced around "the preservation of a way of life," the deportation, mass death, survival in exile, protest and political assertiveness in Crimea became the unifying elements of Crimean Tatar national identity. As reforms began, Crimean Tatars focused on gaining a share of the "spoils" (economic and government positions) as their only hope in securing reasonable access to jobs, education, and making some cultural perseveration possible.[2] The extremity of the ethnic cleansing and the precariousness of their physical presence in the region limited expectations and forced pragmatic compromises. This led to their initial support of recreating the pre-1944 Crimean ASSR with its ethnic quotas in government and party leadership for Crimean Tatars and other minorities.

At the same time, order 666 created a political crisis in Crimea, and the Soviet Union did not have the control or assets to implement many of the practical and political parts of the return plan. Crimean Tatars were at an extreme disadvantage compared to

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[1] Ayshe Seytmuratova, "The Elders of the New National Movement: Recollections," 174.

[2] In contrast, Yuri Slezkine argues that many of the "small peoples of the north" and their nationalist leaders viewed the "preservation of their way of life" as more critical to their national sovereignty than "gaining than their share of industrial spoils." Slezkine, *The Small Peoples of the North*, 379-380.

the Slavic majority in determining the evolution of Crimean governance during Gorbachev's reforms (and in the post-Soviet period). As was the case in the 1960s and 1970s, there was immense and sometimes violent opposition to Crimean Tatar return, and the plan caused a deep resentment towards Gorbachev and reform in Crimea. There actually was common ground between Crimean Tatars and Russians in Crimea, but the dissolving of Soviet institutions and ideology altered the conversation. While remaining under Ukrainian control, Crimea became a battlefield between Russian and Crimean Tatar nationalism. Russian leaders in Crimea clung to the new Crimean narrative assertion that Crimea was unquestionably Slavic and that Stalin had liberated Crimean from both Nazis and treasonous minorities.

The Crimea officials attempted to halt Crimean Tatar enfranchisement by holding a referendum to reiterate who had political, economic and demographic control of the peninsula. The referendum did imply a possible return to Russia from Ukraine contingent on new Soviet law. However, the immediate, and deliberate, goal of the vote was a reactionary countermeasure to Crimean Tatar demands for positions in the government, party, and economic institutions, and the allocation of land and subsidized homebuilding. The referendum created a "new version" of the Crimean ASSR that ensured ethnic Slavs retained the levers of government in Crimean, and was devoid of Soviet nationalities policies of affirmative action. The Soviet Union collapsed just as mass Crimean Tatar return peaked and the new Crimean ASSR became an autonomous republic inside the new Ukrainian state. Few Crimean residents were happy with the result.

Glasnost for Crimean Tatars and Crimea:

The fate of the Crimean Tatar return movement was caught up in the larger drama of a failing Soviet economy, growing nationalist tensions, and the widespread calls for reform. Gorbachev's "glasnost" and "perestroika" reforms began after the XXVIIth Party Congress in 1986 and energized nationalist and dissident movements all over the communist world.[3] As Ronald Suny argues, by 1988 Soviet politics were no longer "within the corridors of the Central Committee in Moscow." The "streets began to speak" and the "elements of civil society that had been developing during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras" found themselves liberated.[4]

No other Soviet protest movement had more experience taking to the streets and protesting from the 1950s to the 1980s than Crimean Tatars. Both old and new Crimean Tatar activists took action. Released political prisoners involved in the movement such as Mustafa Dzhemilev, Edie Dzhemilev and Grigorii Aleksandrov traveled to Crimea.[5] With Crimean Tatar activism now legal, activists coalesced around two often-competing organizations, the National Movement of Crimean Tatars (NDKT) and the Organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement OKND.[6] The NDKT was the larger and more moderate organization and it demanded that the Supreme Soviet admit NDKT members such as Mustafa Dzhemilev as special representatives for Crimean Tatars.[7] In Tashkent, the more radical OKND held their first and second "all-Union meetings" in April and

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[3] Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States* (Oxford University Press, 1998), 461.
[4] Ibid., 459-461.
[5] GARF, f. 10148, op. 1, d. 26, l. 10. Stat'i Ali Khamzina, interv'iu posviashchennye pamita G. M. Aleksandrova. June 5, 2003.
[6] The NDKT was also open to creating a "Slavic-Turkic" Union in Crimea. The OKND was more radical in its disdain towards Moscow, although it was essential in working with Kiev after the Soviet collapse to ensure that Crimean Tatars could retain their national electoral body (the Mejlis). On these organizations see Wilson, "Politics in and around Crimea: A Difficult Homecoming," 281-292.
[7] GARF, f. A-664, op. 1, d. 176, l. 3. Pis'mo Ruslan Kubedinov i drugie- TsK KPSS, Gorbachevu El'tsinu i drugie. 1989.

June 1987 and demanded immediate return to Crimea and reparations for genocide. While disputes between the two organizations and other activists would grow with time, from 1987 to 1991 the popularity of Crimean Tatar return among the ethnic group was near universal and overshadowed internecine conflict. The Moscow lobby swelled from a few dozen representatives to over 700 Crimean Tatars during the summer of 1987. When Reshat Dzhemilev organized mass protests on Red Square, the police surrounded them, but some protests lasted nearly an hour and there were few arrests. Lobbyists met with hundreds of Soviet officials. In a petitions addressed to Gorbachev activists made familiar demands: all Crimean Tatars should be allowed to return to Crimea and exercise their rights and the Soviet state should release all political prisoners.[8]

Outside support included older Soviet dissidents and human rights activists, but also new groups. Volga Tatar nationalists demanded that the Soviet Union end the "genocide and suffering of this people (Crimean Tatars).[9] Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey began making more vocal demands for the Soviet Union to admit to "genocide." In Ufa, a meeting of Soviet Muslim leaders donated 5,000 Korans for distribution to returning Crimean Tatars.[10] In Moscow, 30 Supreme Soviet deputies from Latvia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Chechnya and other republics urged Gorbachev to create a return plan and place liberal experts in charge of the project.[11] The remnants of the

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[8] "A Short Analysis of the Events of Summer of 1987," By Reshat Dzhemilev. HIA, AMNC, box 47, folder 2, pgs 1-3, 20.
[9] GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l. 13. Telegram sem'ia Faizrakh Manovykh iz Tatarstana- Yeltsinu. September 9, 1990.
[10] The Turkish Journal was *Turk Yurtlari* No. 2. April-June 1990, Ankara. The Islamic meeting in Ufa was the *S"ezd musul'man Evropeiskoi chasti Souiza* (meeting of Muslims from the European part of the Soviet Union. See *Avdet* No. 1, July 15, 1991, HIA, AMNC, box 47, folder 2, pgs 1, 4.
[11] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 209, l.3. Pis'mo Narodnykh Deputatov-Gorbachevu. December 22, 1989.

Helsinki Watch Group formed "Memorial" in late October 1988 and discussed "the struggle for the fastest possible return" to Crimea.[12]

At the same time, Crimean and Uzbek officials condemned Crimean Tatar agitation in their respective regions. The "politically safe" Crimean position remained the same: returning Crimean Tatars would destabilize a strategic region. Crimean officials cited the lack of housing and water and the fear of ethnic tensions in their opposition to return.[13] However, the Russians in Crimean leadership had fought Crimean Tatar return for decades and they were conservative communists from military backgrounds who opposed Gorbachev's reforms outright.[14] As the Ukrainian independence movement began, Crimea became a conservative Russian nationalist stronghold within Ukraine.[15] By 1989, there were around 1,717,500 Russians and 732,500 Ukrainians in Crimea.[16] Moreover, many of the Ukrainians had undergone Russification from living in a Russian majority region.[17]

Uzbek officials faced rising ethnic tensions, and they viewed Crimean Tatar activism as a threat to stability in the towns and regions where Crimean Tatars were concentrated. Tashkent had spent four decades containing Crimean Tatar protests and

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[12] The meeting to found "Memorial" (first known as the All-Union Voluntary Historical-Educational Society) occurred on October 29-30, 1988 in Moscow. However, by this time the speed of reform and shear scope of Soviet crimes diluted the once sharp focus on the Crimean Tatar issues that had been apparent throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Document 195, Kryuchkov to Central Committee on the establishment of Memorial, November 16, 1988 in Rubenstein and Gribanov, 333-336.

[13] Certainly housing was a chronic issue in Crimea. Waiting lists for apartments in cities such as Yalta and Simferopol were from 16 to 26 years. However, the problem had not stopped over two million Slavs from moving to Crimea between 1944 and 1990. Furthermore, the 11th Five Year plan pledged to build 13,000 new apartments in Crimea to meet the demand. See GARF, f. 5446, op. 148, d. 1711, l.l. 1-2. "Spravka" tov. Barashkova N. I. "O rezul'tatakh poezdki v komandirovku v krymskoi oblast' v sostave brigady TsK KPSS." December 30, 1986.

[14] Anna Reid, *Borderland: A Journey through the History of Ukraine* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 189.

[15] Orest, *Ukraine*, 585.

[16] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 320, l. 44. Pis'mo Nishanov-Luk'ianovu. April 4, 1991.

[17] Orest, 500. See also, GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l.l. 49-50. "Problemy Kryma." Iu. Osmanov, G. Baev, and R. Gaziev. September 11, 1991.

attempting to integrate Crimean Tatars into Uzbek economic and state institutions. Crimean Tatar return meant that these policies had failed to dissolve the Crimean Tatar nation and that the Uzbek state had wasted a huge amount of money and effort. Uzbek officials reacted to glasnost by ordering an increase in Soviet "patriotic and proletarian" propaganda directed at Crimean Tatars and by attacking the idea of returning to Crimea with old arguments. One Uzbek decree stated that Crimean Tatar return was "egotistical" and contradicted the Soviet "brotherhood of nations." In an article for the journal *Soiuz,* Uzbek party historians argued that Crimean Tatars could not claim the right to return to Crimea because Russians had "spilt more blood" on the peninsula and were therefore entitled to Crimean "blood rights."[18] ITAR-TASS issued an official message on July 24, 1987, that insisted Crimean Tatars could not return because Crimea was overcrowded.[19] The weekly *Sobesednik* ran an interview with the dissident historian Aleksander Nekrich, who, despite having advocated for Crimean Tatar rights, believed that they had missed their "historic chance" to return home in the 1950s.[20]

The Nationalities Soviet of the Supreme Soviet also proposed the creation of Crimean Tatar "national districts" in several Uzbek regions.[21] Following the suggestion, in 1989 the presidium of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet proposed creating Crimean Tatar

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[18] GARF, f. 10026, op. 4, d. 1025, 122ob. "Kto prolil bol'she krov', tot imeet pravo na gospodstvo" – Institute Istorii KP Uzbekistana published in Soiuz No. 13 1990g. and reprinted in "O budushchem krymskoi ASSR." March 30, 1990.

[19] On April 8, 1987 the "Sov. Sekretno" Postanovlenie TsK KPG Uzbekistana "O plane meropriiatii otdelov TsK Kompartii Uzbekistana po dal'neishemu usileniiu organizatorskoi, ideologicheskoi, politico-vospitatel'noi raboty sredi krymskikh tatar prozhivaiushchikh v respublike." See, GARF, f. A-664, op. 1, d. 176, l.l. 29-32. "Zaiavlenie" Ali Khamzin-Ver. Sov. SSSR, sredstvam massovoi informatsii i chlenam komissii po problwmam krymsko-tatarskogo naselenii. July 31, 1989.

[20] The interview is an odd footnote to Nekrich's advocacy. Perhaps, as Vladislav Zubok points out, he was one of the dissidents whose "internationalist spirit" had been humbled by the Soviet crisis and renewed Russian nationalism in Moscow. GARF, f. 10026, op. 4, d. 1025, l. 121. "Istoriia- tizheloe moe remeslo" A. Nekrich in Sobesednik No. 11, 1990g. Reprinted in "O budushchem krymskoi ASSR." March 30, 1990; Zubok, 361.

[21] GARF, f. A-664, op. 1, d. 176, l.l. 59, 59ob. "Zaiavlenie" from 20 Crimean Tatars, A. E. Khalilov and others to Pred. Ver. Sov. SSSR Gorbichevu and chlenu Ver. Sov. Soveta Yelstin. July, 1989.

"schools, national clubs, and cultural centers" in regions with concentrated Crimean Tatar populations.[22] However, by 1990 the deterioration of interethnic relations and security in several Uzbek regions overshadowed any such conciliatory projects aimed at convincing deported minorities to remain in the Uzbek state.[23]

To the dismay of Crimean Tatars, Gorbachev initially supported the positions of the Uzbek and Crimean governments. On December 24, 1987, the Soviet of Ministries issued a reactionary decree designed to discourage Crimean Tatars from returning to Crimea. The order forbade "people returning to Crimea" from receiving residency permits in the seven largest Crimean cities and the seven districts where the vast majority of Crimean Tatars had resided before the deportation. In addition, the order forbade Crimean Tatars from moving to regions adjacent to Crimea.[24]

Regardless of the order, around 60,000 Crimean Tatars returned to Crimea from 1988 to early 1990, and thousands of Crimean Tatars accumulated in illegal encampments on the outskirts of towns in Crimea, Krasnodar krai, and several Ukrainian oblasts. Crimean authorities returned to old tactics of harassing Crimean Tatars with registration, home, and notary laws, but Crimean law enforcement was soon overwhelmed. As these tent cities grew, Crimean Tatars sent thousands of letters and

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[22] GARF, f. 9654, op. 10, d. 123, l.l. 4-16. "Proekt: Zakon Uzbekskoi SSR o iazykakh." May 1989.

[23] Collective letters from ethnic Uzbeks in regions with former special settlers suggest that many people no longer trusted the government to implement reforms or even to prevent violent outbursts between different ethnic groups. See GARF, f. 10007, op. d. 70, l.l. 1-2. Pis'mo Zhitelei g. Khorezma. Feburary 2, 1990 and GARF, f. 10007, op. d. 157 l.l. 1-4ob. Pis'mo Shonazar Avezov "O khode politicheskikh i economicheskikh reform v SSSR. January 12, 1990.

[24] The restricted Crimean towns were Alushta, Evpatoria, Kerch', Sevastopol', Simferopol', Feodosia and Ialta and the restricted districts were Bakhchisaraiskii, Leninskii, Razol'enskii, Sakskii, Simferopol'skii, Sudakskii, and Chernomorskii. The restricted Krasnodar towns were Anapa, Gelendzhsk Krymsk, Novorossiisk, and Tupase. In the 1970s Krasnodar had become and important base of Crimean Tatar activism. GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 120, l. 42. Postanovlenie Sovmin ot 24 Dekabria 1987 no. 1476 "Ob ogranichenii propiski grazhdan v nekotorykh naselennykh punktakh Krymskoi oblasti I krasnodarskogo Kraia."

petitions to Moscow.[25] A. Bekirov wrote that he had fought the Nazis at Stalingrad, Briansk, Kursk and along the Belorussian front. The NKVD deported him in 1944, but he had retained his communist party membership. He and 25 other Crimean Tatar veterans gave a simple message for Moscow in 1990: they and the younger generations of Crimean Tatars were going home and staying.[26]

Not all Crimean officials took a hard line. Iurii Tsavro, a people's deputy to the Supreme Soviet representing Yalta's 485th voting district, accepted that Crimean Tatar mass return was inevitable.[27] On November 14, 1989, he wrote a letter to the chair of Nationalities Committee of the Supreme Soviet, Refik Nishanov. In the letter, Tsavro explained how at least 58,000 Crimean Tatars had already returned to Crimea. On the outskirts of Alushta near the village of Zaprudnom, he had just met with 29 Crimean Tatar families living in tents. All of the families were originally from Zaprudnom, but officials refused to allow them to buy houses and receive residency permits. Tsavro complained that five of the families included World War II veterans with medals.[28]

At the same time, hundreds of letters to Moscow from Russian-speaking Crimeans and inter-Crimean communications reveal a growing divide between rural and urban residents in Crimean. While urban party and government leaders supported the 1987 law to restrict Crimean Tatars from certain cities and districts, by the end of 1989 some rural Crimean residents argued that Moscow should allow Crimean Tatars to live in

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[25] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 120, l.l. 43-44. Pis'mo Iu. S. Tsavro- Narodnyi Deputat SSSR Nishanovu. November 14, 1989.
[26] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 209, l.l. 28-29. Pis'mo Sov. Nats. Ver. Sov. SSSR (Nishanovu). April 27, 1990.
[27] Outside of government, Tsavro was Polish doctor trained in Leningrad and the head of the Yalta City Hospital. A short bio of Iurii Stanislavovich Tsavro is available at http://krymology.info/index.php/Цавро,_Юрий_Станиславович. Accessed on November 5, 2016.
[28] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 120, l.l. 43-44. Pis'mo Iu. S. Tsavro- Narodnyi Deputat SSSR Nishanov. November 14, 1989.

urban areas. These rural residents claimed that Gorbachev's order placed an unfair burden on their farms and villages.[29] Soon, the protests of Crimean Tatars and rural Crimeans against the 1987 decree, combined with the general chaos of massive tent cities in Crimea, forced Moscow to act. Another letter by Tsavro to the Supreme Soviet on November 24, 1989, summed up Crimean Tatar sentiment: the Soviet government organized the deportation in 1944 and it was now Moscow's responsibility to "undo the deportation."[30] While not enthusiastic, by 1989 Gorbachev agreed that Crimean Tatars had the right to "return to the Crimea, gain equal living conditions, and have their political prisoners freed."[31]

The Parade of Commissions and Order 666

By the advent of glasnost and perestroika, the Soviet Union had become the most bloated, complex state bureaucracy in the world. As a result, the Soviet state created over a dozen commissions on the union, republic and oblast levels in order to solve the Crimean conundrum. Even if the Soviet state had been efficient, the task was daunting. Crimean Tatar return was what Lewis Siegelbaum and Leslie Moch describe as "Soviet transnational migration," or the "movement across a border that defined the home of a national group" that had logistical and ideological perils for any Soviet ethnicity even in better circumstances.[32] The Crimean situation was more complicated because the debate over which nations could claim Crimea as a "home" was just beginning, and the Ukraine

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[29] Reid, *Borderland*,185.
[30] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 120, l.l. 57-59. Pis'mo Iu. S. Tsavro- Zam. Pred. Ver. Sov. SSSR A. I. Luk'ianov. November 24, 1989.
[31] Reshat Dzhemilev's "Short Analysis of the Events of Summer 1987," A. M. Nekrich Collection, box 47, folder 2, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, CA.
[32] Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Leslie Page Moch, "Transnationalism in One Country? Seeing and not Seeing Cross-Border Migration within the Soviet Union," *Slavic Review* (Vol. 75:4, Winter 2016), 970-986.

SSR, RSFSR, and Crimean authorities had more political capital than Crimean Tatars. With the combination of the above problems and the intransigence of Crimean officials, many of these commissions were repetitive, confused or pointless. Still, taken as a whole they represented a profound sea change in the Soviet acceptance of Crimean Tatar return.

Crimean Tatar activists began meetings with Soviet officials at all levels in autumn 1989, and thousands of letters, telegrams, and meetings supported the effort by calling on the Supreme Soviet SSSR to create an official return plan.[33] For instance, during Boris Yeltsin's 1989 tour of Central Asian republics, Crimean Tatar factory worker Dilver Mustafaev pressed Yeltsin to support Crimean Tatar return (Yeltsin replied that he could not comment on the situation).[34] This new onslaught of Crimean Tatar activism and a sharp uptick in Crimean Tatar return to Crimea forced the Soviet Union to act.[35] In early 1989, the Supreme Soviet in Moscow created a commission to study and recommend solutions to the "Crimean Tatar problem." In response, the Crimean Obkom created a "Commission on Inter-ethnic Relations" to debate the eminent Crimean Tatar return. At the commission's first meeting on July 8, 1989, Crimean Party Secretary A. N. Girenko invited five Crimean Tatars and instructed them to elect representatives to the Supreme Soviet commission. However, Crimean Tatars immediately became suspicious

[33] GARF, f. A-664, op. 1, d. 176, l.l. 62-64. Informatsiia o vstreche predstavitelei NDKT s Pred. Pres. Ver. Sov. Tad. SSR Pallaevym G. P. By D. K. Mustafaev, E. V. Isliamov, and I. R. Belialov. August 18, 1989.

[34] Dilver posed the question at a meeting of the Tadjik Raw Materials and Building Enterprise in Dushanbe on September 1, 1989. GARF, f. A-664, op. 1, d. 176, l. 60. Letter to Tov. El'tsin from Mustafaev Dillver Kendzhe-Ametovich. September 10, 1989.

[35] GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l.l. 52-54.. Pis'mo Aider Bariev i drugie- 28th S"ezdu TsK KPSS i drugie. July 11, 1990.

because Crimean officials required that the representatives already be residents of Crimea and gave them only two days to hold the election.[36]

Crimean Tatars debated the usefulness of participating in commissions, but most activists believed that, at the very least, the bodies could serve as a platform for protest.[37] Moreover, as even the more radical activists admitted, "Crimean Tatars on their own did not have the power" to return and confront the "massive great-power bureaucracy" simultaneously.[38] On July 9, 1989, Crimean Tatars elected activists Mustafa Dzhemilev and Akseit Seitmemetov as their representatives. At the election meeting, Crimean Tatars also reiterated their specific goals. Above all, they desired full political rehabilitation, return to Crimea, and the reestablishment of the Crimean ASSR according to the October 18, 1921, Crimean constitution.[39]

The Crimean Obkom took the nominations to the Nationalities Soviet of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow. On July 12, 1989, the Nationalities Soviet created "The Commission on the Problem of the Crimean Tatar People" with the goal of finding "realistic" solutions to the Crimean Tatar issue. As head of the Nationalities Soviet, Refik Nishanov had final say over the commissions and appointed Genadi Ianaev, the

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36 Obviously, at the time, the vast majority of Crimean Tatars still resided in exile. The five representatives that meet with the Crimean party were Sabir Seutov, Ebazer Seitvaapov, Ul'imi Umerov, Shevket Mustafaev and Akseit Seitmemetov. GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 120, l. 5. Vypiska iz protokola soveshchaniia Krymskoi oblastnoi NDKT. July 9, 1989.

37 The debate over working with the government commissions continued until the Soviet Union collapsed. Some, such as NDKT Iuri Bekirov remained opposed and had a prolonged dispute with activist Riza Asanova who opted to participate in the government commissions in Simferopol and Moscow. GARF, f. 10026, op. 4, d. 1025, l. 127. "Protokol Sobraniia" (Crimean Tatar meeting in Fergana). April 22, 1990.

38 GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l. 15. "Ne povtorit istoricheskoi oshibki," zaiavlenie Makhalinskikh (Tajik SSR) sobranii NDKT- Verkh. Sov. SSSR i drugie. June 2, 1990.

39 In addition, Crimean Tatars demanded that nine more Crimean Tatars participate in the commission as assistants to the two representatives. These assistants included Abdureshit Dzhepparova, Bekir Umerov, Sadyk Berberov, Shevket Kaibullaev, Eskender Fazylov, Sabir Seutov, Izzet Reshitov, Refat Kurtiev, and Shevket Mustafaev. GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 120, l. 5. Vypiska iz protokola soveshchaniia Krymskoi oblastnoi NDKT. July 9, 1989.

First Secretary of VTsSPS and a peoples' deputy, to head the Crimean Tatar commission. The 13 non-Crimean Tatar commission members included economists, journalists, and bureaucrats from Crimea, the Uzbek SSR and Moscow, each assigned with studying a specific aspect of the Crimean Tatar issue.[40]

Crimean Tatars' early suspicions of the Supreme Soviet commissions proved correct. Nishanov, who had veto power over the commission's members and recommendations, was already notorious among Crimean Tatars for his leadership in the Uzbek party during the 1960s and 1970s. On his watch, the Uzbek KGB had imprisoned Dzhemilev, while Uzbek party branches had expelled Crimean Tatars and economic managers had fired Moscow lobby participants from their jobs because of their activism. He also once told Crimean Tatar activists that, if they wanted to go "home," they should go to Kazan.[41] Nishanov, who remained wary of Crimean Tatar activism, rejected Dzhemilev's nomination and replaced him with Crimean Tatar activist Dzhul'vern Abliamitov.[42] Angered at the snub of Dzhemilev, Abliamitov and three other Crimean Tatar activists traveled to Moscow and sought a meeting with Nishanov on July 17, 1989. Nishanov agreed to the meeting, but during the visit explained that "reasonable" people and experts were going to determine solutions, and Crimean Tatar influence would be minimal because "extreme and passionate" activists such as Dzhemilev would not allow for "constructive" solutions. Abliamitov and the other Crimean Tatars replied that this approach would fail because, like it or not, most Crimean Tatars were passionate about

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[40] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 120, l.l. 6-7. Postanovlenie Soveta Natsional'nostei Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR no. 220-1 "ob obrazovanii komissi po problema Krymsko-Tatarskogo Naroda." July 12, 1989.

[41] The Volga Tatar center and capital of the Tatar ASSR. GARF, f. A-664, op. 1, d. 176, l. 72-73. Rezoliutsiia NDKT po itogam vstrech Komissii Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR s trudiashchikhsia krymsckimi Tatarami v Ferganskoi dolinei i Krasnodarskom Krae. Uiri Osmanov- Plenumu TsK KPSS po Natsional'noi politike, Ver. Sov SSSR i drugie. September 14, 1989.

[42] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 120, l.l. 9-16. Stenograficheskaia Zapis'. July 17, 1989.

the subject. Moreover, with just two seats on the commission, meeting attendee Reshat Kenzhe quipped that the Crimean Tatar future was bleak if their "fate was going to be decided by a show of hands." Nishanov replied that Crimean Tatars did not "have the right to distrust" the Soviet government.[43]

Regardless of the question of trust, the commission's work on "solutions" began. Ianaev and the commission toured Crimea, Russia and the Uzbek SSR. They met with hundreds of Crimean Tatars and gauged their desire to return. In general, Crimean Tatars relayed to the committee that the return had to be a "deliberate economic operation" that would provide returnees with jobs, both in new home construction and long-term careers in agriculture, tourism and industry.[44] Upon returning to Moscow, Ianaev argued to Nishanov that Moscow should declare all acts against Crimean Tatars illegal and immoral, reestablish the Crimean ASSR, and not consign Crimean Tatars to some "national region" or "reservations" outside of Crimea. In addition, he argued that Moscow should create a body that represented Soviet republics and relevant ministries to devise a return plan with a "significant financial element."[45]

After September 1989, the number of commissions boomed as the scope and scale of the return project became clear. When Ianaev's commission made a recommendation, republics and ministries created new commissions to study the recommendations and soon the process stalled. By December 1989, in all its bureaucratic glory, Moscow and

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[43] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 120, l.l. 9-16. Stenograficheskaia Zapis'. July 17, 1989.
[44] GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l. 15. "Ne povtorit istoricheskoi oshibki," zaiavlenie Makhalinskikh (Tajik SSR) sobranii NDKT- Verkh. Sov. SSSR i drugie. June 2, 1990.
[45] The commission's biggest meetings were in Simferoopl' and Bakchisarai in Crimea, Novorossisk in Krasnodarskii Krai , and in Tashkent, Kokand, Andijan, Namangan, Palvantasho, Kurgan-Tepa in the Uzbek SSR from September 1-14, 1989. Other commission requests included releasing all activists jailed for their participation in the Crimean Tatar movement. GARF, f. A-664, op. 1, d. 176, l. 72-73. Rezoliutsiia NDKT po itogam vstrech Komissii Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR s trudiashchikhsia krymsckimi Tatarami v Ferganskoi dolinei i Krasnodarskom Krae. Uiri Osmanov- Plenumu TsK KPSS po Natsional'noi politike, Ver. Sov SSSR i drugie. September 14, 1989.

republic governments had created "commissions on the Crimean Tatar problem" to address the dysfunction of earlier commissions. The new commissions then recommended the creation of more commissions.[46]

While the commissions failed to produce a return plan in 1989, other developments were positive. On November 19, 1989, the Supreme Soviet declared that the deportations of ethnic groups had been unlawful, and that the Soviet government had to reinstate the full rights of individuals and nations.[47] A further order created a list of Stalin's "illegal" policies in Crimea that included the deportation order and the order dissolving the Crimean ASSR.[48] Crimean Tatars also began publishing the newspaper, *Avdet*, in Simferopol to "unite all Crimean Tatars with the ideas of a progressive society and human democracy" and chronicle the return to Crimea.[49]

Soon the combination of liberalizing politics, bureaucratic dysfunction, the situation in Crimea, and unrest in Central Asia reached a critical point. On May 18, 1990, the 46th anniversary of the Crimean Tatar deportation, Crimean Tatars in Moscow, Crimea, the Uzbek SSR, Kiev, Kransodar krai and other regions protested the Soviet failure to implement a concrete return plan.[50] In Uzbek towns with large Crimean Tatar populations such as Chirchik, hundreds of workers went on strike with demands for

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[46] Many of the commissions also combined examining the Crimean Tatar situation with rehabilitating other ethnic groups such as Meshketians and Volga Germans. This only made the process more confusing. See GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 120, l. 60. Postanovlenie Ver. Sov. SSSR "O vyvodakh i predlozheniiakh komissiia po problemam sovetskikh nemtsev i Krymsko-Tatarskogo Naroda" no. 845-I. November 28, 1989 and GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 120, l. 61. Postanovlenie Ver. Sov. SSSR no. 1117 "Ob obrazivanii komissii po organizatsii vypolneniia Postanovlenie Ver. Sov. SSSR "O vyvodakh i predlozheniiakh komissiia po problemam sovetskikh nemtsev i Krymsko-Tatarskogo Naroda."" December 21, 1989.

[47] GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l.l. 52-54.. Pis'mo Aider Bariev i drugie- 28th S"ezdu TsK KPSS i drugie. July 11, 1990.

[48] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 209, l. 12. Postanovlenie Ver. Sov. SSSR "O vostanovlenie Krymskoi ASSR." Febuary 26, 1991.

[49] *Avdet* No. 2, August 1 1991, HIA -AMNC, box 47, folder 2.

[50] GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l. 27. Pis'mo Sh. A. Ulanova, R. Ia. Khatyb-Zade, B. G. Gafarov, Z. Seitkhalilov, i D. Ametova- Yeltsinu. September 27, 1990.

Uzbek authorities to reinstate the jobs and party memberships of Crimean Tatars expelled over the previous decades. In Almalyk, strikers demanded material help for the move to Crimea.[51] As the commissions debated possible solutions, the Crimean Tatar return population grew, along with the tent cities and the anxiety of everyone in Crimea. By March 1990, rumors were circulating among Russians that Crimean Tatars were smuggling weapons into the camps to begin an uprising. While this rumor was false, increasing violence in the Caucuses and the Ferghana Valley heightened tensions.[52]

The situation in and around Simferopol, Bakhchisarai, and Alushta were typical of the summer of 1990 in Crimea. Simferopol district authorities refused to grant returnees land plots and registration so Crimean Tatars created massive tent cities in the villages of Fontany, Sofievka, Mar'ino, Kamenka, Lozovoe, and the Zapadnaia neighborhood. On July 15, Il'im Umerov helped organize a demonstration and the construction of a "mini-camp" on Simferopol's Lenin Square to showcase the living conditions of returning Crimean Tatars.[53] In the Bakhchisarai district, after registering over 300 Crimean Tatars in some villages, officials refused the registration of 33 applicants at one passport table. Afterwards, newly arrived Crimean Tatars to the district refused to apply for registration, arguing that they did not need police permission to return to their homeland. In addition to refusing Crimean Tatars registration and land, authorities in Alushta and several other areas blocked access to drinking water.

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[51] One such large protest was at the Chirchiksel'mash Transportmatornyi Zavod. *Avdet* No. 1, July 15, 1991, AMNC, box 47, folder 2, page 1-2.

[52] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 209, l. 18. Pis'mo Narodnikh Deputatov Kryma- Pred. Ver. Sov, Ukraine SSR, i drugie. March 1990.

[53] An update from Simferopol district by Il'im Umerov. *Avdet* No. 2, August 1 1991. HIA, AMNC, box 47, folder 2.

Confrontations and fights between Crimean Tatars, police and other residents increased and further stoked the fears of armed conflict.[54]

Despite his reservations, Nishanov believed Moscow needed a concrete plan. Gorbachev had to either support total Crimean Tatar return or mobilize police or military units to stop Crimean Tatar repatriations and perhaps begin a larger version of the 1978 deportations.[55] Even though he soon lost control of the situation, Gorbachev chose liberalization. On July 11, 1990, the Supreme Soviet issued order 666, a twelve-point plan of "initial measures" to reverse the ethnic cleansing of Crimean Tatars. In the short term, the order reversed the 1978 and 1987 decrees and directed all Crimean authorities to provide registration stamps to Crimean Tatars regardless of home ownership, and the Ukraine SSR had to assure that all returnees received land, jobs, and building materials. Moreover, an addendum to the plan required the Crimean government to find housing for 8,400 Crimean Tatar families who had already returned. In the long term, Ianaev's commission had work to with the relevant republics and ministries to finalize a 10-year plan for future returnees and then present the project to the Council of Ministries by September 1990.[56]

It was the responsibility of all Soviet Republics with Crimean Tatar populations to draft detailed plans to find Crimean Tatars, ask if they desired to return, and then oversee the logistics of return in their perspective republics. For example, the RSFSR Sovmin issued a decree on September 12, 1990, that gave dozens of RSFSR ministries different tasks to complete over the course of the next year, with an emphasis on creating list of

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[54] *Avdet,* No. 1, July 15, 1991. HIA, AMNC, box 47, folder 2, page 1.
[55] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 120, l. 66. Pis'mo Nishanov, Tarazevich, Shishov- Luk'ianovu.. March 28, 1990.
[56] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 209, l.l. 33-35. Postanovlenie ot 11 iiulia 1990 No. 666 "O pervoocherednykh merakh po resheniiu voprosov, sviazannykh s vozvrashcheniem krymskikh tatar v krymskuiu oblast'.

potential returnees and finding funds for their travel.[57] Ministries and republics had to complete the above preparations by January 1, 1991, when the first Crimean Tatars would begin arriving as part of the official return plan.

The Reality of Reform: Failure, Radical Change, and Resentment

The plan was radical. All Crimean Tatars could return and reside in Crimea. Crimean authorities could no longer arrest and deport Crimean Tatars because of passport violations.[58] This reversed decades of Soviet policy that had protected Stalin's ethnic cleansing. However, the plan's radicalism could not ensure total success. At first, Gosplan and Crimean Tatars activists surveyed Crimean Tatars and created cost estimates, but the implementation quickly stalled.[59] The official return plan had three key problems, best categorized as financial, geographic-demographic, and political-ideological, and these failures undermined the enfranchisement of Crimean Tatars after they returned. The death of the Soviet Union in December 1991 killed the Crimean Tatar return plan. Still, the history of the plan's implementation is crucial to understanding the post-Soviet political, ethnic and demographic fissures of Crimea.

The financial failure was indicative of the larger Soviet economic crisis and political fragmentation. As a Ukraine SSR oblast, Ukrainian enterprises were responsible for new home and infrastructure construction. While many Ukrainian politicians supported the spirit of the project on paper, they did not believe that the Ukrainian state

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[57] GARF, f. A-259, op. 49, d. 2479, l. 1. Sovmin RSFSR Postanovlenie ot 12 sentiabria 1990 g. No. 358; GARF, f. A-259, op. 49, d. 2479, l. 2. Meropriiatiia dlia vpolneniia pervoocherednykh mer po resheniiu voprosov, sviazannykh s vozvrashcheniem Krymskikh Tatar na postoiannoe zhitel'stvo v Krymskuiu oblast. September 12, 1990.

[58] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 67, d. 9982, l. 30. Akademii Nauik Ukrainskii SSR Doklad. August 1990.

[59] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 67, d. 9982, l. 58. Soveshchanie Podkomissii Gosudarstvennoi Ekspertnoi Komissii Gosplana SSSR. October 23, 1990.

should pay for the effort because orders from Moscow, and not Kyiv, deported Crimean Tatars.[60] Moreover, the Ukrainian Rada was surprised to learn how many Crimean Tatars actually lived in the Uzbek SSR and that most wanted to return to Crimea immediately.[61] As reports from other republics on Crimean Tatar populations reached Kyiv, the potential cost of the project increased.[62] Kyiv also argued that cleaning up the Chernobyl disaster was still draining the Ukrainian budget. Crimean Tatar activist Refik Muzafarov best summed up the Ukrainian position on funding Crimean Tatars: the government (Ukraine SSR) "wants the bird to sing, but does not want it to eat (*chtoby ptichka pela, no ni ela*)."[63]

The only government entities that funded their part of the return program were the Ukrainian Cultural Fund and Ukrainian Ministry of Culture. They helped establish the "Vatan" (homeland) Crimean Tatar Cultural, Educational and Academic Research Center in Prikorskiiin 1991. As the center's director, professor Muzafarov began work on a Crimean Tatar encyclopedia in Crimean Tatar and Russian.[64] In Bakchisarai, funds helped Crimean Tatars establish the Crimean Tatar Musical-Drama Theater. The first production was of "Fakel nad Krym," the Grigory Aleksandrov poem that chronicled the 1978 self-immolation of Musa Makmut. The Crimean Tatar director, Bilial Bilialov, cast Crimean Tatar actors and actresses to play Crimean police declaring to Musa, "there is no

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[60] GARF, f. A-259, op. 49, d. 2479, l.. 9 Pis'mo "O peredache RSFSR kapital'nykh vlozhenii dlia osushchestvleniia mer, sviazannykh s vozvrashcheniem krymskikh tatar v Krymskuiu oblast'. (Zam. Predsedatelia Sovmin Ukr. SSR A. Statinov- Sovmin RSFSR. August 20, 1990.

[61] Soviet ethnographers estimated that the current population was between 350,000 to 420,000 people. RGAE f. 4372, op. 67, d. 9982, l.l. "Ekspertnoe zakliuchenie po predlozheniiam po rtsional'nomu rasseleniiu Krymskikh Tatar i razvitiiu sotsial'noi sfery Krymskoi oblasti." Zh. A. Zaionchovskaia. 1990.

[62] GARF, f. A-259, op. 49, d. 2479, l.l 5-6. Pis'mo Somvin Ukrainskaia SSR (Zam. Predsedatelia Sovmin Ukr. SSR A. Statinov- Sovmin SSSR. August 29, 1990.

[63] GARF, f. 10121, op. 1, d. 21, l.l. 3-4. Pis'mo Predsedatel' Sovmin Ukr. SSR V. Fokin- Sovmin SSSR. December 17, 1990.

[64] GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l. 47. Pis'mo Direktor Tsentra Professor Refik Muzafarov- Prezidiuma Ver. Sov. RSFSR Vorotnikobu. April 26, 1990.

place for Crimean Tatars in Crimea."[65] Aleksandrov attended the premier on May 16, 1991.[66] Other cultural centers opened in Evpatoria, Starii Krym and other towns, and Crimean Tatar women organized the Crimean League of Tatar Women.[67] In other words, Kyiv provided some funds to Crimean Tatar cultural activities and return, but this was not enough to rebuild the Crimean Tatar nation.

Further debate revealed that no Soviet entity was willing to pay for the project. In August 1990, the Ukrainian Council of Ministers drafted a 10 million-ruble bill for the RSFSR.[68] The RSFSR refused to pay and argued that the Soviet state budget, and not individual republics, should pay for the program because the Soviet government was responsible for the deportation.[69] Next, Kyiv pressed Gosplan to find the money elsewhere, but there is no evidence that the Ukraine SSR ever received funds for the project.[70] With no money for the project forthcoming, the State Committee for Construction (Gosstroi) proposed a radical solution: market forces. To be precise, Gosstroi suggested that Crimean Tatars receive expedited privatization of their homes, apartments, dachas, and private plots in their places of exile. Crimean Tatars should then sell the privatized property and use the capital to purchase land and build homes in

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[65] GARF, f. 10148, op. 1, d. 7, l.l. 1-20. G. Aleksandrov, "Fakel nad Krymom" (Bakhchisarai: Avdet, 1991). Originally written in 1978.
[66] GARF, f. 10148, op. 1, d. 7, l.l. 21-22. Programma "Fakel nad Krymom." Min. Kul'tury Ukr. SSR, Krymskotatarskii Muzykal'no-dramaticheskii Teatr. May 16, 1991.
[67] Center for Civil Society International Collection, box 114, folder 4. HIA.
[68] This bill amounted to transferring the sum from the RSFSR budget to the Ukraine SSR budget. GARF, f. A-259, op. 49, d. 2479, l.l. 10-10ob. Protokol Peredachi kapital'nykh vlozhenii i stroitel'no-montazhnykh rabot na 1991 g. August 1990.
[69] GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l. 47. Pis'mo Direktor Tsentra Professor Refik Muzafarov- Prezidiuma Ver. Sov. RSFSR Vorotnikobu. April 26, 1990.
[70] GARF, f. 10121, op. 1, d. 21, l.l. 3-4. Pis'mo Predsedatel' Sovmin Ukr. SSR V. Fokin- Sovmin SSSR. December 17, 1990.

Crimea. It was a plan that wed Gorbachev's political and economic reforms, but no such reforms occurred before the Soviet Union collapsed.[71]

The general deficits of goods during the late-Gorbachev, especially of building materials, food, and other household items, exacerbated the funding problems. By August 1990, there were not enough building materials to meet the requirements of order 666 even if Ukrainian construction enterprises had received funds.[72] As a result, Crimean Tatars and Crimean officials built only a few officially sanctioned houses before December 1991.[73]

The 1989 Crimean Tatar census by Crimean Tatar activists and Gosplan also revealed the developing disputes over Crimean geography and demography. Even with funds, the task of placing Crimean Tatars into appropriate housing in their desired return locations would have been daunting. Moreover, the parties involved disagreed on where in Crimea the Crimean Tatars were going to live.

As they had done since the 1950s, Crimean authorities claimed that there was not enough land for Crimean Tatars. This was simply not true. In 1988 alone, Crimean authorities distributed over 100,000 plots of land to Slavic settlers and to current Crimean residents to build dachas. At the same time, Crimean enterprises were building new apartments in Feodosiia, Kerch, Simferopol, and Dzhanko. In 1989, as Crimean Tatar return increased, Crimean Tatars received only 4% of the land plots, and most returnees had to squat. One Crimean district party boss summed up the sentiment: "While I am the

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[71] GARF, f. 10121, op. 1, d. 21, l.l. 3-4. Pis'mo Predsedatel' Sovmin Ukr. SSR V. Fokin- Sovmin SSSR. December 17, 1990.

[72] GARF, f. A-259, op. 49, d. 2479, l. 1-1ob. Postanovlenia Sovet Ministrov RSFSR ot 12 sentyabrya 1990 g. No 258, "O meropriyatiyakh po resheniu voprosov, svyazannykh s vozvrashcheniem krymskikh tatar v krymskuu oblst'" and GARF f. A-259, op. 49, d. 2479, l.l. 5-6. Letter from Sov. Min. Ukraine SSSR by Zam. Pred. Sov Min UkSSR A. Statinov to Sov. Min. SSSR. August 29, 1990.

[73] GARF, f. A-259, op. 49, d. 2479, l. 7. Pis'mo Zam Zav. Ekonomicheskim otdelom Sovmin RSFSR V. Sychev- Sovmin RSFSR. August 29, 1990.

owner of Crimea, not one Crimean Tatar is returning here."[74] As Donald Raleigh notes, Soviet housing access often depended on the "class considerations, the whims of local authorities, party membership, an individual's value to the state, and corruption."[75] In Crimea, that "whim" was undermining Crimean Tatar return in spite of order 666.

The geographic and demographic considerations overwhelmed planners and Crimean Tatars. Mass death, special settlement and exile had transformed the economic life of the Crimean Tatar nation from 1944 to 1990, but not changed what Crimean districts they called home. Ukrainian officials had hoped that 70 percent of Crimean Tatars would agree to move to the arid, sparsely populated steppe.[76] However, before the deportation nearly 70 percent of Crimean Tatars (approximately 151,200 people) lived on the Southern Coast of Crimea, while around 30 percent (nearly 64,000 Crimean Tatars) had lived on the steppes.[77] By 1989, the Crimean Tatar population had rebounded to 271,715 people officially, but chronic undercounting means that the actual population was perhaps between 350,000 and 420,000 individuals in the USSR.[78] Not surprisingly, surveys revealed that over 70 percent of Crimean Tatars wanted to return to Crimea's southern coast, either in or near ancestral towns and villages.[79] Moreover, most Crimean

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74 GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l.l. 26-27. Pis'mo Sh. A. Ulanova, R. Ia. Khatyb-Zade, B. G. Gafarov, Z. Seitkhalilov, i D. Ametova- Yeltsinu. September 27, 1990.

75 On the realities of postwar Soviet housing see Raleigh, *Soviet Baby Boomers*, 45-49.

76 Ukraianian Gosplan espoused this idea as a way to save "dying steppe villages" that still suffered from endemic water shortages. RGAE, f. 4372, op. 67, d. 9982, l.l. 79-81. Zakliuchenie Doktor Ekonomicheskii Naiuk V. K. Papisov. October 1990.

77 RGAE, f. 4372, op. 67, d. 9982, l.l. 65-67. Analiz Predlozhenii SOPS Ukr. SSR AN Ukr. SSR (Iu. Osmanov). October 1990.

78 RGAE, f. 1562, op. 68, d. 6128, l. 24. Chislonost' Krymskikh Tatar po territoriam preimushchestvennogo prozhivaniia. 1989.

79 Both Crimean Tatar activists and Gosplan conducted the surveys. Individuals indicated which village their family came from and whether or not they planned to return to that area. RGAE, f. 4372, op. 67, d. 9982, l.l. 65-67. Analiz Predlozhenii SOPS Ukr. SSR AN Ukr. SSR (Iu. Osmanov). October 1990 and GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 209, l. 79. Transcript of "Zasedanie Vtoroe: Ver. Sov. SSSR. Remarks by A. I. Balagura. November 1, 1990.

Tatars of working age were no longer the agriculturalists of the deported generation. As one Academy of Sciences researcher observed, a "paradox" of the situation was that Crimean Tatars were deported as farmers, but returning as an urban population.[80] In sum, several hundred thousand Crimean Tatars were going to return to the cities and towns in the most populous region of the peninsula, and they needed non-agricultural jobs.

Faced with imminent Crimean Tatar return, the Crimean government suggested dispersing the Crimean Tatar population to dilute the political leverage of Crimean Tatars. Acquiescing to the desires of Crimean authorities, the original return plan kept the Crimean Tatar population in any one Crimean district or town to less than 25 percent of the total population. Even in historic Crimean Tatar regions, Slavs (with the majority Russian and minority Ukrainian) would have demographic dominance. For example, in 1939, Crimean Tatars made up 65% of the population in the Bakichisarai district, but the return plan would have the renewed Crimean Tatar population at just 24.6%. In Sudak, where in 1939 Crimean Tatars were 70.5% of the population, the plan called for Crimean Tatars at 16.7%.[81] At the same time, Crimean Tatars knew that their population had rebounded enough to recreate the previous Crimean ASSR demographic proportion Tatars to Russians in a least some districts.[82] Most economists at the Ukrainian Gosplan and Soviet Gosplan agreed and articulated that the forced dispersion of Crimean Tatars was bad policy and a naked attempt by Crimean officials to disenfranchise the returning

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[80] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 67, d. 9982, l.l. 141-144. "Zakliuchenie" Nauchnyi Sodtrudnik Akademii Nauk SSSR P. M. Polian. November 26, 1990.
[81] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 67, d. 9982, l.l. 65-67. Analiz Predlozhenii SOPS Ukr. SSR AN Ukr. SSR (Iu. Osmanov). October 1990.
[82] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 67, d. 9982, l.l. 73-78. Ekspertnoe Zakliuchenie Zh. A. Zaionchovskaia SOPS Ukr. SSR AN Ukr. SSR. October 1990.

minority. As economist V. K. Papisov remarked, "why should they (Crimean Tatars) not have the right to return to the villages of their fathers?"[83]

In this context of diverging opinions between Slavic Crimeans, Crimean Tatars, Kyiv and Moscow, the ideological/political failure of the project became obvious. Activists had studied anti-Tatar historians, books, Crimean tour guides and museum exhibits for decades and had a list of all works that had perpetuated anti-Tatar narratives. Crimean Tatars also turned to the archives, gaining access to transcripts of the Crimean party during the postwar Crimean transformation.[84] They were pleased Moscow denounced Stalin, but demanded that Moscow also condemn all the above anti-Tatar efforts and Crimean leaders such as Kabanov and Tiulieva and academics such as Nadinskii who had key roles in the transformation of Crimea from 1944 to 1954.[85] Activists also complained that *Pravda* and other central press outlets refused to explain the project in detail and that the Crimean Tatars were now politically rehabilitated.[86]

Crimean Tatars had good reason to believe that they would have no real enfranchisement in Crimea without a pro-Tatar agitation campaign to counter decades of anti-Tatar propaganda. They understood that many Crimea officials viewed the condemnation of Stalin's policies as a threat to their position in Crimea and Crimea's prominent place in the Russian nationalist myth. Slavic Crimean residents (the forced

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[83] Papisov proposed a program whereby the head of the household would return to their ancestral village first, find housing or build a house, and then arrange for the full family to return. RGAE, f. 4372, op. 67, d. 9982, l.l. 79-81. Zakliuchenie Doktor Ekonomicheskii Naiuk V. K. Papisov. October 1990.

[84] Bekirova, *Krymskie Tatary*, 73-74.

[85] For example, activist Ali Khamzin found the Crimean party transcripts for the plenum during which Kabanov and Tiuleva declared a "new Russian Crimea" (Новым Крымом со своим русским укладом) after the deportations. GARF, f. A-664, op. 1, d. 176, l.l. 29-32. "Zaiavlenie" Ali Khamzin-Ver. Sov. SSSR, sredstvam massovoi informatsii i chlenam komissii po problwmam krymsko-tatarskogo naselenii. July 31, 1989. For the original transcript see RGASPI f. 17, op. 44, d. 759, l.l. 103, 194-201. November 27-29, 1944 Plenum of the Crimean Obkom.

[86] GARF, f. A-664, op. 1, d. 176, l.l. 19-20. "Zapros NDKT za Leninskoe reshenie natsional'nogo voprosa krymskykh tatar." Ferghana NDKT- Gorbachev, TsK KPSS SSSR i drugie. July 12, 1989.

and volunteer settlers who came after the war) increasingly echoed these concerns and began considering the return plan to be "anti-Russian." Several prominent Soviet ethnographers argued that the return plan would cause an "increase in inter-ethnic conflict and anti-Crimean Tatar feelings."[87] Thus, the Soviet Union faced the dilemma of any liberalizing state attempting to enfranchise a repressed ethnic or social group: how to promote the rights of the minority without offending the majority. The fact that the Soviet Union had created a unique strain of Russian nationalism in Crimea and stressed the importance of Crimea to Russian national identity exacerbated the situation. The "relatively moderate" strain of Russian nationalism that promoted "Russia as the dominant nation within a multiethnic state" was incompatible with the version of Russian nationalism in Crimea that was by definition anti-Tatar.[88]

As such, in the late-1980s Russian nationalism in Crimea combined a politics of resentment and racism with a disdain for Gorbachev's reforms. One handwritten note to Yeltsin explained that Stalin was right to deport Crimean Tatars because they were "terrible people" and "speculators and corruptible" cowards who "fled the Nazis like Jews."[89] Some Crimean officials held demonstrations against Crimean Tatar return and Gorbachev's reforms. One demonstration in Alushta repeated the insult that Tatars "remove their dirty feet" from the town square.[90] Another demonstration organized by the Dzhanskoii City Communist Party in the village of Azovsk descended into chants against Gorbachev (*doloi Gorbacheva*) and against Crimean Tatar "autonomy" in

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[87] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 67, d. 9982, l. 89. "Zakliuchenie" Sergei Viktorovich Cheshko- Zam. Direktora Instituta Etnologii i antropologii Akademii Nauk SSSR. 1990.
[88] Siegelbaum and Moch, "Transnationalism in One Country?," 970-986.
[89] The letter writer, signing as "Shapkov," easily combined anti-Semitism and anti-Tatar feelings into a general distaste for non-Slavs in Crimea. GARF, f. A-664, op. 1, d. 176, l.l. 33, 33ob, 34. Letter to Tov. El'tsin from Shapkov. August 12, 1989.
[90] *Avdet* No. 1, July 15, 1991, AMNC, box 47, folder 2, page 1-2.

Crimea. Allegedly, the Secretary of the Dzhanskoii party even threatened returning Crimean Tatars with violence just as "good as in the Ferghana incidents" (referring to pogroms against Crimean Tatars and other non-Uzbeks in the Uzbek SSR).[91]

Resentment grew over the "special privileges" Crimean Tatars were going to receive in the form of land plots, loans for housing, and bypassing the Crimean waitlist for housing. While most Crimean Tatars never received the above benefits, many non-Tatars believed that even the ability of a Crimean Tatars to arrive and squat in Crimea was "reverse discrimination." After the beginning of glastnost, Crimean authorities had received thousands of letter from Slavic Crimeans complaining about the slow pace of housing construction, and many residents viewed Crimean Tatar return as an event that would worsen the situation.[92] Moreover, some Slavic Crimeans claimed that they were angry about benefits for returnees because Crimean Tatars were "returning to Crimea in new "Volgas" (perhaps referring to some of the Crimean Tatar urbanites from Tashkent). The appearance of Crimean Tatar single mothers with multiple children also disconcerted many Slavic farmers.[93] Finally, since Crimean officials denied Crimean Tatars work, a myth that Crimean Tatars did not work also developed.[94] This popular portrayal of Crimean Tatars getting rich off government benefits took on a similar tone to the myth in

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[91] GARF, f. A-664, op. 1, d. 176, l.l. 62-64. Informatsiia o vstreche predstavitelei NDKT s Pred. Pres. Ver. Sov. Tad. SSR Pallaevym G. P. By D. K. Mustafaev, E. V. Isliamov, and I. R. Belialov. August 18, 1989.

[92] A survey of letters sent to the Crimean Party in 1986 stated that most "critical complaint" was the lack of new housing. See GARF, f. 5446, op. 148, d. 1711, l.l. 1-2. "Spravka" tov. Barashkova N. I. "O rezul'tatakh poezdki v komandirovku v krymskoi oblast' v sostave brigady TsK KPSS." December 30, 1986.

[93] There is no way to tell how many Crimean Tatars returned to Crimea from the Uzbek SSR in new Volgas, but there were certainly some party members who perhaps owned the car. GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 120, l.l. 46-49. "Obrasheniia grazhdan Bakhchisaraiskogo raiona Krymskoi oblasti po voprosu slozhivsheisia napriazhennoi obastanovki v oblasti sviazi s massovym stikhiinym pereseleniem krymskikh tatar"- Gorbachevu. November 20, 1989.

[94] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 120, l.l. Pis'mo "Ot delegatov skhodov grazhdan Krymskoi oblasti"- Luk'ianovu. December 1989.

the United States of "welfare queens" and underrepresented groups using material assistance to accumulate wealth.[95] This was a myth in Crimea and the United States, but was still a powerful rhetorical tool.

By 1989, Crimean officials and the majority of Russians in Crimea detested Stalin's transfer of Crimean to Ukraine, but continued to support his ethnic cleansing. Similar to the "party and state bureaucracies" in many non-Russian republics, local Crimean leaders created a "concentrated opposition" to Gorbachev's policies.[96] In a 1989 interview, the Secretary of the Crimean Obkom, L. Grach, said that, while he was "preparing for Crimean Tatars to return, he still believed in the mass treason charges and that all Crimean Tatars shared the guilt as a collective whole.[97] The head of the Yalta city government, B. P. Chernenko, disagreed with "letting you Crimean Tatars come back here (Yalta)" and would do everything in his power to "remove Crimean Tatars from here (Yalta)." On the farm, town, and city level, Crimean leaders and Slavic Crimeans organized citizens' councils that echoed these beliefs. Some villages and districts created armed "civil defense committees" to stop the "illegal actions" of Crimean Tatars.[98] In Alushta, one such "counter defense" protest including slogans such as "this is our land and the land of our children."[99] Focusing on the material situation, the "Russian Society of Crimea" claimed that Tatar return was worsening their standard of living.[100] Many

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95 On the politics of racial resentment and welfare in the United States, see Sharon Hays, *Flat Broke with Children: Women in the Age of Welfare Reform* (Oxford University Press, 2004).

96 Ronald Suny quoting Martha Brill Olcott in *The Revenge of the Past.* 127.

97 GARF, f. A-664, op. 1, d. 176, l. 68-70. "Komu nuzhna "Politicheskaia Reabilitatsiia""- Rezoliutsiia gorodskogo sobraniia trudiashchikhsia krymsckikh Tatar, g. Namangan- narodnym deputatam SSSR. September 10, 1989.

98 GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 209, l. 87. Transcript of "Zasedanie Vtoroe: Ver. Sov. SSSR. Remarks by G. S. Tarazevich. November 1, 1990.

99 *Avdet* No. 1, July 15, 1991, HIA, AMNC, box 47, folder 2, page 1-2.

100 GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l. 12. Telegram Zhiteli Kryma, chleni krymskogo russkogo obshchestva- Yeltsinu. July 3, 1990.

Crimean Tatars recognized this backlash as a marriage of anti-Tatar and "anti-perestroika" sentiment in Crimea.[101]

Russian nationalists in Crimean also received support from outside of Crimea. In one example, a doctor living in Sweden, V. P. Shuiski, wrote an article for the journal *Chasavoi* that essentially restated the new Crimean narrative argument that Tatars should never return to Crimea because they had always been occupiers of Russian lands.[102] Writing from Baku, one Russian letter writer argued that, with the return program, "Gorbachev was giving Crimea to Tatars."[103] As journalist Anna Reid underlined, even some Muscovites who were "otherwise impeccably democratic," held a militant belief that "Crimea is Russian, Russian!"[104]

To counter the backlash, Crimean Tatar activists argued that Crimean Tatar return to Crimea was not anti-Russian. Iurii Osmanov noted how many Russian nationalists were themselves critiquing the Soviet government because those "who suffered and continue to suffer from Russian rule are often Russians themselves."[105] Moreover, some activists proposed a restoration of the Crimean ASSR inside the RSFSR in which Crimean Tatar autonomy and Russian rights in Crimea had not been mutually exclusive. Crimean Tatars wrote specifically to RSFSR officials declaring that they themselves were former citizens of the Russian republic and sought solidarity with Russians in reversing Stalin's crimes. For example, G. S. Seidalieva, a Crimean Tatar veteran living in the

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[101] GARF, f. A-664, op. 1, d. 176, l. 78. Letter to TsK KPSS Gorbachev and to Sov. Nats. Vorotnikov and Yeltsin from Ruzet Abdullaev and Tulizar Asanova.
[102] Shuiski included 100 Swedish kronas to cover the cost of publishing. GARF, f. 10231,op. 1, d. 39, l.l. 1-1ob. Pis'mo V. P Shuiski v redaktsiiu zhurnala Chasavoi o polozhenii Krymskikh Tatar. October 14, 1987.
[103] GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l. 10. Telegram "ot Lisina v Baku- Yeltsinu. June 30, 1990.
[104] Reid, *Borderland,* 174.
[105] GARF, f. A-664, op. 1, d. 176, l. 56. "Letter from Uirii Bekirovich Osmanov in Ferghana to Gazete "Tatarstan Iash'lare," editor Fliura Nizamova. July 22, 1989.

Uzbek SSR, explained that she was angry that "Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian settlers are living in our homes," but she believed that the deportation of Crimean Tatars and the transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR were all part of the same criminal process. Seidalieva further stated that, "we (Crimean Tatars) lived with Russians side by side in Yalta, Guzufe, Simferopol, Sevastopol, and other parts of Crimea without conflict" and supported the transfer of "our homeland" back to the RSFSR.[106] A large group of Crimean Tatars in Novorossisk (waiting to return to Crimea) told Yeltsin in a letter that "the struggle for Russian sovereignty and the equality of all nations within Russia" had to include Crimean Tatars because "our national territory" will be in the "future sovereign Russia."[107] This was perhaps a naïve hope for Crimean Tatars at the time, but they had little other choice to make this argument.

While never a popular opinion, in the late-1980s some Slavic Crimeans desired common ground between the groups or at least understood that the return project needed a media campaign. For example, one Russian letter-writer from Crimea, Mikhail Iunasheva, argued that returning Crimea to Russia and returning Crimean Tatars to Crimea should be part of the same project addressing all of Stalin's orders in Crimea.[108] Even before order 666, Tsavro pleaded with Moscow to use all "Crimean mass media and the central (Moscow) print press and television channels" to immediately explain "the scope of the problem facing Crimean Tatar return and the realities for non-Tatar Crimean

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[106] GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l. 4ob. Pis'mo ot veteran voiny i truda, byshevo grazhdanina RSFSR, Krymskoi ASSR, Seidalieva- Verh. Sov RSFSR. May 1990.
[107] These words are especially ironic after 2014. GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l. 7. Telegram "Sobranie Uchastnikov NDKT (13 podpisei) v gorod Novorossiisk- El'tsinu. June 13, 1990.
[108] GARF, f. 10007, op. 1, d. 14, l.l. 1-12. Pis'mo Iunasheva, Mikhail Andrevich "O mezhnatsional'nikh otnosheniiakh v krimu." August 5, 1989.

residents.[109] The First Secretary of the Crimean Party, N. V. Bagrov, claimed that "nobody" disputed the right of Crimean Tatars to return and that Stalin's treason charges had been a lie.[110] Perhaps Bagrov believed this, or perhaps he was telling Moscow what it wanted to hear. Regardless, pro-Tatar agitation largely failed.

Given the above failures of the initial plan, Crimean Tatars observed that the resurrection of their rights in Crimea required Moscow to force Crimean authorities to comply.[111] Crimean Tatars wrote directly to Yeltsin seeking changes with the plan. For example, on September 27, 1990, several Crimean Tatars in Moscow and a philosophy professor from Moscow State University explained to Yeltsin that order 666 did not provide enough financial and material resources or guarantee political equality. They argued that the plan was so devoid of reality that it was actually slowing down the return. Without ensuring Crimean Tatars some degree of political power on the peninsula, Crimean authorities remained free to use the police, registration laws, notaries, building codes, and other bureaucratic tools to harass returnees.[112]

In response to the continued disenfranchisement, Crimean Tatars created their own governing body. The Crimean Tatar national assembly, the Kurultaia, established the Crimean Tatar national governing body, the Mejlis, on September 28, 1991. As political scientist Andrew Wilson underlines, the Mejlis was the work of the OKND, with the NKDT arguing that the "formation of the proto-state" would have no real political

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[109] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 120, l.l. 57-59. Pis'mo Iu. S. Tsavro- Zam. Pred. Ver. Sov. SSSR A. I. Luk'ianov. November 24, 1989.
[110] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 209, l. 84. Transcript of "Zasedanie Vtoroe: Ver. Sov. SSSR. Remarks by N. V. Bagrov. November 1, 1990.
[111] "Shovinizm bez maski" in *Avdet* No. 2, August 1 1990, HIA, AMNC, box 47, folder 2.
[112] GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l.l. 26-27. Pis'mo Sh. A. Ulanova, R. Ia. Khatyb-Zade, B. G. Gafarov, Z. Seitkhalilov, i D. Ametova- Yeltsinu. September 27, 1990.

influence.[113] In general, the NKDT was right and the 1991 Crimean referendum was proof that Crimean Tatars had little leverage in Crimean politics. However, the Mejlis became a champion of Crimean Tatar rights, not unlike Western civil rights organizations such as the NAACP and LULAC. The first declaration of the Mejlis supported both the Supreme Soviet declaration restoring the full rights of deported peoples and international declarations of human rights. They sought full enfranchisement and "national sovereignty" in Crimea, but denounced violence and the confiscation of land from Russian settlers, even those who had occupied Crimean Tatar villages.[114] The Mejlis also argued that the influx of skilled labor and specialists in fields such as health, agriculture, and industry would boost the Crimean economy in the long-term.[115] For Crimean Tatar national culture, the Mejlis created a Crimean Tatar flag, a national hymn and declared that the Crimean Tatar language should move from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet.[116]

With the state failing, Crimean Tatars themselves became the coordinators of mass return. They scraped together building materials, occupied vacant land, and built homes. By December 1990, the Ukrainian Sovmin estimated that Crimean Tatars had already built over 1,500 such houses and hundreds more were under construction.[117] Despite growing anti-Tatar sentiment, by October 1, 1990, over 5,500 new Crimean Tatar families had bought homes and 1,700 families had bought apartments from Slavic Crimeans. At least 434 families had signed contracts with construction enterprises to

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[113] Wilson, "Politics in and Around Crimea: A Difficult Homecoming," 281-292.
[114] GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l.l. 107-107ob. Deklaratsiia "O natsional'noi suverenitete krymskotatarskogo naroda." June, 28, 1991.
[115] GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l. 112. "Obrashchenie Kurul'taia Krymskotatarskogo naroga po vsem zhitelim Kryma." June 30, 1991.
[116] GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l. 112a. Postanovlenie Kurul'taia "O natsiaonal'nom flage i natsional'nom gimne Krymskotatarskogo naroda" i Postanovlenie Kurul'taia "O perekhodeis latinskuiu grafiku." June 30, 1991.
[117] GARF, f. 10121, op. 1, d. 21, l.l. 3-4. Pis'mo Predsedatel' Sovmin Ukr. SSR V. Fokin- Sovmin SSSR. December 17, 1990.

build homes on land plots, and around 5,000 Crimean Tatar families were able to legally purchase land plots before the Soviet collapse. This again underlines that disdain for Crimean Tatars was never absolute and some Slavic settlers had decided to return to their old oblasts. Another 1,220 Crimean Tatars had applied for land, but local Crimean Soviets and farm directors undermined this land distribution at every turn. Crimean Tatar activists told Moscow that while some Crimean officials slowly cooperated, other refused. Not surprisingly, Crimean Tatars flocked to locales with the more sympathetic leaders, and this in turn placed a huge burden on the more humane Crimean officials and agitated many of their non-Tatar constituents.[118]

These financial and logistical failures combined with political and ideological shortcomings to create a standoff between Crimean Tatars and other Crimeans who were now mutually suspicious neighbors in a failing state. Soviet authorities understood this conundrum, best summed up by the last order that the Soviet of Nationalities issued concerning Crimean Tatars. The order contained bullet-points highlighting the above problems and urging different republics and ministries to work together and with the media to promote the plan as a progressive step forward for all Crimeans.[119] However, as 1991 began, the last order was more an admission of the Soviet government's failure to finance and support Crimean Tatar return.

A special commission at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was the last Soviet body that attempted to save the plan. The research, surveys, and deliberations of the Ukrainian commission are thoughtful and well-presented. The effort included the

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[118] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 209, l. 70. Transcript of "Zasedanie Vtoroe- Nishanov i Ver. Sov. SSSR. November 1, 1990.

[119] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 209, l.l. 95-96. Postanovlenie Sov. Nats. Ver. Sov. SSSR no. 1771-I "O khode osushchestvleniia pervoocherednykh mer sviazanny s vozvroshcheniem krymskikh tatar v krymskoi oblast." November 1, 1990.

participation of dozens of academics, Crimean Tatar activists including Refik Dzhemilev (the brother of Mustafa Dzhemilev) and Iuri Osmanov, and Crimean officials.[120] Committee members wrote reports that identified the above failures of order 666 and presented reasonable solutions and a timeline over the next several years.[121] Realizing the earlier plan's unrealistic expectation that most Crimean Tatars would settle in steppe areas, the new plan sought the resettlement of Crimean Tatars in their ancestral districts. The plan offered incentives for Crimean Tatars to return only after they had purchased a home, creating a gradual option that would extend to 1998, with a possible extension until 2005.[122] Economists also began studying what state enterprises or potential new private sectors Crimean Tatars could bolster. In short, the effort recognized that the full enfranchisement Crimean Tatars and future Crimean economic and political development should be inseparable.[123] Had the Soviet Union not collapsed, this body would have had the best chance at addressing some of the plan's failures, but such counterfactual speculation was irrelevant to Crimean Tatars by 1992.

Referendum and Crimean Tatar Reaction

Despite the plan's collision with the messy Crimean reality, the political precedent of order 666 was clear. Crimean Tatars could return as a group and Crimean

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[120] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 67, d. 9982, l. 58. Soveshchanie Podkomissii Gosudarstvennoi Ekspertnoi Komissii Gosplana SSSR ot 23 oktiabria 1990g.
[121] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 67, d. 9982, l. 23. "Kalendarnyi Grafik" provedeniia ekspertizy predlozhenii po ratsional'nomu rasseleniiu krymskikh tatar i razvitiiu sotsial'noi sferu krymskoi oblast. October 24, 1990.
[122] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 67, d. 9982, l. 26. Tablitsa 1p Raspredelenie po godam predlagaemogo kolichestva krymskikh tatar, vozvrashchaiushikhsiia v krymskuiu oblast'. August 1990.
[123] To emphasize this effort, the official title of the committee was the "Commission on the Rational Return of Crimean Tatars and the Future Development of Crimean Social Spheres (po ratsional'nomu rasseleniiu krymskikh tatar i razvitiiu sotsial'noi sferu krymskoi oblast)."

authorities could not re-deport them, as had been the case from 1944 to 1989.[124] Before the plan, the repression of Crimean Tatar return was a conspiracy of federal, republic and regional officials. By July 1990, both the Soviet government in Moscow and the Ukrainian government in Kyiv had relented, and the remaining 300,000 Crimean Tatars in exile soon returned.[125] Without the backing of Moscow, Crimean officials no longer had the resources or mandate to re-deport Crimean Tatars, despite their increasing anti-Tatar hysteria. The physical return of Crimean Tatars was extraordinary. By December 1991, the Ukrainian Rada believed that at least 108,000 Crimean Tatars had returned and activists argued that the number was closer to 160,000 and increasing everyday.[126]

Physical Crimean Tatar return to Crimea and political and economic enfranchisement in Crimea were two different projects. Order 666 helped complete the first project, but the Soviet government never had the time, resources or will to make Crimean authorities concede some political power to Crimean Tatars. Decentralization of Soviet power was good for many repressed nations, but it also meant there was no muscle behind the plan's most radical points as the economic and political decentralization of perestroika and glasnost increased the logistical nightmare.[127] The Soviet bureaucracy stalled and what little cooperation that had existed between federal, republic, and regional authorities completely broke down.[128]

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[124] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 209, l. 84. Transcript of "Zasedanie Vtoroe: Ver. Sov. SSSR. Remarks by N. V. Bagrov. November 1, 1990.
[125] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 209, l.l. 64-65. Transcript of "Zasedanie Vtoroe- Nishanov i Ver. Sov. SSSR. November 1, 1990.
[126] GARF, f. 10121, op. 1, d. 21, l.l. 3-4. Pis'mo Predsedatel' Sovmin Ukr. SSR V. Fokin- Sovmin SSSR. December 17, 1990.
[127] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 209, l. 54. Pis'mo Luk'ianov-Nishanovu. October 24, 1990.
[128] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 209, l.l. 74-75. Transcript of "Zasedanie Vtoroe: Ver. Sov. SSSR. Remarks by Tsavro. November 1, 1990.

The desire of the Russian majority to secure their political monopoly produced the January 1991 referendum to recreate the Crimean ASSR. As Ronald Suny argues, people no longer feared the regime in Moscow, and they "now had a means to be heard."[129] With a transfer of Crimea to Russia looking unlikely and the Ukrainian independence movement surging, the hard line-communist and Russian nationalist alliance wanted to maximize local control of Crimea and minimize the political power of returning Crimean Tatars. Co-opting human rights language for themselves, Crimean officials and Russian activists argued that Russians in Crimea were a minority (counting themselves within Ukraine) per the European Convention on the Protection of Minorities.[130]

The process creating the referendum began over the summer of 1990 with Crimean government discussions on the future status of Crimea. The first proposal that Crimean officials considered was designating Crimea an "All-Union Resort" that had a special autonomous status. Under this plan, the Crimean government would investment in new resort construction that would exploit returning Crimean Tatar laborers, simultaneously growing the Crimean tourist industry and finding work and living space for returning Crimean Tatars. However, only the liberal minority of officials (including Tsavro) supported this idea. As deliberations on Crimean autonomy and Ukrainian independence intensified, Nishanov backtracked on his "support" for Crimean Tatar rights in the new Crimean government. In one letter to Crimean authorities, Nishanov

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[129] Suny, *The Soviet Experiment*, 466.

[130] The Council of Europe began working on the framework in 1990. Federation Pamphlet No. 8, The Council of Europe's Framework Convention For the Protection of National Minorities, Directorate General of Human Rights, Council of Europe. www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuideMinorities8en.pdf. Accessed Febuary 15, 2017. On Crimean authorities invoking the framework see GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l.l. 95-96. "Proekt Evropeiskoi Konventsii o zashchite menshinsktve." June 7, 1991.

agreed with Crimean authorities calling for a snap referendum to recreate the Crimean ASSR with no mention of the Crimean Tatar representation that had existed before 1944. The subsequent exchanges on the referendum discussed the fact that, if it had been ratified, the New Union Treaty would have given the new Crimean ASSR the right to exit the Ukraine SSR at a later date, an appealing prospect for Russian nationalists. However, fear of Kyiv or Moscow attempting to force Crimean authorities to share power with Crimean Tatars was the urgent matter. The sooner the referendum occurred, the less Crimean Tatars could participate and protest. Under pressure from Crimea and Nishanov, on November 9, 1990, the presidium of the Rada declared the right of Crimean authorities to call a referendum deciding the "autonomy or special status of Crimea inside the Ukraine SSR."[131]

Crimean Tatar activists argued that they should have a special role in deciding the "administrative ownership" of the new Crimea. They pointed out the irony that Leninist ideas of national self-determination had inspired indigenous national movements across the globe, but the state Lenin founded denied the same right to repressed Soviet nations. Crimean authorities ignored these calls and began preparing for the vote.[132]

The hasty referendum ensured a vote before the majority of Crimean Tatars returned. Crimean Tatar leaders understood this fact, and called an emergency meetings in December and January. At gatherings in the Uzbek SSR and other republics, Crimean Tatars argued that the recreated republic should guarantee them 36% percent of Supreme Soviet SSSR seats in Crimea (as in the Crimean ASSR from 1921 to 1944) and that Crimean Tatars outside of Crimea should be allowed to vote. This was essential to

[131] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 320, l. 5. Pis'mo Nishanov-Gorbachevu. December 8, 1990.
[132] GARF, 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l.l. 62-68. Proekt- Kontseptsiia konstitutsiia krymskoi avtonomnoi SSR. May 1990.

guaranteeing the right of the majority of Soviet Crimean Tatars who could not return before the referendum. Crimean officials objected, saying that having Crimean Tatars outside of Crimea voting in the referendum violated the Soviet constitution.[133] When the vote occurred on January 20, 1991, Slavic Crimeans overwhelmingly voted to recreate the Crimean ASSR without any Crimean Tatar positions in the government or party. Crimean government officials simply declared all the existing oblast authorities to now be positions in the new Crimean ASSR.[134] The "new" government did allow Crimean Tatars seven People's Deputies in the Crimean Supreme Soviet, but this was out of 163 total deputies and far from the pre-war proportions.[135]

After the referendum, the Rada approved the results and recreated the Crimean ASSR on February 12, 1991, making no mention of the previous balance of ethnic-based people's deputies.[136] The Crimean Supreme Soviet convened on March 22, 1991 to formally declare itself the Crimean ASSR and pass a litany of orders giving the new republic more control in local affairs. The Crimean Committee on Deported Peoples protested and sent letters to Gorbachev, Anatolii Luk'ianov (the leader of the Supreme Soviet at the time) and other Moscow officials arguing that two Crimean Tatar deputies

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[133] When Crimean Tatars argued that the Soviet constitution did not ban a republic from seating a member from an outside organization, Crimean officials countered that the wording of the Ukraine SSR constitution forbade citizens from outside Crimea from voting in the referendum or holding office. GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 320, l.l. 33-37. Pis'mo E. Koliushin (Ver. Sov. Krymskoi ASSR). March 26, 1991.

[134] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 320, l. 24. Postanovlenie Ver. Sov. Krymskoi ASSR. March 15, 1991.

[135] Crimean Tatars had seven deputies and Crimean Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks and Germans had a deputy each. Crimean Slavs retained the 158 deputies that had existed in the Crimean Oblast government plus an increase for an additional 28 Sevastopol' deputies. This gave Russian-speaking Crimeans a permanent super majority. In the first version of the Crimean ASSR, there was an informal quota that 36 percent of the deputies be Crimean Tatars, as well as several government positions. Most importantly, from 1921 to 1944, the head of the Crimean government had been Crimean Tatar and the head of the Crimean party had been Russian. See GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 320, l. 27. Postanovlenie Ver. Sov. Krymskoi ASSR "O popolnenii sostava Ver. Sov. Krymskoi ASSR. March 15, 1991 and GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 320, l.l. 33-37. PIs'mo E. Koliushin- Luk'ianovu. March 26, 1991.

[136] The order was Ver. Sov. Ukr. SSR Postanovlenie "O vosstanovlenii krymskoi avtonomoi SSRG." Feburary 12, 1991. GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 320, l.l. 33-37. Pis'mo E. Koliushin (Ver. Sov. Krymskoi ASSR). March 26, 1991.

in exile (F. Sefershaeva from Fergana and V. Ia. Kariagina from the Tajik SSR) should also be included in the new Crimean ASSR Supreme Soviet. Luk'ianov agreed with the Crimean Tatar argument, and sent a memo to Nishanov instructing the multiple committees on Crimean Tatar return as well as Crimean officials to include a provision that guaranteed the 36% representation quota for Crimean Tatars.[137] Nishanov had never respected the Crimean Tatars right to return, and in response to Luk'ianov he essentially argued that significant Crimean Tatar representation in Crimea would be bad for the region, was not constitutionally protected, and would give Tatars disproportional representation per current Crimean demographics.[138] Crimean officials agreed with Nishanov. They claimed that the March 7, 1991 Supreme Soviet order that condemned Stalin's "actions against deported peoples" did not require the restoration of Crimean Tatar political autonomy and representation. Rather, the Crimean Supreme Soviet would "discuss" the matter later.[139]

In other words, Crimean Tatars would have no significant political voice in their homeland. True, Crimean Tatars could now celebrate romanticized versions of pre-Revolutionary Crimean Tatar history such as the life of the Jadid reformer Ismail Gasprinski.[140] Reopened mosques allowed an Islamic revival. In monuments, libraries, museums, and theater productions such as Aleksandrov's play, Crimean Tatars commemorated the nationalist idea, which focused on the creation and execution of resistance and return during the Soviet period. However, the "spoils" of Crimea, farms, resorts, vineyards, orchards, and most land, remained in the hands of non-Tatars.

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[137] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 320, l. 42. Memo, Luk'ianov-Nishanovu. April 13, 1991.
[138] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 320, l.l. 43-46. Pis'mo Nishanov i drugie- Luk'ianovu. April 13, 1991.
[139] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 320, l. 48. Pis'mo Nishanov-Bagrovu. May 8, 1991.
[140] On Gaprinskii (Gasprali) see Edward J. Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii (Gasprali): The Discourse of Modernism and the Russians" in Allworth, 48-70.

The Mejlis had little choice but to attempt to work with the new Crimean ASSR government, but it proved unsuccessful.[141] Crimean leaders loathed the Mejlis, and turned to the Soviet judicial ministry to undermine its legality. The assistant to the Soviet Minister of Justice, N. A. Ostrov, received the assignment to de-legalize the Mejlis. He listed several points in the Soviet and Ukrainian constitutions that claimed any body outside of the Soviet government was illegal. He also took human rights law, and argued that Crimean Tatars could not claim Crimea as their national homeland because the claim violated the rights of Russian residents. Crimean Tatar leaders again called meetings in Crimea as well as local meetings across the Soviet Union to protest the vote. In unison, they demanded that the Gorbachev either void the referendum result or ensure that Crimean Tatars had guaranteed positions in the government that the 1921 Crimean ASSR constitution had created.[142] On June 28, 1991, the Kurltai began a series of requests to the United Nations asking the body to recognize their right to national self-determination.[143] The larger drama of Ukrainian independence loomed and by December 1991 the Crimean government no longer answered to Moscow. With the uncomfortable relationship with Kyiv and Crimean authorities, Ukraine was not willing to advocate for more Crimean Tatar enfranchisement and the geopolitical issues of the Black Sea Fleet and Ukraine's nuclear weapons overshadowed the treatment of Crimean Tatars. By

[141] The body would meet every three months and elect representatives on the village and city level. GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 320, l.l. 53-59. "Polozhenie o Medzhlise Krymskotatarskogo Naroda." May 31, 1991.
[142] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 209, l. 10. Rezoliutsiia Samarkandsoi obliskonferentii po vyboram delegatov na obshchenatsional'nyi kurultai krymskotatarskogo naroda po povodu prevedennogo referenduma v krymu po initsiativa mestnykh vlastei. February 1991.
[143] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 320, l. 62. Kurultai Obrashchenie k OON. June 28, 1991.

1992, the referendum had served to guarantee that the Russian majority had the ability to deny the indigenous population of Crimea any real power in Crimea.[144]

Return without Representation

The longest and most intense protest movement in the Soviet Union achieved the primary goal of returning Crimean Tatars to Crimea. By the mid-1990s, over 260,000 thousand Crimean Tatars had returned to Crimea.[145] The Soviet Union's condemnation of Stalin's Crimean ethnic cleansing and creation of a plan to reverse engineer ethnic cleansing were extraordinary steps for any twentieth century state. Crimea became a strategic region where one nation-state (Ukraine) controlled a region with a majority population (Russians) who considered themselves members of another nation-state (Russia). At the same time, the long-exiled indigenous population continued to return, but remained disenfranchised. This outcome created political ire between Russia, Ukraine and Crimean Tatars and shaped the events of 2014.

However, continued discrimination and disturbing recent developments should not overshadow the fact that Crimean Tatars accomplished what most ethnic and religious minorities that faced such total ethnic cleansing from their homeland will never accomplish. With non-violent resistance, they forced one of history's most repressive states to hear their concerns through both domestic and international pressure. Decades of protest, return attempts and learning to endure and combat discrimination prepared Crimean Tatars to take advantage of real reform after 1986. Gorbachev's reforms were not a forgone conclusion. But if Crimean Tatars had remained docile and resigned to

[144] GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 320, l.l. 33-37. Pis'mo E. Koliushin (Ver. Sov. Krymskoi ASSR). March 26, 1991.
[145] Wilson, "Politics in and Around Crimea," 312.

total assimilation in exile for several decades, it is difficult to see how such a massive return movement could have taken place before Crimean authorities had time to devise a robust deterrent to Crimean Tatar return.

Conclusion

On January 21, 2016, Crimean General Prosecutor Natalia Poklonskaia issued an arrest warrant for Mustafa Dzhemilev for resisting the 2014 Russian occupation of Crimea. Crimean authorities will never prosecute Dzhemilev because they already banned him from the Russian Federation and he now lives on the Ukrainian mainland. The warrant was symbolic. Poklonskaia has become a hero of Russian hegemony in Crimea and Dzhemilev is the icon of Crimean Tatar resistance to Moscow.[1] Russia now uses symbolism and force to assert their control of the peninsula. However, the arrest warrant also is an indirect compliment to the legacy of Crimean Tatar activism. The new Crimean government understands that Crimean Tatars have proven themselves capable of resisting ethnic cleansing and decades of ethnic discrimination. Dzhemilev embodies Crimean Tatar perseverance and the ultimate failure to eliminate the Crimean Tatar nation. From Stalin and Kabanov in the 1940s to Poklonskaia in 2016, authorities in Moscow and Crimea view Crimean Tatars as a threat to cultural aspirations, Russian national myths, and security.

As this study demonstrates, this antagonistic dynamic is the direct result of Crimean Tatars resisting Stalin's ethnic cleansing. Crimea was where the Soviet Union's geopolitical concerns, ideological foundation, ethnic diversity, Second World War victory, and postwar transformation collided. Stalin's ethnic cleansing in Crimea was the pinnacle of his project to "weed out" peripheral nationalities across the Soviet Union. He believed that creating ethnically homogenous Crimea would make this vital

[1] "Leader Mustafa Dzhemilev on Federal Wanted List," *The Moscow Times*, January 21, 2016.

"assemblage point" of the Soviet empire easier to manage. Few other empires ever attempted such a radical transformation of a peripheral region in such a quick manner and no other Soviet region was the subject of more orders from Moscow. Crimean Tatars were the primary target of this policy because they were (and are) the region's largest indigenous people.

World War II was an opportune moment for ethnic cleansing because the impending victory legitimized Stalin's rule.[2] Despite this greater level of control and legitimacy, Stalin still lied to excuse the inexcusable treatment of targeted ethnic groups. Because of Marxism-Leninism, Stalin would not explain his ethnic cleansing policies in chauvinistic, strategic, or imperialistic terms. Instead, any targeted group or individual became a traitor to Stalin and the state. Crimean Tatars and other peripheral ethnic groups became ritualized sacrifices to a wartime leader who was equal-parts paranoid, ruthless, popular, victorious, and above all, obsessed with restoring and expanding the Soviet empire.

As this study has stressed, Soviet archives can illuminate how and why Soviet officials lied, and how these falsehoods became part of the larger narratives of Crimean and Soviet history. Stalin's claim that the deportation was the result of Crimean Tatar collaboration was patently false. Crimean Tatar service in the Soviet armed forces was extensive and became a defining experience for the nation, despite the treason charges. NKVD, party, and government documents and first-hand accounts reveal that Stalin's police knew that the Crimean Tatars they deported were not collaborators. How Ilia Vergasov lied about the wartime service of Iurii Osmanov is one example of how Crimean historians and tourism writers created evidence for the treason charges. While

[2] Oleg Khlevniuk, *Stalin: Zhizn' Oodnogo Vozhdia* (Moscow: AKT-CORPUS, 2015), 450.

lacking show-trials, the state media's condemnation of the Crimean Tatar nation for treason became a public spectacle that many Soviet citizens, especially residents of, and visitors to Crimea witnessed. The project of exaggerating collaboration numbers, and concealing Crimean Tatar service in the war, lasted a decade, and most Crimean authorities continued the charade for the rest of Soviet history.

This study should help eliminate any lingering doubts about how cruel the Soviet system was under Stalin. The actual deportation of all Crimean minorities in May and June 1944 was an extreme example of Moscow's control. In particular, the NKVD knew how Crimean Tatars would die because they had extensive experience in facilitating mass starvation, disease, and exposure. With this knowledge, Stalin and the Soviet state proceeded with the bureaucratic genocide of Crimean Tatars. This atrocity differentiated itself from the "Terror" in executioners and methods. During the terror and wartime policing, the NKVD usually shot people. While they did shoot some Crimean Tatars in May 1944, the NKVD's main task was delivering deportees to special settler divisions of the NKVD and MVD. Once in special settlement, the NKVD and MVD observed, and sometimes encouraged, the bloodless brutality.

Stalin's police made the bureaucratic genocide possible, but the main purveyors of mass death from 1944 to 1946 were Stalin's commanders, local officials, food and supply ministries, and farm and enterprise directors. This was a "frightful slaughter," but climate, heat, cold, viruses, and physical deterioration, not guns, killed.[3] The state bureaucracy made decisions on food supplies, housing, land distribution, slave labor,

[3] A "frightful slaughter" was Robert Conquest's first characterization of the "Great Terror." While academics can argue about the accuracy of Conquest's work with the opening of the archives, this original description of Stalin's purges remains justified. See Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: Stalin's Purges of the Thirties* (London: Macmillan, 1969), xiii.

medicine, dry goods, and other essentials. They often lied about supplies and clashed with the NKVD and each other, killing Crimean Tatars with starvation and isolation from shelter and medical assistance. Kabanov participated by confiscating food and livestock and then concealing the totals. He and other authorities in Crimea and the Uzbek SSR never followed the instructions of the voucher and reimbursement plan for food, fowl, and livestock. The Uzbek NKVD lied about death and illness as much as possible, but erred on the side of honesty when disease threatened to spread outside of special settlement regions. Chernyshov and Beria reported on deteriorating conditions and demanded food and supplies. The various food and supplies ministries and Molotov ensured that their pleas were inconsequential. Crimean Tatar first-hand accounts, special settler labor statistics and research by Soviet academics during the Gorbachev-era confirm the obvious, that at least 40,000 Crimean Tatars perished from May 1944 to 1946.

In bureaucratic genocide, Stalin and his circle could always blame the bureaucrats, rogue NKVD officers, farm managers, and the geographic and organizational distances between their orders and the apparatchiks who implemented their policy. However, this study exposes the extensive paper trail of this effort and reveals that all Soviet officials, from Stalin to a beet farm director, understood that mass deportations to remote and arid regions caused mass death. In a sense, the Soviet state was efficient at killing its citizens with inefficiency, and understood and embraced this tool. This was not total annihilation because Stalin's crime against ethnic minorities lacked the ideological immediacy of Nazism. The ideology came after mass death. In the end, the bureaucratic genocide's outcome resembled the expulsion period of the

Armenian and Circassian genocides, the U.S. ethnic cleansing of indigenous peoples, and countless other forced migrations.

After the deportation, Stalin folded ethnic cleansing into the general rebuilding effort in Crimea. Exemplifying Soviet waste, the deportation hobbled a Crimean recovery that had already begun with the participation of Crimean Tatars. Stalin's commitment to transforming Crimea, not the logistics of a plan, determined success. At Stalin's behest, Kabanov and Gosplan reordered Crimean land distribution, remaining homes, water resources and other remnants of the Crimean ASSR. They renamed districts and 1,066 Crimean Tatar villages in just one order. The post-deportation land rush attracted hundreds of farms, enterprises, ministries, and other Soviet organizations attempting to claim their share of the shattered peninsula. Surviving Crimeans were often searching for a roof over their heads, while farms and Sevastopol military instillations were seeking farmland, orchards, vineyards, and water and grazing rights. Ministries, the party, and Komsomol sought to retain and later expand their sanatoriums.

All Crimean officials and most Moscow ministries understood how the deportation further devastated Crimea. To combat Crimean depopulation, Stalin ordered the rushed and often forced relocation of tens of thousands of Slavic settlers to Crimea. This effort was key in making the new Crimean society and economy function. These settlers faced many of the same hardships as special settlers, but because their survival was essential to Stalin's project, the food ministries actually supplied some food. When conditions did deteriorate, Moscow allowed settlers to save themselves by leaving Crimea. This was a key difference with forced migration that ended with bureaucratic genocide. As a final push to ensure Crimean growth, Stalin reasoned that the transfer of

Crimean water and electrical infrastructure to Ukrainian enterprises made sense in logistical and geographic terms. He began this shift in 1947, and Khrushchev completed the "transfer" in 1954. The state celebrated the transfer as Ukraine safeguarding a region that was now Russian in content. For Crimean Tatars, this transfer was a distraction that often stole attention from their grievances, and the costs of the transfer for regional stability are still apparent today.

As the demographic and economic situation in Crimea stabilized, Stalin ordered Crimean officials to create an ideology to justify and safeguard the Crimean transformation. In response, Crimean academics wrote the new Crimean narrative, an anti-Tatar branch of Russian nationalism for Crimea. This narrative denounced the Crimean Tatar national nation, from its origins with the Golden Horde to the legacy of veterans and partisans during World War II. This ideology revived imperialistic sentiment towards the region and allowed Crimean officials and relocated farmers to grapple with the total ethnic cleaning of an autonomous Soviet republic on the heals of defeating Hitler. As chapter four argues, Moscow allowed Crimean academics leeway in writing the narrative, but attempted to encase the nationalist story in strange Marxist-Leninist terms. It was liberation politics for Russians on the periphery, many of whom Soviet authorities has also forced from their homes. They had a mission to help free this hearth of the Russian nation from the taint of Tatars and Nazis.

Crimean tour guides, excursion writers, historians, and museum directors expanded and popularized this narrative in the postwar period. As this study has underlined, Soviet officials were conscious that their work was erasing Crimean Tatar history. Some such as the Museum director Kustova had moral qualms and questioned

the wisdom of manipulating history. The Glavlit censor Zotiev questioned the compatibility of the new Crimean narrative with Soviet nationalities policy and Marxism-Leninism. Others such as Kirillov and Nadinskii hid any objections and embraced their job rewriting Crimean history. Regardless of commitment and personal beliefs, all the above figures and a host of others created a new Russian Crimea. By the 1960s, Crimean Tatars understood the significance of this transformation. Crimean Tatars and Slavic Crimean officials alike admitted that the exiled nation would not receive a warm welcome because of this economic, demographic and ideological transformation.

The ethnic cleansing and bureaucratic genocide of Crimean Tatars was catastrophic, but many Crimean Tatars survived and rebuilt their lives in exile The peripheral nature of Crimean Tatar survival was crucial. Stalin let the bureaucracy "implement" policy, and then placed the fractured survivors into positions where their former national or social identities should no longer matter. Crimean Tatars survived by remaining in or rejoining the very state that had just committed the atrocity. Crimean Tatar party members, veterans, and a newly educated young people replenished economic and party leadership jobs. In the regions of exile, many factories and farms depended on special settler labor. Some enterprises treated special settlers as slaves, others chronically underpaid them, and a few provided reasonable conditions. After special settlement ended, most Crimean Tatars found jobs and homes. It was contradictory and often confusing to have "traitors" running a Tashkent enterprise or voting in Supreme Soviet elections, but the Soviet Union commonly operated with such glaring contradictions from 1917 to 1991. This was Soviet domestic realpolitik.

Crimean Tatar participation in the state was not an acceptance of Stalin's crime or lies. It was an effective survival mechanism for both Crimean Tatar individuals and the Crimean Tatar nation. Crimean Tatars could have maintained an identity in exile had they not interacted with the state. However, during the "Thaw," Crimean Tatar activists decided that self-isolation was not an option. They began a campaign to encourage the mass participation of all Crimean Tatars in arguments with the Soviet state over their rights as both individuals and a national collective. This decision meant that national memory and identity would not be based on pre-revolutionary history and the "Surgun" alone, but combined with the active participation in resisting ethnic cleansing.

In *Soviet Baby Boomers*, Raleigh underlines that a majority of Soviet baby boomers from Moscow and Saratov who joined the Komsomol and Communist Party did not participate in "nationalist or dissident movements." Most boomers were cynical about Soviet ideology, read samizdat, and joined the party because of family obligations and for social mobility purposes, but they had no interest in challenging or changing the Soviet system.[4] This was not the case with Crimean Tatars. Some (although not all) Crimean Tatars believed that party membership and activism were not mutually exclusive. They knew that their position in the Soviet system enhanced their chances of gaining Moscow's attention and initiating new reforms. They were not excusing the Soviet crimes, but they accepted Leninist self-determination as important for their argument to return to Crimea. Rather than wallowing in cynicism over the Soviet failure to create an equal "brotherhood of nations," they viewed this Soviet shortcoming as a rhetorical tool to challenge the state and communicate with transnational human rights networks. In other words, Soviet citizens' relationship with Soviet state and ideology

[4] Raleigh, *Soviet Baby Boomers*, 359.

was not uniform across the Soviet Union. Ethnicity, location, and Stalin's legacy mattered in how individuals and groups understood the purpose and function of Komsomol and party membership, and the obligations that the state had to its citizens.

By engaging both state and dissident actors and beliefs, the Crimean Tatar movement to return to Crimea became the longest, largest, and most organized protest movement in the Soviet Union. The trauma of deportation, mass death, survival, and the frustration of remaining exiled from Crimea after 1956 united this devastated nation, giving them a common purpose. It gained massive public support among Crimean Tatars. The older leaders such as Selimov, with positions in the party and the authority of their veteran status, organized the first letter writing campaigns with younger students and Komsomol members such as Dzhemilev. Crimean Tatars pioneered the use of mass petitions, letter writing campaigns, and postwar protest in the Soviet Union. Activists overwhelmed Moscow governmental and party offices with mail. Protesters in the Uzbek SSR, Moscow, and Crimea learned how to react to initial arrests with snowballing demonstrations that forced Soviet authorities into awkward defenses of their actions. Activists in Moscow and elsewhere put hundreds of officials on record, asking what they thought about Stalin's charges, the deportation, and continuing repressions against Crimean Tatars. Most significant of all, for four decades, the Crimean Tatar protest movement sustained popularity among its main constituents.

These efforts uncovered Moscow's confusion over policy and disagreements about the future of Crimean Tatars and Crimea. Moreover, Crimean Tatars' interaction with the state proved that many Soviet officials understood the absurdity of mass treason charges, especially on an individual level. From Chernyshev to Skliarov, Soviet police

officials and government bureaucrats recognized and sometimes even acquiesced to the pleas and demands of Crimean Tatars and their protests. As a result, after Stalin's death the Soviet Union sustained Crimean ethnic cleansing with a combination of repression and policy adjustments. As Oleg Khlevniuk argues, the Soviet system was "modified" after Stalin's death. "Modifications" included, less dictatorial rule, "social political activation, attempted economic reforms, and increased openness to the world."[5] In the words of Raleigh, for many Soviet citizens this was "decades of peaceful, evolutionary change" that was bolstered by normalized living conditions and an extensive welfare state.[6] This study demonstrates how each of these "modifications" affected Crimean Tatars and Soviet domestic policy. De-Stalinization and the "Thaw," no matter how imperfect, allowed Soviet officials to experiment with governance. Policy makers such as Georgadze, Andropov, and Skliarov met with Crimean Tatars and local officials and identified the main problems with Crimean policies. They proposed reforms and mulled new repressions. The overall strategy was similar to how other global powers dealt with unrest and protest in the 1960s and 1970s. They hoped to stabilize the situation and dampen enthusiasm for protests.

The ultimate example of this strategy was the September 5, 1967 decree that gave individual Crimean Tatars the right to return to Crimea. Moscow never intended for all Crimean Tatars to return to Crimea, but the document was an important domestic and international message that, at least officially, Soviet officials could not discriminate against an ethnic group. To prevent a mass return, Moscow relied on Crimean authorities to repress and harass Crimean Tatars. Crimean Tatars understood this dynamic, and they

[5] Khlevniuk, *Stalin*, 451.
[6] Raleigh, *Soviet Baby Boomers*, 360-361.

denounced Moscow's half-measures and thousands of Crimean Tatars called Moscow's bluff and returned.

As Crimean Tatars returned in the late-1960s and 1970s, Crimean authorities became specialists in using internal passport and registration laws, notary laws, sanitation codes, and other legal routes to deny Crimean Tatars housing, land, jobs and education in Crimea. In other words, Crimean officials learned that denying access to the Soviet welfare state was the most effective tool for ethnic discrimination. In both legal and extralegal manners, Crimean police often deported Crimean Tatars for violating one of the above legal codes.

In the face of another wave of mass return in the late-1970s, this arrangement was no longer enough. Moscow reacted by ordering the KGB, Soviet prosecutors, and Crimean prosecutors to begin a new wave of repression and deportation to punish Crimean Tatars and anyone who assisted their return. This was not a new wave of ethnic cleansing and did not target all Crimean Tatars, but was a intended to stop further return once the Crimean Tatar population had reached around 10,000 people in Crimea. Police and prosecutors also target ethnic Slavs who assisted returning Crimean Tatars by selling or renting homes.

Throughout the post-Stalin period, Crimean Tatar resistance attracted Russian dissidents who found little in the way of popular support in Russia proper. Although isolated in Soviet society to a small minority population, the Crimean Tatar movement and the crises it caused over the course of four decades showed Soviet bureaucracy at its most confounding and confounded. It revealed how in corners of the Soviet Union the Leninist and the Bolshevik legacy was open for never-ending debate. Leninism meant

different things to different people, and Soviet nationalities policy helped create this situation. On both the domestic and international stage, Crimean Tatar agitation and collaboration with Soviet dissidents and transnational human rights networks created a permanent headache for the Soviet state. Crimean Tatars also intrigued Western "Cold Warriors" who were keen to highlight Soviet hypocrisy during the Cold War.

Crimean Tatars were organized and prepared for another round of protest and return when Gorbachev began glasnost and perestroika. Gorbachev first hesitated at allowing Crimean Tatar return, perhaps for the same geopolitical logic that led to the deportations. However, Crimean Tatars protested and tens of thousands returned on their own from 1987 to 1990. Finally, in 1990 Gorbachev signed Supreme Soviet order 666, a lengthy plan to reverse-engineer Crimean ethnic cleansing. The substantial research and planning for Crimean Tatar return by Crimean Tatar and Gosplan economists highlighted the urbanization and industrialization of the Crimean Tatar nation in exile. Order 666 succeeded in at least one aspect. The Kremlin ordered the KGB and Soviet police state to relent in the case of Crimea, robbing Crimean authorities of support battling Crimean Tatar return. Without the entirety of Soviet law enforcement buttressing Crimean ethnic discrimination and deportations, Crimean authorities could not stop more than 200,000 Crimean Tatars returning from 1990 to 1993.

Crimean Tatar activists and Gosplan also identified the key reasons why the plan would likely fail to give Crimean Tatars political and economic enfranchisement in Crimea. In general, Crimean authorities revolted against the radical ideas of distributing land, political positions, and material and monetary benefits to Crimean Tatars. Crimean officials did not want to discuss land redistribution, renamed and vanished villages, and

political and economic enfranchisement for the returned nation. The romantic goal of returning home collided with the reality of Stalin's Crimean transformation, and Crimean Tatar leaders struggle to define their role in a republic that was hostile to their return. As the Soviet police state and bureaucracy disengaged from Crimea, there was no enforcement mechanism to implement order 666 and the plan failed to economically and politically rehabilitate the nation.

While Crimean authorities lost the ability to conduct mass deportations, they had identified the various tools of ethnic discrimination and these mechanisms remained. Crimean police continued to operate many of the repressive tools such as residency registration. By the 1980s, the hatred of Crimean officials towards Crimean Tatars transitioned from the Stalinist "enemy" of the state narrative of treasonous collaboration to an increasing focus on ethnic characteristics and stereotypes. Although not all Slavic Crimeans shared this view, the conservative Russian communists attacked any accommodations to Crimean Tatars and dominated the political discourse. They pioneered a reactionary version of the modern "Russian World (*Russkii Mir*)" concept that encourages Russians stuck within the former Soviet Empire to promote Russian culture and political influence.[7] But the Crimean room of the Soviet communal apartment was very different from other Soviet republics in the Baltics and Central Asia

[7] As Marlene Laurelle argues, the concept has three different branches that include a geopolitical/soft power use for the former Soviet space, the maintenance of Russian national identity and pride among diaspora communities, and a "public relations project and a messianic project." Each of these element appeared in Crimea among Russian leaders well before intellects such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Dimitri Rozogin and in the "anti-Yeltsin" politics of Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party and Gennady Zuganov's "Communist" Party. Solzhenitsyn in particular told budding Russian nationalists to "forget about" the South Caucasus and Central Asia as part of the "Russian World," but no "anti-Yeltsin" party was willing to concede Crimea to either permanent Ukrainian control or greater power sharing with Crimean Tatars. Putin understood this dynamic, and it has informed his message to Slavic Crimeans from 2013 to the present: see Marlene Laurelle, *The Russian World: Russia's Soft Power and Geopolitical Imagination* (Washington DC: Center on Global Interests, 2015), 4-8, 24.

because Russians and Russian speakers controlled the government and economy. As a result, they held a "popular" referendum to mandate their power in Crimea and exclude Crimean Tatars from meaningful power-sharing during the Soviet crisis and then in post-Soviet Crimea.

Many scholars characterized the January 20, 1991 referendum to reestablish the Crimean ASSR solely as a reaction to Ukrainian nationalism. By doing so, they often miss the vote's immediate goal.[8] The referendum created an anti-Tatar and chauvinistic bulwark in response to Crimean Tatar return. During the referendum process, Crimean officials denounced the Mejlis and any form of Crimean Tatar self-governance or participation because it threatened the status quo. After the vote, Crimean oblast government and political institutions simply became the new republic's structure. By rejecting the precedent of the 1921 to 1944 Crimean ASSR structure of ethnic diversity in governance, Crimean authorities assured that during the coming privatization of Soviet infrastructure that Crimean Tatars would have little to claim. After Ukrainian independence, Kyiv failed to assert much influence over the Russian majority. Its preferred candidates lost in Crimean presidential and council elections, leading to near constant tension between Kyiv, Russophile Crimeans, and Moscow. Crimean Tatars, with only a small number of Crimean Council seats, often quarreled as the unity of the return movement yielded to inevitable divisions over policy and participation in Crimea. Overall, Crimean Tatars tended to side with pro-Kyiv forces in Crimea because of the simple fact that that much of the Russian majority remained hostile to their presence and

[8] Andrew Wilson has been an important exception. Wilson, "Politics in and around Crimea," 291-292.

political demands.[9] This dynamic only further complicated the Crimean Tatar position after Russia's March 2014 occupation of Crimea.

Scholars commonly focus on the contradictions in Soviet ideology and economics as the reason the state collapsed. This study examined the specific contradictions of Soviet Crimea and Crimean Tatar policy versus Soviet nationalities policies, Leninist self-determination policy, territorial demarcations, economic problems and other topics. The Crimean case, while certainly not a driver in the ultimate Soviet collapse, is an important indicator that these contradictions did have long-term consequences. Stalin's plan to homogenize and "secure" multiple assemblage points of the Soviet empire, while drastically changing demographics and the landscape, never solved the problems of imperial control of the periphery. It left a legacy of death and displacement and harmed economic development. As this study argues, Crimea was an extreme example of this policy and, in the long term, Stalin's methods failed to end questions of ethnic and state control over the peninsula. The protest and crises from the 1960s to 1991 give specific examples of the Soviet inability to provide concrete and sustainable policy solutions to complicated questions on nationality, human rights, economics and the many consequences of inter-Soviet migration. For Crimean Tatars, the legacy of these contradictions is the remaining political and economic disenfranchisement, but also a proud tradition of national resistance.

Perhaps most importantly, as younger scholars of the Soviet Union in academia turn their focus to the postwar era, historians must research the similar crimes Stalin committed during World War II. As "Resisting Ethnic Cleansing" has displayed, this

[9] On the fragmentation of Crimean Tatar unity in the Mejlis and Kulturai assemblies and policies see Wilson, "Politics in and around Crimea," 292-313.

must begin with examining each individual nation's memories and experiences of the period and comparing and contrasting that evidence with the actions and documents of the Soviet state. This combination of extensive archival research mixed with examples of resistance and resilience reveals the antagonistic relationship between the elites and some Soviet ethnic minorities. By doing so, we can begin to draw larger conclusions about the nature of Soviet nationalities politics and ethnic discrimination from 1945 to 1991.

The Future of Crimea

As Crimean native and scholar Constantine Pleshakov argues, there is a post-Soviet "fetish" over the status of Crimea. To a large degree, this study supports Pleshakov's point that, being the Crimean Tatar homeland, neither Moscow nor Kyiv should have the right to transfer or annex Crimea as occurred in 1954 and 2014. At the same time, Pleshavkov and other scholars and pundits focus on NATO versus Soviet (and now Russian) foreign policy when debating the current crisis over Crimean control. This focus on great power politics has transcended the Soviet Union's collapse and the West's premature and immature Cold War triumphalism in the 1990s.[10] However justified, this focus obscures a discussion of Crimean populism.

Putin's March 2014 referendum reactivated anti-Tatar sentiment and made it visceral because, unlike in 1991, Crimea actually could "return" to Russia. Any Crimean Tatar objecting to the nature of the referendum or occupation had to keep quiet or face the consequences. Afterwards, the world's attention turned to the war in the Donbas.

[10] Constantine Pleshakov, *The Crimean Nexus: Putin's War and the Clash of Civilizations* (Yale University Press, 2017), 22-35, 93

Soon, even when Crimea and Crimean Tatars entered the public debate, it was usually about their place in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

Many in the West and Russia find solace in the idea that, even if Putin was wrong to annex Crimea in a forceful manner, Crimeans were just expressing themselves in 1991 and 2014. Some have even supported a populist and democratic interpretation of both referendums. Neither Moscow nor Kiev knows best, the narrative goes, so let Crimeans decide. In this, Judy Brown and other scholars find an independent and laudable Crimean identity. Besides, as Brown explains, there is no satisfactory answer to how or if Crimean Tatars or other Crimean minorities could claim national rights in Crimea.[11] This is odd and disturbing, on par with supporting racist voter laws in the United States because the dominant party has a popular mandate. Moreover, much of this discussion focuses on Sevastopol, rarely acknowledging that, until the ethnic cleansing, Moscow viewed policy, culture, and ethnicity in Sevastopol and the rest of the peninsula in very different terms.[12] As this study has underlined, the period of ethnic cleansing and Crimean Tatar resistance carries immense political, economic, and ideological baggage, and was essential in developing the postwar "Crimean identity." The 1991 referendum may have been popular, but had the clear goal of solidifying control over the Crimean government, economy and territory for Crimean leaders and elites. Crimean leaders privatized the Crimean communal apartment, and the referendum ensured continuing discrimination against Crimean Tatar power-sharing in the new Crimean ASSR.

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[11] Vladimir Koriagin, "Krym utratil svoi imperskii kontekst," *gazeta.ru,* March 31, 2014. Available at https://www.gazeta.ru/science/2014/03/31_a_5969497.shtml. Accessed on June 11, 2017.

[12] In fact, Sevastopol affirmed its separate, Russian identity, when the Crimean parliament declared it to be a "Russian city" in 1994. Not surprisingly, the Crimean parliament never declared any villages, towns or regions to be Crimean Tatar: see Doris Wydra, "The Crimean Conundrum: The Tug of War Between Russia and Ukraine on the Questions of Autonomy and Self-Determination, *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* (Vol. 10, No. 2 2003), 111-130 (here 118).

The populist and pro-Russian message of Putin's 2014 referendum campaign in Crimea, like so much of the xenophobic and anti-Western, anti-globalist wave, has some roots in economic displacement. In particular, Ukraine's descent into corrupt and cutthroat capitalism in the 1990s gave many Crimeans numerous economic grievances. However, Putin's most powerful tool was embracing nostalgia for Soviet Crimea. The anti-Tatar, new Crimean narrative, or the steadfast belief that Crimea was Slavic, and particularly Russian, enjoyed a renewal. Putin deployed this narrative to secure support and make historical justifications for his actions in Crimea. He supported a reactionary, Russian nationalist government that unleashed a new wave of repression against Crimean Tatars. As "Little Green Men" secured urban infrastructure and Ukrainian military bases, masked men harassed Crimean Tatars activists and kidnapped and killed several Crimean Tatars. Crimean officials shuttered Crimean Tatar cultural sites and most importantly, Crimean Tatar television.[13] Putin did not have to directly order any such actions because the anti-Tatar sentiment was already in place. He officially welcomed Crimean Tatars as a public façade, but the reality on the ground is very different.[14]

That remains the hard truth in Crimea. A popular mandate does not make discrimination and disenfranchisement less real. The new Crimean administration may embrace a "Russian nationalist identity" that is genuinely and proudly non-Western. This identity certainly has an independent streak that eschews Moscow at times. However, a strain of Russian nationalism that has its roots in anti-Tatar agitation and ethnic cleansing

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[13] Vladimir Ryzhkov, "Russia's treatment of Crimean Tatars echoes mistakes made by the Soviets," *The Guardian* (online), November 25, 2014. Available online at https://www.theguardian.com /world/2014/ nov/25/-sp-russia-crimean-tatars-soviet-ukraine. Accessed on June 15, 2017.

[14] Vladimir Putin, "Address by President of the Russian Federation," *Kremlin.ru*, March 18, 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603.

dominates this identity. As Vladimir Ryzhkov argues, the Crimean Tatar situation is "the gravest ethnic and political conflict in Russia today."[15]

Crimean Tatars have proven that brutality against even a small nation can have long-term consequences for a large empire. Geopolitical arguments and the nefariousness of Putin or NATO or Ukrainian nationalism will continue to dominate headlines. However, if this study is any indication, it is likely that Crimean Tatars will continue to challenge Moscow. Perhaps not for control of the peninsula, but, similar to their resistance in the Soviet Union, with a focus on demanding Moscow and Crimean authorities respect Crimean Tatar national, political and economic participation in their homeland. The geopolitical importance of Crimea only makes each move more consequential for both foreign relations and the current domestic political realities in Russia and Ukraine. In the end, all parties involved know that Crimean Tatars have always resisted Moscow's plans for Crimea and underlined contradictions in policy and ideology.

[15] Ryzhkov, "Russia's treatment of Crimean Tatars."

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